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PREFACE 
The Committee on Natura l  D i s a s t e r s  of  t h e  Na t iona l  Research Counci l  
a r r anges  f o r  t h e  t imely  documentation of n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  
on man. Information on any f a i l u r e s  of s t r u c t u r e s  o r  systems and ana lyses  of 
t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  important: i n  advancing ou r  a b i l i t y  to  withstand 
n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r s  i n  t h e  fu tu re .  The s torms and f l o o d s  of  1978 and 1980 i n  
southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona have been chosen by t h e  Committee as d i s a s t e r s  
t o  be documented. 
The Committee joined wi th  t h e  Environmental Q u a l i t y  Laboratory of t h e  
C a l i f o r n i a  I n s t i t u t e  of Technology i n  sponsoring a symposium he ld  a t  Pasadena, 
C a l i f o r n i a ,  on September 17-18, 1980. Th i s  symposium provided an oppor tuni ty  
f o r  300 people i n t e r e s t e d  i n  storms and f lood  c o n t r o l  systems t o  exchange 
views on t h e  even t s  of 1978 and 1980 and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on f u t u r e  f lood  hazard 
m i t i g a t i o n  p o l i c i e s .  
The program committee f o r  t h e  symposium c o n s i s t e d  of :  
Norman H. Brooks, D i rec to r ,  Environmental Q u a l i t y  Laboratory, 
C a l i f o r n i a  I n s t i t u t e  of  Technology (Di rec to r )  
John F. Kennedy, D i rec to r ,  Iowa I n s t i t u t e  of  Hydraul ic  Research, 
Univers i ty  o f  Iowa, and member of t h e  Committee on Natura l  D i s a s t e r s ,  
Nat iona l  Research Council  
Jack C o e ,  Chief ,  South District,  C a l i f o r n i a  Department of 
Water Resources 
Daniel  Davis, Sec t ion  Head, Erosion Con t ro l  Sec t ion ,  Los  Angeles 
County Flood Cont ro l  D i s t r i c t  
Robert Ha l l ,  Deputy Chief ,  Engineering Div is ion ,  Los Angeles 
Distr ict ,  Corps of Engineers 
Darwin Knockenmus, S u b d i s t r i c t  Chief ,  Water Resource Div is ion ,  
Laguna Niguel,  U.S. Geological  Survey 
Robert C. Y. Koh, Research Assoc ia te  i n  Environmental 
Engineering Science,  EQL, Cal tech  
Brent  D. Taylor ,  Senior  Research Engineer,  EQL, Cal tech  
F i n a n c i a l  suppor t  was provided by: 
Nat iona l  Science Foundation 
(Grant No.  PFR-7810631 t o  Nat iona l  Academy of  Sciences,  
and subgrant  No. C5588-80-365 from NAS t o  Cal tech)  
iii 
California Department of Water Resources 
(Agreement No. B-53743 with Caltech) 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District 
(Contract No. DACW09-08-M-2009 with Caltech) 
U. S. Geological Survey (Geologic 'Division) 
(Purchase Order No. 119573 to Caltech) 
Frank and Elizabeth Gilloon Trust, and others 
(Gifts to the Environmental Quality Laboratory 
for discretionary use) 
The California Department of Water Resources, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the U.S. Geological Survey, and many other organizations (shown by 
the affiliations of the authors) also contributed significantly to the 
symposium through participation of their staff members. 
The proceedings volume was edited and produced as a joint effort of the 
Environmental Quality Laboratory and the Conunittee on Natural Disasters. At 
EQL Theresa Fall coordinated the reviews and revisions of manuscripts and 
graphics; Brent D. Taylor, Vito A. Vanoni, and Robert C. Y. Koh assisted with 
the technical reviews. Norman H. Brooks organized the whole volume and 
prepared the summary paper. Debra Brownlie, Patricia Rankin, and Marcia 
Nelson handled the conference arrangements and secretarial work for EQL. At 
the NRC the final editing and preparation of the proceedings for publication 
was done by the Committee on Natural Disasters staff: 0. Allen Israelsen, 
Executive Secretary; Steve Olson, Consultant Editor; Joann Curry and Lally 
Anne Anderson, Secretaries. 
We gratefully acknowledge all of the various contributions of the authors, 
the staff, and the sponsors who made the symposium and the publication of this 
proceedings volume possible. 
Symposium Co-Chairmen 
Paul C. Jennings, Chairman, 1980 
Committee on Natural Disasters 
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OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY 
by Norman H. Brooks 
INTRODUCTION 
' 
Following the floods of 1978 and 1980 in southern California and Arizona a 
symposium was convened at the California Institute of Technology in September 
1980 to document the significant events of these floods and to exchange 
information and evaluations. The symposium laid the groundwork for these 
proceedings, which serve as a compact permanent source of information on these 
floods for not only local readers but national readers as well. 
Special attention is given to documenting problems--some engineering, some 
institutional--and to drawing conclusions and making recommendations for 
research. The papers included in this volume are not intended to be .research 
papers or to replace the much more detailed reports of individual agencies. 
The emphasis was on preparing and presenting the papers soon after the event 
in such a way as to emphasize the regional nature of floods and flood control 
problems. 
These proceedings are organized into several sections, with 35 papers 
altogether. Following this overview and summary, Section 2, STORM 
METEOROLOGY, which consists of four papers, describes the long-range weather 
patterns that affect the southwestern United States; the relationship of these 
patterns to sea surface temperatures in the North Pacific Ocean; the 
short-term synoptic meteorology of the storms under consideration, showing the 
importance of multiple storm sequences; and statistical analyses of return 
periods, based on historical data, for precipitation at a point. 
Section 3, DOWNSTREAM RIVER FLOODING, consisting of nine papers, gives an 
overview of the floods on the larger rivers, how the flood control works 
responded, and what damages occurred. Section 4, UPLAND FLOODS AND SEDIMENT 
TRANSPORT (five papers), focuses on the unique aspects of sedimentation in 
regional floods. Section 5, LANDSLIDES, with four papers, explains the 
problems of landslides, both large and small, that were triggered by the 
prolonged periods of heavy rainfall. 
Norman Brooks is Director of the Environmental Quality Laboratory and 
James Irvine Professor of Environmental and Civil Engineering at the 
California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California. 
Section 6, CASE STUDIES OF ENGINEERING PROBLEMS (four papers), gives 
detailed analyses of three particular engineering problems: the failure of 
levees on the San Jacinto River, the uncontrolled filling of Lake Elsinore to 
damaging stages, and the severe streambed scour threatening to undermine the 
Interstate 10 highway bridge over the Salt River at Phoenix, Arizona. The 
experiences and analyses described in these papers should be useful to 
engineers who deal with similar structures and situations in the future. 
Section 7,  EFFECTS ON THE SHORELINE, consisting of two papers, illustrates 
the damaging effects of the high storm waves and high tides that occurred in 
1978 and 1980. Beach profiles shifted very rapidly, with sand being moved 
temporarily offshore, which exposed many shoreline structures to direct wave 
attack, causing severe damages. 
Section 8, POLICIES FOR FLOOD CONTROL AND HAZARD MITIGATION (six papers), 
focuses on institutional issues. Four of these papers advocate a strong new 
emphasis on hazard mitigation, better flood warning systems, and other 
nonstructural approaches as part of the mix of society's activities to deal 
with floods. 
About 300 people participated in the symposium, and many contributed to 
the questions and discussion. In the closing session there was a panel 
discussion by Russell Campbell, Engineering Geologist with the U.S. Geological 
Survey; John F. Kennedy, Director of the Iowa Institute on Hydraulic Research 
at the University of Iowa and member of the Committee on Natural Disasters of 
the National Research Council; Dale Peterson, Director of Community Services 
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in San Francisco; and 
Richard Wainer, Los Angeles City Engineer's Office in Van Nuys. The writer 
served as moderator. Since it was not feasible to digest and record all of 
these discussions in this volume, I am attempting in this summary to capture 
the main conclusions and issues.* Nonetheless, the following conclusions and 
recommendations are solely the responsibility of the author and do not 
necessarily represent a consensus by the participants at the symposium. 
For the record it should be noted that the following papers included in 
these proceedings were not presented at the symposium: 'Geotechnical Origin 
and Repair of the Bluebird Canyon Landslide, Laguna Beach, California1' by 
Beach Leighton and "Levee Failures and Distress, San Jacinto River Levee and 
Bautista Creek Channel, Riverside County, Santa Ana River Basin, California" 
by Joe Sciandrone, Ted Albrecht, Jr., Richard Davidson, Jacob Douma, Dave 
Hammer, Charles Hooppaw, and A1 Robles, Jr. The latter paper is a shortened 
version of the official Corps of Engineers report on the Sdn Jacinto River 
levee failure, which was not available in time for presentation at the 
conference. 
Numerous brief discussions at the symposium are gratefully acknowledged, 
although very few are included in these proceedings. 
*The entire symposium was recorded on 10 audio cassette tapes, which are 




This section gives some general background on the flood hydrology of 
southern California and Arizona for those who may be unfamiliar with the 
area. An overview of the 1978 and 1980 floods is then presented in the next 
section, followed by discussion of nonstructural approaches and 
recommendations for research. 
Flood Potential in the Southern California Coastal Region 
Climate and Geology 
The climate in the southwestern United States is arid, except for the 
California coastal strip and mountainous areas that receive orographic 
+increases in precipitation. The main focus of this volume is the southern 
California coastal strip between Point Conception on the north and the Mexican 
border on the south, extending inland to the drainage divide between the 
streams flowing to the ocean and those flowing to the desert. The principal 
drainages are shown in Figure 1, and the identifications and areas are listed 
in Table 1. The elevation of the highest peak is about 3,500 m (11,500 ft) 
above sea level, and several are higher than 3,000 m (9,800 ft). The geology 
of the region, especially in relation to erosion and deposition, has been 
summarized by Fall (1981). 
The mountain ranges are responsible for giving this strip a semiarid 
Mediterranean climate with considerably higher rainfall (an annual average of 
10 to 25 in. or 250 to 630 mm in the valley areas and up to twice as much in 
the mountains) than on the desert side of the mountains (with less than 8 in. 
or 200 mm). The mean annual rainfall distribution for California is shown in 
Figure 2. The large variation of the annual rainfall at Los Angeles for the 
period 1877-1980 is shown in Figure 3 of the paper by James Slosson and James 
Krohn in Section 5. The precipitation falls almost entirely during the winter 
months, with long dry hot summers that generally inhibit the development of 
forest cover below about 1,500 m elevation except on some north-facing 
slopes. Below this level the slopes are covered with chaparral (native 
brush), a few trees, grasses, or bare soil. The soils in the mountains are 
quite thin and rapidly erode or slide down the slopes; the underlying rocks 
decompose fairly rapidly, yielding an overall long-term erosion rate of the 
order of 1 m per thousand years (Taylor, 1981). The vegetation and soils of 
the area are described in more detail by Wells and Palmer (1981). A 
comprehensive summary of a wide range of hydrologic and geologic 
characteristics for a part of the San Bernardino Mountains has been lucidly 
presented with excellent maps and graphics by Troxell et al. (1954). 
Flood Factors 
Several factors make this region susceptible to severe floods and storm 
damage : 
1. Steep slopes in the mountains, with many slopes at the angle of repose 
(or steeper) for loose material. Landslides and mudflows are common during 
heavy and prolonged rainfall, and landslides may occur up to a year later. 

TABLE 1 Major Drqinage Un i t s  i n  t h e  Southern C a l i f o r n i a  Coas t a l  Area ( a s  
shown i n  F igu re  1) 
P r i n c i p a l  Basin 
Map o r  Group of Small 
Symbol Basins  
Cont ro l led  Percent  
Drainage Area of Area 
of P r i n c i p a l  Con t ro l l ed  
 asi ins^ Area i n  P r i n c i p a l  
( sq  km) ( sq  km) Basins  
T o t a l s  
Santa  Ynez Mountains group 
Ventura River bas in  
Venturd group 
Santa  C l a r a  River bas in  
Oxnard group 
Cal leguas  C r e e k  bas in  
Santa  Monica Mountains group 
L o s  Angeles River bas in  
Long Beach group 
San G a b r i e l  River bas in  
Huntington Beach group 
Santa  Ana River bas in  
Lake E l s i n o r e  bas in  
Laguna H i l l s  group 
Santa  Margari ta  River bas in  
San L u i s  ~ e y  River bas in  
Escondido C r e e k  group 
San Diegui to  River bas in  
San Clemente Canyon group 
San Diego River  bas in  
San Diego group 
Sweetwater River bas in  
Otay River bas in  
Ti juana  River bas in  
a ~ a l c u l a t e d  by adding t h e  dra inage  a r e a s  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  major water 
r e t e n t i o n  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  are f a r t h e s t  downstream i n  each basin.  
h h i t t i e r  Narrows f lood  c o n t r o l  bas in  c o n t r o l s  both Los Angeles and San 
G a b r i e l  r i v e r s .  Th i s  e s t ima te  assumes t h a t  35 s q  km of  t h e  dra inage  a r e a  
c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  Whi t t i e r  N a r r o w s  s t r u c t u r e  l ies  w i t h i n  t h e  L o s  Angeles River 
d ra inage  basin.  
C ~ x c l u d e s  Lake E l s i n o r e  bas in  ( M ) .  
d~losed i n t e r i o r  bas in .  Overflow i n t o  Santa  Ana River bas in  d i d  no t  occur  
between 1916 and 1980. 
Source: Brownlie and Taylor  (1981). 
FIGURE 2 Annual precipitation map for California. Source: Califor- 
nia Department of Water Resources (1980), p. 16. 
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2. Intense winter storms, often in groups (such as six in nine days in + February 1980), with strong orographic increases in precipitation with 
elevation. 
3. Snowfall generally above 2,000 to 2,500 m, an area that is a minor 
fraction of the-total area. Floods are therefore caused by rapid rain runoff, 
not by snowmelt. 
' 4. Naturally high erosion rates (or sediment yields), causing very high 
sediment transport out of the canyons onto alluvial fans and floodplains. 
5. Burned watersheds, producing flood peaks that are several times higher 
and sediment outflows that are an order of magnitude greater than for unburned 
watersheds. 
The fire-flood sequence is the most devastating and least well controlled 
of the flood phenomena of southern California and contributed significantly to 
Phe damages to the foothill areas in the 1978 and 1980 storms (see the papers 
by Wade Wells and Daniel Davis in Section 49. The chaparral on the lower 
slopes burns fiercely when fires start accidentally in the dry weather of late 
summer or early fall, often whipped by Santa Ana winds from the north off the 
desert. Many residents of southern California living next to the foothills 
have luckily escaped the damage of the summer fires only to see their property 
buried by sediments pouring out of the canyons or sliding down slopes in the 
winter floods. 
The inhabitable land on the coastal strip naturally lies between the 
mountains and the shoreline. Before human development these lands were 
largely depositional areas; although the alluvial fans at the mouths of many 
canyons were the most rapidly aggrading features, many have nonetheless become 
urbanized areas (such as Altadena, shown in Figure 3). The fans may have 
slopes of up to 0.08 to 0.1. The main rivers in the valleys still are 
relatively steep, with slopes of 0.001 to 0-01--large values for major rivers 
that make them flow at relatively high velocities, often with wavy surfaces. 
Before human intervention the gravel and coarse sands were all deposited on 
the alluvial fans and the river valleys, while much of the fine sand, silt, 
and clay was carried through to the ocean in large uncontrolled floodflows. 
This flow of sand has been the principal source of nourishment for southern 
California's extensive beaches (Brownlie and Taylor, 1981). 
FZood Contro Z 
The early settlers in the coastal areas of southern California quickly 
discovered how brutal uncontrolled streams and rivers could be. The earliest 
flood control efforts were accelerated by the formation of the Los Angeles 
County Flood Control District in 1915, which had as its mission not only flood 
control but also water conservation. Since that time the district, along with 
the Corps of Engineers (starting in the 1 9 3 0 ~ ) ~  has built one of the most 
intensive systems of flood control structures in the world. Outside Los 
Angeles County the flood control systems are less developed, with more works 
in the planning stages to protect growing developments. 
In the early years the flood control systems in the Los Angeles area 
focused on major flood control dams and channel improvements, most with 
FIGURE 3 The San Gabriel Mountains drain from steep canyons directly 
onto alluvial fans, such as this large one underlying Altadena and the 
northern part of Pasadena (northeast of Los Angeles). The developed 
areas on this fan are protected by debris basins at the mouths of the 
canyons (see Figure 4) . 
permanent concrete linings. However, after the New Year's Day flood in 1934 
it became apparent that extraordinary measures would be needed to control the 
huge and damaging outpourings of sediment (or debris) from the many smaller 
canyons onto the urban areas in the foothills. A system of 105 debris basins 
was conceived, and most of them have now been built. The longest period of 
operation is now over 40 years, so some statistics on rates of filling are 
becoming established (see the paper by Daniel Davis in Section 4 and Brown and 
Taylor (1981) ) . 
A typical basin is shown in Figure 4, and design details are shown in 
Figure 1 of the paper by John Tettemer in Section 4. As sediments accumulate 
these basins are supposed to be excavated, sometimes even between storms (see 
the paper by Daniel Davis in Section 4). They are intended only to catch the 
coarser sediments, with the finer sediments flowing through the outlet tower 
(see Figure 1 in the paper by John Tettemer). They have insignificant water 
FIGURE 4 Pickens d e b r i s  bas in  i n  L a  Crescenta ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  s h o r t l y  
a f t e r  it was cons t ruc t ed  by t h e  Los Angeles County Flood Con t ro l  D i s -  
t r ic t  i n  1936. Flow e n t e r s  from upper r i g h t ,  and a f t e r  coa r se  sed i -  
ments a r e  cap tu red  t h e  outf low passes  i n t o  a  l i n e d  channel  (lower l e f t ) .  
s t o r a g e  volumes and do n o t  apprec iab ly  change t h e  water d i scharges .  These 
f lows can  then  be c a r r i e d  i n  l i n e d  conc re t e  channels  wi thout  danger of t h e  
channels  being f i l l e d  by deb r i s .  E a r l i e r  e f f o r t s  t o  convey canyon f loodflows 
a c r o s s  a l l u v i a l  f a n s  wi thout  removing t h e  d e b r i s  m e t  wi th  quick  and 
unequivocal fai lure--channels  simply f i l l e d  r i g h t  up wi th  sediments ,  allowing 
t h e  water t o  flow over  t h e  f a n  a s  before  ( s e e  t h e  photograph i n  F igure  5, 
taken a f t e r  t h e  1938 f lood)  . 
Large f lood  s t o r a g e  dams have a l s o  been f i l l i n g  up a t  a r ap id  r a t e ,  and 
many of  them have had to be cleaned o u t  about  once every  30 to 50 years .  
Disposing of a l l  of t h e  sediments from t h e  major dams and t h e  d e b r i s  dams is 
posing an inc reas ing  problem f o r  t h e  L o s  Angeles County Flood Cont ro l  D i s t r i c t  
and o t h e r  agencies  because t h e r e  a r e  few a v a i l a b l e  p l a c e s  t o  s t o r e  t h i s  
m a t e r i a l  s a f e l y  f o r  t h e  long run. The h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a  on c l eanou t s  of major 
r e s e r v o i r s ,  d e b r i s  bas ins ,  and channels  (be fo re  t h e  1978 and 1980 f loods )  have 
been summarized f o r  t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  c o a s t a l  reg ion  by Kolker (1981). 
FIGURE 5 Concrete f l ood  channel  on an a l l u v i a l  f an  i n  Monrovia, com- 
p l e t e l y  f i l l e d  with sediment i n  t h e  1938 f lood  (only  a  s h o r t  l eng th  of 
t h e  very tops  of t h e  channel  w a l l s  is v i s i b l e ) .  Without an upstream 
d e b r i s  bas in  a  channel  l i k e  t h i s  is u s e l e s s  i n  a f lood.  
Flood P o t e n t i a l  i n  Arizona 
I n  Arizona t h e  r a i n f a l l  from winter  s torms from t h e  P a c i f i c  Ocean is 
g e n e r a l l y  l e s s  than  i n  c o a s t a l  p o r t i o n s  of C a l i f o r n i a .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
shor t -dura t ion  i n t e n s e  r a i n f a l l  from thunderstorms is more f requent .  
Occasional ly,  Arizona is a l s o  h i t  with i n t e n s e  r a i n  from t r o p i c a l  s torms t h a t  
come from t h e  south  o f f  t h e  Gulf of C a l i f o r n i a  and P a c i f i c  Ocean dur ing  t h e  
f a l l .  The primary a r e a  of  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  volume is t h e  v i c i n i t y  of Phoenix 
and t h e  upstream t r i b u t a r y  a r e a s  of t h e  G i l a  River system a s "  shown i n  F igure  1 
of  t h e  paper by B. N. Aldridge,  Sec t ion  3. I n  t h e s e  a r eas ,  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  
C a l i f o r n i a ,  e r o s i o n  and sediment t r a n s p o r t  i nc rease  t h e  f lood  hazards.  
As urbanization spreads around Phoenix and other areas in the arid 
Southwest (e.g., Palm Springs, California, or Tucson, Arizona), developers 
will be looking for choice building sites and will think that many alluvial 
fans are attractive for development. In his two papers in this volume, John 
Tettemer describes the urgency of adopting a flood mitigation policy for 
floodplain zoning in order to keep developments off those alluvial fans that 
are active, hazardous, and entail exorbitant costs of protection. The 
development of floodplain hazard maps along with the implementation of the 
National Flood Insurance Program by FEMA will be very useful in forcing 
communities to pay more attention to sediment hazards. 
OVERVIEW OF THE 1978 AND 1980 FLOODS 
The notableoflood events of 1978 and 1980 are discussed in the papers that 
kollow. Our job here is to ask "What did we learn?' and "How can we improve 
our systems for flood control and damage mitigation?" This subject will be 
discussed in the next several sections; since this is an overview and 
evaluation, the reader is referred to the papers for detailed information. A 
discussion of nonstructural approaches and recommendations for research will 
be presented in later sections. 
The Natural Events--How Well Do We Understand Them? 
The storms and floods of 1978 and 1980 have each been judged to be of the 
size that can be expected approximately once in 25 years (although the 
severity of these events varied considerably with location). Precise 
frequencies cannot be determined because our data base is too short and 
different stations and criteria give different answers. Whether the number is 
10, 25, or 50 years, these floods were well within the range of frequencies 
for which the flood control systems have been designed. They were definitely 
not of disastrous proportions (say, once-in-several-thousand-years frequency) 
that would exceed the capacity of the control structures. Therefore, without 
minimizing the loss of life, property damage, and general disruption and 
psychological impacts that - did occur, it is important to realize that these 
storms were far from the worst that could occur. 
In 1978 the two major storms occurred separately (in February and early 
March) on watersheds well saturated with previous rainfall. In 1980 the 
biggest floods were caused primarily by an unusual sequence of six storms in 
the eight and a half day period February 13-21. Figure 6 shows the hourly 
distribution of the 19.71 in. (501 mm) of rainfall that fell in that period at 
Caltech, while Figure 7 shows the accumulative amounts. For short-term 
durations the amounts were generally far from record-breaking (see the paper 
by Wade Wells in Section 4), thereby indicating that the main flooding 
problems in 1980 were not associated with small drainages or culverts but 
rather with the larger-scale flood control dams and channels of the bigger 
systems. The exceptions were those watersheds that had been burned within a 
few years prior to 1980 (see the paper by Daniel Davis in Section 4). 
The meteorology of these situations is now much better understood than it 
was before, both on short and long time scales. Satellite observations help 
greatly in understanding the sequences of storms (such as occurred in 1980) 
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FIGURE 6 Hourly r a i n f a l l  a t  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  I n s t i t u t e  of  Technology i n  
Pasadena f o r  t h e  s i x  s torms  i n  t h e  per iod  February 13-21, 1980 (from 
t h e  record ing  gage r eco rd  of  S t a t i o n  303F opera ted  by Cal tech  f o r  t h e  
Los Angeles County Flood Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t ) .  
and i n  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e i r  a r r i v a l  times and approximate i n t e n s i t i e s .  The 
r e g u l a r  " c l e a r  water" hydrau l i c s  of  s t ream runoff  is w e l l  i n  hand, except  f o r  
t h e  sharper  and h igher  peaks coming from urbanized a r e a s  a s  more s u r f a c e s  g e t  
paved or  roofed (see t h e  paper by P h i l i p  Pryde i n  Sec t ion  3 ) .  
Heavy sediment t r a n s p o r t  i n  f l oods  from t h e  canyons is always expected.and 
is p a r t  o f  t h e  long-term geo log ic  p roces s  t h a t  downcuts the'mountains a t  a 
r a t e  of about  1 m per  thousand y e a r s  (whi le  t e c t o n i c  p roces ses  u p l i f t  them a t  
a r a t e  s e v e r a l  t imes  h ighe r ) .  I n  f a c t ,  much of t h e  development i n  southern  
C a l i f o r n i a  l i e s  on a c t i v e  o r  h i s t o r i c a l  d e p o s i t i o n a l  a r eas .  I n  t h e  ex t ens ive  
r e c e n t l y  burned a r e a s  t h e  sediment e ros ion  r a t e s  were increased  a s  much a s  
t e n f o l d  over  unburned a r e a s  (see t h e  paper by Danie l  Davis i n  Sec t ion  4 ) ;  
f loodf lows  were a l s o  s h a r p l y  increased  due t o  bulking (h igh  sediment l o a d s ) ,  
less i n f i l t r a t i o n ,  and f a s t e r  f lows (Wells, 1981).  P r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  t h e  f l ood  
damage i n  t h e  f o o t h i l l  a r e a s  i n  1978 and 1980 was a s soc i a t ed  wi th  burned 
watersheds. 
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FIGURE 7 Cumulative rainfall at the California Institute of Techno- 
logy for February 13-21, 1980. 
Fires, which are natural for the southern California mountains, occurred 
before humans developed the area and recur in spite of our efforts at 
suppression (see Wells (1981) for a discussion of fires). Available fuel in 
the chaparral stand builds up between fires so that after several decades 
without a burn, it is practically impossible to stop a wildfire before it 
covers tens of square kilometers. In the long-term geologic sense the heavy 
erosion following fires (which also occurred before man's arrival) may be 
considered part of the normal process of downcutting. The fire-flood sequence 
will continue to be a threat to foothill communities, and the risks of these 
events are probably underestimated by the public. 
Although the most spectacular sediment transport by streams is in the 
mountain canyons, even the downstream rivers can produce staggering rates of 
transport of suspended sediment. For example, data in Kenneth Wahl's paper in 
Section 3 for the Santa Clara River, the region's largest, show instantaneous 
sediment transport rates of over one million tons per day and sediment 
concentrations ranging up to 32 grams per liter. 
Landslides and mudslides are predictable general consequences of wet 
winters in southern California. Small landslides occur as soon as the ground 
is saturated, while larger slides do not occur until months later because of 
the time required for the deep percolation of moisture to the weak shear 
zones. One example is the Bluebird Canyon landslide in Laguna Beach, which 
destroyed 25 homes on October 2, 1978, seven months after the end of the rainy 
season (see the paper by Beach Leighton in Section 5). An even longer delayed 
response was the large Malibu rock slide that occurred on April 13, 1979, 
blocking Pacific Coast Highway more than a year after the heavy rains (see the 
paper by Raymond Forsyth and Marvin McCauley in Section 5). We can identify 
areas that are prone to landslides and mudflows, but we do not have the 
ability to predict just when any particular slide might occur. Strict 
controls on hillside developments, such as the ordinances adopted by the City 
of Los Angeles (see the paper by James Slosson and James Krohn, Section 5), 
can significantly mitigate the hazards from these natural phenomena. 
The shoreline in southern California, especially in the vicinity of 
Malibu, received heavy wave attacks during the 1978 and 1980 storms. George 
Armstrong in his paper in Section 7 describes the shore erosion of 1978 as the 
worst in the past 40 years, but he still calls the 1978 storm season 
"exceptional but not unusual." As a predictable natural process during winter 
storms, the large waves caused a major realignment of beach profiles, shifting 
sand from the beach to the offshore berm and leaving many structures unduly 
exposed to the breaking of waves. The seasonal coming and going of beaches is 
a normal phenomenon, as described in the paper by Martha Shaw in Section 7. 
She observed that during the February 1980 storms over 150 cubic meters of 
sand per meter of beach were removed in a few days from the nearshore region 
of Leadbetter Beach at Santa Barbara; this is equivalent to the removal of an 
area of 150 sq m in the vertical cross section. Again, these are normal 
well-understood phenomena, but the risks due to shifting beach profiles during 
storms are probably generally underestimated. 
Flood Control Structures--How Well Did They Work? 
In California the floods caused 38 deaths in 1978 and 18 deaths in 1980; 
estimated property damages were $220 million in 1978 and $270 million in 1980 
(see the paper by Carlos Garza and Craig Peterson in Section 2 and Jacob 
Angel's paper in Section 8). However, Joseph Evelyn in his paper in Section 3 
estimates that the Corps of Engineers projects alone in the Los Angeles-San 
Gabriel-Santa Ana River systems in southern California prevented more than $4 
billion in damages. In Arizona the flood damages were $70 million in March 
1978 and $90 million in December 1978; no estimates were given for 1980 (see 
the paper by B. N. Aldridge in Section 3). 
In general, the main flood control systems in southern California and 
Arizona performed very well. Yet there were some failures and problems with 
engineered systems, in spite of the highly favorable operating experience. 
Levee Failures 
Levee failures on the San Jacinto River flooded the to& of San Jacinto; 
other failures on Calleguas Creek flooded the Point Mugu Naval Air Station. 
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A t  San J a c i n t o  t h e  l evee  f a i l e d  due t o  t o e  e ros ion ,  whi le  a t  Cal leguas  Creek 
t h e  l evee  was" oveb topped. 
The l evee  f a i l u r e s  on t h e  San J a c i n t o  River a r e  f u l l y  descr ibed  i n  t h e  
papers  by Kenneth Edwards and Joe ~ c i a n d r o n e  e t  a l .  i n  Sec t ion  6. The 
apparent  cause  of t h e  f a i l u r e  was undermining of  t h e  l e v e e  t o e  due t o  very 
deep scour .  The l o c a t i o n  of t h e  scour  was a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  confluence of 
B a u t i s t a  Creek and t h e  San J a c i n t o  River ,  which caused a poor alignment of t h e  
main s t ream of f low with r e spec t  t o  t h e  levee.  The peak flow i n  t h e  channel  
(25,000 cu f t / s )  was on ly  29 percent  of  t h e  des ign  f low (86,000 cu f t / s ) .  The 
median s i z e  of t h e  r i p r a p  rock t h a t  was s p e c i f i e d  a t  t h e  t ime of  cons t ruc t ion  
of  t h e  l evee  was 130 l b  (12 i n . ) ,  whereas p r e s e n t  Corps of Engineers  c r i t e r i a  
would have c a l l e d  f o r  2,000-lb (30-in.) rock ( f o r  d e t a i l s  see t h e  paper by J o e  
Sciandrone e t  a l .  i n  Sec t ion  6 ) .  
These examples i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t  channels  having sand beds wi th  l evees  may 
not  be as s a f e  a s  t h e  des igne r s  expected. Even grade  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  such 
a s  t hose  i n  t h e  Santa  Ana River i n  Orange County, may n o t  c o n t r o l  degrada t ion  
i n  c a s e s  where t h e  s t ream is s t a rved  f o r  sediment (see t h e  paper by C a r l  
Nelson i n  Sec t ion  3 ) .  The f a i l u r e  of such drop  s t r u c t u r e s  can  be followed by 
undermining of levees .  
Bridge Piers undermined by  Channel Scour 
The undermining of  br idge  p i e r s  is another  r e c u r r i n g  engineer ing  problem, 
a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by s e v e r a l  f a i l u r e s  i n  San Diego County, t h e  problems with t h e  
I n t e r s t a t e  10 b r idge  a t  Phoenix, and near f a i l u r e s  on t h e  Santa  Ana River i n  
Orange County. During f loods ,  scour  may reach cons ide rab le  depths,  o f t e n  much 
more than  t h e  depth  of  t h e  water i t s e l f .  The depth  of scour  is dependent on 
t h e  amount of sediment load of sand and g r a v e l  s i z e s  e n t e r i n g  t h e  channel  wi th  
t h e  water discharge.  Channels with sand beds downstream of  s t o r a g e  dams 
(e.g., t h e  Santa  Ana River below Prado Dam; see t h e  paper by C a r l  Nelson i n  
Sec t ion  3) a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  vulnerable  t o  s eve re  degrada t ion  because almost a l l  
of t h e  sand load is probably depos i ted  i n  t h e  r e s e r v o i r .  The d ischarge  of 
water without  a sand load  a t t a c k s  t h e  bed a s  it seeks  to  e s t a b l i s h  a new 
equ i l i b r ium r a t e  o f  t r anspor t .  Urbanizat ion may a l s o  lower t h e  inpu t  o f  sand 
i n  v a l l e y  and h i l l  a r e a s  below previous  n a t u r a l  r a t e s .  
Sediment-control s t r u c t u r e s  l i k e  d e b r i s  bas ins ,  which a r e  a b s o l u t e l y  
e s s e n t i a l  f o r  prevent ing  severe  aggradat ion on a l l u v i a l  f ans ,  may c r e a t e  a 
hazard of severe  degrada t ion  un le s s  they feed  i n t o  l i n e d  channels  or un le s s  
t h e  channels  have o t h e r  sources  of  sediment to keep them i n  reasonable balance. 
Increased Flood Peaks from Urban Areas 
Spreading u rban iza t ion  is tending t o  reduce t h e  concen t r a t ion  time (or  t h e  
time from peak r a i n f a l l  t o  peak streamflow) and t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  peak f lood  
d ischarge  f o r  a g iven  storm ( s e e  t h e  paper by Dolores  Taylor  i n  Sec t ion  3, 
which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  f a c t o r  con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  overtopping of t he  
Cal leguas Creek l e v e e ) .  This  e f f e c t  is reducing t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of t h e  
e x i s t i n g  s e t  of improved channels ,  inasmuch as they  w i l l  no t  be a b l e  to c a r r y  
floods of lesser frequency than originally thought (see Philip Pryde's paper 
in Section 3). 
OverfZm of Debris Basins i n  Fire Areas 
In Los Angeles County the severe floods and debris transport from burned 
areas exceeded the capacity of some debris control structures (Daniel Davis 
gives examples in his paper in Section 4). The present design criterion of 
200,000 cubic yards of capacity per square mile (or 59,000 cu m/-;3 Llri, which 
is equivalent to 5.9 cm of depth over the watershed area) appears to be 
adequate for the storms that occurred, according to Davis, who shows no 
measured values exceeding 50,000 cu m/sq km. However, some of the debris 
basins were built with smaller volumes in earlier years and can be expected to 
overflow more often (e.g., upper Shields Canyon). For watersheds that were 
not recently burned, the debris basins in the Los Angeles County system proved 
-
to be very sufficient, with no problems during the 1978 and 1980 floods. 
Flooding and Sediment Damages in Unprotected Areas 
Streams and Canyons 
Other flood problems occurred in flood-prone areas unprotected by flood 
control structures, such as areas upstream of debris basins and dams or houses 
built in canyons in the Santa Monica Mountains and elsewhere. There the 
pattern of development of many houses along the canyon bottoms makes flood 
control impossible. When these streams are aggraded during floods because of 
heavy sediment loads (later the deposits will be cut out again), flooding of 
roadways and dwellings is almost inevitable. Here the problem is not with the 
flood control system but rather with a lack of control of development in areas 
of extreme flood hazard. 
Lake Elsinore--Flooding of Developments Encroaching on the Historical 
Lake Area 
A unique flood event in southern California was the record high level that 
Lake Elsinore reached in March 1980, which caused extensive flooding and 
threatened the developments that had gradually encroached on the historical 
lake area (see the paper by Charles White in Section 6). Lake Elsinore is the 
sink for the San Jacinto River and has a relatively high overflow channel to 
the Santa Ana River system. In geological time this channel undoubtedly 
carried overflows a number of times. However, it had been so long since hake 
Elsinore had filled up (not since 1916) that the perception of a flood hazard 
had all but faded away! Damage prevention would have been easy with proper 
zoning control of the developments around the lake. Present zoning controls, 
stringently enforced, will reduce flood damages in the future. 
Landslides and Mudflows 
Lands Zides 
Landslides were widely scattered during and after the itorms, threatening 
loss of life as well as property. There is no practical way to stop a 
r 
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landslide once it$tarts, so all countermeasures must be preventive. During a 
storm, individual troublesome slopes can be protected from additional rainfall 
by plastic sheeting or by deflecting concentrated surface runoff away from 
weak slopes, if possible. But only vigorous zoning and grading ordinances, 
such as in the City of Los Angeles, can permanently reduce the potential for 
landslide damage. Hazards can come either from natural slopes or from 
improperly constructed earth embankments. Structures at both the tops and 
bottoms of the slopes are in jeopardy. 
James Slosson and James Krohn report in their paper in Section 5 that the 
City of Los Angeles has been keeping detailed statistics of landslide damages 
within the city and relating these to the ordinances in effect at the time of 
development. Total damages within the city were estimated to be $50 million 
in 1978 and $70 million in 1980. Their Table 3 (showing 3,000 failures for 
1978) gives a slope failure rate of 7.5 percent for pre-1963 construction 
(before the modern code) versus only 0.7 percent for post-1963 construction. 
Damages in 1978 to developments under the new code are estimated to have been 
reduced 95 percent from what they would have been had the new code not been 
adopted in 1963. 
The essence of the code is to require proper geologic investigations of 
natural slopes and avoid building where there are significant hazards. For 
man-made embankments it requires proper soil mechanics engineering regarding 
materials to be used, choice of slopes, and methods of construction. 
Furthermore, geologists and soil mechanics engineers must inspect grading 
projects while they are in progress and certify them upon completion as 
meeting the safety standards. 
While the present codes effectively prevent construction of new possible 
sources of damage, houses built before 1963 could still be subject to heavy 
damage in future wet years under the right circumstances. According to Harold 
Weber, Jr., in his paper in Section 5, shallow slides may be triggered by 
special sequencing of rainfalls. For instance, over 100 homes were damaged in 
Monterey Park on February 16, 1980 (the day of heaviest rain--see Figure 6 
above), although there had been no previous damage in over 40 years since 
development of the area started. In other areas damage regularly occurs in 
any very wet year, and for some areas damage was much worse in 1978 than in 
1980. 
When a saturated landslide begins to liquefy and flow like a viscous 
fluid, it is called a mudflow. In the mountains, landslides often fall into 
streams in the canyon bottoms and may start mudflows, which surge down the 
natural stream channels. These mudflows have the consistency of wet sloppy 
concrete, with large boulders and gravel included in the matrix. They stop as 
soon as they spread out laterally or the grade flattens, and the water and 
fine sediments drain away from larger sediments as they stop. 
Mudflows at the base of hillslopes can flow out with flatter surface 
slopes than landslides per se. Since the ~ational Flood Insurance Program 
covers mudflow damage but not landslide damage, there is a difficult problem 
of definitions. Physically, however, a sharp distinction is often not 
possible--who can say exactly where a landslide turns into a mudflow? 
Mudflows may also start as a surface or streambed erosion process on very 
steep slopes during periods of exceptionally heavy rainfall without being 
triggered by a landslide. A committee of the National Reseach Council has 
prepared a report for the Federal Emergency Management Agency on methodologies 
to define and clarify mudflow hazards and distinguish them from landslides for 
insurance purposes (National Research Council, 1982). For an excellent 
description and explanation of landslides and mudflows in the Santa Monica 
Mountains, see Campbell (1975) . 
Mudflows should not be confused with heavy sediment transport and 
deposition by streams during floods. Mudflows are special, distinct episodes 
and are not continuous like floodflows. The alluvial fans at the mouths of 
mountain canyons are mainly the result of stream transport and deposition, not 
of mudflows. Although sediment concentrations in mudflows may be over 1,000 
grams per liter, much more sediment transport occurs in alluvial floods (with 
sediment concentrations only very rarely exceeding 100 grams per liter) 
because of the latter's high volume. Again, there may be instances where the 
distinction is unclear. 
NONSTRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO DAMAGE REDUCTION--WERE THEY USEFUL IN THE 1980 
FLOODS? 
Risks and Benefits 
There is a growing awareness that flood control structures (dams, lined 
channels, storm drains, pump stations, etc.) are necessary but not sufficient 
to provide for safety and prevent damage (e.g., see California Department of 
Water Resources (1980) and the paper by Ronald Robie in Section 8). 
Nonstructural approaches, which are getting increased attention, will be 
discussed in this section. There are several compelling reasons for this 
shift in attitudes toward flood control: 
1. Flood control structures can be designed to handle floods only up to a 
certain size, usually expressed as a flood frequency. For floods exceeding 
this size the structures may no longer be effective or, in case of failures, 
the damages can be worse than if there had been no structures at all. For 
example, a levee designed for a 25-year flood may create confidence that 
encourages development next to the levee; then if a 50-year flood causes the 
levee to fail the damage might be extensive. Although spillways of majot dams 
may be designed for very large floods (the maximum possible as determined by 
hydrometeorological methods), the channels downstream often cannot feasibly be 
built to carry such extraordinary floods. Acceptance of some risk is 
inevitable and economically sensible. At some point on the scale of risk 
reduction, flood insurance and disaster assistance provide a way to share the 
remaining risk at annual costs to society that are less than the costs of 
additional structural measures. 
2. The cost of public works has increased sharply in-the last decade. 
Not only has the cost of construction increased by a factor of about three 
over the last decade, but the cost of borrowing (expressed as the interest 
rate paid by govehment) has also tripled. Therefore the annual cost could 
have increased between three and nine times, depending on the length of the 
repayment period. Thus there are strong economic incentives to consider and 
use other approaches. 
3. The environmental impacts of flood control works are being viewed with 
more sensitivity than they were 15 to 20 years ago. 
4. Experience, including that with the floods of 1978 and 1980, is 
showing that nonstructural methods can be used effectively to save lives and 
reduce property damaqe for reasonable costs. 
5. Some nonstructural measures, such as better flood forecasting and 
better flood channel maintenance, enhance the protection afforded by 
structures already built. 
In this section we shall discuss some nonstructural measures of flood 
control, both as they were used in 1980 and as they might be used effectively 
as a more significant part of an overall response to floods in the future. 
The 1980 Experience with Nonstructural Approaches 
FZood Predictions and Warnings 
With satellite imagery the National Weather Service was able to make 
better storm predictions in 1980 than ever before. However, since the 
intensity of rainfall and small-scale variations are still difficult to 
predict, it is useful to instrument the key larger watersheds with real-time 
telemetry to transmit rainfall amounts and stream stages from upstream 
locations to a central operations center. Using computer simulation, 
downstream hydrographs can be predicted in time to warn residents and mobilize 
flood fighting forces. In their paper in Section 3, Ira Bartfeld and Dolores 
Taylor describe the development of such a system for the unregulated Sespe 
Creek in Ventura County after the 1978 floods. In 1980 the system was 
operational and was instrumental in saving Fillmore from a repeat of the 
damaging flood and the frantic evacuation it experienced in 1978. 
Operation of FZood Control Systems 
Although all major reservoirs performed well and prevented millions of 
dollars in damage (see the paper in Section 3 by Joseph Evelyn), there is 
still need for a more systematic approach to reservoir operations to get the 
most benefit from the overall system of reservoirs and channels. Although the 
storms of 1978 and 1980 were not a truly great series of storms, the larger 
flood control dams and channels were used in many cases to near capacity in 
1980. In a system of storms with a return period of approximately 100 or more 
years, the writer believes that there would be some significant uncontrolled 
spillway releases, with some downstream channels likely to overflow since they 
generally have less capacity than do the spillways of large dams. 
With telemetry of flood data to a computer during a flood, the best 
strategies for releases on multidam systems could be calculated while 
considering the limitations of the downstream channels. 
Flood Fighting 
Flood damages can be reduced by carefully patrolling flood channels, 
levees, debris dams, and other flood control works. In case of trouble, fast 
responses can often be vital--for example, in removing trash that plugs an 
outlet or channel. In Santa Barbara County a diligent patrol of levees on the 
Santa Maria River probably averted a levee failure when deteriorating sections 
were discovered and emergency reinforcement procedures were instigated 
immediately (see James Stubchaer's paper in Section 4). 
During the floods of 1978 and 1980 local officials received a great many 
calls for assistance from private property owners with problems of high water, 
deposition of debris, or erosion. Personnel of flood control agencies and 
public works organizations generally do not have the authority (or the time 
during floods) to provide emergency flood protection on private property, a 
fact that is not generally understood by the public. Since the City of Los 
Angeles had no way to respond to the numerous requests for help, callers were 
referred to the TreePeople, a private volunteer organization primarily 
dedicated to planting trees and other conservation projects (see the paper by 
Andrew Lipkis, Sherna Hough, and Lisa Geller in Section 8). In a very short 
time (without any advance planning) the TreePeople established a telephone 
hotline and mobilized hundreds of volunteers to help people protect their 
houses and property with sandbags and other small-scale emergency measures. 
The volunteer organization's response was so successful that it should serve 
as an example for flood fighting during the next flood and in other areas. 
Some advance organizational work and training of team leaders would be very 
useful to make the volunteer work as effective and safe as possible. 
Temporary Defensive Measures i n  Fire Areas 
When a watershed burns, the f l d  and sediment hazards are greatly 
increased. Flood control agencies can make special efforts to warn property 
owners of the extra hazards and advise them of temporary precautionary 
measures to take until vegetation reestablishes itself on the watershed over 
several years. Temporary public works can be erected to retain sediment, and 
flood fighting preparations and evacuation plans can be made. A program of 
this kind was successfully implemented following the Sycamore Canyon fire near 
Santa Barbara in 1977 (see James Stubchaer's paper in ~ectibn 4). 
Cleanup and Maintenance 
Agencies have learned that good maintenance of flood control facilities 
between floods is essential to keep the floodflow capacities of the structures 
up to design values. Such maintenance includes removal of sediment and debris 
from debris basins, reservoirs, and flood channels; repair of levees and other 
structures; and upkeep of outlet works and pump stations. bocal agencies have 
the responsibility for maintaining flood channel projects built by the Corps 
of Enqineers,-but they may not have sufficient funds to do so until federal 
disaster assistanc?e is received after the great floods. 
Sand and Gravel Mining 
Mining of sahd and gravel from riverbeds must be closely regulated to be 
suke that the river regime is not unreasonably disturbed (e.g., by 
headcutting, levee undermining, or severe reduction of sand flux to the 
beach--see the paper by Vito A. Vanoni, Robert Born, and Hasan Nouri in 
Section 4). On the other hand, sand and gravel operators can help by removing 
unwanted sand and gravel from reservoirs and improved flood channels, although 
it may cost more than digging a large pit in a river bottom. Different 
institutional arrangements could well be used to encourage operators to use 
more surplus sed-iments and fewer riverbed excavations. 
Flood Hazard Zoning and Proper Hillside Development Ordinances 
Ordinances to control development are certainly worthy preventive 
measures, but they generally are used much too little. Ordinances to control 
developments in identified flood hazard areas that incorporate the federal ' 
requirements of FEMA would prevent or reduce damages from floods up to a 
100-year flood. 
As discussed above, the City of Los Angeles has adopted successful codes 
for controlling hillside development to prevent landslides. The National 
Flood Insurance Program strongly seeks to reduce hazards and discourages 
rebuilding of washed-out structures in the same hazardous locations. 
Communities must adopt and enforce meaningful hazard mitigation plans in order 
for their residents to be eligible for flood insurance (see Dale Peterson's 
paper in Section 8 ) .  
Flood Insurance 
Flood insurance, administered by FEMA, provides a sharing of risks and 
pays for damages. The premiums will be based on the claims experienced over 
many years. The cost of further structural measures can then be compared with 
the money saved on insurance premiums (i.e., the benefits). The flood 
insurance program is growing, but the need to prepare maps of hazard zones, 
especially involving sediment or mudflow damage, has slowed it down. 
Better Coordination of Local, State, and Federal Objectives and Act iv i t ies  
Coordination among the various levels of government would lead to improved 
flood control and faster settlement of intergovernmental transactions, such as 
for federal disaster assistance to local governments (see the papers by Ronald 
Robie, Dale Peterson, and Donald Tillman in Section 8 ) .  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Although the region avoided a catastrophe of major proportions in the 
recent flood years, it would be worthwhile to continue research, using these 
recent flood experiences, on a variety of topics to improve our flood control 
systems and mitigate hazards. Topics for additional research are listed below. 
1. Long-range weather forecasting. 
2. Occurrence of cells of especially intense rainfall. 
3. Effects of urbanization on flood peaks. 
4. Computer programs for better real-time numerical flood forecasting for 
major rivers, using telemetered data. 
5. Real-time determination of optimum reservoir release strategies during 
a flood. 
6. Adequacy of the design criteria for levees, especially for scour 
protection at the toe. 
7. Mechanics of landslides and mudflows, including evaluation of hazards 
for insurance and mitigation programs. 
8. Detailed case studies of rainfall, runoff, and debris flow for 
selected small canyons in the San Gabriel and Santa Monica mountains in order 
to understand the responses of small watersheds better and to help assess 
risks on alluvial fans, manage the watersheds, and operate (or design) debris 
basins. 
9. Controlled burning of small portions of watersheds on a rotating 
schedule as a means to reduce the severity of wildfires and ensuing floods and 
debris flows. 
10. Techniques to control bed and bank erosion in streams with erodible 
beds when they are "starved' for sediment. 
11. Benefits and costs of various combinations of structural and 
nonstructural components of an overall system for reducing damage, loss of 
life, and personal injury and for sharing the residual risks through insurance 
and disaster relief. 
12. Governmental institutions and regulations needed to reduce hazards 
and future damages through mapping of areas subject to flooding, debris flows, 
and landslides and through controlling developments in these areas. 
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METEOROLOGIC AND OCEANOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS FOR THE ENHANCEMENT 
OR SUPPRESSION OF WINTER RAINS OVER CALIFORNIA 
by Jerome Namias 
This paper describes some coupled atmosphere-ocean systems that  have 
led to  excessive or def ic ient  winter rains over much of California. These 
systems are slow changing and of large scale, of ten embracing the great 
North Pacific gyres and much of the North Pacific, and involve the North 
Pacific anticyclone, the Aleutian low, and the associated j e t  streams and 
long waves i n  the upper wester l i e s ,  In  d i f ferent  winters the atmospheric 
systems usually depart from their  normal position and orientation, so that 
the character of the a i r  masses deployed by them changes markedly between 
winters. In  turn these wind and weather systems a l t e r  the extraction of 
heat from the ocean and i t s  vert ical  and horizontal advection, thus resulting 
i n  substantial sea szcface temperature (SST) anomalies. These anomalies of ten 
penetrate to  a couple of hundred meters and span areas as large as one fourth 
of the North Pacific. Therefore thgy const i tute  vast heat reservoirs for the 
overlying atmosphere. Since the time constant of the upper-layer oceanic 
thermal patterns i s  an order of magnitude slower than the overlying weather 
patterns, the signature of an abnormal ocean of ten las t s  for months, seasons, 
and sometimes years. 
With the proper reinforcement from atmospheric patterns, these oceanic 
thermal reservoirs can feed back to  maintain and amplify an abnormaZ 
a-tmospheric pattern. This kind of interaction seems to  have taken place 
strongly during the winters of 1980, 1978, and 1969. I n  fact, the character- 
i s t i c  rain-enhancing SST patterns were f i r s t  generated i n  antecedent seasons. 
Details of these cases are demonstrated with the help of synoptic charts 
showing atmospheric and SST fields.  
Jerome Namias is Research Meteorologist with the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography in La Jolla, California. 
Note: My thanks go to Daniel Cayan for editorial assistance, Madge 
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by the National Science Foundation's Office of Climate Dynamics under Contract 
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Contract No. NOAA04-8-M01-188, and the Department of Water Resources under 
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INTRODUCTION 
The precipitation regime over California is extremely complex. This 
complexity is associated with great geographic differences in the state, 
including coastal and orographic influences, seasonal variations, and other 
factors. Superimposed on this spatial and regular seasonal variability are 
surprisingly large interannual variations in precipitation. While there is no 
simple explanation for these interannual variations, research over the past 
decade indicates that they are associated with large-scale (almost 
hemispheric) aberrations in the general circulation of the atmosphere and with 
concomitant variations in the thermal characteristics in the upper layers of 
the ocean--perhaps the first 300 to 400 m (see Bjerknes, 1969; Namias, 1975; 
Newell, 1979). This paper presents evidence that the coupled ocean-atmosphere 
system modulates rainfall over much of California. In this vein some - 
suggestions will be given for the enhancement or suppression of recent winter 
rains. 
MACROSCALE PHYSICAL PROCESSES ASSOCIATED WITH CALIFORNIA PRECIPITATION 
As with most temperate-latitude areas, precipitation in California is 
primarily associated with ascending air motion while dryness is associated 
with subsiding air. Ascending air currents produce the well-known adiabatic 
cooling of air, while subsiding motions result in adiabatic heating. After 
condensation is reached in ascending air, latent heat is liberated and the 
vertical speed of ascending parcels often increases by two orders of 
magnitude--from centimeters per second to meters per second. A central 
question arises as to how these ascending and descending air motions are 
brought about. Obviously, one effect is introduced by orographic lifting of 
moist air from the Pacific by coastlines and mountains. Occasionally, air 
from the continent is forced westward down the mountains, resulting in 
descending motion and suppressed precipitation. One could estimate the amount 
of precipitation by knowing the component of air flow from the Pacific onto 
California. An additional influence is the complicating vertical motions 
introduced by cyclonic storms, for it is along the fronts of these storms that 
the strongest vertical motions are usually found. A good deal of California's 
and the West Coast's precipitation falls from unstable air masses flowing into 
these cyclones. If these air masses are statically unstable (rapid decline of 
temperature with elevation), ascending motion takes place in convective cells 
that can give rise to intense showers. Strong inversions or marked vertical 
stability makes substantial precipitation less likely. This situation is 
frequently associated with anticyclonic circulations and subsidence, and ' 
sometimes leads to drought. 
Figure 1 shows the strong dependence of winter rainfall over the southern 
California coastal area on the pressure distribution in the lower atmosphere. 
This chart shows that heavy precipitation over southern California is closely 
related to sea level pressure over the Pacific in the sense that low pressure 
off the coast of central California, and, indeed, out to about 140%, is 
strongly correlated with southern California precipitation. Also, it shows 
that heavy precipitation over southern California is associated with higher 
than normal pressure in the area west of about 140%. These lines of equal 
FIGURE 1 Lines of equal correlation (drawn for each 0.10 with 
centers labeled) between precipitation in southern California (heavy 
shaded area) and sea level pressure (SLP) elsewhere as computed from 
144 winter months (Decembers, Januarys, and Februarys). Arrows show 
anomalous component of geostrophic wind flow when precipitation is 
heavy. 
correlation can also be associated with prevailing flow in the lower 
atmosphere, as shown by Stidd (1954). Thus Figure 1 indicates that the 
optimum case for heavy precipitation involves an anomalously strong 
southwesterly component of air flow from the offshore coastal waters and an 
anomalously strong north to south component in the remainder of the eastern 
Pacific. Since the northerly component usually brings cold air and the 
southwesterly component brings warm air, the figure suggests that appreciable 
temperature contrast (baroclinicity) is associated with the storms. It also 
suggests that the orographic effects operating on the southwesterly air stream 
are ideally placed to enhance ascending motion. If, on the other hand, the 
-0.70 correlation area is associated with high pressure, then reverse arrows 
would show an anomalous anticyclonic system with descending motion (Santa Ana 
conditions) in southern California. In this case low-pressure systems would 
lie in the domain of positive correlations in the east-central Pacific. 
In most cases of abnormally wet or abnormally dry winters, the concept 
just stated can be verified. From a pragmatic standpoint of long-range 
forecasting, these concepts stress that one must first predict the anomalous 
flow pattern in the atmosphere before hoping to estimate the precipitation 
distribution. 
This problem, essentially one of causality, will be addressed in the 
subsequent sections. 
SPACE AND TIME SCALES OF ATMOSPHERIC AND OCEANIC TIMl3-AVERAGED SYSTEMS - 
The spatial patterns of sea surface temperature (SST) and 700 mb height 
(or sea level pressure) are highly coherent. For example, Figure 2 shows the 
space scales of 700 mb height and sea surface temperature for the North 
Pacific, with values at each 5O intersection correlated with the central 
diamond values. This figure shows the high spatial coherence in both air and 
sea patterns and the similarity of the correlation fields for these elements. 
The characteristic dimensions of both air and sea anomalies are roughly one 
third to one half the size of the North Pacific. This coherence is largely 
the result of large-scale effects of long waves (Rossby waves) in the 
atmosphere, which are closely coupled to the underlying SST patterns. The 
coupling results from several, often synergistic, factors that come into play 
when cold, dry air currents extract large amounts of sensible and latent heat 
from the ocean and create regions of upwelling (in cyclones) and downwelling 
(in anticyclones). Anomalous surface Ekman drifts of warm or cold water also 
contribute to produce anomalies. we shall have more to say about this 
coupling later on. 
As for time scales, a striking indication of the differing time scales in 
the ocean and the atmosphere is afforded by Figure 3. The patterns of sea 
surface temperature, sea level pressure, and 700 mb height were autocorrelated 
at discrete lags of 1 to 12 months by using standardized anomalies computed 
for each 5O square for each month of each of the 20 years 1947-66. The 
resulting correlations give a measure of the degree of similarity of the 
anomaly patterns for one month to any other month. Figure 3 shows that the 
upper ocean retains its anomalous temperature pattern for a much longer time 
than the atmosphere retains its pressure pattern, and thus the ocean can 
provide a heat storage memory to influence the overlying atmosphere at a later 
date. To a large extent this strong pattern autocorrelation in the sea is a 
result of the high specific heat of water, the substantial depth of anomalies 
(often below 200 m), and slow ocean currents. 
The most important thing to note in this figure is the long time constant 
for SST patterns relative to 700 mb contour patterns. This difference means 
that the ocean, having a long time scale, could serve as a reservoir or memory 
for the relatively fast-changing atmosphere. That is, once. the upper thermal 
structure is disturbed relative to normal, it might retain this abnormal 
FIGURE 2 Contemporaneous correlations between 40°~, 170% (diamond), 
and elsewhere for 700 mb heights (upper) and sea surface temperature 
(lower). Values are computed from about 20 years of monthly mean data. 
Shaded areas represent correlations exceeding the one percent level of 
significance, with positive correlation stippled and negative correlation 
patched. 
MONTHS LAG 
FIGURE 3 Overall autocorrelations of standardized values of monthly 
mean sea surface temperature, 700 mb height, and sea level pressure 
determined from a 5O grid of points covering the North Pacific 
(north of 20%) during the 20-year period 1947-66. 
pattern for several months and thereby encourage the atmosphere to return to 
an abnormal track. We shall give illustrations of this phenomenon in this 
report . 
SOME AIR-SEA FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RECENT WET WINTERS 
The extreme precipitation observed in California during the winter of 
1979-80 was associated with extreme patterns of both atmospheric temperature 
and sea surface temperature. Figure 4 shows in its lower portion the observed 
anomalous components of 700 mb height and the associated SST patterns for this 
winter. The very large negative departures from normal over much of the 
eastern Pacific imply frequent and intense storminess in an area normally 
dominated by the North Pacific anticyclone. It also shows that the air 
influencing much of California frequently arrived with a southerly component, 
indicating the advection of tropical air. (More about the characteristics of 
the individual storms is presented in subsequent papers.) The view in Figure 
4 is the entire winter mean and thus only the statistical aggregates of the 
storms. Coupled to the highly anomalous atmosphere is the anomalous SST 
pattern over the eastern Pacific. A strong gradient of sea surface 
temperature appears between the warm eastern Pacific and the cold water to its 
west. The theory proposed is that not only did the atmosphere influence the 
sea but, equally important, the sea influenced the overlying atmosphere by 
encouraging the development of storms in the contrasting area between the cold 
and warm water. This implies that the water imparted its heat rapidly to the 
overlying air and produced a zone of enhanced baroclinicity on which storms 
could feed. 
3 1 
It has been shpwn in many papers (see, e.g., Namias, 1975) that the 
contemporaneous coupling between air and sea can be captured qualitatively by 
the use of stepwise multiple regression. In this case one might ask the 
following questions: 
1. Given the atmospheric anomalies in 700 mb height distribution 
indicated in the lower half of Figure 4, what would be the associated SST 
pattern? 
2. Given the SST pattern observed in the lower part of Figure 4, what 
would be the associated 700 mb anomalous pattern? 
Both these questions are answered in the top part of the figure (labeled 
"specified"). From these specifications it is seen that both the atmospheric 
patterns and sea-surface temperatures are similar though not precisely the 
same as observed. The conclusion is that - if one knew either pattern, the sea 
surface temperature or the 700 mb height, a good estimate of the other pattern 
could be made. Because of the longevity of the sea surface temperature 
relative to the upper-level contour patterns, it might be easier to predict 
the SST pattern. In this case, as in others studied, the SST patterns were 
indeed remarkably similar to one another not only during the winter months of 
December, January, and February 1979-80 (Figure 5) but also for the antecedent 
months, September, October, November, and December 1979 (Figure 6). This 
series of patterns may mean that the disturbed ocean thermal structure of the 
fall of 1979 remained roughly unchanged until late winter, when the westerlies 
and associated storms spread southward. At this time of southernmost 
displacement, storms could draw upon the enhanced atmospheric baroclinicity 
provided by the SST contrast. 
The fall of 1979 may thus have been one where the underlying ocean offered 
a clue as to the probability of extreme winter rains. It cannot be overly 
stressed, however, that in order for this coupling to take place both 
atmosphere and ocean must collaborate. In this case the collaboration was 
enhanced because of the seasonal forcing of storm tracks and westerlies 
southward in winter (particularly late winter), so they could draw upon the 
reservoirs of energy supplied by the underlying ocean. 
It i,s interesting to note the vertical temperature and humidity 
distributions for February 1980 and to compare these with the values for 
1977--a drought year. These soundings are shown in Figures 7A and 7B for San 
Diego along with the striking differences in rainfall between the two 
Februarys. A major difference appears in the static stability of the lowest 
layers 06 the atmosphere (below 850 mb). In the wet February of 1980 the low 
levels were much more unstable and more moist than in the dry year. This 
circumstance would make it easier for convective rains to occur than in 1977, 
when there was a much stabler lower layer with frequent inversions and 
appreciably dryer air. 
A similar pattern of sea surface temperature in collaboration with 
atmosphe~ic developments was observed in the heavy rains of the winter 
1968-69. The SST patterns antecedent to that winter are reproduced in Figure 
8. These figures show the strong temperature contrast between warm water in 
the extreme eastern Pacific and cold water to its west. 
FIGURE 4 Lower: SST anomaly 
(shaded) observed during the 
winter of 1979-80 and associated 
lines of departure from mean 
(DM) of 700 mb height (in tens 
of feet). Arrows indicate 
anomalous flow. Temperature 
deviations are drawn for 
intervals of greater than   OF 
above normal (+) and for greater 
than  OF below normal (-). 
Upper: The predicted 700 mb 
anomalies and SST anomalie's from 
observed conditions shown in the 
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FIGURE 6 Observed SST anomalies (+Is and -Is) and lines of honstant 
700 mb height for indicated months. 
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FIGURE 7 Average v e r t i c a l  temperature (A) and dew poin t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  (B) f o r  February 1980 (wet) and February 1977 (dry) a t  
San Diego, C a l i f o r n i a ,  a long with a s s o c i a t e d  r a i n f a l l  i n  these two 
months. 
CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 1976-77 WINTER DROUGHT AND THE FOLLOWING 
WINTER 
A s  seen  from F igu re  9,  t h e  1976-77 drought  a f f e c t e d  a l a rge  por t ion  of t h e  
West (see Namias, 1978). T h i s  was a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  anomalous p a t t e r n s  of sea  
s u r f a c e  temperature and 700 mb he igh t  oppos i t e  t o  those  observed i n  t he  two 
w e t  w in t e r s  d i scussed  above. The observed c o n d i t i o n s  of t he  winter of 1976-77 
a r e  shown i n  F igure  10. The mer id iona l ly  o r i e n t e d  SST p a t t e r n  and 700 mb 
anomalies sugges t  t h a t  storms would be forced  northward t o  Alaska while the 
West would be dominated by a n t i c y c l o n i c  cond i t i ons ,  subsidence, and consequent 
l a c k  of  r a i n s .  
Refer r ing  t o  F igu re  9,  it w i l l  be  noted t h a t  t h e  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  p a t t e r n  
changed d r a m a t i c a l l y  between t h e  win te r s  o f  1976-77 and 1977-78, when t h e  
drought was broken over t h e  e n t i r e  West ( s e e  N a m i a s ,  1979). Precursors  t o  
t h i s  impending break were ev iden t  a s  e a r l y  a s  t h e  f a l l  of 1977, when the  s i g n s  
of 700 mb anomalies were almost  oppos i t e  t o  t hose  observed i n  t h e  f a l l  o f  1976 
FIGURE 8 SST anomalies observed in the fall 
months of 1968. 
PERCENTAGE OF NORMAL PRECIPITATION 
Dec. 1975-Feb. 1976 Dec. 1976- Feb. 1977 Dee. 1977- Feb. 1978 Dec. 1978- Feb. 1979 Dee. 1979-Feb. 1980 ' 
PREDICTED FOR W l NTER ( Dec., Jan, Feb. ) 
FIGURE 9 Upper: Percentage of normal precipitation over the western third of the united 
States  during the past f ive  winters. Lower: Predicted precipi ta t ion i n  three equally 
probable classes--light (L or LT) , moderate (M) , and heavy (H) . 
OBSERVED 
FIGURE 10 Observed SST anomalies (+'s and -Is) and associated 700 mb 
anomalies (solid lines with arrows) for the winter of 1976-77. 
Virtually all of the western United States was dry during this winter, 
in association with this pattern. 
over most of the hemisphere (the pattern correlation between these falls was 
-0.41). Equally important was the fact that the antecedent SST anomaly ' 
distribution was also strikingly different . Using the stepwise multiple 
regression equations mentioned earlier, the probable winter 700 mb anomalies 
for 1977-78 were constructed at the end of September, October, and November 
1977. These prognostic charts are reproduced in Figure 11. Given the SST 
patterns observed in the fall months of 1977, when advected with normal ocean 
current movements, the subsequent winter's 700 mb specified pattern has large 
negative anomalies affecting the West Coast. From material such as shown in 
Figure 1 and descriptions thereof, we see that these are indeed heavy rain 
patterns for much of the West. Therefore the break in the drought had 
FIGURE 11 Estimated pattern of 700 mb departures from normal for the 
winter of 1977-78 based on initial conditions and projections made during 
September, October, and November 1977. 
antecedent  s i g n s  t h a t  were s t r o n g  enough t o  hazard a p r e d i c t i o n  of such a 
break. 
The SST p a t t e r n  observed f o r  t h e  1978 winter  is reproduced i n  F igure  12,  
where we aga in  s e e  t h e  c o n t r a s t  between warm water o f f  C a l i f o r n i a  and co ld  
water i n  t h e  c e n t r a l  Pacif ic--a  s t r o n g  g r a d i e n t  t h a t  could in f luence  t h e  
over ly ing  atmosphere and a c t  t o  e x c i t e  storms. 
FINAL REMARKS 
From t h e  s t u d i e s  desc r ibed  and referenced above, w e t  and d ry  win te r s  i n  
C a l i f o r n i a  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by s t r i k i n g l y  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  700 mb he igh t  
and s e a  s u r f a c e  temperature.  The contemporaneous r e l a t i o n s h i p  between monthly 
o r  seasonal  averages of  s e a  s u r f a c e  temperature and 700 mb he igh t  is 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  good s o  t h a t  a knowledge of  one f i e l d  can l e a d  t o  a p red ic t ion  of  
t h e  o the r  with f a i r  accuracy. S ince  t h e  atmosphere p e r s i s t s  much less than 
does t h e  SST f i e l d ,  it might be easier t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  SST anomaly f i e l d  and 
then  use s tepwise  m u l t i p l e  r eg re s s ion  equat ions  t o  o b t a i n  an e s t ima te  of  t h e  
a s soc i a t ed  700 mb f i e l d .  
However, t h i s  would s t i l l  r e q u i r e  success  i n  p red ic t ing  t h e  SST f i e l d .  I n  
r e c e n t  c a s e s  of w i n t e r s  wi th  very heavy o r  very l i g h t  p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  t h e  
an tecedent  p a t t e r n s  of  s e a  s u r f a c e  temperature have appeared s e v e r a l  months 
before  t h e  o n s e t  of winter .  I t  is poss ib l e  t h a t  t hese  p a t t e r n s ,  themselves 
formed by abnormal atmospheric events ,  could l i e  i n  wa i t  f o r  seasonal  changes 
i n  storm t r a c k s  and upper- level  w e s t e r l i e s  s o  a s  t o  produce g r e a t  
abnormal i t ies  i n  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  i n  t h e  subsequent winter .  
Obviously, such a complex cha in  of  even t s  r equ i r e s  a g r e a t  d e a l  of  f u r t h e r  
r e sea rch  before  h i g h l y  s u c c e s s f u l  p r e d i c t i o n s  a r e  poss ib le .  
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DAMAGE-PRODUCING WINTER STORMS OF 1978 AND 1980 
IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A SYNOPTIC VIEW 
by Carlos Garza and Craig Peterson 
The winter storms of 1977-78 and 1979-80 produced record ra in fa l l  and 
subsequent property damage and loss o f  l i f e .  However, the storm systems, 
from a synoptic point of view, were quite d i f ferent .  Although there were 
many storms during the 1977-78 winter, the storms of February 8-10 and 
February 28-March 5 produced the most ra in fa l l  and the greatest amount o f  
damage. The f i r s t  storm i s  seen as a case of strong, rapid development 
that  reached i t s  maximwn intensi ty  as it moved over southern California. 
A strong positive vortex imposed upon a frontal zone i s  shown t o  be the 
reasor? for strong cyctogenesis. This, combined with a j e t  stream that had 
been displaced t o  low lati tudes,  resulted i n  a Zarge precipitation event 
over southern California. The la t t e r  storms o f  1978 and also the ones i n  
2980 were a series of moderate-iztensity storms rather than a single large 
storm. In the days preceding the storms a large high-latitude block formed 
over the Bering Sea or over Alaska. This block produced a very stable long- 
wave pattern, allowing the storm track t o  remain a t  low lat i tudes for several 
days. The 1978 and 1980 stomns are discussed synoptically using 500 mb and 
surface analyses, s a t e l l i t e  imagery, and isohyetal. analyses. 
INTRODUCTION 
The winter seasons of 1977-78 and 1979-80 both produced rainfall far 
greater than average. Rainfall rates on all time scales approached--and in 
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some c a s e s  exceeded--past records .  S ince  it would be impossible  t o  d e s c r i b e  
s y n o p t i c a l l y  t h e  e n t i r e  winter  seasons o f  1977-78 and 1979-80, t h i s  paper w i l l  
focus its a t t e n t i o n  on what t h e  au tho r s  f e e l  were t h e  most damaging pe r iods  of 
those  seasons. 
WINTER STORMS OF 1977-78 
During t h e  1977-78 winter  season two storm per iods  produced v a s t  amounts 
o f  damage i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  The f i r s t  d i s a s t r o u s  storm occurred dur ing  
February 8-10, a l though t h i s  was imbedded i n  a r a i n y  per iod  t h a t  extended over  
February 5-14. Heavy r a i n s  f a l l i n g  over t h e  southern  San Joaquin  Va l l ey  and 
t h e  Los Angeles bas in  and t h e  surrounding mountains caused nea r ly  $100 m i l l i o n  
worth of damage ( inc lud ing  approximately $43 m i l l i o n  i n  Los Angeles and over 
$40 m i l l i o n  i n  sou the rn  San Joaquin  Val ley)  and were r e spons ib l e  f o r  20- 
dea ths .  The f loods ,  f l a s h  f loods ,  and mudslides r e s u l t e d  from r a i n f a l l  t o t a l s  
t h a t  exceeded 16 in .  a t  some mountain s t a t i o n s  ( f o r  example, L y t l e  Creek had 
16.40 in .  and C r y s t a l  Lake had 16.53 in . ) .  The i s o h y e t a l  a n a l y s i s  is shown i n  
F igu re  1. While t h e  ex t ens ive  damage was caused by t h e  heavy r a i n s  dur ing  
t h i s  per iod ,  o t h e r  r a i n s  dur ing  t h e  preceding two months had a l r eady  s a t u r a t e d  
t h e  soil  and thus  a l s o  con t r ibu ted  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  ex tens iveness  o f  t h e  damage. 
Normally, dur ing  t h e  win ter  season,  a s t r o n g  upper- level  wes t e r ly  flow can 
i n t r u d e  i n t o  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  p e r i o d i c a l l y .  However, t h a t  type  o f  p a t t e r n  
w i l l  l a s t  on ly  a few days a t  a t i m e .  I n  t h e  winter  of  1977-78 w e s t e r l i e s  
remained f u r t h e r  south  than  normal f o r  longer t ime periods.  The r e s u l t  was a 
s o u t h e r l y  s h i f t  i n  t h e  mean storm t r ack  and t h e r e f o r e  an abnormal amount of 
r a i n s  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  ~ u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  January and t h e  e a r l y  
p a r t  of February, a f a i r l y  s t a b l e  s i t u a t i o n  e x i s t e d ,  with a wel l -es tab l i shed  
upper-level r i dge  through t h e  western p a r t  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  through 
northwestern Canada. F igure  2 d e p i c t s  a s u r f a c e  p a t t e r n  t h a t  was t y p i c a l  o f  
what occurred dur ing  January  15-February 4--the passage of  fast-moving f r o n t a l  
systems wi th  only  t h e  t a i l  end of  t h e s e  moving through southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  
Most s u r f a c e  l o w s  dur ing  t h a t  time formed nor th  o f  40% and moved eastward. 
By February 5 a dynamic and s t rong  cold-core low, which had been 
developing over t h e  no r the rn  P a c i f i c ,  cont inued digging and progress ing  s lowly 
i n t o  t h e  western United S t a t e s  (Figure 3 ) .  The j e t  maximum was loca t ed  from 
near Santa  Barbara n o r t h e a s t  i n t o  Idaho. The combination of t h e  i n t e n s e  low 
and t h e  l a r g e  ampli tude o f  t h e  midwestern U.S. r i dge  r e s u l t e d  i n  a pronounced 
s p l i t  of t h e  flow, which was very  ev iden t  on February 7 (F igure  4 ) .  S t rong  
p e r t u r b a t i o n s  i n  t h e  upper- level  flow were noted a c r o s s  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  a t  
t h i s  t i m e .  
This  same type of  f low con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  unusual ly s t r o n g  development of 
t he  February 8-10 storm. I t  was a c l a s s i c  c a s e  of f r o n t a l  wave development. 
The wave was f i r s t  ev iden t  about  600 mi l e s  no r theas t  of Hawaii, and t h e  system 
moved eas t -no r theas t  a t  40 knots. I t  i n t e n s i f i e d  a t  f i r s t ,  then more r a p i d l y  
a s  it neared t h e  coas t .  During t h e  l a t e  a f te rnoon of t h e  n in th  t h e  s torm 
c e n t e r  moved t o  a p o s i t i o n  w e s t  of Los Angeles. Then, on t h e  t e n t h ,  it moved 
in land  (F igure  5 ) .  A t  5:54 a.m. (PST) on t h e  t e n t h  t h e  Los Angeles 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A i r p o r t  Weather Of f i ce  recorded a s e a  l e v e l  p re s su re  of 993.7 
mb, t h e  lowest  ever  recorded a t  t h a t  o f f i c e .  
FIGURE 1 R a i n f a l l  t o t a l s  f o r  t h e  s torm of February 8-10, 1978.  
FIGURE 2 Surface  weather p a t t e r n  of January 30 ,  1978. 
FIGURE 3 500 mb analysis for February 5, 1978. 
FIGURE 4 500 mb analysis for February 3,  1978. 
FIGURE 5 Surface  weather p a t t e r n  of February 10, 1978. 
Although f r o n t a l  wave development of t h i s  type  is n o t  uncommon i n  t h e  
e a s t e r n  P a c i f i c ,  it is unusual a t  such l o w  l a t i t u d e s .  Typica l ly ,  s e v e r a l  
s torms each year  move i n t o  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  from t h e  southwest,  b u t  t h e s e  
a r e  u sua l ly  c u t o f f  upper-level cyclones t h a t  weaken a s  they  move inland. The 
extreme southern  ex tens ion  of  t h e  upper- level  w e s t e r l i e s  during t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  
o f  February s e t  up cond i t i ons  t h a t  were more t y p i c a l  of  t h e  Washington o r  
Oregon c o a s t s  than  of  southern  Ca l i fo rn i a .  
There w a s  an important  p o i n t  t h a t  was a l s o  noted from t h i s  storm. Even 
though t h e r e  was widespread f looding ,  some f l a s h  f looding ,  and mudslides,  m o s t  
o f  t h e  r a i n f a l l  amounts from t h i s  storm were a t  o r  below those  a s soc i a t ed  with 
a 10-year storm. T h i s  means t h a t ,  given t h e  proper an tecedent  condi t ions ,  
s i m i l a r  f looding could be expected s e v e r a l  times dur ing  an  average l i f e t i m e .  
The o the r  s i g n i f i c a n t  storm per iod  o f  t h e  1977-78 winter  season occurred 
dur ing  February 28-March 5,  1978. Storms from t h i s  pe r iod  a l s o  had a 
devas t a t ing  e f f e c t  on t h e  Los Angeles bas in  and surrounding areas .  A s  i n  t h e  
s torm of February 8-10, t hese  caused cons ide rab le  damage and loss o f  l i f e .  
Eighteen persons were k i l l e d  and an es t imated  $120 m i l l i o n  worth of damage 
occurred. Over 300 homes were damaged i n  Los Angeles County alone. F igure  6 
shows t h e  i s o h y e t a l  a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h i s  per iod .  R a i n f a l l  amounts surpassed 20 
in .  i n  s e v e r a l  l o c a t i o n s .  Mount Wilson recorded 24.16 in .  during t h a t  six-day 
episode. 
FIGURE 6 R a i n f a l l  t o t a l s  f o r  t h e  storm of  February 28-March 5,  1978. 
While t h e  e a r l i e r  storm was developmental i n  na ture ,  t h e s e  l a t e r  storms 
were t h e  r e s u l t  o f  another  well-known phenomenon--the h igh - l a t i t ude  block. 
Toward t h e  end of  t h e  month of  February a s t rong  upper-level r i dge  i n  t h e  
e a s t e r n  P a c i f i c  had been bu i ld ing  northward i n t o  t h e  Gulf of Alaska. Minor 
p e r t u r b a t i o n s  from a low-pressure system i n  t h e  Bering Sea would s l i d e  over 
t h i s  r i d g e ,  caus ing  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  t o  remain w e l l  nor th  of  southern  
C a l i f o r n i a .  The 500 mb c h a r t  f o r  February 26 (F igure  7) dep ic t ed  t h e  g radua l  
push of t h e  r i d g e  i n t o  t h e  Gulf of  Alaska. The s u r f a c e  c h a r t  f o r  t h e  same 
d a t e  (Figure 8) showed a p a t t e r n  t h a t  had been noted dur ing  t h e  preceding t w o  
weeks, t h a t  is, a f a i r  weather p a t t e r n .  By t h e  twenty-eighth, however, t h e  
upper- level  r i dge  had s p l i t ,  and a wel l -es tab l i shed  block became entrenched 
over western Canada, w i th  a weaker r i d g e  s t r e t c h i n g  from Baja northwestward t o  
about  5 0 % ~  1 4 5 O ~  (Figure  9 ) .  A t rough,  s l i d i n g  under t h e  r idge ,  moved 
through southern  C a l i f o r n i a  on t h e  twenty-eighth, and l i g h t  r a i n s ,  on t h e '  
o rde r  of 0.5 in .  o r  l e s s ,  were experienced over most of  t h e  southern  p a r t  o f  
t h e  s t a t e .  On Wednesday, March 1, t h e  upper-level blocking p a t t e r n  p e r s i s t e d  
over  Alaska with a l o w  l oca t ed  j u s t  o f f  t h e  c o a s t  o f  southern  Ca l i fo rn i a .  A 
temperature trough was noted j u s t  west of  t h e  low, i n d i c a t i n g  continued 
development. The s u r f a c e  p a t t e r n  f o r  t h a t  per iod  showed an  i n t e n s e  s u r f a c e  
low (994 mb) moving in l and  j u s t  no r th  of  Los Angeles. Th i s  low even tua l ly  
weakened a s  it moved i n t o  Nevada. Another r a p i d l y  moving s torm en te red  
southern  C a l i f o r n i a  immediately t h e r e a f t e r .  R a i n f a l l  t o t a l s  recorded over t h e  
Los Angeles bas in  dur ing  t h e  24-hour per iod  ending a t  7 a.ni. Wednesday ranged 
from 0.75 in .  t o  n e a r l y  1.5 in .  The main f e a t u r e s  dur ing  t h i s  storm per iod  
FIGURE 7 500 mb a n a l y s i s  f o r  F e b r u a r y  26,  1978. 
FIGURE 8 S u r f a c e  weather  p a t t e r n  o f  F e b r u a r y  26 ,  1978. 
FIGURE 9 500 m b  a n a l y s i s  f o r  February 28, 1978. 
were t h e  r ap id  success ion  of  t h e  500 mb troughs through southern C a l i f o r n i a  
and t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  Alaskan block. 
By March 3 t h e  upper- level  block had been d i sp l aced  northwestward i n t o  t h e  
Bering Sea and rep laced  by a low over Alaska. A s u r f a c e  f r o n t ,  which proved 
t o  be the  l a s t  one i n  t h e  s e r i e s ,  moved i n t o  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  on t h e  
morning o f  March 4 (F igu re  10) and was accompanied by heavy r a i n ,  
thunderstorms, and g a l e  f o r c e  winds. La te  t h a t  a f te rnoon a r i dge  b u i l t  
r a p i d l y  a long  135%, s i g n a l i n g  a r e t u r n  t o  a f a i r  weather pa t t e rn .  
WINTER STORMS OF 1979-80 
During 1979-80 southern  C a l i f o r n i a  aga in  experienced a "wet" win ter .  
Heavy r a i n s  occu r r ing  over  t h e  nine-day period February 13-21 caused over  $270 
m i l l i o n  worth of damage and 18 dea ths .  Over 1,500 homes wete des t royed  o r  
damaged, and seven of  e i g h t  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  coun t i e s  were dec l a red  major 
d i s a s t e r  a r eas .  Storm t o t a l s  reached 30 in .  a t  va r ious  mountain s t a t i o n s  and 
exceeded 5 in .  i n  t h e  e n t i r e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  c o a s t a l  reg ion  (F igure  11). 
Again, a s  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  s torms of  t h e  1977-78 winter  season, t h e  
meteoro logica l  s i t u a t i o n  l ead ing  t o  t h e  s e r i e s  of  ra ins torms was the  r e s u l t  of 
a block t h a t  formed over  B r i t i s h  Columbia, causing a more sou the r ly  s torm 
t r ack .  T h i s  blocking p a t t e r n  allowed f o r  a s e r i e s  of s i x  storms t o  move 
through southern  C a l i f o r n i a  dur ing  February 13-21. The s torms a r e  shown i n  
FIGURE 10 Surface weather pattern o f  March 4 ,  1978. 
FIGURE 11 Tota l  r a i n f a l l  from the  storms o f  February 13-21, 1980. 
Figures  12-17. The f i r s t  s torm moved in land  on t h e  t h i r t e e n t h  (F igure  12) and 
was followed by a  sma l l  a r e a  of  p o s i t i v e  v o r t i c i t y  advec t ion  (PVA), which was 
noted j u s t  southwest  of t h e  main storm. 
Storm 2  a l s o  began a s  an  a r e a  of p o s i t i v e  v o r t i c i t y  advect ion (Figure 
13 ) .  A f r o n t a l  band was noted j u s t  south  of t h e  PVA a r e a ,  and storm 3 could 
be seen a s  a wave on t h i s  f r o n t a l  band, l oca t ed  west of  storm 2. The second 
storm moved in land  on t h e  f i f t e e n t h ,  and t h e  proximity o f  t h e  f r o n t a l  band t o  
t he  storm con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  heavy r a i n s  experienced t h a t  day. Twelve hours  
l a t e r  s torm 3 moved in land  (F igu re  1 4 ) ,  with a  s t rong  cyc lon ic  c i r c u l a t i o n  
noted northwest of  t h e  f r o n t a l  band. Storm 4  was b a r e l y  d i s c e r n i b l e  a t  t h e  
western edge of t h e  s a t e l l i t e  imagery. 
F igure  15  g i v e s  a  good overview of s torms 4, 5, and 6. Storm 4  had j u s t  
made l a n d f a l l  and was progress ing  eastward i n t o  Arizona. Storm 5, seen i n  t h e  
cen te r  o f  t h e  p i c t u r e ,  was i n t e n s i f y i n g  a s  it moved e a s t  a t  about  30 knots.  
Storm 6 ,  a t  t he  l e f t  o f  t h e  s a t e l l i t e  p i c t u r e ,  was a l s o  forming and moving 
slowly eastward. A s  storm 5 moved in l and  on t h e  twent ie th  a l a r g e  a r e a  of  
convect ive a c t i v i t y  i n t e n s i f i e d  j u s t  o f f s h o r e  from Los Angeles (F igure  1 6 ) ,  
t e s t i f y i n g  t o  t h e  extremely uns t ab le  cond i t i ons  dur ing  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  day. 
Storm 6 ,  seen  i n  t h e  extreme l e f t  of F igure  16, moved i n  on t h e  evening of t he  
twent ie th  and e a r l y  morning o f  t h e  twen ty - f i r s t .  However, t h i s  storm weakened 
a s  it moved onshore due t o  i n i t i a l  r i dg ing  cond i t i ons  commencing on the  
twenty- f i r s t .  F igu re  17 shows t h e  r idg ing  e f f e c t  on t h e  c louds  west o f  
southern C a l i f o r n i a .  The c louds  thinned o u t  a s  they  en te red  an a r e a  of 
s t a b i l i t y .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The winter s torms o f  1977-78 and 1979-80 caused ex tens ive  damage due t o  
f l a s h  f loods ,  f l oods ,  and mudslides. The even t s  of  t hese  p a s t  yea r s  and 
o t h e r s  seem t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  widespread d e s t r u c t i o n  is f a r  
g r e a t e r  i n  t he  win ter t ime than i n  any o t h e r  season. Moreover, winter  f looding  
should no t  be cons idered  r a r e  even t s  b u t  events  t h a t  can  occur s e v e r a l  t imes 
wi th in  a  persons ' s  l i f e t i m e .  And, a s  t h e  February 8-10 storm of  1978 proved, 
devas t a t ion  can occur even when p r e c i p i t a t i o n  amounts f a l l  below 10-year s torm 
t o t a l s .  
A s  f o r  t he  mechanisms t h a t  can  t r i g g e r  t h e  ex t ens ive  and p e r s i s t e n t  win ter  
r a i n s ,  t h e r e  a r e  two d i s t i n c t  types:  (1) a  wel l -es tab l i shed  h igh - l a t i t ude  
block and (2) a more s o u t h e r l y  storm t r a c k  t h a t  enhances $he developmental 
systems t o  move through southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  
FIGURE 1 2  S a t e l l i t e  p i c t u r e  of s torm 1 o n  February 13 ,  1980.  
FIGURE 1 3  Storms 2 and 3  o n  February 1 4 ,  1980 ,  as d e t e c t e d  by  sate l l i te .  
FIGURE 14 S a t e l l i t e  p i c t u r e  o f  storm 3 moving i n t o  Nevada, February 16,  1980. 
FIGURE 15 Storms 4 ,  5 ,  and 6 moving eastward on~February 17 ,  1980. 
FIGURE 16 Storm 5 approaching L o s  Angeles on February 20, 1980. 
FIGURE 17 Cloud shearing due to building upper-level r idge ,  February 21, 1980. 

HISTORICAL EXTREME ANNUAL RAINFALL DATA I N  CALIFORNIA 
by James D. Goodridge 
A l l  drainage engineering seems t o  be based around one central idea--the 
magnitude of the design storm. .This paper discusses three data se ts  that 
are used i n  California t o  compare historical precipitation events and t o  
develop design storms. The f i r s t  se t  i s  an annual series from 740 recording 
rain gages summarizing 16,000 station-years of data on the extreme annual 
values o f  precipitation for 5, 10, 15, 30, and 60 minutes and 2, 3, 6, 12, 
and 24 hours as well as the annual to ta ls .  The second i s  36,000 station- 
years of records from 1,450 nomecording precipitation gages with extreme 
annual values for 1, 2, 3, 4 ,  5, 6, 8 ,  10, 15, 20, 30, and 60 consecutive 
days as well as annual to ta ls .  The third i s  the maximum daily precipitation 
for each month a t  1,150 stations with 32,000 station-years of data. 
A s ta t i s t i ca l  evaluation of each record i s  made showing retw?n periods 
ranging from 2 t o  1,000 years. A method of selecting a frequency dis tr ibut ion 
i s  i l lus t ra ted .  Regional values of s t a t i s t i c a l  parameters are used i n  the 
analysis. This project i s  a progress report on the joint e f f o r t  of about 100 
public agencies who share data on California's weather. The data se ts  are 
updated annually, and the anaZysis and data are available on microfiche or 
magnetic tape. 
INTRODUCTION 
The C a l i f o r n i a  Department of  Water Resources is involved i n  a s se s s ing  
extreme r a i n f a l l  i n  C a l i f o r n i a  and i t s  frequency. These d a t a  a r e  used (1) f o r  
sp i l lway  s a f e t y  s t u d i e s  on 1,200 dams i n  t h e  s t a t e ,  ( 2 )  f o r  street and roadway 
dra inage  s t u d i e s ,  and (3)  f o r  des ign  of f lood  c o n t r o l  w o r k s .  These d a t a  a r e  
extremely u s e f u l  i n  comparing c u r r e n t  s torms wi th  h i s t o r i c a l  events .  
Three d a t a  f i l e s  conta in ing  extreme r a i n f a l l  d a t a  have been developed to  
a r c h i v e  these  d a t a .  Procedures f o r  r e t r i e v i n g  and ana lyz ing  t h e s e  d a t a  have 
been developed on a r eg iona l  bas i s .  
James D. Goodridge is S t a t e  C l ima to log i s t  wi th  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Department 
of Water Resources i n  Sacramento, C a l i f o r n i a .  
Our data files on extreme annual rainfall data are cooperative efforts of 
about 100 agencies who keep gages and share their rainfall data. 
The 13 regions used to define our extreme annual rainfall data files are 
shown in Figure 1. 
The California Department of Water Resources (1980, 1981) published two 
reports containing extreme annual precipitation data. The data on depth- 
duration-frequency of rainfall are divided into two data sets. One set is for 
recording rain gages. The other is for nonrecording once-a-day observations 
from the long-term climatological station network. 
There are records from 689 recording rain gages representing 15,417 
station-years of data. The extreme annual rainfall is indicated for ea-ch year 
for durations of 5, 10, 15, 30, 60, 120, and 180 minutes and for 6, 12, and 24 
hours. Return periods indicated are 2 to 10,000 years. These stations are 
located throughout the state but mainly in the urban areas. 
There are records from 853 nonrecording gages representing 31,055 
station-years of record for the maximum annual 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 15, 
20, 30, and 60 days as well as for the annual totals. Return periods of 3 to 
10,000 years are reported. 
Data on the extreme daily rainfall for each month was developed for 1,100 
California stations with 32,000 station-years of data. This new report will 
show extreme rainfall for periods of 2 to 1,000 years. 
ANALYSIS 
Analysis of extreme precipitation consists of determining four basic 
statistical parameters: the mean, the standard deviation, the coefficient of 
skew, and the coefficient of kurtosis. Certain statistical equations basic to 
the analysis are presented below. These are the equations of mean (X), 
standard deviation (S), coefficient of skew (g), coefficient of kurtosis (k), 
and coefficient of variation (CV): 
- 
where X = the magnitude of an event, x = X - X, and N = the number of events. 
FIGURE 1 ~ a j o r  drainage provinces and hydrographic u n i t s .  
The mean expresses the central tendency of the data set. The standard 
deviation measures the deviation from the mean. The skew shows the lack of 
symmetry, or lopsidedness, that occurs in a rainfall data set due to bounding 
by a lower limit at one end and by virtually no upper rainfall limit at the 
other. Kurtosis is used here to test for the appropriateness of various 
frequency distributions. The coefficient of variation measures the variation 
of the data set. 
RETURN PERIODS 
The computed return periods are the mean value plus a varying number of 
standard deviations. The number of standard deviations corresponding to a 
return period depends only on the coefficient of skew for the Pearson type I11 
distribution used here. Table 1 shows the general relationship. 
TABLE 1 Number of Standard ~eviations in Excess of Means Associated with 
Specific Return Periods 
Return Coefficient of Skew 
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 
(years) 
Source: Harter (1967) . 
The standard deviations in this analysis are expressed as coefficients of 
variations. The reason for this is the areal stability of coefficient of 
variation, which is shown in Figure 2. This procedure was reported in the 
British Flood Studies Report (Sutcliff et dl., 1975), as shown in Figure 3. 
One of the problems of this type of analysis is the abrupt differences in 
design values of statistical parameters in adjacent watersheds. An example is 
the 0.448 value of the coefficient of variation used in the region north of 
the Mono Lake drainage and the 0.584 value in the Mojave Desert, as shown in 
Figure 2. 1 
The stability of the coefficient of variation for various storm durations 
is shown in Figure 4. The monthly variation is illustrated in Figure 5. 
The choice of frequency distribution was based on the relationship between 
the coefficients of skew and kurtosis, as illustrated in ~igure 6 for annual 




FIGURE 2 C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  var iat ion  (above l i n e )  and skew (below l i n e )  
for  maximum annual one-day r a i n f a l l .  
FIGURE 3 An example o f  another  use of  r eg iona l  average va lues  of t h e  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  of v a r i a t i o n  (CV) and s k e w  (SK) ( S u t c l i f f  e t  a l . ,  1975).  
Upper va lues  = CV x 100; lower va lues  = SK. 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  was chosen f o r  use  i n  our  extreme p r e c i p i t a t i o n  s t u d i e s  based on 
t h e  skew-kurtosis graphs (Wu and Goodridge, 1976). The poor f i t  of t h e  d ry  
summer months with r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  Pearson type  I11 c r i t e r i a  is an  a r e a  needing 
f u r t h e r  s tudy  . 
EXTREME RAINFALL 
The records  o f  extreme annual  r a i n f a l l  f o r  C a l i f o r n i a  a r e  shown i n  Tables  
2, 3,  and 4. Table 2 shows t h e  extreme r a i n f a l l  f o r  5 minutes through 24 . 
hours  i n  each of t h e  13  major dra inage  provinces o u t l i n e d  i6 Figure  1. The 
g r e a t e s t  5-minute r a i n f a l l  t o t a l  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  was 1.17 in .  a t  Opid's Camp i n  
t h e  San Gabr i e l  Mountains on A p r i l  5, 1926. 
The extreme annual  r a i n f a l l  f o r  1 t o  60 consecut ive days i n  each major 
dra inage  province is l i s t e d  i n  Table 3. 
The maximum d a i l y  r a i n f a l l  f o r  each month and each major dra inage  province 
is shown i n  Table 4. 
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TABLE 2 Extreme Annual Short-Duration Rainfall (in.) 
Duration 
Drainage 












Note: Sample size was 655 stations for 14,632 station-years. 
TABLE 3 Extreme Annual Long-Duration Rainfall (in.) 
Duration Days 
Drainage 
Province 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 15 2 0 30 60 Annual 
State 24.92 36.34 36.94 37.34 37.60 43.15 49.20 52.00 54.86 84.72 88.03 90.35 . 174.40 
Note: Sample size was 853 stations for 31,055 station-years. 
TABLE 4 Maximum D a i l y  R a i n f a l l  for C a l i f o r n i a  ( i n . )  
Drainage 
Province Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept, Year 
Y 6.37 12.40 15.15 21.61 9.73 15.06 5.22 3.63 1.63 3.90 3.80 8.13 21.61 
Z 5.52 9.60 7.92 8.54 12.81 7.65 5.33 3.69 2.25 2.87 3.67 5.00 12.81 
State 13.79 12.40 15.34 21.61 20.00 15.06 6.90 6.32 5.48 5.96 4.00 9.02 21.61 
Note: Sample s i z e  was 1100 stations for 32,200 station-years. 
The heaviest 24-hour rainfall in California was the 26.12 in. recorded on 
January 22, 1943, at Hoegees in the San Gabriel Mountains of Los Angeles 
County at 2,650 ft. This station, which receives an average annual rainfall 
of 37 in., receives 64 percent of the annual total gage catch during the 60 
wettest days of the year. Maximum 24-hour precipitation for each drainage 
province and each month is shown in Figure 8. 
Extreme rains do not necessarily fall just where rain gages are located, 
just as some recorded rainfall extremes are for records that are not included 
in our summaries of extreme rainfall. The 8 in. of rain in 2.5 hours measured 
in Chiatovich Flat in the White Mountains by a traveler (Douglas Powell) who 
was carrying a rain gage illustrates this point. Some of these extreme events 
are shown in Figure 9. 
OUTLIERS 
The effect of extreme storms on the coefficients of skew and variation is 
minimized by areal averaging. Extreme storms, called "outliers,' do not seem 
to fit with the data sets in which they are found. An example is the 
September 24, 1939, storm at Indio in Riverside County, when 158 mrn (6.45 in.) 
fell in six hours (Pyke, 1975). Yet the mean annual rainfall at Indio is only 
19.25 mm (3.12 in.). 
Another example was the 140 mm (5.5 in.) that fell in Citrus Heights on 
October 12, 1962. The coefficient of variation of the maximum annual one-day 
rainfall of the 23-year record at Citrus Heights is 0.55 without the extreme 
storm of 1962, but 0.90 when it is included. 
The outliers have been included in the records contained in this paper so 
that their influence on the development of design storms will be f e l t .  I n  the 
past some analysts excluded outliers as a means of providing less costly 
drainage facilities. 
DESIGN STORMS 
Selecting a design storm using the procedures outlined here consists of 
using the mean storm plus a varying number of standard deviations in excess of 
the mean. A map of the once-in-a-1,000-year 24-hour rainfall for California 
is shown in Figure 10 as a percentage of the mean annual rainfall. This 
once-in-a-1,000-year storm varies from 200 percent of the mean annual rainfall 
in the desert area near the Salton Sea to less than 20 percent of the mean. 
annual precipitation in the more humid areas of the state. ' 
STATION-YEAR METHOD 
The procedure used here for averaging coefficients of variation, skew, and 
kurtosis is essentially a variation of a station-year method. There was an 
extensive discussion of this method in a paper by Katherine Clark-Hafstad 
(1942). Estimates of frequencies of rare events by a station-year approaoh 
have a weakness in that there is some interdependence in the data from 
adjacent stations. Studies of the deteriorating determination coefficients of 
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FIGURE 10 Once-in-a-1,000-year 24-hour storms. 
rainfall from extreme storms have shown that the effective amount of data can 
be estimated. These studies were not done for this report because all of the 
available data have been used in the development of our regional coefficients. 
The main object of this paper is to describe the data sets and the extreme 
values. These data are readily available to those who need their own analysis. 
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IYETURN PERIODS OF 1977-80 PRECIPITATION I N  SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA 
by C h a r l e s  B. Pyke 
During the 2977- 78, 2978- 79, and 2979-80 winter ra in fa l l  seasons i n  
southern California and Arizona there were a number of rare precipitation 
amounts on time scales ranging from a few minutes t o  an ent ire  season. 
Between mid-December 2977 and mid-March 2978 most southern California and 
Arizona stations received 250 t o  400 percent of t he i r  nomal precipitation. 
The return periods for the to ta l s  observed over durations from 70 t o  200 days 
exceeded 20 years a t  many stations and ranged as high as 165 years. Short- 
duration high-intensity ra in fa l l  a t  several southern California stations i n  
early 2978 also exceeded ZOO-year return periods. In  January 2978 ra in fa l l  
amounts of 2.2 i n .  or more i n  25 minutes were observed a t  widely separated 
southern California stations,  with return periods running as high as  3,300 
years. I n  2978-79 there were a number of re la t ive ly  rare three-month ra in fa l l  
t o ta l s  i n  Arizona, but re la t ive ly  few highly unusual short-duration high- 
in tens i ty  events were observed. In 2979-80 most of the unusual precipitation 
s t a t i s t i c s  centered around the storm period of February 23-22, during which 
many stations exhibited 20-day to ta l s  approaching, and i n  a few cases 
exceeding, t he i r  normal annual precipitation, with return periods exceeding 
200 years i n  some instances. 2ijo high-intensity s t o m s  i n  1980 also exhibited 
return periods exceeding 200 years a t  some s tat ions for durations of  four t o  
eight hours. 
INTRODUCTION 
During t h e  y e a r s  1977-80 t h e r e  were a s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  u n u s u a l l y  
heavy p r e c i p i t a t i o n  amounts a t  v a r i o u s  s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona 
s t a t i o n s  on time scales rang ing  from a few minu tes  to a n  e n t i r e  season.  Most 
o f  t h e s e  o c c u r r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  w i n t e r  months, p r i m a r i l y  December through March, 
b u t  a few o f  t h e  s h o r t e r - d u r a t i o n  e v e n t s  were observed  d u r i n g  t h e  summer and 
f a l l .  
Fol lowing t w o  y e a r s  o f  s e v e r e  d r o u g h t  from 1975 th rough  much o f  1977, t h e  
w i n t e r  r a i n f a l l  s e a s o n s  o f  1977-80 were a l l  c o n s i d e r a b l y  w e t t e r  t h a n  normal in  
C h a r l e s  B. Pyke is M e t e o r o l o g i s t  w i t h  t h e  U.S.  Army Corps  o f  Engineers  i n  
LOS Angeles ,  C a l i f o r n i a .  
the southwestern United States, with several especially wet periods. Between 
mid-December 1977 and mid-March 1978 most southern California and Arizona 
stations received from 250 to 400 percent of their normal precipitation. 
Several very heavy storms also occurred in December 1978 and January 1979, 
especially in Arizona. Still another unusually wet period occurred in 
southern California and Arizona from early January through early March 1980, 
with a strong concentration of very heavy storms from February 13 through 22. 
LIST OF PRECIPITATION EVENTS 
A listing of many of the major heavy precipitation events that occurred in 
southern California and Arizona from 1976 through 1980 can be found in Table 
1. This listing includes not only the numerous unusually heavy rainfall 
events of the seasons of 1977-80 but also those of the period beginning -in 
1976 that led up to these unusual three seasons. All precipitation events 
listed in the table are single-station measurements. 
The table lists for each event its date or dates, the name of the station 
at which the precipitation was measured, the amount of precipitation, the 
duration of the event, the computed return period, and other information, as 
outlined at the end of the table. Note that many of the return periods listed 
in the table are very large. For computed return periods much greater than 
the periods of record, the variance of the estimates becomes, of course, very 
large. Nonetheless, the large values of the return periods are retained in 
the table for purposes of comparison. 
Two sets of sources for the statistical computations, including the return 
periods, were used. For stations in California the California Department of 
Water Resources Bulletin No. 195 (Goodridge, 1976a,b) was used: Volume I for 
durations up to and including 24 hours, Volume I1 for durations greater than 
24 hours. Some interpolations between the statistics for the published 
durations and return periods were required. For events that occurred at 
stations for which return period computations are published in Bulletin NO. 
195, direct computations of the return periods were performed and tabulated, 
as were computations of the ratio of the event precipitation amount to the 
100-year precipitation amount for the corresponding duration (column 6) and 
the number of standard deviations of the event precipitation above the mean 
for the corresponding duration (column 7). For these stations the number of 
years of precipitation record used in the computation of statistics in 
Bulletin No. 195 is also listed (column 1). For events that occurred at 
stations or locations for which return period statistics are,not published in 
Bulletin No. 195, estimates of the return period of the event, plus estimates 
of the statistics tabulated in columns 6 and 7, were made based on statistics 
published in Bulletin No. 195 for nearby stations. 
For stations in Arizona the National Weather Service publication NOAA 
Atlas 2 (Miller et al., 1973) was used for precipitation statistics at 
durations up to and including 24 hours. The 2-, 3-, 4-, 7-, and 10-to-1-day 
ratios from the U.S. weather Bureau (predecessor to the National weather 
Service) publications Technical Paper No. 40 (Hershfield, 1961) and Technical 
Paper No. 49 (Miller, 1964) were used to extend the statistics computed from 
TfiBLE 1 Some Extreme P r e c i p i t a t i o n  Events i n  Southern Ca l i fo rn ia  and Arizona, 1976-80 (see  end of 
t a b l e  f o r  d e f i n i t i o n s  of symbols; s t a t i o n s  a r e  i n  Ca l i fo rn ia  except  where noted) 




February 8 Haines Canyon-Upper 
September 10  M t .  Laguna 
Borrego County Road S t a t i o n  
September 23 Borrego County Road S t a t i o n  
Hayf ie ld  Pumping P l a n t  
October 1 San t a  Maria P u b l i c  Works 
Go le t a  
October 22 Jamul 
1977 
-
August 1 5  Yuma Experiment S t a t i o n ,  
Arizona 3,200 1.80 - - 2 
September 10 nea r  Thousand Palms - - R 4.5 2 h  * 2-3E - - I 
October 6-9 nea r  Nogales,  Arizona -- WS 12.0 4 d x 2.11 - - 2 
1977-78 
December 25- 
March 6 Opid ' s  Camp 58 LA 71.64 7 1 d  155 1.04 3.25 I1 
December 25- San ta  Barbara Flood Cont ro l  
March 31  D i s t r i c t  - - SB 38.97 9 7 d  165E 1.08E 3.71E I1 
1978 
-
January  3 Oceanside 
January 10  San t a  Barbara Flood Cont ro l  
D i s t r i c t  10 SB 1.22 1 5  m 3,300 1 .51  5.87 I 
January 16  Fa l l b rook  32 SD 1.2 1 5  m 1 ,000 1.36 5.38 I 






















Haines Canyon-Upper 3 6 
Beverly Hills - - 
Rock Springs, Arizona - - 





Palomar Mountain Observatory 36 
Crown King, Arizona -- 
Indio State Division of 
Forestry 24 
Indio Date Garden 7 3 
E 1 Sinor e 26 
Los Angeles-Hancock Park 4 2 
Fillmore Fish Hatchery 18 
Sepulveda Dam 2 9 
Flinn Springs 11 
El Capitan Dam 18 
near. Franklin, Arizona - - 
Note: Explanations of symbols. 
Number of years of record. 
Source of 1976-80 precipitation data: 
CD = Climatological Data (U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
1976-80a) . 
CE = U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
GS = U.S. Geological Survey. 
- 
HP = Hourly Precipitation Data (U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 1976-80b). 
LA = Los Angeles County Flood Control District. 
R = Riverside County Flood Control and Water Conservation District. 
SB = Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District. 
SD = San Diego County Department of Sanitation and Flood Control. 
V = Ventura County Flood Control District. 
WS = Unpublished data provided by National Weather Service. 
Precipitation amount in inches. 
Duration of precipitation event (m = minutes, h = hours, d = days). 
Estimated return period in years. 
Ratio of event precipitation amount to the 100-year precipitation for the 
corresponding duration. 
Number of standard deviations above the mean. 
Source of precipitation statistics: 
I = Bulletin No. 195, Volume I (Goodridge, 1976a). 
I1 = Bulletin No. 195, Volume I1 (Goodridge, 1976b). 
2 = NOAA Atlas 2 (Miller et al., 1973) for durations to 24 hours. 
2-, 3-, 4-, 7-, and 10-to-1-day ratios from Technical Paper No. 40 
(Hershf ield, 1961) and Technical Paper No. 49 (Miller, 1964) . 
Estimated return period 2 10,000 years, according to published statistics. 
Not available. 
Gage overflowed. Value listed may have been exceeded. 
Value listed is'an estimate. 
t h e  24-hour va lues  of NOAA A t l a s  2. Since t h e  r e t u r n  per iod  computations i n  
t h e s e  U.S. weather Bureau and Nat iona l  Weather Serv ice  pub l i ca t ions  a r e  
performed e n t i r e l y  on a  r eg iona l  b a s i s  i n s t ead  of  on an ind iv idua l  s t a t i o n  
b a s i s ,  no t a b u l a t i o n s  of  t h e  number of yea r s  of  record f o r  i nd iv idua l  s t a t i o n s  
(column 1) o r  f o r  s tandard  d e v i a t i o n s  (column 7) a r e  ava i l ab l e .  
A t  t h e  Yuma Experiment S t a t i o n  i n  Arizona, l oca t ed  very  near t h e  Colorado 
River border between C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona, s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  both i n  
B u l l e t i n  No. 195 f o r  t h e  nearby Yuma Ai rpo r t  and i n  NOAA A t l a s  2. Thus f o r  
t h e  August 15 ,  1977, p r e c i p i t a t i o n  event  a t  t h e  Yuma Experiment S t a t i o n ,  t h e  
r e t u r n  per iod  and o t h e r  s t a t i s t i c s  have been computed, us ing  both B u l l e t i n  NO. 
195 and NOAA A t l a s  2 ,  with understandably somewhat d i f f e r i n g  r e s u l t s .  
A d i scuss ion  of some of t h e  unusual r a i n f a l l  events  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  t a b l e  
w i l l  fol low l a t e r  i n  t h i s  paper. 
OCEANIC AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
Some of t h e  ocean ic  and meteoro logica l  cond i t i ons  t h a t  were r e spons ib l e  
f o r  t h e  unusual ly heavy p r e c i p i t a t i o n  during t h e  yea r s  1977-80 have a l r eady  
been d iscussed  i n  t h e  papers  by Jerome Namias and by Car los  Garza and Cra ig  
Peterson.  A s  noted by t h e s e  au tho r s ,  t h e  primary atmospheric p a t t e r n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  seasons,  e s p e c i a l l y  those  o f  1977-78 and 
1979-80, was a  low- la t i tude  j e t  s t ream and storm t r ack  t h a t  impinged upon 
southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona from t h e  west and southwest. This  p a t t e r n  
appears  t o  have r e s u l t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t ,  from anomalous s e a  su r f ace  
temperatures  over t h e  North P a c i f i c .  A trough of  low p res su re  west o r  
southwest of southern  C a l i f o r n i a  a l s o  tended t o  recur  p e r s i s t e n t l y  during 
t h e s e  years ,  inc luding  t h e  1978-79 season. The c i r c u l a t i o n  around t h i s  low 
p e r i o d i c a l l y  brought l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of  warm and very moist t r o p i c a l  a i r  i n t o  
t h e  southwestern u n i t e d  S t a t e s  from o u t  of t h e  e q u a t o r i a l  and subequa to r i a l  
P a c i f i c  Ocean south  and southwest of  t h e  region. I t  was i n  t hese  surges  of 
unusual ly moist a i r  flow t h a t  a  number of t h e  extremely heavy sho r t -  and 
intermediate-durat ion p r e c i p i t a t i o n  even t s  of  1977-80 occurred. 
COMMENCEMENT OF PATTERN 
Por t ions  of t h e  atmospheric  p a t t e r n s  t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  unusual concent ra t ion  
o f  heavy p r e c i p i t a t i o n  even t s  dur ing  1977-80 a c t u a l l y  began to develop i n  
e a r l y  1976, while  C a l i f o r n i a  and o the r  western s t a t e s  were i n  t h e  midst o f  a  
r a p i d l y  worsening drought--a drought t h a t  was t o  be t h e  mo$t severe  of r e c e n t  
decades. I n  e a r l y  1976 t h e  low- la t i tude  storm t r ack  from ac ros s  t h e  P a c i f i c  
had not  y e t  developed. On t h e  con t r a ry ,  an  extremely l a r g e  r idge  of  high 
p re s su re  p e r s i s t e d  on t h e  average over t h e  f a r  western United S t a t e s ,  sending 
the  P a c i f i c  storms f a r  t o  t h e  nor th  of  t h e  region. The drought  t h a t  p e r s i s t e d  
from 1975 through much of  1977 was extremely severe  i n  nor thern  and c e n t r a l  
C a l i f o r n i a  and only  somewhat l e s s  severe  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona. 
What p r e c i p i t a t i o n  t h e s e  southern  a r e a s  d i d  r ece ive  dur ing  t h e  middle and 
l a t t e r  p a r t  of t h e  drought  occurred a s  t h e  r e s u l t  of an occas iona l  
low-lat i tude upper- level  trough of low p res su re  t h a t  developed over o r  j u s t  
west of southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  Th i s  trough appears  t o  have been the  forerunner  
Z 
2 
of  t h e  trough t h a t x p e r s i s t e n t l y  recur red  o f f  t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  c o a s t  
dur ing  t h e  1977-80 seasons. 
Even though t h e  average seasonal  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and 
Arizona dur ing  t h e  drought yea r s  of 1975-77 w a s  l i m i t e d ,  t h e  presence o f  t h e  
rec,urring upper- level  trough, and t h e  i n f l u x  o f  mois t  t r o p i c a l  a i r  i n t o  t h e  
southwestern United S t a t e s  i n  t h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  around t h e  trough, r e s u l t e d  i n  
s e v e r a l  l o c a l l y  very  heavy p r e c i p i t a t i o n  even t s  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and 
Arizona, beginning i n  e a r l y  1976. For t h i s  reason t h e  l i s t i n g  o f  extreme 
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  even t s  f o r  t h e  1977-80 r a i n f a l l  seasons  has  been expanded 
backward t o  inc lude  the  major even t s  beginning i n  e a r l y  1976. 
WINTER AND SUMMER EVENTS 
I t  can be seen  i n  Table 1 t h a t  most of  t h e  unusual ly  heavy p r e c i p i t a t i o n  
even t s  l i s t e d ,  inc luding  a l l  o f  t h e  even t s  having d u r a t i o n s  of more than  four  
days,  occur red  dur ing  t h e  winter  months, December through March. There a r e ,  
however, a  few very prominent summer and f a l l  even t s  t h a t  occurred,  p r imar i ly  
dur ing  1976 and 1977. The major reason f o r  t h i s  appears  t o  be t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  upper-level t rough o f f  t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  c o a s t  and t h e  a s soc i a t ed  
i n f l u x  of very  mois t  t r o p i c a l  a i r  i n t o  t h e  southwestern United S t a t e s  were not  
confined t o  t h e  win ter  months bu t  i n s t ead  p e r s i s t e d  on and o f f  dur ing  t h e  
warmer seasons of  t h e  year .  Seve ra l  o f  t h e  major summer and e a r l y  f a l l  events  
l i s t e d  i n  t h e  t a b l e  occurred a s  t h e  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  r ecu r r ing  trough, 
whi le  o t h e r s  occurred  a s  t h e  consequence of  t r o p i c a l  storms from o f f  t h e  west 
c o a s t  of Mexico being caught  up i n  t h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  around t h i s  upper-level 
t rough and r a p i d l y  s t e e r e d  unusual ly f a r  northward i n t o  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  or 
Arizona. The even t s  of September 10, 1976, August 15, 1977, and October 6-9, 
1977, were a l l  d i r e c t l y  a s soc i a t ed  with such t r o p i c a l  storms. 
DISCUSSION 
I t  can  be seen  i n  Table 1 t h a t  a l l  o f  t h e  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  e n t r i e s  l i s t e d  a r e  
considered r a r e  events .  Only those  even t s  having r e t u r n  per iods  of 
approximately 40 t o  50 y e a r s  o r  g r e a t e r  were s e l e c t e d  f o r  t h i s  t a b l e .  Many of 
t h e  even t s  exceed 1,000 yea r s  i n  computed r e t u r n  per iod ,  according t o  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  and a  few appear g r e a t l y  to  exceed 10,000 years .  (An 
even t  wi th  a  r e t u r n  per iod  of  10,000 yea r s  should have approximately a one 
pe rcen t  chance o f  occurr ing  some time dur ing  t h e  next  10 years . )  
M course ,  cons ide rab le  argument can be advanced about  computed r e t u r n  
pe r iod  s t a t i s t i c s  such a s  those  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  t a b l e .  For one th ing ,  n o t  
enough is known about  t h e  na tu re  and magnitudes of  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  i n  very  major 
s torm even t s  o r  about  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of  such events  compared 
wi th  those  of  t h e  more common storm events .  I t  may be t h a t  very l a r g e  summer 
thunderstorms, t r o p i c a l  storms, and even some o f  t h e  g i a n t  winter  ra ins torms 
t h a t  occas iona l ly  a f f e c t  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona should r i g h t f u l l y  not  
be considered p a r t  o f  t h e  same popula t ion  a s  t h e  l e s s e r  s torms upon which t h e  
r eco rds  and t h e  computed r e t u r n  per iod  s t a t i s t i c s  must o f t e n  be based. No one 
r e a l l y  knows t h e  answers to t h e s e  ques t ions .  
For another  t h ing ,  even i f  t h e  t r u e  s t a t i s t i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n ( s )  of  t h e  
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  popu la t ion ( s )  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona was (were) 
known, t h e  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  r eco rds  a t  s t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  southwestern United S t a t e s  
a r e  n o t  n e a r l y  long enough f o r  one to be a b l e  to determine 1,000-year, l e t  
a lone  10,000-year, r e t u r n  pe r iods  meaningfully. The c a s e  of Cathedra l  C i t y  on 
J u l y  20, 1979, i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o i n t  very  g raph ica l ly .  I n  t h e  seven yea r s  of 
record  (1969-75 i n c l u s i v e )  used t o  determine t h e  r e t u r n  per iod  s t a t i s t i c s ,  no 
large-magnitude s torm had occurred.  I f  t h e  1976-80 seasons  had been included 
i n  t h e  record used i n  B u l l e t i n  No. 195, t h e  wet yea r s  o f  1977-80 i n  gene ra l  
and t h e  unusual ly heavy September 1976 and J u l y  1979 s torms i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
would have g r e a t l y  lowered t h e  r e t u r n  pe r iods  f o r  t h e  J u l y  20, 1979, event  a s  
listed i n  Table 1. 
A s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  is demonstrated i n  t h e  November 7,  1979, 
Camarillo-Adohr event ,  where r e t u r n  per iod  computations publ ished i n  B u l l e t i n  
N o .  195 based on t h e  18-year per iod  o f  record ,  1957-74 inc lus ive ,  would 
i n d i c a t e  a r e t u r n  per iod  f o r  t h e  event  o f  more than 10,000 years ,  while 
computations based on a  per iod  of  record through t h e  very  l a t e s t  a v a i l a b l e  
d a t a ,  including t h e  November 1979 event  i t s e l f ,  i n d i c a t e  a  r e t u r n  per iod  f o r  
t h a t  even t  of on ly  1,300 yea r s ,  according t o  t h e  Ventura County Flood Con t ro l  
District. 
Another i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e  can  be seen  i n  Ind io ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  dur ing  t h e  
per iod  February 14-22, 1980. A t  t h e  I n d i o  Date Garden (73 yea r s  of  record)  
a l l  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  s t a t i s t i c s ,  a s  publ ished i n  B u l l e t i n  No. 195, from t h e  mean 
o f  t h e  annual  n-day maximums (where n ranges from 1 t o  365) a l l  t h e  way t o  t h e  
computed 10,000-year and probable maximum p r e c i p i t a t i o n  va lues ,  a r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  higher  than  those  publ ished f o r  t h e  I n d i o  S t a t e  Div is ion  o f  
Fo res t ry  (SDF) s t a t i o n .  Thus f o r  a  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  event  of a  given magnitude 
a t  both I n d i o  s t a t i o n s ,  t h e  computed r e t u r n  per iod  should be smal le r  a t  the  
Date Garden than a t  t h e  SDF s t a t i o n .  I n  t h e  February 1980 storm per iod  it 
t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  SDF s t a t i o n  (normally t h e  d r i e r  s t a t i o n )  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
wetter i n  February 1980 than t h e  Date Garden. Thus t h e  computed r e t u r n  per iod  
f o r  t h e  eight-day 1980 event  is very  much g r e a t e r  a t  I n d i o  SDF than a t  t h e  
D a t e  Garden. 
Although some o f  t h e  r e t u r n  pe r iods  i n  t h e  t a b l e  do appear t o  be q u i t e  
extreme, it can s a f e l y  be s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  gages t h a t  measured t h e  r a i n f a l l  
amounts l i s t e d  i n  t h e  t a b l e  d i d  n o t  always sample t h e  heav ie s t  r a i n f a l l  o f  t h e  
storm. Such is known t o  be t h e  c a s e  on t h e  morning of  February 15, 1980, 
where t h e  1.0 in .  measured i n  30 minutes a t  Los Angeles-Haqcock Park exhib'its 
a r e t u r n  period of on ly  33 years .  I t  t u r n s  o u t ,  however, from t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  
obse rva t ions  of t h e  au thor  and those  o f  some of  h i s  co l leagues  t h a t  s e v e r a l  
a r e a s  f a r t h e r  t o  the  w e s t ,  l oca t ed  between record ing  r a i n  gages, experienced 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  heavier  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  f o r  du ra t ions  up t o  around one hour. ~t 
is  f e l t  t h a t  such i n t e n s i t i e s ,  i f  measured, would have e a s i l y  exceeded, and 
perhaps cons iderably  exceeded, t hose  f o r  t he  100-year r a i n f a l l .  
Another ca se  where t h e  c e n t e r  of  h e a v i e s t  r a i n  may not  have been 
o f f i c i a l l y  sampled occurred j u s t  one day l a t e r  on t h e  morning and af te rnoon of 
February 16, 1980. I n  t he  t a b l e  it can  be seen t h a t  t he  F i l lmore  F i sh  
Hatchery and Sepulvzda Dam recorded p r e c i p i t a t i o n  over du ra t ions  of f i v e  t o  
n ine  hours  t h a t  exh ib i t ed  computed r e t u r n  pe r iods  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  150 
years .  However, t h e r e  may have been even heavier  r a i n f a l l  i n  Topanga Canyon 
( i n  t h e  mountains to t h e  south o f  t h e  two l i s t e d  s t a t i o n s ) ,  where extreme 
f looding  and mudslide damage were repor ted .  One u n o f f i c i a l  and 
unsubs tan t ia ted  amount o f  10.7 in .  i n  10 hours  was r epo r t ed  t o  t h e  National  
weather Serv ice ,  b u t  no confirmation of  t h i s  c la im could be made. I f  t h i s  
amount and du ra t ion  were t r u e ,  it would r e p r e s e n t  a r e t u r n  per iod  of 
approximately 600 yea r s  o r  perhaps g r e a t e r ,  depending j u s t  where i n  Topanga 
Canyon (wi th  its h igh ly  orographic v a r i a t i o n s )  t h e  gage had been loca ted .  
I t  should be poin ted  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  t a b l e  lists one t r u l y  extreme 
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  event .  The very f i r s t  entry-- that  of February 8 ,  1976, a t  
Haines Canyon-Upper--is an a l l - t ime S t a t e  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  record f o r  five-minute 
r a i n f a l l .  The amount and du ra t ion  a r e  o f f i c i a l  and confirmed, according t o  
t h e  Los Angeles County Flood Cont ro l  D i s t r i c t ,  a l though some meteoro logis t s  
f e e l  t h a t  t h e r e  s t i l l  might be some ques t ion  a s  t o  t h e  accuracy of t h i s  
record ing  gage ' s  measurement. I f  t h e  va lue  is c o r r e c t ,  it is 3.5 t imes the  
100-year va lue  f o r  t h e  same du ra t ion ,  according t o  B u l l e t i n  No. 195, and t h e  
number of s t anda rd  d e v i a t i o n s  above t h e  mean f o r  t h i s  event  is a n  i n c r e d i b l e  
15.91--thus exceeding t h e  computed probable maximum p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  which is 
def ined  i n  B u l l e t i n  No. 195 a s  t h e  mean p l u s  15 s t anda rd  devia t ions .  
CONCLUSIONS 
I n  examining t h e  t a b l e  i n  t h i s  paper one might reach t h e  conclusion t h a t  
t h e  y e a r s  1976-80 were t r u l y  extreme i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona wi th  
regard  t o  p r e c i p i t a t i o n .  With t h e  l a r g e  number o f  even t s  whose es t imated  
r e t u r n  per iods  exceed 1,000 and even 10,000 yea r s ,  it could perhaps be 
surmised t h a t  such a five-year per iod  was excep t iona l ly  r a r e  throughout t he  
southwestern United S t a t e s .  Th i s ,  of course ,  is no t  t r u e .  I n  almost any 
year ,  wi th  t h e  l a r g e  number of s t a t i s t i c a l l y  independent r a i n  gages t h a t  t h e r e  
a r e  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Arizona (gages t h a t  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  independent 
from each o the r  with r e s p e c t  t o  h igh - in t ens i ty  l o c a l  downpours), t h e r e  a r e  
l i k e l y  t o  be a t  l e a s t  one o r  two p r e c i p i t a t i o n  even t s  somewhere i n  the  reg ion  
t h a t  have r e t u r n  pe r iods  of  more than 100 yea r s ,  and poss ib ly  one or more i n  
some yea r s  wi th  r e t u r n  pe r iods  of  1,000 t o  10,000 yea r s  or so.  
Nevertheless ,  t h e  number of major events  recorded dur ing  t h e  years  1976-80 
is s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r  than  t h a t  of a s i m i l a r  pe r iod  of  time taken a t  
randclm. Thus it would appear t h a t  t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s  have been very  much more 
a c t i v e  than  normal as f a r  a s  r a r e  r a i n f a l l  even t s  a r e  concerned. Th i s  
obviously has  had a major bearing upon t h e  l a r g e  number of f loods ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
f l a s h  f loods ,  and mudslides t h a t  have been observed i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and 
Arizona from l a t e  1976 through much of 1980. 
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HYDROLOGY OF THE FLOODS OF MARCH 1978 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1980 
IN THE PHOENIX AREA, ARIZONA 
Severe precipitation i n  the mountains north and east  o f  Phoenix caused 
five floods i n  the Phoenix area from March 1978 through February 1980. The 
floods occurred i n  March 2978, December 2978, January 1979, March 1979, and 
February 1980 when the flow i n  the Sal t ,  Verde, and Agua Fria r ivers  exceeded 
the storage capacity of the reservoirs on the r ivers .  In  most years the 
storage capacity of the reservoirs i s  su f f ic ien t  t o  store the inflow. Water 
has been released nine times i n  70 years on the Sal t  River, s i x  times i n  40 
years on the Verde River, and five times i n  53 years on the Agua Fria River; 
the largest peak release rates were during the floods of 1978-80. 
The reservoirs were f i l led  i n  March 1978 by the large runoff  volumes from 
more than five days of heavy precipitation. The seven-day floodflow was the 
maximum of record i n  the Verde River and Tonto Creek and the second highest of 
record i n  the Sal t  River. The reservoirs were f i l l ed  again i n  December 1978 
and i n  February 1980 because of large amounts of inflow and Zarge carryover 
storage. 
Hydrographs of the floods along the Sa l t  and Verde r ivers  do not show the 
typical progression of a floodwave moving downstream. Flood crests occurred 
more or less  concurrently a t  a l l  s i t e s  along the r ivers .  Tributary inflow 
caused the cres ts  a t  some downstream stations t o  precede the crests a t  the 
upstream stations; t h i s  complex runoff pattern res tr ic ted  advance warning of  
the magnitude of the floods approaching the reservoirs. 
The storage provided by the reservoirs greatly reduced the magnitude and 
duration of the floods i n  Phoenix. Without the reservoirs the peak discharges 
of the Sal t  River would have been as much as twice the actual discharges, and 
high flows would have lasted for several days. 
Severe prec ip i ta t ion  i n  the mountains north and e a s t  o f  Phoenix caused 
f i v e  f l oods  i n  the  Phoenix area from March 1978 through February 1980. Floods 
occurred i n  March 1978, December 1978, January 1979, March 1979, and February 
1980 when the  f low i n  the S a l t ,  Verde, and Agua Fr ia  r i v e r s  exceeded the 
storage capaci ty  o f  the  re servo ir s  on the r i v e r s .  The S a l t  River flows 
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westward through t h e  c e n t r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  a r ea ,  and t h e  Agua F r i a  River flows 
southward along t h e  w e s t  s i d e ;  t h e  r i v e r s  j o i n  t h e  Gi l a  River w e s t  of  
Phoenix. River bas ins  t h a t  con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  f loods  and t h e  main 
streamflow-gaging s t a t i o n s  a r e  shown i n  ~ i g u r e s  1 and 2, r e spec t ive ly .  
The peak d ischarge  of  122,000 cu f t / s  i n  March 1978 was t h e  h i g h e s t  s i n c e  
1920 i n  t h e  S a l t  River a t  Jo in thead  Dam, Phoenix, and t h e  f lood  caused $37 
mi l l i on  i n  damage i n  Maricopa County (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,  1979a) .  
The a r e a  was j u s t  recovering from t h e  f lood  of March 1978 when another  major 
f lood  occurred i n  December 1978. The peak d ischarge  of  141,000 c u  f t / s  i n  
December 1978 was t h e  h i g h e s t  s i n c e  1905 i n  t h e  S a l t  River a t  Jo in thead  Dam, 
and t h e  f lood  caused $51.8 m i l l i o n  i n  damage i n  t h e  Phoenix a r e a  (U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers,  1979b). Smaller f l o o d s  i n  January and March 1979 caused 
l i t t l e  a d d i t i o n a l  damage except  f o r  c l o s i n g  an  i n t e r s t a t e  highway b r idge  t h a t  
surv ived  t h e  f lood  of December 1978 and de lay ing  t h e  reopening of o t h e r  r i v e r  
c ross ings ;  t h e  peak d i scha rges  f o r  t h e s e  f loods  were about  85,000 and 60,000 
c u  f t / s ,  r e spec t ive ly .  The a rea  aga in  was recovering when an even l a r g e r  
f lood  occurred i n  February 1980. The peak d ischarge  was 170,000 cu f t / s  a t  
Jo in thead  Dam, and t h e  f lood damage is still being assessed.  The l a s t  t i m e  
t h a t  f l oods  occurred s o  f r equen t ly  i n  t h e  Phoenix a r e a  was when n ine  f lows of  
more than  50,000 cu f t / s  occur red  between February 1905 and March 1906. The 
f loods  of March 1978, December 1978, and February 1980 a l s o  caused 
cons ide rab le  damage o u t s i d e  t h e  Phoenix a rea .  Damages i n  ou t ly ing  a r e a s  from 
t h e  f loods  of March and ~ e c e m b e r  1978 were $29.8 and $39.8 m i l l i o n ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  damage from t h e  f lood  o f  February 1980 is s t i l l  being assessed.  
More than 60,000 cu f t / s  was r e l ea sed  from Lake P leasan t  to t h e  Agua F r i a  
River dur ing  t h e  f lood  of December 1978 and aga in  during t h e  f lood  of February 
1980. Downstream from Lake P l e a s a n t  t h e  peak d ischarges  were t h e  h i g h e s t  
s i n c e  1919, and l a r g e  a r e a s  were inundated (Thomsen, 1980). The f loods  of  
March 1978, January 1979, and March 1979 on t h e  Agua F r i a  River downstream 
from Waddell Dam caused some damage and inconvenience bu t  were not  
hydro logica l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The primary purpose of  t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  upstream from Phoenix is to s t o r e  
water f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  u s e ,  b u t  t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  a l s o  provide cons iderable  f lood 
p ro t ec t ion .  ~ e s e r v o i r  s t o r a g e  capac i ty  g r e a t l y  reduced t h e  magnitude and 
d u r a t i o n  of t h e  f loods  of  1978-80. Without t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  t h e  peak d ischarge  
o f  t h e  S a l t  River dur ing  t h e  f lood  of March 1978 would have been about  260,000 
c u  f t / s  (Figure 3 ) ,  and t h e  peak d ischarge  during t h e  f lood  of December 1978 
would have been about  240,000 cu f t / s .  The reduct ion  i n  peqk d ischarge  was 
l e s s  dramatic  dur ing  t h e  f lood  o f  February 1980 b u t  was s u f f i c i e n t  to reduce 
g r e a t l y  t h e  f looding  i n  Phoenix. The r e s e r v o i r s  d i d  no t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reduce 
t h e  f l o o d s  of January  and March 1979 because t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  were f u l l  owing t o  
t h e  f lood  of ~ecember  1978. 
Flood c o n t r o l  provided by t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  is t h e  r e s u l t  o f  l a r g e  c a p a c i t i e s  
and ope ra t ing  procedures.  The c a p a c i t i e s  o f  t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  on the  S a l t  and 
Agua F r i a  r i v e r s  a r e  cons iderably  g r e a t e r  than t h e  median annual streamflow 
(Table  1 ) .  On t h e  average, annual  streamflow exceeds r e s e r v o i r  c a p a c i t i e s  
about  1 year i n  12 i n  t h e  S a l t  River and 1 year i n  30 i n  t h e  Agua F r i a  River. 
FIGURE 1 River basins  that  contributed t o  the  f l oods  o f  March 1978 
through February 1980 i n  the  Phoenix area. 
( FLAGSTAFF 
BASE MAP FROM U.S. GEOLOGICAL S I R M Y  
STATE BASE MAP. 1: 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0  
FIGURE 2 Main streamflow-gaging stations in the Salt River and ~Ffua Fria River basins. 
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FIGURE 3 Comparison of  actual  regulated and probable unregulated 
discharge for  the  f lood o f  March 1978,  S a l t  River below Granite Reef 
Dam. 
TABLE 1 Minimum, Median, and Maximum Annual Streamflow and Reservoir  
C a p a c i t i e s ,  S a l t ,  Verde, and AgUa F r i a  Rivers  ( ac re - f t )  
S a l t  River Verde River Agua F r i a  River 
Streamf low 
Minimum 
25 t h  p e r c e n t i l e  
Median 
75th p e r c e n t i l e  
Maximum 
Reservoir c a p a c i t i e s  1,755,000 317,000 157,000 
asurnmation of streamflow, S a l t  River near Roosevelt  and Tonto Creek (near  
Roosevel t ,  1914-41; above Gun Creek near Roosevelt ,  1941-78). Represents a t  
l e a s t  95 percent  of t h e  inf low t o  Roosevelt  Lake. 
b ~ a s e d  on records  from s e v e r a l  s i t e s  between Tangle Creek and t h e  mouth of 
t h e  Verde River,  1905-78. Represents inf low t o  Horseshoe ~ e s e r v o i r .  
C~omputed inflow t o  Lake P leasan t ,  1914-19, 1933-78. 
I n  t h e  Verde River t h e  annual streamflow exceeds r e s e r v o i r  c a p a c i t i e s  about 1 
year  i n  3; however, du r ing  much of t h e  year  t h e  streamflow is re l eased  almost 
immediately from t h e  r e s e r v o i r s ,  thereby increas ing  the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f lood  
p ro t ec t ion .  The degree of f lood  c o n t r o l  provided by t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  during a 
f lood  depends on t h e  amount of  carryover  s to rage  from preceding years.  The 
carryover  s to rage  shown i n  F igure  4 is t h e  s t o r a g e  t h a t  was c a r r i e d  over a f t e r  
t h e  i r r i g a t i o n  season i n  t h e  calendar  year shown. Water is re l eased  over t h e  
sp i l lways  only when t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  a r e  nea r ly  f u l l  and t h e  inflow is g r e a t e r  
t han  the  amount needed f o r  i r r i g a t i o n .  Water has  been r e l eased  nine times i n  
70 yea r s  on the  S a l t  River ,  s i x  t imes i n  40 y e a r s  on t h e  Verde River ,  and f i v e  
times i n  53 yea r s  on t h e  Agua F r i a  River. The f loods  of December 1978 and 
February 1980 a r e  examples of t h e  e f f e c t s  of a sha rp  peak superimposed on a 
h igh  carryover  s t o r a g e ,  and t h e  f lood  of March 1978 is an example of  t h e  . 
e f f e c t  of  a l a r g e  volume of runoff  on r e s e r v o i r  s torage .  geve ra l  hydrologic  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t he  f lood  of March 1978 a r e  important t o  t h e  understanding 
of f loods  i n  t he  S a l t  River bas in ,  and t h e  f lood  is analyzed more ex tens ive ly  
i n  t h i s  paper than t h e  o the r  f loods.  
The runoff volumes during t h e  f lood  of  March 1978 were t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n c e  
t h e  beginning of  record i n  1905 f o r  t h e  Verde River and i n  1914 f o r  Tonto 
Creek (Table 2 ) .  The volume of runoff  i n  t h e  S a l t  River was t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n c e  
1916. Inf low from ungaged t r i b u t a r i e s  downstream from thewmain  gaging 
s t a t i o n s  on the  S a l t  River ,  Tonto Creek, and Verde River was t h e  l a r g e s t  
computed s i n c e  t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  were constructed.  

TABLE 2 Highes t  Three- and Seven-Day Mean Discharge,  a t  Se l ec t ed  Gaging 
S t a t i o n s ,  S a l t  R iver ,  Tonto Creek ,  and Verde River (cu ft/s) 
S a l t  River  TOntO Creek Verde River 
near  above below 
Roosevel t ,  Gun Creek, Tangle Creek,  
1915-80 1914-80a 1905-8ob 
P r i o r  t o  March 1978 
Three-day mean 
Highes t  d i s c h a r g e  
Year 
2nd h i g h e s t  d i s c h a r g e  
Year 
Seven-day mean 
Highes t  d i s c h a r g e  
Year 
2nd h i g h e s t  d i s c h a r g e  
Year 










January  1979 
March 1979 
February 1980 
= ~ a s e d  on r eco rds  from Tonto Creek near  Roosevel t ,  1914-41; above Gun Creek 
n e a r  Roosevel t  , 1941-78. 
b a s e d  on r eco rds  from s e v e r a l  sites between Tangle Creek and t h e  mouth of  
t h e  Verde River.  
These l a r g e  volymes of runoff occurred i n  a  s e r i e s  of  c r e s t s  and t roughs 
i n  a  three-day period--March 1-3--followed by a  sma l l  r i s e  on March 5. 
 he 
shapes of t h e  hydrographs and t h e  t imes of  t h e  maximum c r e s t s  a t  t h e  s t a t i o n s  
were no t  c o n s i s t e n t .  The orographic e f f e c t  of  t h e  mountains caused l o c a l i z e d  
r a i n f a l l  p a t t e r n s ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a l t i t u d e  and exposure caused v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
snowmelt, and t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  storm movement r e l a t i v e  to t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of 
flow caused v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  t iming o f  f l ood  crests. 
Timing of  t h e  crests on t h e  t r i b u t a r i e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  shape o f  
t h e  floodwave and t h e  magnitudes of t h e  c r e s t s  on t h e  S a l t  and Verde r i v e r s .  
Hydrographs of  f l oods  along these  r i v e r s  seldom show t h e  t y p i c a l  progression 
of a  floodwave moving downstream. Genera l ly  t h e  f lood  c r e s t s  occur more o r  
less concur ren t ly  a t  a l l  sites along t h e  r i v e r s  because t h e  t r i b u t a r y  inf low 
adds p rog res s ive ly  more d ischarge  a t  each downstream s t a t i o n .  Frequent ly ,  as 
d u i i n g  t h e  f lood  of March 1978, t r i b u t a r y  inf low is s u f f i c i e n t  to cause a  
f lood  t o  c r e s t  a t  a  downstream s t a t i o n  be fo re  t h e  f lood  has  c r e s t e d  a t  a n  
upstream s t a t i o n .  
The c r e s t  of t h e  f lood  of  March 1978 a t  t h e  S a l t  River near Roosevelt  
gaging s t a t i o n  was t h e  r e s u l t  o f  l a r g e  t r i b u t a r y  inf low i n  add i t i on  t o  t h e  
inc reas ing  d ischarge  of  t h e  S a l t  River (F igure  5 ) .  The c r e s t  occurred s e v e r a l  
hours  before  t h e  crest a t  S a l t  ~ i v e r  near C h r y s o t i l e ,  t h e  next  upstream 
s t a t i o n .  The c r e s t  a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  near C h r y s o t i l e  caused a  f l a t t e n i n g  o f  t h e  
r e c e s s i o n  a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  near Roosevelt. No c r e s t  o f  t h e  S a l t  River near 
Roosevelt  can be i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  a  corresponding crest o f  t h e  Black River near 
F o r t  Apache. Tonto Creek and t h e  o t h e r  t r i b u t a r i e s  t o  Roosevelt  Lake c r e s t e d  
wi th in  a  few hours  of  t h e  S a l t  River. The n e a r l y  s imultaneous c r e s t s  produced 
a  s i n g l e  high c r e s t  of inflow t o  t h e  lake .  
F igure  6 shows t h e  e f f e c t s  of  t r i b u t a r y  inf low t o  t h e  Verde River dur ing  
t h e  f lood  of March 1978. The r ap id  r i s e  of  t h e  Verde ~ i v e r  a t  t h e  gaging 
s t a t i o n  below Tangle Creek was concurren t  wi th  t h e  r ise a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  below 
E a s t  Verde River and preceded by s e v e r a l  hours  t h e  r i s e  a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  below 
Camp Verde. A t  1200 hours on March 1, when t h e  most r a p i d  r i s e  ( c r e s t  A) 
began below Camp Verde, t h e  Verde River below Tangle Creek was a l ready  
c r e s t i n g  a t  80,000 cu f t / s  because of t h e  l a r g e  t r i b u t a r y  inf low between t h e  
s t a t i o n s .  C r e s t  A can be t r aced  from below Camp Verde t o  below Tangle Creek. 
C r e s t  B, which occurred a  few hours  l a t e r ,  o r i g i n a t e d  downstream from t h e  E a s t  
Verde River. C r e s t  C o r i g i n a t e d  between Camp Verde and t h e  Eas t  Verde River 
and probably r e s u l t e d  from t h e  same surge  of  r a i n f a l l  a s  c r e s t  B; however, 
c r e s t  C lagged behind c r e s t  B because of  t h e  g r e a t e r  d i s t a n c e  of  t r a v e l .  
Crests D and E can  be i d e n t i f i e d  a t  t h e  t h r e e  upstream s t a t i o n s  but  no t  a t  t h e  
two downstream s t a t i o n s .  R ~ S ~ S  t h a t may have occurred owing t o  t he  c r e s t s  
were obscured by t r i b u t a r y  inf low from l a t e r  r a i n f a l l .  C r e s t  D probably 
reached the  two downstream s t a t i o n s  concurren t ly  wi th  crest C. The f l a t t e n i n g  
on t h e  r i s i n g  limb of t h e  c r e s t  on March 3 may have been the  r e s u l t  of c r e s t  
E. C r e s t s  D and E r e s u l t e d  from t h e  same per iod  of  r a i n f a l l ;  however, c r e s t  E 
was delayed because of s to rage  i n  Su l l i van  Lake, t h e  c i r c u i t o u s  rou te  followed 
by t r i b u t a r i e s  t o  Big Chino Wash, and a  slow t r a v e l  t i m e  along t h e  wash, which 
has a  much f l a t t e r  s lope  than most s t reams i n  t h e  Verde River basin.  
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FIGURE 5 Discharge of the Black and S a l t  r i v e r s  upstream from 
Roosevelt Dam during the  f lood o f  March 1978. 
FIGURE 6 Discharge of t h e  Verde River dur ing  the  f lood  of March 1978. 
The complex runoff  p a t t e r n  i n  t h e  Verde River bas in  r e s t r i c t e d  advance 
warning of  t h e  magnitude of  t he  flow approaching t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  during t h e  
f lood  of  March 1978. The only  advance warning was t h a t  provided by t h e  gaging 
s t a t i o n  below Tangle Creek, which is only  4 miles upstream from Horseshoe 
Reservoir.  Although t h e  s h o r t  f lood  warning complicated t h e  scheduling o f  
r e l e a s e s  from t h e  r e s e r v o i r s ,  t h e  maximum r e l e a s e  r a t e  w a s  kept  wi th in  a few 
percent  of  t h e  maximum inflow r a t e .  
During t h e  f i r s t  two days of t h e  f lood ,  t h e  r e l e a s e  r a t e s  were kept w e l l  
below t h e  inf low r a t e s  t o  t h e  r e se rvo i r s .  A c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  developed 
about 1000 hours on March 2 ,  when about 60,000 cu f t / s  was being r e l eased  from 
B a r t l e t t  Reservoir.  The r e se rve  s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  r e s e r v o i r  system w a s  
down t o  13,400 acre-f t. Inf low t o  Horseshoe Reservoir  was about  68,000 cu 
f t / s ,  o r  about 5,400 ac re - f t / h r ,  and t h e  record f o r  t h e  gaging s t a t i o n  below 
E a s t  Verde shows t h a t  t h e  r i v e r  was beginning t o  r i s e  f o r  t h e  f o u r t h  time i n  
abou t  24 hours; each c r e s t  had t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  being higher  than t h e  
preceding ones. Concurrent ly,  t h e  ungaged t r i b u t a r i e s  were d ischarg ing  l a r g e  
b u t  unknown q u a n t i t i e s  of  water d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  r e se rvo i r s ;  subsequent 
ana lyses  show t h a t  t h e  t r i b u t a r y  inf low probably was between 20,000 and 30,000 
c u  f t / s .  Between 1000 and 1100 hours  t h e  outf low was increased from 60,000 cu 
f t / s  t o  about  100,000 cu f t / s ,  which was a few percent  g r e a t e r  than t h e  t o t a l  
inf low.  The r i s e  a t  t h e  gaging s t a t i o n  below E a s t  Verde d i d  not  m a t e r i a l i z e  
as a s i g n i f i c a n t  peak a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  below Tangle Creek, and outf low was 
reduced t o  65,000 cu f t / s  by 1230 hours. 
Although t h e  r e l e a s e  from B a r t l e t t  Reservoir caused m o s t  o f  t h e  f l w d f l o w  
i n  Phoenix i n  March 1978, some water was r e l ea sed  a t  Stewart  Mountain Dam, t h e  
o u t l e t  o f  Saguaro Lake, on t h e  S a l t  River owing t o  t r i b u t a r y  inf low downstream 
from Roosevelt Dam; no water was r e l ea sed  a t  Roosevelt  Dam. 
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of water were r e l ea sed  a t  Roosevelt  Dam 
dur ing  t h e  f loods  of December 1978, January 1979, March 1979, and February 
1980 because of t h e  l a r g e  amount o f  carryover  s to rage  from preceding f loods .  
Water r e l ea sed  from Roosevelt  Lake passed d i r e c t l y  through Apache, Canyon, and 
Saguaro l a k e s  and w a s  r e l ea sed  a t  Stewart  Mountain Dam. During t h e  f loods  of  
December 1978 and February 1980, about equal  amounts of water were r e l ea sed  
from B a r t l e t t  and Stewart  Mountain dams. The f loods  of January and March 1979 
were caused mainly by t h e  r e l e a s e s  from Stewart  Mountain Dam. 
Although the  inflow volumes t o  Roosevelt  Lake during t h e  f loods  of 
December 1978 and February 1980 were among t h e  f i v e  l a r g e s t  of record,  t he  
f lows would not  have n e c e s s i t a t e d  sp i l lway r e l e a s e s  i f  t h e  carryover  s to rage  
had not  been s o  l a rge .  Carryover s to rage  is low enough 80 percent  of  t h e  time 
t o  permit  s to rage  of  inf low volumes equal  t o  those  of t h e  December 1978 o r  
February 1980 f loods.  The l a r g e  inf low volumes t o  t h e  r e s e r v o i r s  on t h e  Verde 
River would have n e c e s s i t a t e d  some r e l e a s e  even i f  t h e  carryover  s to rage  had 
been a t  t h e  average l e v e l .  The f loods  of December 1978 and February 1980 were 
s i n g l e  high c r e s t s ,  whereas t h e  f lood  of  March 1978 cons i s t ed  of  mu l t ip l e  
peaks. 
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FLOODS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1980 I N  CALIFORNIA 
by Kenneth L. Wahl, John R. Crippen, and James M. Knott 
During January and February 1980 storms caused substantiaZ r i se s  i n  
streamfZow throughout much of CaZifornia. In  mid-January flooding occurred 
i n  the foothilzs of the Sierra Nevada and i n  the central coastal area. In 
Zate January and mid-February high fZoodfZows i n  streams i n  coastal southern 
CaZifornia caused much &age and several deaths. The Tijuana River i n  
northern Baja CaZifornia (Mexico) and southern Sun Diego County flooded many 
square miles of lovlands as i t s  flow during two separate f Zooding episodes 
exceeded aZZ records. Most reservoirs i n  Sun Diego County spi t ted,  several 
for the f i r s t  time since their  comptetion. Lake Elsinore, i n  eastern River- 
side County, caused much damage to  Zakeside property as i t  fizzed t o  an 
eZevation not reached since 191 6. 
The ~ e b r & ~  f Zooding i n  southern CaZifornia was caused by a series of 
storms separated by short intervals.  Some peaks of record were ohsemed, and 
streamfZow throughout the area remained high for a reZativeZy Zong period. 
I n  many streams the volwnes of sustained flow for periods of  7 and 15 consec- 
ut ive days were the greatest that  have occurred d d n g  the period o f  record. 
INTRODUCTION 
The storms of January-February 1980 caused s i g n i f i c a n t  f looding  over  most 
of C a l i f o r n i a  (F igure  1). The storm o f  mid-January covered t h e  e n t i r e  s t a t e ,  
b u t  most of  t h e  f looding  was caused by runoff  from t h e  S i e r r a  Nevada and t h e  
Kenneth L. Wahl, John R. Crippen, and James M. Knott  a r e  with t h e  U.S. 
Geological  Survey i n  Menlo Park,  Ca l i fo rn i a .  
Note: Th i s  r e p o r t  is r ep r in t ed  from U.S. Geological  Survey Open-File 
Report 80-1005 wi th  t h e  omission of  Table 6. The d a t a  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  were 
c o l l e c t e d  as p a r t  of coopera t ive  programs between t h e  U.S. Geological  Survey 
and var ious  f e d e r a l ,  s t a t e ,  county, and municipal agencies .  The cooperat ion 
of t h e  ~ a t i o n a l  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrat ion,  t h e  U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and county f lood  c o n t r o l  d i s t r i c t s  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  i n  
fu rn i sh ing  unpublished p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  streamflow, and r e s e r v o i r  d a t a  is 
g r a t e f u l l y  acknowledged. 
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FIGURE 1 Approximate boundaries o f  areas i n  Cal i fornia  a f f ec t ed  by 
flooding i n  January and February 1980.  
S i e r r a  f o o t h i l l s ;  subsequent s torms p r i m a r i l y  a f f e c t e d  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and 
b 
c o a s t a l  a r e a s  northward to San Francisco.  F igu re  2 shows t h e  accumulation o f  
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  dur ing  t h e  per iod  December 1, 1979, t o  A p r i l  1, 1980, a t  Los 
Angeles i n  t h e  south ,  Yosemite Val ley  i n  t h e  S i e r r a  Nevada, and Shasta  Dam i n  
t h e  north.  A s  can  be seen  i n  F igure  2, accumulated p r e c i p i t a t i o n  a t  Shas ta  
Dam d i d  no t  exceed 120 percent  o f  seasonal  normal. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t o t a l  
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  t o  A p r i l  1 was 162 percent  o f  normal a t  Yosemite Val ley  and 201 
percent  of normal a t  Los Angeles. Most o f  t h e  exces s  occurred  i n  mid-January 
a t  both Yosemite Val ley  and Los Angeles and i n  mid-February a t  Los Angeles. 
The d a t a  presented  i n  t h i s  paper a r e  p r o v i s i o n a l ,  and a r e a l  coverage is 
no t  complete. 
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FIGURE 2 Accumulated p r e c i p i t a t i o n  between October 1, 1979, and indi -  
c a t e d  d a t e ,  f o r  t h r e e  l o c a t i o n s  i n  Ca l i fo rn i a .  
DESCRIPTION OF STORMS 
Up t o  December 31, 1979, seasonal  r a i n f a l l  over  C a l i f o r n i a  had no t  been 
excessive.  The average p r e c i p i t a t i o n  from October 1 t o  December 3 1  a t  all 
r epo r t ing  s t a t i o n s  ranged from 127 percent  o f  normal i n  t h e  no r th  c o a s t  
d ra inage  ( see  F igu re  3 f o r  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  r e p o r t i n g  u n i t s )  to only  22 
percent  o f  normal i n  t h e  sou theas t  d e s e r t  bas ins  (Table 1). October was 
we t t e r  than  normal except  i n  t h e  sou theas t  d e s e r t  bas ins ,  bu t  November 
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  was below normal except  i n  t h e  n o r t h  c o a s t  a r ea .  P r e c i p i t a t i o n  
*A water year  is a 12-month per iod  ending September 30 and is des igna ted  
by t h e  ca lendar  year  i n  which it ends. 
FIGURE 3 ~ e p o r t i n g  u n i t s  f o r  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  da ta .  
f o r  t h e  month of ~ e c e m b e r  was a l s o  below normal d e s p i t e  a  s e r i e s  of  storms 
t h a t  a f f e c t e d  most o f  t h e  s t a t e  during t h e  per iod  December 18-31. 
Two major storms s t r u c k  t h e  s t a t e  i n  January. The f i r s t  o f  t hese  occurred 
du r ing  January 7-19; r a i n f a l l ,  o f t e n  heavy, was recorded a t ,mos t  r epo r t ing '  
s t a t i o n s  fo r  t he  1 0  consecut ive  days  January 8-17. Th i s  storm was warm, 
producing r a i n f a l l  i n  t h e  S i e r r a  Nevada a t  e l e v a t i o n s  a s  high a s  9,000 f t .  
The second storm, dur ing  t h e  per iod  January 28-31, p r imar i ly  a f f e c t e d  the  
southern  ha l f  of t h e  s t a t e .  
During mid-February a s e r i e s  of  fast-moving P a c i f i c  s torms brought very  
heavy r a i n f a l l ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  southern  Ca l i fo rn i a .  These storms, separa ted  
by i n t e r v a l s  of less than  24 hours,  produced heavy r a i n f a l l  dur ing  February 
13-22. P r e c i p i t a t i o n  f o r  t h a t  per iod  t o t a l e d  24.26 in .  a t  Cuyamaca and 19.79 
i n .  a t  Henshaw Dam, both i n  San Diego County; 24.26 in .  a t  Lake Arrowhead, San 
TABLE 1 Average Ac=cumulated P r e c i p i t a t i o n  from ~ a t i o n a l  Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administrat ion Reporting Un i t s  
Accumulated P r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  1980 Water Year 
O c t .  1 t o  Dec .  3 1  O c t .  1 t o  Jan.  3 1  O c t .  1 t o  Feb. 29 
Pe rcen t  Pe rcen t  Percent  
of o f  0 f 
Report ing Unit  In.  Normal In .  Normal In. N o r m a l  
North c o a s t  d ra inage  20.92 12 7 28.30 114 37.60 12 3 
Sacramentodra inage  15.08 110 24.00 117 35.19 13  6 
Northeast  i n t e r  i o r  
bas ins  7.99 10 6 16.60 14 6 23.61 16 7 
C e n t r a l  c o a s t  
d ra inage  8.76 12 0 14.30 12 3 21.43 14 4 
San Joaquin dra inage  5.86 89 14.12 13  9 20.62 15  7 
South c o a s t  d ra inage  2.23 44 11.44 14 1 23.26 2 11 
Southeas t  d e s e r t  
bas ins  0.51 22 3.55 98 7.81 16 3 
Bernardino County; 12.75 in .  a t  t h e  Los Angeles C i v i c  Center ;  and 14.25 in.  a t  
O j a i ,  Ventura County. These amounts range from 320 pe rcen t  of  normal February 
r a i n f a l l  a t  Lake Arrowhead t o  530 percent  o f  normal February r a i n f a l l  a t  
Henshaw Dam. By t h e  end of  February, cumulat ive p r e c i p i t a t i o n  f o r  most 
reg ions  of C a l i f o r n i a  was we l l  above normal (Table 1). 
P r e c i p i t a t i o n  d a t a  f o r  January and February a t  s e l e c t e d  r epor t ing  s t a t i o n s  
a r e  summarized i n  Table 2. 
DESCRIPTION OF FLOODS 
The January and February s torms produced t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  per iods  of 
f lood ing ,  and d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  were a f f e c t e d  by each period. 
Floods of Mid-Januar y 
The mid-January s torm was s ta tewide ,  bu t  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  f looding  was 
i n  t h e  San Joaquin  bas in ,  t h e  Sacramento bas in ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  c o a s t  d ra inages ,  
and t h e  Truckee River and Honey Lake bas ins .  Because t h e  airmass was w a r m ,  
r a i n  f e l l  a t  h igh  e l e v a t i o n s  and melt ing snowpack con t r ibu ted  to runoff i n  the  
S i e r r a  Nevada. Flooding was widespread i n  t h e  a f f e c t e d  a r e a s ,  b u t  f l ood  
magnitudes a t  most gaging s t a t i o n s  were g e n e r a l l y  less than  the  h i s t o r i c a l  
peaks. Peak flows i n  t h e  dra inages  of  t h e  Tuolumne, Mokelumne, Cosumnes, and 
American r i v e r s ,  however, were among t h e  h i g h e s t  i n  t h e  l a s t  20 years.  On 
January 12 and 13  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  was e s p e c i a l l y  heavy from P l a c e r v i l l e ,  on  t h e  
South Fork American River ,  t o  Cisco,  on t h e  South Yuba River.  The r e s u l t i n g  
peak flows damaged s e v e r a l  powerplants and f i l l e d  small r e s e r v o i r s  i n  t h e  
S i e r r a  Nevada wi th  debr i s .  Runoff i n  t h e  a r e a  equaled or exceeded t h e  
TABLE 2 Precipitation at Selected Locations in California During January and February 1980 (in.) 
January February 
January January Maximum Total Departure February Maximum Total Departure 
Altitude 7-19 28-31 one Day for from 13-22 oneDay for from 
Precipitation Station (f t) Total Total Month Normal Total Month Normal 
North coast drainage 
Eureka 60 2.92 T 0.75 3.19 -4.23 2.69 1.13 4.67 -0.48 
Healdsburg 102 8.77 T 2.50 8.82 -1.04 12.50 3.20 14.61 7.89 
Sacramento drainage 
Red Bluff 342 2.77 0 .92 2.84 -1.64 6.45 1.72 7.77 4.60 
Placerville 1890 13.39 0.60 3.84 15.33 7.50 9.62 1.80 11.51 5.91 
Sacramento FAA 18 5.62 0 1.23 5.64 1.91 6.41 1.38 7.12 4.44 
Northeast interior basins 
Tahoe City 6230 13.46 0.19 3.49 14.89 8.11 10.47 2.12 11.07 6.48 
Central coast drainage 
Mount Hami 1 ton 4206 6.42 0 1.21 6.42 1.96 3.93 .92 4.28 .23 
San Luis Obispo Poly 315 8.47 0.53 2.60 9.52 4.92 11.47 3.98 11.91 7.89 
Santa Cruz 130 9.92 0 4.14 9.97 3.24 7.87 1.55 8.69 3.43 
San Joaquin drainage 
Fresno 328 3.78 0.04 .96 3.83 1.99 3.18 1.57 3.30 1.58 
Hetch Hetchy 3870 14.67 0.71 3.07 16.27 10.42 11.52 * 12.73 7.92 
Yosemite Park HDQ 3966 15.59 0.29 4.03 16.54 10.03 13.53 3.07 14.24 8.71 I-' 0 
South coast drainage m 
Cuyamaca 4640 13.14 9.23 4.40 22.37 16.78 24.34 5.35 24.34 18.93 
San Diego 13 2.96 2.53 1.92 5.58 3.70 4.47 1.41 4.47 2.99 
Escondido 660 6.08 5.41 3.24 11.49 * 10.11 1.96 10.11 7.90 
Henshaw Dam 2700 10.63 8.14 5.60 18.77 14.54 19.79 3.85 19.79 16.06 
Palomar Mt. 
Observatory 5545 11.27 7.36 5.65 18.63 13.78 19.89 2.90 19.89 15.24 
Laguna Beach 35 4.68 2.93 2.25 7.61 5.33 9.64 1.70 9.64 6.37 
Riverside Fire 
Station 3 840 3.34 2.13 1.47 5.47 3.66 6.31 1.27 6.31 4.56 
Los Angeles Civic 
Center 257 4.66 2.84 2.44 7.50 4.50 12.75 3.03 12.75 9.98 
Ojai 750 6.70 2.11 2.15 8.81 4.18 14.25 5.60 14.25 10.08 
Santa Barbara 
4 
5 5.71 1.00 1.94 6.71 2.77 8.98 3.48 8.98 6.53 
Southeast desert basins 
.Lake Arrowhead 5205 14.14 6.68 6.26 22.15 14.01 24.26 4.55 24.26 16.64 
Palm Springs 425 1.52 2.62 2.02 4.14 3.01 5.41 1.14 5.41 4.63 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
Note: Dates shown refer to those in Climatological Data reports of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
National Climatic Center. T = trace; * = not determined. 
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Decembgr 1964 f lood .  A t  North Fork of Middle Fork American River near 
F o r e s t h i l l  and a t  Maine Bar Canyon Creek near  Greenwood, runoff was 339 and 
346 cu f t / s - sq  m i ,  r e spec t ive ly .  
The flows of  most r i v e r s  d ra in ing  t h e  S i e r r a  Nevada a r e  r egu la t ed  by 
r e s e r v o i r s  l oca t ed  upstream from t h e  lowlands o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  Valley. Normal 
ope ra t ing  procedures  f o r  t hese  r e s e r v o i r s  main ta in  a s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y  to 
r ece ive  t h e  high runoff  expected i n  t h e  s p r i n g  and e a r l y  summer. Runoff from 
t h e  mid-January s torms encroached on t h i s  f l ood  s t o r a g e  space  i n  15 of  t h e  1 6  
major r e s e r v o i r s ,  caus ing  some anxie ty  concerning d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  might 
a r i s e  i f  l a t e r  s torms and snowmelt should produce excess ive  r a t e s  of inflow. 
The unusual ly high d ischarges  of  t h e  Sacramento and San Joaquin r i v e r s  
coincided wi th  abqormally high t i d e s  and winds. Th i s  combination of stresses 
caused l evees  t o  f a i l  on both t h e  Holland and Webb t r a c t s ,  and t h e  9-mile-long 
l a k e  t h a t  was formed i n  t h e  Sacramento-San Joaquin  De l t a  flooded about 10,000 
a c r e s  of prime a g r i c u l t u r a l  land. One person was drowned and about 900 head 
of  c a t t l e  were l o s t  when t h e  l evees  f a i l e d .  
R a i n f a l l  t o t a l s  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  had been w e l l  below normal p r i o r  t o  
t h e  mid-January storm. Consequently, runoff  from t h i s  s torm was no t  extreme. 
The replenishment of  s o i l  moisture,  however, set t h e  s t a g e  f o r  f looding from 
t h e  s torms t h a t  were t o  fol low l a t e r  i n  January  and February. 
Floods of La te  January 
The storm of  January  28-31 brought l a r g e  amounts of r a i n f a l l  t o  t h e  sou th  
c o a s t a l  and s o u t h e a s t  d e s e r t  a r e a s  but  on ly  l i g h t  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  t o  o t h e r  a r e a s  
of  t h e  s t a t e .  Cuyamaca and Henshaw Dam i n  San Diego County r epor t ed  three-day 
t o t a l s  of  9.23 i n .  and 8.14 in . ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and Lake Arrowhead repor ted  a 
one-day r a i n f a l l  o f  6.26 in .  on January 28. Most peak f lows i n  t h e  a r e a  were 
w e l l  below t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  record peaks. For example, t h e  January 29, 1980, 
peak a t  Santa  Ana River a t  E S t r e e t ,  near San Bernardino ( s t a t i o n  11059300), 
was 22,000 cu f t / s ,  below t h e  1969 peak d i scha rge  o f  28,000 cu f t / s .  However, 
t h e  peak d ischarge  of  3,559 c u  f t / s  a t  t h e  gaging s t a t i o n  on E a s t  Twin Creek 
near Arrowhead Spr ings  ( s t a t i o n  11058500) was t h e  h i g h e s t  f o r  t h e  per iod  of 
record ,  d a t i n g  back t o  1919. Fa r the r  south ,  i n  t h e  Ti juana  River bas in ,  heavy 
runoff  from t h e  R i o  Las Palmas i n t o  Rodriguez Reservoir  i n  Mexico caused 
concern f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  of  t h e  dam and n e c e s s i t a t e d  l a r g e  r e l e a s e s .  These 
r e l e a s e s  reached 28,000 cu f t / s  on January 30 and combined with the  
f loodwaters  from t h e  Ti juana  River t o  produce an  e s t ima ted  peak d ischarge  o f  
32,000 cu f t / s  a t  t h e  Ti juana River near Nestor ( s t a t i o n  11013500). The 
previous record peak d ischarge  a t  t h e  Ti juana  River gage was 17,700 cu f t / s  i n  
1937. The January peak produced widespread f looding  along t h e  Ti juana River 
downstream from t h e  l e v e e s  t h a t  end a t  Dairy Mart Road, about  2 miles 
downstream from t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  boundary. Flooding w a s  t o  occur aga in  i n  
mid-Febr uary . 
Floods of Mid-February 
L i t t l e  r a i n  f e l l  i n  C a l i f o r n i a  i n  e a r l y  February, a s  t h e  southern  p a r t  o f  
t h e  s t a t e  began t h e  t a sk  of c leaning  up from t h e  l a t e  January  storms. Then 
during February 13-22, a s e r i e s  of  s torms swept through t h e  south  and c e n t r a l  
c o a s t a l  a r eas ,  b r inging  record  amounts of  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  and runoff  t h a t  caused 
damage t o  roads and property.  By t h e  time t h e  s torms had ended, e i g h t  
c o u n t i e s  had been dec l a red  f e d e r a l  d i s a s t e r  a r e a s  and 18 l i v e s  had been l o s t  
a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  storms. Th i s  series of  storms, l i k e  t h a t  a t  t h e  end o f  
January ,  s t r u c k  h a r d e s t  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  and Baja Ca l i fo rn i a ;  however, 
it a l s o  produced s i g n i f i c a n t  f looding  t o  t h e  no r th  i n  t h e  San Franc isco  Bay 
a r e a  and i n  t h e  S a l i n a s  River bas in .  
Flooding was only  one of  t h e  problems caused by storms. High winds and 
wave a c t i o n  caused heavy damage i n  s e v e r a l  c o a s t a l  a reas ;  mudflows and s lope  
f a i l u r e s  due t o  s a t u r a t e d  s o i l s  caused ex tens ive  proper ty  damage. Broken 
sewer l i n e s  caused contaminat ion of  beaches. 
CoastaZ Basins South of the Santa A m  River 
San Diego County aga in  was hard h i t ,  with ex t ens ive  f looding  on t h e  
Ti juana  River and i n  t h e  Mission Val ley  a r e a  along t h e  lower San ~ i e g o  River. 
A s  i n  l a t e  January,  heavy runoff  from Baja C a l i f o r n i a  and concern f o r  t h e  
s a f e t y  of Rodriguez Dam n e c e s s i t a t e d  l a r g e  r e l e a s e s  from t h e  r e se rvo i r .  These 
r e l e a s e s ,  a l though not  a s  g r e a t  a s  those  o f  January 30, combined with 
f loodflow from t h e  ~ i j u a n a  River t o  produce an est imated peak d ischarge  on t h e  
Ti juana  River near Nestor on February 2 1  of 34,200 cu f t / s ,  s l i g h t l y  l a r g e r  
t han  t h e  previous  record peak of  January 30. Flooding was ex tens ive  
downstream from San Ysidro,  and t h e  br idge  on H o l l i s t e r  Road was destroyed.  
F i g u r e  4 is t h e  hydrograph o f  d a i l y  d ischarge  on t h e  Ti juana River near Nestor 
a t  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  boundary. 
Except f o r  Lake Henshaw, a l l  major r e s e r v o i r s  i n  San Diego County s p i l l e d  
a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  storm. Lower Otay Reservoir ,  however, s p i l l e d  only  350 cu 
f t / s ,  and t h a t  d i d  n o t  occur  u n t i l  March 11. Estimated inf low and outf low 
d a t a  f o r  s e l e c t e d  r e s e r v o i r s  i n  San Diego County a r e  summarized i n  Table 3. 
Peak d ischarges  a t  gaging s t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  San Lu i s  Rey River and Santa 
Margari ta  River bas ins  were g e n e r a l l y  t h e  h ighes t  i n  t h e  l a s t  50 years ,  
approaching t h e  magnitudes of  t h e  1927 f loods .  V a i l  Lake on t h e  Temecula 
River s p i l l e d  i n  February f o r  t h e  f i r s t  time s i n c e  t h e  dam was completed i n  
1948. The d a i l y  d ischarge  hydrograph f o r  Murrieta  Creek a t  Temecula ( s t a t i o n  
11043000) is  shown i n  F igure  5. 
CoastaZ Basins from the Santa A m  River t o  the Los AngeZes River 
Peak d i scha rges  i n  t h e  Santa Ana River bas in  were no t  a s  high a s  they  were 
i n  e i t h e r  1969 o r  1938. Runoff volumes, however, were among t h e  h ighes t  of  
t h i s  century  and a r e  d iscussed  i n  a l a t e r  s ec t ion .  Storage i n  t h e  Prado ~ l o o d  
C o n t r o l  Reservoir reached a maximum of  about 111,000 a c r e - f t  on February 22, 
t h e  second h ighes t  o f  record.  The h ighes t  s t o r a g e  of  record ,  130,000 ac re - f t ,  
occur red  on February 25, 1969. F igure  6 shows s to rage  a s  a func t ion  o f  time 
f o r  January  through March. 
Flooding from Lake E l s i n o r e  damaged many homes and f a c i l i t i e s  i n  low-lying 




FIGURE 4 Dai ly  d i s cha rge  f o r  T i juana  River near  Nestor. 
t h e  s u r f a c e  a r e a  o f  t h e  l a k e  spread  t o  much more than  i ts  normal s i z e .  In f low 
to E l s i n o r e  is from t h e  San J a c i n t o  River ,  wi th  s l i g h t  a d d i t i o n a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from smal l  t r i b u t a r y  bas ins .  The d a i l y  d i s cha rge  hydrograph f o r  
t h e  San J a c i n t o  River near ~ l s i n o r e  ( s t a t i o n  11070500) is shown i n  F igu re  7. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e  l a k e  is i n t e r m i t t e n t ,  wi th  t h e  l a k e  bed remaining d ry  f o r  
many y e a r s  i n  success ion .  Then, du r ing  w e t  pe r iods ,  it becomes covered to  
sha l low depths  f o r  a s  much a s  s e v e r a l  square  miles. The n a t u r a l  o u t l e t  o f  t h e  
l a k e  is Temescal Creek. There probably was ou t f low down Temescal C r e e k  i n  
1862, and outf low is known to  have occur red  i n  1872, 1883-84, and 1916. The 
l a k e  bed was d r y  i n  t h e  1960s u n t i l  1965, when Colorado River water was 
brought  i n  v i a  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River.  S ince  t h a t  t i m e  a l a k e  of  about  6 
square  miles i n  a r e a  has  been maintained. 
On February 13,  1980, t h e  l a k e  s u r f a c e  was recorded by t h e  U.S. Army Corps 
o f  Engineers  to be  a t  1246.59 f t ,  gage datum, and its c o n t e n t s  w a s  61,200 
TABLE 3 Estimated Peak Inf low and Outflow from Se lec t ed  Reservoi rs  i n  San 
Diego County 
Inflow Outflow Date of  
River Basin Reservoir  (CU f t / s )  (CU f t / s )  Peak Outflow 
T i  juana B a r r e t t  
Morena 
~ o d r  iguez a 
Sweetwater Loveland 
Sweetwater 
San Diego E l  Capi tan  
San Vicente  
San Diegui to  Sutherland 
Lake Hodges 
February 2 1  
February 2 1  
January  30 
February 2 1  
February 2 1  
February 24 
February 2 1  
February 21  
February 2 1  
Note: a = no es t imate .  
a ~ o c a t e d  i n  Mexico. 
Source: County of  San Diego, Department o f  S a n i t a t i o n  and ~ l o o d  Control .  
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FIGURE 6 Storage in  Prado Flood Control Reservoir during January- . 
March 1980. 
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FIGURE 7 D a i l y  d i s c h a r g e  f o r  San J a c i n t o  River  near  E l s i n o r e .  
a c r e - f t .  I n f l o w  reached  a maximum o f  s l i g h t l y  more t h a n  5,000 c u  f t / s  on  
February  22 and t h e n  decreased ,  e x c e p t  f o r  a s l i g h t  r ise a f t e r  r a i n f a l l  i n  
e a r l y  March, t o  less t h a n  100 c u  ft/s i n  mid-April.  A f t e r  c l e a r i n g  and r e p a i r  
of  t h e  o u t l e t  c h a n n e l ,  o u t f l o w  s t a r t e d  on March 8 and reached  a maximum rate 
o f  a lmos t  240 c u  f t / s  later  i n  t h e  month. The s t a g e  o f  Lake E l s i n o r e  reached 
a maximum on March 20-21 o f  1265.72 f t ;  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  volume o f  t h e  l a k e  
w a s  163,400 a c r e - f t  and its s u r f a c e  a r e a  w a s  a b o u t  10 s q u a r e  miles. Data from 
t h e  Corps  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i n f l o w  from February  1 3  to March 2 1  was 107,000 
a c r e - f t ,  w i t h  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  in f low o f  5,800 a c r e - f t  by A p r i l  11. Figure  8 
shows t h e  changes  i n  s t a g e  and c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  l a k e  from February  1 to April 
11. 
Flooding i n  t h e  headwater t r i b u t a r i e s  o f  t h e  San G a b r i e l  and Los Angeles 
r i v e r s  was comparable w i t h  t h e  extreme f l o o d s  of 1969. On t h e  main stem of  
t h e  San G a b r i e l  R iver ,  however, f l o o d  c o n t r o l  r e s e r v o i r s  reduced peak 
d i s c h a r g e  to below t h e  1969 magnitudes. By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  February 16 peak 
d i s c h a r g e  f o r  t h e  Los Angeles  River  a t  Long Beach ( s t a t i o n  11103000) was 
125,000 c u  f t / s ,  t h e  h i g h e s t  a t  t h a t  s i t e  s i n c e  r e c o r d s  began i n  1928. The 
hydrograph o f  d a i l y  d i s c h a r g e  f o r  Arroyo Seco n e a r  Pasadena ( s t a t i o n  
11098000),  t r i b u t a r y  to t h e  Los Angeles River ,  is shown i n  F i g u r e  9. 
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FIGURE 8 Changes i n  s tage  and contents  o f  Lake Els inore .  
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FIGURE 9 Daily d ischarge  f o r  Arroyo Seco near  Pasadena. 
CoastaZ Basins North and West of Los AngeZes 
Flood damage was ex tens ive  i n  t h e  small b a s i n s  between t h e  L o s  Angeles 
River  and t h e  Santa  C la ra  ~ i v e r .  Homes were damaged by mudflows and 
f loodwaters  i n  t h e  Topanga Creek and Malibu Creek basins .  Raw sewage flowed 
down Malibu Creek a f t e r  a sewer l i n e  was broken by f loodwaters;  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
contamination caused h e a l t h  o f f i c i a l s  t o  c l o s e  about  65 m i l e s  of beaches fo r  
s e v e r a l  weeks t o  swimmers and s u r f e r s .  P a r t s  o f  t h e  P o i n t  Mugu U.S. Naval A i r  
Missil-e Tes t  Center were flooded when a d i k e  a long  Cal leguas  Creek f a i l e d .  
Flooding i n  t h e  Santa  C la ra  River b a s i n  and i n  Santa Barbara County was 
g e n e r a l l y  less seve re  than  t h e  record f loods  i n  1969 and 1978. Dai ly  
d i scha rge  hydrographs f o r  Sespe Creek near  F i l lmore  ( s t a t i o n  111130000) and 
Santa C la ra  River a t  Montalvo ( s t a t i o n  11114000) a r e  shown i n  F igures  10 and 
11. 
I n  t h e  a r e a  extending no r th  from San Luis  Obispo County t o  t h e  San 
F ranc i sco  Bay a rea ,  peak flows of  many sma l l  s t reams were among t h e  h ighes t  i n  
20 years .  The 1980 peaks i n  t h e  coun t i e s  surrounding San Francisco Bay 
r i v a l e d ,  bu t  u sua l ly  d i d  n o t  exceed, peaks i n  t h e  1955 and 1958 f loods.  
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FIGURE 10 Dai ly  d i s cha rge  f o r  Sespe Creek near F i l lmore .  
S i g n i f i c a n c e  of Floods 
The i n d i v i d u a l  storms o f  January-February 1980 followed a  p a t t e r n  n o t  
unusual  i n  C a l i f o r n i a .  However, t h e  number of  storms and t h e  s h o r t  i n t e r v a l s  
between them dur ing  February 13-22 were unusual f o r  sou thern  C a l i f o r n i a .  
T h e i r  c lo senes s  i n  time ensured t h a t  each succeeding r a i n f a l l  would s t r i k e  an 
a r e a  a l r eady  primed to y i e l d  s u b s t a n t i a l  runof f .  Few o f  t h e  storms a lone  
would have caused major f looding;  however, t h e  r a p i d  sequence of  s torms 
r e s u l t e d  i n  extreme volumes of  f lows and i n  f looding  t h a t  was unusual ly  h igh  
and d e s t r u c t i v e .  Table  4 shows f o r  s e l e c t e d  si tes,  a s  indexes o f  f lood  
volume, t h e  h i g h e s t  average f lows f o r  pe r iods  o f  7 consecut ive  days and 15  
consecut ive  days i n  1980; t h e i r  ranking i n  o rde r  of  magnitude when compared 
wi th  s imi l a r  flow d u r a t i o n s  dur ing  t h e  per iod  o f  record;  and t h e  prev ious  
h i g h s  of such flows. Many s t reams sou th  of  t h e  Los Angeles bas in  c a r r i e d  t h e  
h i g h e s t  7- and 15-day volumes y e t  recorded. Streams to t h e  no r th ,  a l though 
unusua l ly  high,  c a r r i e d  volumes s u b s t a n t i a l l y  less than t h e  prev ious  maximums 
f o r  7 and 15 days. 
I n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  s u s t a i n e d  high flow c o n s t i t u t e s  an  important  source  
o f  recharge  t o  t h e  groundwater bas ins .  Because o f  t h e  s ea sona l  concent ra t ion  
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FIGURE 11 Daily d i scharge  f o r  Santa  C l a r a  River a t  Montalvo. 
o f  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  dur ing  t h e  win te r  months, followed by pumping dur ing  t h e  
summer, groundwater l e v e l s  t end  to show l a r g e  s e a s o n a l  f l u c t u a t i o n ,  r i s i n g  i n  
t h e  win te r  and e a r l y  s p r i n g  and f a l l i n g  i n  summer and autumn. I n  a d d i t i o n  to  
t h i s  seasona l  cyc l e ,  recharge  v a r i e s  g r e a t l y  from year  to year  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  
t h e  l a r g e  va r i ance  i n  annual  p r e c i p i t a t i o n .  F igu re  12 shows changes i n  t he  
water l e v e l  a t  an index w e l l  i n  Baldwin Park ,  about  15 miles e a s t  o f  c e n t r a l  
Los  Angeles,  from January  1977 t o  l a t e  May 1980. 
DAMAGE ESTIMATES 
E igh t  coun t i e s ,  inc lud ing  a l l  of  sou the rn  C a l i f o r n i a  except  Imper ia l  
County, were dec l a r ed  d i s a s t e r  a reas .  They are Los  Angeles,  Orange, Santa 
Barbara,  San Bernardino, Rivers ide ,  San Diego, Ventura ,  and, f a r t h e r  nor th ,  
San ta  Cruz (F igu re  13 ) .  Eighteen l i v e s  were los t  i n  t h e s e  coun t i e s  as a  
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  January  and February storms and f l oods .  
TABLE 4 Sustained Floodflows a t  Selec ted  S i t e s  During Floods of  1980 i n  Southern Ca l i fo rn ia  
S t a t i o n  
No. Name 
High 7  d a y s  High  1 5  d a y s  
P e r i o d  1980  P r e v i o u s  h i g h  1980  P r e v i o u s  h i g h  
o f  
Record  Flow Rank Flow Year F low  .Rank Flow Year 
11012500 Campo C r e e k  n e a r  Campo 1937-80 219 1 88 1 9 4 1  149  1 67 1 9 4 1  
11013500 T i j u a n a  R i v e r  n e a r  N e s t o r  1937-80 1 5 , 7 0 0  1 5 , 6 7 0  1 9 4 1  9 , 3 3 0  1 4,250 1 9 4 1  
11015000 Swee twa t e r  R i v e r  n e a r  Descanso  1907-8oa 1 , 1 1 0  2  1 , 2 6 0  1916 602 2  1 , 0 4 0  1916  
11043000 M u r r i e t t a  C r e e k  a t  Temecula  1931-80 2 ,800  1 2 , 1 7 0  1969 1 , 6 7 0  1 1 , 0 3 0  1969  p 
11070500 S a n  J a c i n t o  R i v e r  n e a r  E l s i n o r e  1917-80 4 , 4 1 0  2 4 ,490  1927 3 , 1 8 0  1 2,360 1927 P 
11074000 S a n t a  Ana R i v e r  be low P r a d o  Dam 1941-80 5 , 9 1 0  1 5 , 3 2 0  1969 4 ,750  1 3,580 1969 03 
11098000 Ar royo  S e c o  n e a r  P a s a d e n a  1914-80 440 6  1 , 2 3 0  1914 272 8 639 1914 
11113000 S e s p e  C r e e k  n e a r  F i l l m o r e  1928-80 4 , 9 5 0  7  1 1 , 5 0 0  1969  2 ,780  8  7 ,220  1969  
11114000 S a n t a  C l a r a  R i v e r  a t  Mon ta lvo  1950-80 1 4 , 1 0 0  3  25 ,400 1969  8 , 2 8 0  3  13 ,700  1969  
11118500 V e n t u r a  R i v e r  n e a r  V e n t u r a  1930-80 4 , 7 4 0  4  6 , 9 7 0  1969  2 ,640 5  3 ,960 1969  
11132500 S a l s i p u e d e s  C r e e k  n e a r  Lompoc 1942-80 526 3  925 1978  272 4 5 2 3  1 9 6 2  
11140000 S i s q u o c  R i v e r  n e a r  Ga rey  1942-80 1 , 8 0 0  6  6 ,250 1969 1 , 0 8 0  5 3 , 7 8 0  1969  
Note:  Ave rage  f l o w s  f o r  h i g h e s t  7  and  1 5  c o n s e c u t i v e  d a y s .  A l l  f l o w s  i n  c u b i c  f e e t  p e r  s econd .  To compute  a c r e - f e e t ,  
m u l t i p l y  7-day f l o w  by  9 .917 and  15-day f l o w  by  29.752.  Rank o f  1 i n d i c a t e s  h i g h e s t  e v e n t  d u r i n g  p e r i o d  o f  r e c o r d ;  2  
i n d i c a t e s  s e c o n d  h i g h e s t ;  a n d  s o  f o r t h .  A l l  t h e  s u s t a i n e d  f l o w s  shown f o r  1980  began  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  F e b r u a r y  13-19. 
a ~ o  r e c o r d  f o r  1928-56.  
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FIGURE 13 Counties declared d i sas t er  areas a s  a r e s u l t  o f  the  January- 
February 1980 f l oods .  
12 1 
Prel iminary £1004 damage e s t ima te s  f o r  t h e  eight-county a r e a  were 
coord ina ted  by t h e  Federa l  Emergency Management Agency ( o r a l  communication, 
1980). T o t a l  damages were es t imated  t o  be almost  $350 mi l l i on .  The breakdown 
o f  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  by types  of proper ty  damaged is shown below: 
Type 
of 
Proper ty  
Damage 
(mi l l i ons  
of  d o l l a r s )  
Pub l i c  f a c i l i t i e s  
P r i v a t e  proper ty  
Business 
Agr icu l ture  
T o t a l  
SEDIMENT DATA 
Se lec t ed  sediment samples, ob ta ined  dur ing  t h e  f loods  of  January and 
February 1980 i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a ,  were analyzed f o r  sediment 
concent ra t ion ,  and t h e  d a t a  a r e  presented i n  Table 5. The l i m i t e d  time 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a n a l y s i s  of samples and of streamflow d a t a  precluded t h e  
d e t a i l e d  computation of  sediment d ischarge  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  f l ood  per iods .  
Water and sediment d ischarge  d a t a  presented  h e r e  are p rov i s iona l ;  f i n a l  d a t a  
w i l l  be publ ished i n  t h e  annual s e r i e s  Water Resources Data f o r  C a l i f o r n i a .  
Data on water and sediment d ischarge  dur ing  t h e  1980 f loods  from t h r e e  
s i t e s  (Santa Ana River a t  Santa  Ana, Santa  C l a r a  River a t  Montalvo, and 
Ventura River near  Ventura) a r e  p l o t t e d  i n  F igures  14-16. Similar  d a t a  
obtained during t h e  f loods  of 1969 and 1978 a r e  a l s o  p l o t t e d  f o r  comparison. 
Analys is  of sediment samples is no t  y e t  complete enough to warrant  es t imates  
of  t h e  t o t a l  sediment t ranspor ted  dur ing  t h e  1980 f loods .  
TABLE 5 Suspended-Sediment Data f o r  Selected Gaging S t a t i o n s  i n  Southern 
Ca l i fo rn ia  During January-February 1980 




Time Height Discharge Concentration 
(hours ) ( f t )  (cu f t / s )  (mg/l i ter)  Tons Per Day 
11046550 San Juan Creek a t  San Juan Capistrano 
January 10 1200 11.73 17 159 
January 14 1055 12.08 17 101 
January 17 1335 12.01 12 281 
January 18 1420 - 12 72 
February 17 1240 - 3,000 7,390 59,900 
February 18 1010 - 9,560 29,700 767,000 












February 17 0945 9.95 9 9 4,450 1,190 
February 18 1200 10.37 259 17,000 11,900 
February 18 1240 10.18 313 11,600 9,800 
11074000 Santa Ana River Below Prado Dam 
January 2 1600 2.86 203 8 3 45 
January 16 1040 3.94 705 180 343 
January 23 1400 2.93 226 42 2 6 
February 4 0920 5.03 1,950 128 
February 4 1210 5.17 2,200 127 
February 4 1500 5.17 2,200 134 
February 5 0915 5.15 2,090 106 
February 5 1440 4.85 1,620 126 
February 6 0815 3.04 250 110 
February 7 1030 3.03 246 9 1 
TABLE 5 ,  suspended-S~diment Data f o r  Selec ted  Gaging Sta t ions  i n  Southern 
c a l i f o n r i a  During January-February 1980 ( ~ o n t )  
suspended Sediment 
Gage 
Time Height Discharge Concentrat ion 
Date (hours) (ft) (CU f t / s )  (mg/l i ter)  Tons Per  Day 
February 8 1330 3.01 314 49 42 
February 16 0920 5.38 2,600 157 1,100 
February 16 1520 4.72 1,500 162 656 
February 17 0830 5.44 2,800 1,890 14,300 
February 17 1430 5.56 3,000 720 5,830 
February 17 1630 5.55 2,990 488 ' 3,940 
February 18  0815 6.04 4,300 437 5,070 














February 14  
February 14 
February 16  
February 17 
February 19 
11078000 Santa Ana River a t  Santa Ana 
January 10 1030 5.30 17 1 7 1  
January 11 1600 6.47 340 470 
January 14  1330 5.78 140 245 
January 15 1400 5.97 177 301 
January 16  1445 6.22 276 196 
January 17 1145 6.25 297 264 
January 22 1550 5.61 9 6 113 
TABLE 5 Suspended-Sediment Data f o r  Selec ted  Gaging S t a t i o n s  i n  Southern 
Cal i forn ia  During January-February 1980 (Cont) 
Suspended Sediment 
Gage 
Time Height Discharge Concentration 
Date (hours ) (ft) (CU ft/s) (mg/l i ter)  Tons Per  Day 
January 29 1300 7.17 1,600 5,230 22,600 
January 30 1140 7.57 2,300 3,110 19,300 






February 1 3  
February 14 
February 14 
February 1 5  
February 1 6  
February 16  
February 17  




















11114000 Santa Clara  River a t  Montalvo 
125 
TABLE 5 Suspended-?ediment Data f o r  Selected Gaging S t a t i o n s  i n  Southern 
Ca l i fo rn ia  During January-February 1980 (Cont) 
Suspended Sediment 
Gage 
Time Height Discharge Concentration 
Date (hours ( f t )  (CU f t / s )  (mg/l i ter)  Tons Per Day 
February 11 
February 13 



































Ventura River Near Ventura 
TABLE 5 Suspended-Sediment Data f o r  Selec ted  Gaging S t a t i o n s  i n  Southern 




Time Height Discharge Concentration 






February 1 4  
February 15 
February 1 5  
February 1 5  
February 1 6  
February 1 6  
February 1 7  
February 17  
February 17  
February 1 8  
February 1 8  
February 1 8  
February 19 
February 19  
February 1 9  
February 19  
February 20 
February 2 1 





INSTANTANEOUS WATER DISCHARGE, IN CUBIC FEET PER SECOND 
FIGURE 14 Suspended-sediment discharge versus water discharge for 
selected years at Santa Ana ~iver at Santa Ana. 
INSTANTANEOUS WATER DISCHARGE, IN  CUBIC FEET PER SECvOND 
FIGURE 15 Suspended-sediment discharge versus water discharge for 
selected years at Santa Clara River at Montalvo. 
INSTANTANEOUS WATER DISCHARGE. IN  CUBIC FEET PER SECOND 
FIGURE 16 Suspended-sediment discharge versus water discharge for 
se lected years a t  Ventura River near Ventura. 

OPERATION M D  PERFORMANCE OF CORPS OF ENGINEERS FLOOD CONTROL 
PROJECTS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA DURING 1978-80 
by Joseph B. Evelyn 
The storms and resultant floods of 1978-80 i n  southern California and 
~ r i z o n a  put many flood control f ac i l i t i e s  t o  a reasonably severe t e s t .  This 
paper discusses the operation and performance of Corps of Engineers flood 
control projects during t h i s  period. 
The extent that the flood controZ capability of Corps reservoirs was used 
i n  controlling the 1978-80 flood events i s  examined i n  terms of the percentage 
of flood control storage used and the percentage o f  m a x i m  scheduled reservoir 
re lease actually made. F i Z  ling frequency relationships a t  these projects are 
used to  estimate the frequency of occurrence of the 1978-80 flood events. 
The effectiveness o f  reservoir operation i s  discussed i n  terms of the 
reduction i n  peak discharge inflow compared with maximum reservoir release. 
The necessity of considering real world circumstances i n  the planning, design, 
and operation of flood control works i s  i l lus t ra ted  by br i e f l y  tracing the 
actual operation of several reservoirs. 
A comparison between the f i r s t  cost plus accwnulated operation and 
maintenance cost for Corps projects and the benef i ts  generated from fZood 
damage reduction during 1978-80 i s  made. Finally, a s m a r y  of pertinent 
observations i s  presented, which should prove useful t o  water resource 
managers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Southwest has recently experienced a series of wet years (1978-80) 
during-which winter precipitation has been well above normal. The resulting 
floods and mudslides caused extensive damage to homes and businesses, which 
was vividly portrayed in the news media. Yet the story of how the operation 
of numerous flood control works effectively prevented the occurrence of 
catastrophic flooding over large areas of the Southwest was left largely 
untold. This paper seeks to fill that gap by presenting some quantitative 
Joseph B. Evelyn is Chief of the Hydrologic Engineering Section with the 
Los Angeles District Corps of Engineers in Los Angeles, California. 
information on the magnitude and frequency of the 1978-80 floods, the 
reduction in flood magnitude achieved by Corps reservoir projects, and flood 
damages prevented. Finally, some conclusions and recommendations are put 
forth that should be of value to both the planners and operators of flood 
control projects. 
LOS ANGELES DISTRICT PROJECTS 
Flood control projects operated by the Los Angeles District of the Corps 
of Engineers lie in three major watersheds: the Los Angeles-San Gabriel River 
(Figure 1) , the Santa Ana River (Figure 2), and the lower Colorado River 
(Figure 3). Of the 21 reservoirs constructed by the Los Angeles District, 
this paper will focus on the 11 projects that are gated structures and located 
above major flood damage centers. Table 1 presents a summary of pertinent 
characteristics of the projects. 
Most of these structures were designed on the basis of controlling a 
"standard project floodn with a nondamaging reservoir release rate without 
spillway flow. A standard project flood is a hypothetical flood that would 
result from the most severe combination of meteorologic and hydrologic 
conditions considered reasonably characteristic of the region. 
FLOOD MAGNITUDES 
The storms and resultant floods of 1978-80 in southern California and 
Arizona put many flood control facilities to a reasonably severe test. Table 
2 summarizes the maximum storage attained and the corresponding maximum 
release associated with Corps projects during 1978-80, as percentages of total 
available storage and maximum scheduled release. As can be seen in Table 2, 
the portion of total flood control capability used varied widely from 
reservoir to reservoir during the same year. For example, during 1980 the 
percentage of available storage used varied from 9 percent at Carbon Canyon 
Dam to 78 percent at San Antonio Dam. Table 2 also presents the estimated 
return period of the reservoir stage, which is referred to as "filling 
frequency1' in the table. Note that the 1980 flood season produced the two 
most infrequent events in terms of reservoir stage versus frequency. The 
Sepulveda and Alamo reservoirs reached stages corresponding to recurrence 
intervals of 60 years and 90 years, respectively. 
The portion of total flood control capability used in any particular event 
is a function of the magnitude of the inflow, constraints on the downstream* 
channel, the basic mode of operation, and adjustments compatible with other 
water control facilities in the same system. However, the filling frequency 
curve is a useful indicator of the overall magnitude and recurrence interval 
of observed events. Figure 4 shows the filling frequency curve at Prado Dam 
derived from the annual series of flood events since the construction of the 
dam in 1941. Note that the flood of February 1980 plots at about the 25-year 
return period. The filling frequency curve tends to lump all the variables 
pertinent to both the flood and the reservoir operation into a single value. 
The Prado Dam volume-frequency curves shown in Figure 5 illustrate in a 
more definitive manner the magnitude and frequency of the flood inflows. It 


FIGURE 3 Location map of the Colorado River. 
TABLE 1 Pertinent Data for Gated Flood Control Reservoirs, Los Angeles District Corps of Engineers 
Dam Stream 
Maximum 
Drainage Scheduled Storage t o  Maximum Storage of Record 
Area Completion Release Spillway Crest Storage Percent 
(square miles) Date (CU f t / s )  (acre-f t )  (acre-f t )  Ful l  Date 
Los Angeles and San Gabriel River Watersheds 
Sepulveda Los Angeles River 152 1941 16,500 17, 300a 11,500 66 Feb. 1980 
Hansen T u j  unga Wash 147 1940 23,000 26,090 19,900 56b Jan. 1943 
Santa Fe San Gabriel River 236 1949 41,000 32,600 15,350 44b Jan. 1969 
Whittier Narrows Rio Hondo 5 54 1957 40 ,000~ 36, 200a 10,240 28 Jan. 1969 
Brea Brea Creek 22 1942 1,400 4,000 870 22 Feb. 1969 
Fuller ton Fuller ton Creek 5 1941 260 760 
Santa Ana River Watershed 
520 68 Jan. 1979 p 
W 
0\ 
San Antonio San Antonio Creek 2 7 1956 8,200 7,650 5,950 78 Feb. 1980 
Prado Santa Ana River 2,233 1941 5,165 198,000 111,000 56 Feb. 1980 
Carbon Canyon Carbon Creek 19 1961 1,050 6,600 720 11 Mar. 1979 
Lower Colorado River Watershed 
Alamo B i l l  W i l l i a m s  River 4,770 1968 7,000 1,045,000 724,000 69 Feb. 1980 
6 Painted Rock Gila River 50,800 1959 22,500 2,492,000 1,849,000 74 Mar. 1980 
a Storage a t  the top of flood pool (is above spillway c r e s t  due t o  gated spi l lway).  
b ~ e r c e n t  f u l l  based on storage capacity on date  of flood. 
C Rio Hondo o u t l e t  only. An addit ional  5,000 cu f t / s  is scheduled f o r  the  San Gabriel River ou t l e t .  
TABLE 2 Magnitude of 1978-80 Flood Events at Gated Flood Control Reservoirs, Los Angeles District 
Corps of Engineers 
Storage to Maximum Water Year 1978 Water Year 1979 Water Year 1980 
Spillway Scheduled 
Dam 
Crest Release Percent Filling Percent Percent Filling Percent Percent Filling Percenb 
(acre-ft) (cuft/s) Full Frequency Maximum Full Frequency Maximum Full Frequency Maximum 
(years) Scheduled (years) Scheduled (years) Scheduled' 
Release Release Release 
Los Angeles and San Gabriel River Watersheds 
Sepulveda 17,300~ 16,500 30 14 76 6 3 5 9 66 60 9 2 
Hansen 26,090 23,000 31 32 57 11 5 3 2 2 17 16 
Santa Fe 32,600 41,000 17 4 35 2 2 1 2 5 6 4 5 
Whittier Narrows 36, 200a 40,000 14 17 80 11 2 54 19 40 89 
Brea 4,000 1,400 4 5 72 5 6 84 18 2 5 7 6 
Fullerton 760 260 42 10 108 68 40 110 3 6 9 110 
Santa Ana River Watershed 
San Antonio 7,650 8,200 3 7 40 26 9 5 1 78 n/a 2 5 
Prado 198,000 5,165 40 18 44 15 7 10 56 2 5 120 
Carbon Canyon 6,600 1,050 11 13 31 11 13 21 9 9 4 9 
Lower Colorado River Watershed 
Alamo 1,045,000 7,000 32 10 4 49 25 8 69 90 5 7 
Painted ~ o c k  2,492,000 22,500 15 n/a 1 65 n/a 13 74 n/a 20 
Note: n/a = not available. 
astorage at top of flood pool (is above spillway crest due to gated spillway). 
EXCEEDENCE FREQUENCY PER HUNDRED YEARS 
LEGEND 
Median p l o t t i n g  pos i t ions  f o r  
period 1942-80 (N = 39) 
recorded water surface elevations 
grea ter  than 472 f t  MSL 
Standard projec t  flood, elevation 
555 f t ,  based on gross s torage 
capacity 
Drainage area = 2,255 sq m i l e s  
EXCEEDENCE INTERVAL I N  YEARS 
FIGURE 4 The f i l l i n g  frequency curve a t  Prado Dam, p a r t i a l  durat ion.  
EXCEEDENCE INTERVAL IN YEARS 
FIGURE 5 Volume-frequency curves for the Santa Ana River at Prado 
(drainage area = 2,255 sq miles) . 
Dam 
should be noted that the recurrence interval of a single flood event varies 
with the duration selected. In Figure 5 it can be seen that the February 1980 
flood inflow at Prado Dam was a 14-year event with respect to instantaneous 
peak discharge, an 11-year event for a one-day duration, and a 30-year event 
for a five-day duration. The filling frequency relationship (Figure 4) 
smoothesthis range of return periods versus duration to indicate that a 
25-year return period is representative of the entire February 1980 flood 
event. 
RESERVOIR OPERATION 
A measure of the effectiveness of a reservoir facility in controlling 
flood runoff is the degree of reduction of peak reservoir inflow as compared 
with maximum reservoir release. Table 3 summarizes the reductions in peak 
inflows achieved by gated Los Angeles ~istrict reservoirs during 1978-80. 
Note that substantial reductions were achieved at most reservoirs, 
particularly those having natural unimproved downstream channels, such as 
Prado, Alamo, and Painted Rock dams. Where high-capacity, improved channels 
were available, such as at Whittier Narrows Dam, reductions in peak reservoir 
inflows were typically much smaller, since large releases could be made safely 
from these structures. 
The remainder of this section describes the operation of several of the 
Corps reservoirs discussed above, in order to convey in more detail an 
understanding of the actual operations and the decision making involved. The 
importance of adequate downstream channel capacity, forecasting of projected 
reservoir inflows, and timely exchange of information with other agencies 
operating reservoirs in the same system can be inferred in the following 
discussions. 
Prado Dam operation during January-August 1980 is shown graphically in 
Figure 6. ~uring the large flood inflow in mid-February, reservoir releases 
were held in the range of 5,000 to 6,000 cu ft/s, except for a brief cutback 
to evaluate the condition of the downstream channel and make emergency channel 
repairs. Similar temporary cutbacks were made in late March and April, until 
in mid-May it was possible to reduce releases to 300 cu ft/s, which could be 
recharged entirely to groundwater by the Orange County Water District, thereby 
maintaining a dry lower river channel to facilitate the repair of damaged 
portions of the channel through Orange County. The reservoir had to be dry in 
mid-August to permit seismic investigation of the Prado Dam embankment as well 
as to perform needed gate maintenance. 
Sepulveda Dam operation during the February 16, 1980, flood event is 
depicted in Figure 7. Note that reductions in release were required between 
1600 and 2100 hours so as not to exceed the downstream channel capacity of 
16,500 cu ft/s. These adjustments were made on the basis of reports by 
channel observers in the field at that time. 
Beginning in 1978 significant inflows occurred at Painted Rock Dam each 
winter following large spills from upstream water conservation reservoirs. 
Figure 8 illustrates the operation of Painted Rock Reservoir during 1978-80. 
TABLE 3 Reduction of Peak Inflows a t  Gated Flood Control Reservoirs,  Los Angeles D i s t r i c t  Corps 
of Engineers 
Drainage Water Year 1978 Water Year 1979 Water Year 1980 
Area 
(square miles) Peak Maximum Percent Peak Maximum Percent Peak Maximum Percent 
Inflow Release Reduction Inflow Release Reduction Inflow Release Reduction 
(CU ft/s) (CU ft/s) of Peak (cu ft/s) (CU ft/s) of Peak (cu ft/s) (CU ft/s) of Peak 












Los Angeles and San Gabriel River Watersheds 
13,190 49 16,410 9,680 
13,120 74 1,785 740 
14,160 20 420 180 
31,850 15 16,700 21,600 
1,010 34 1,580 1,170 
285 78 1,328 285 
Santa Ana River Watershed 
1,980 4 275 80 
2,250 93 5,885 510 
325 68 637 225 
Lower Colorado River Watershed 
1,500 98 67,000 1,500 
250 99.8 128,100 3,000 
a .  Rlo Hondo outlet only. 
b~pproximate. 

FIGURE 7 Operat ion of Sepulveda Dam on February 16, 1980. 

Due to many years 0: little or no flow on the Gila River downstream of Painted 
Rock Dam, and to use of the floodplain by agricultural interests, adequate 
downstream channel capacity is no longer available to make scheduled flood 
control releases. Although the maximum scheduled flood control release is 
22,500 cu ft/s, releases were constrained to a maximum of 250 cu ft/s in 1978, 
about 3,000 cu ft/s in 1979, and about 4,800 cu ft/s in 1980. Forecasts of 
probable inflow were essential to accommodating such a constrained reservoir 
operation. 
LOWER LOS ANGELES RIVER 
Thus far, attention has been focused on reservoir projects. The 
functioning of the channels that are part of the Los Angeles-San Gabriel River 
system is also pextinent to the discussion of project operation and 
p&formance. Annual peak discharge frequency curves for the Los Angeles River 
near the Wardlow stream gage (see Figure 1 for location) are presented in 
Figure 9. The leveed Los Angeles River channel at this location was designed 
to carry 146,000 cu ft/s. The February 16, 1980, flood of 125,000 cu ft/s, 
the largest flood of record, required using 86 percent of the design channel 
capacity . 
Generally, improved channels (concrete or rock lined) in the Los 
Angeles-San Gabriel system performed well, with only minor problems and little 
or no damage. The most significant problem observed was localized water 
surface disturbances caused by large storm drain side inflows. Standing 
waves, in some locations several feet higher than the water surface upstream 
and downstream of the disturbance, required throttling back reservoir releases 
in order to prevent possible damage to the channel itself. The Los Angeles 
River about 1 mile downstream of Sepulveda Dam (Figure 10) vividly illustrates 
this situation. 
Two discharge frequency relationships for the L o s  Angeles River near the 
Wardlow gage are presented in Figure 9. A graphical curve using median 
plotting positions is drawn through the annual peak discharges for the record 
beginning in 1941. However, since the drainage area has been urbanizing, the 
change in percentage of impervious cover and drainage system improvements 
(e.g., storm drains) have greatly increased the efficiency of runoff. This is 
illustrated in Figure 11, which depicts the change in mean annual peak 
discharge versus time from 1941 to the present. The points plotted in Figure 
11 represent the mean of the annual peak discharges occurring in the 10-year 
period immediately prior to the year at which the point is plotted. The mean 
peak discharge for the 10-year period 1941-50 was determined to be about 
17,000 cu ft/s. The mean peak discharge for the period 1970-80 had increased 
to about 56,000 cu ft/s. In order to reflect this change in watershed 
response due to urbanization, the mean peak discharge for 1970-80 was used in 
conjunction with the upper end of the best-fit curve in Figure 9 to draw a 
graphical estimate of the present discharge frequency relationship, shown as a 
dashed line in Figure 9. Note that the 125,000-cu ft/s peak discharge plots 
at about the 50-year return period. 
EXCEEDENCE INTERVAL IN YEARS 
FIGURE 9 Discharge frequency curve for the  L o s  A n g e l e s V ~ i v e r  a t  
Wardlow Road. 
FIGURE 10 Looking downstream on the Los Angeles River near Kester 
Avenue (approximately 1 mile downstream of Sepulveda Dam) on February 
16, 1980. Note the standing wave resulting from side weir overflow. 
(Photo courtesy of Los Angeles County Flood Control District.) 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The discussion of the performance of the projects would not be complete 
without addressing the benefits resulting from reduction in potential flood 
damage achieved through the operation of the projects versus their cost to the 
public. Table 4 summarizes the original cost of the projects plus the 
accumulated annual operation and maintenance costs, along with flood damages 
prevented, using present price levels. Dollar damage estimates were developed 
by the Corps' Economics Section based on available damage versus discharge 
relations for the condition of no projects in place. The comparison of flood 
I 
ENDING YEAR OF 10-YEAR PERIOD 
FIGURE 11 Mean o f  annual peak discharge versus t i m e  for the L o s  
Angeles River near Wardlow. 
TABLE 4 Costs and Benefi ts  f o r  Gated Flood Control ~ e s e r v o i r s  and Selected Channels (thousands of 
d o l l a r s ) ,  Los Angeles D i s t r i c t  Corps of  Engineers 
a Costs Damages Prevented in Water Year 
Construction Accumulated Total Construction 1978 1979 1980 1978-80 
Operation and and Operation and 
Maintenance Maintenance )r 














Los Angeles and San Gabriel River Watersheds 
3,200 11,100 140,000 
2,400 14,500 280,000 
2,400 22,000 210,000 
4,100 48,800 97,000 
2,200 3,400 5,100 
1,700 4,500 2,000 
13,500 328,400 480,000 
Santa Ana River Watershed 
Lower Colorado River Watershed 
a Not adjusted for inflation. 
damages prevented and the cost of the flood control works indicates that most 
of the projects paid for themselves several times over during the period 
1978-80. 
SUMMARY 
1. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of the 1978-80 floods varied 
widely among the Corps projects. However, on the basis of the filling 
frequency relationships derived for each project, most of the observed flood 
events had recurrence intervals of less than 50 years, and all were less than 
100-year events. 
2. Water resource managers should recognize the need to make realistic 
assumptions with respect to usable channel capacity below flood control 
reservoirs during both design and operation. 
3.  During flood control operation there is a real need for rapid and sure 
exchange of information about the operation of projects within a river system 
and about the impacts and problems resulting from operating the system. 
4. Flood forecasting of inflows is essential to optimizing the operation 
of flood control facilities. 
5. Deviations from the original reservoir operation plan, commonly based 
solely on control of a particular design flood, are frequently necessary to 
accommodate real world circumstances. 
6. Corps flood control facilities have been cost effective measures in the 
Southwest . 
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FLOODFLOWS I N  MAJOR STREAMS 
I N  VENTURA COUNTY 
by Dolores B. Taylor  
Several floo~fZows of special importance occurred i n  Ventura County 
dwing the storms of February 1980. The most devastating was the breach 
of the Calleguas Creek levee, which released an estimated 24,000 acre-ft 
of water and 1.7 mil l ion tons of sediment onto the Oxnard plain. A t  the 
Point Mugu Naval Base, which @as i n  the path o f  the floodwaters, damages 
t o  470 residences totaled some $9 million. 
To warn the residents of Point Mugu of future flooding, the Navy, the 
flational Weather Service River Forecast Center, and the Ventura County 
Flood Control District  have set  up a flood warning system for CaZleguas 
Creek. This system combines rain and stream gages, runoff models, and 
sediment-monitoring procedures t o  provide advance notice that flood 
conditions are imminent. 
Several other large floodflows i n  Ventura County were related t o  the 
Creek f ire  of September 2 979, which blackened 33,000 acres. The Canada 
Larga watershed produced a uave of debris-laden water thut demoZished build- 
ings i n  i t s  path. I n  East Ventura, Arundell Barranca overtopped i t s  west 
bank for the f i r s t  time i n  memory and swept through the nearbg streets .  
Along wi th  t h e  usua l  c o l l a g e  of  problems a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  in t ense  s torms on 
s a t u r a t e d  watersheds,  t w o  primary even t s  a f f e c t e d  Ventura County during t h e  
s torms i n  February 1980. 
The most devas t a t ing  i n  terms of t h e  number o f  people a f f e c t e d ,  t h e  
p rope r ty  damaged, and t h e  manpower requi red  t o  m i t i g a t e  t h e  event  was t h e  
Cal leguas Creek l evee  break. Some $9 m i l l i o n  of damage was done a t  P o i n t  
Mugu, wi th  n e a r l y  3,000 people s u f f e r i n g  from t h e  psycho l sg i ca l  stress o f  
evacuat ion,  t h e  l o s s  of  household goods, and t h e  f e a r  t h a t  t h i s  could  happen 
again.  
Approximately 1,500 a c r e s  of va luable  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l and  were covered by 
f loodwaters  ranging from 2 t o  5 f t  i n  depth. An e s t ima ted  24,000 ac re - f t  of 
Dolores B. Taylor  is Surface Water Hydrologis t  wi th  t h e  Ventura County 
Flood Cont ro l  and Water Resources District i n  Ventura, C a l i f o r n i a .  
floodwaters escaped through the levee breach from 6:00 p.m., February 16, 
1980, to 2:00 p.m., February 20, 1980. After the water receded, approximately 
450 acres of farmland were buried by silt from 4 in. to 4 ft deep. 
The second event that was a cause for major concern was the storm's impact 
on the upland areas burned in the 33,000-acre Creek fire that occurred in 
September 1979. Thirteen large watersheds, draining to the Ventura River and 
lower Santa Clara River, were 50 to 90 percent burned. The intense heat from 
the fire turned tree stumps into white powder and left no sign of a prior 
orchard. During subsequent storms, culverts at the canyon outlets captured 
debris while silt and ash swept into channels below, creating the highest 
peaks on record. Debris production formulas developed by Scott and Williams 
(1974) were used to predict the amount of bulking of runoff from the burned 
areas. The estimates of tremendous debris production were borne out by 
subsequent debris entrapment in control structures. Damage to flood control 
facilities amounted to $2 million, resulting from the 15-year rainfall event 
(six hours of rainfall) and the consequent peak discharge, which was in excess 
of an event with a 100-year return period. 
CALLEGUAS CREEK LEVEE BREAK 
Chronology of Event 
On Saturday, February 16, 1980, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a 
conscientious flood control hydrographer called into the County Storm Center 
to report that sheet flow was lapping over the east levee above the USGS gage 
at Calleguas Creek near Camarillo State Hospital. The gage height reported at 
that time corresponded to a channel discharge of 25,300 cu ft/s--a 50-year 
event and over twice the original design flow capacity. To prove herself in 
charge, Ma Nature compounded the problem with a very high tide and onshore 
wind waves. Ordinarily, the waves near Point Mugu approach obliquely so that 
the full effect on the outflow is not felt. That night, however, wave action 
was perpendicular to the shore, driven by the third in a series of storms. 
After dark, ranchers in the area reported some breakout near Highway 1 
where Revolon Slough and Calleguas Creek merge, but the full comprehension of 
what had occurred did not come until dawn. Then, 1,500 acres between a major 
breach in Calleguas' levee and Highway 1 looked like a muddy lake. 
Revolon Slough's levees, rising several feet above the surrounding 
agricultural land, blocked the seaward path of the escaping floodwaters. , 
Because of rising floodwaters at the junction of the two levees above Highway 
1, the Revolon Slough east levee gave way, followed by overtopping on its west 
bank. Calleguas Creek's floodwaters poured through the escape channels, 
filling in the low-lying area (see Figures 1 and 2). Highway 1, nearly 5 ft 
above the surrounding ground, has a low point directly opposite base housing 
at Point Mugu. This sag acted like a 1,200-ft-long weir, with floodwaters 
sheeting across and into base housing. Streets and yards began to flood 
without warning. Base operations at several locations came to a standstill 
and civilian employees were sent home. At the worst point,-30 in. of water 
was standing inside many homes. Families grabbed what few things they could 
FIGURE 1 Thi s  a e r i a l  photograph shows t h e  l e v e e  break on Cal leguas  
Creek and c o n s t r u c t i o n  crews t r y i n g  t o  rechannel  t h e  escaping water.  
A t o t a l  of 24,000 ac re - f t  of water flowed through t h e  breach be fo re  
it was r e p a i r e d ,  and 450 a c r e s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l and  were bur ied  by 
silt from 4 i n .  t o  4 f t  deep. (Photograph by Western Aer i a l ,  
February 22, 1980.) 
and were qu ick ly  evacuated t o  nearby P o r t  Hueneme to awa i t  t h e  recess ion  o f  
f loodwaters .  Of t h e  550 housing u n i t s  a t  P o i n t  Mugu, 470 u n i t s  rece ived  sol 
f lood  damage. 
Af te r  t h e  l e v e e  breached, channel  headcu t t i ng  occurred  upstream o f  t h e  
breach, lowering t h e  channel  bottom and c o n t r i b u t i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  sediment t o  
depos i ted  on f looded a g r i c u l t u r a l  a r eas .  
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
MILES 
5 0 0 0  0 5 0 0 0  1UOOO 1 5 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 5 0 0 0  
F E F T  
FIGURE 2 Location map showing the area f looded by the  Cal leguas Creek 
l e v e e  break on February 1 6 ,  1980. The area south of U.S. Highway 1 
encompasses the  Po in t  Mugu base housing. 
Below t h e  b reach  t h e  streambed was plugged wi th  sediment.  This  sediment 
had t o  be removed t o  r e s t o r e  some channel  c a p a c i t y  and p repa re  f o r  t h e  nex t  
storm. An emergency c o n t r a c t o r  and Navy c o n s t r u c t i o n  f o r c e s  (Seabees) from 
P o r t  Hueneme a t t a c k e d  t h e  breach wi th  bul ldozers .  C a l c u l a t i o n s  of  t h e  
requi red  d i s t a n c e . t o  bul ldoze a  p i l o t  channel  t h a t  would d r a i n  were h u r r i e d l y  
completed and work began. By 2:00 p.m., Monday, February 20, t h e  breach was 
c losed ,  t h e  p i l o t  channel  was ca r ry ing  Cal leguas '  f lows  harmless ly  to t h e  
ocean,  and t h e  masssive cleanup began. 
The l evee  breach caused extended problems to m i l i t a r y  personnel  i n  base  
housing. Not u n t i l  t h e  breach was c losed  could t h e  ma jo r i t y  of  t h e s e  people 
r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  q u a r t e r s ,  and very  few f a m i l i e s  chose to be moved to o t h e r  
q u a r t e r s  while  t h e i r  former q u a r t e r s  were being r epa i r ed .  The c o s t  of  
r e p a i r i n g  wallboatd,  f l o o r i n g ,  and o the r  major damage t o  housing s t r u c t u r e s  
amounted t o  $6 mi l l i on .  The va lue  of  damaged c o n t e n t s  o f  homes and l o s s  of 
work added another  $3 m i l l i o n  t o  t h e  t o t a l  l o s s .  
Meanwhile another  storm f r o n t  roared onshore,  dumping an a d d i t i o n a l  2  i n .  
of  r a i n  on t h e  a l r e a d y  s a t u r a t e d  soil. To hear  t h a t  t h e  sou the rn  C a l i f o r n i a  
c o a s t a l  a r e a  had been dec lared  a  d i s a s t e r  a r e a  was no s u r p r i s e  to f lood  
f i g h t i n g  f o r c e s  i n  Ventura County. 
Hydrology 
What genera ted  such unusual runoff?  
The approximate t ime of concent ra t ion  o f  t h e  Ca l l eguas  Creek watershed is 
four  t o  s i x  hours ,  depending on storm i n t e n s i t y .  One major t r i b u t a r y ,  t h e  
Arroyo Simi, d r a i n s  nea r ly  90 square  miles o f  r a p i d l y  urbaniz ing  watershed. 
Simi Val ley  secondary d r a i n s ,  paved a r e a s ,  and close-packed r o o f s  a l l  
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  increased  runoff .  A record ing  r a i n  gage i n  Tap0 Canyon, a 
t r i b u t a r y  t o  Arroyo Simi, showed r a i n  beginning a t  5 a.m., February 16. By 10 
a.m. t h e  i n t e n s i t y  was increas ing ,  with t h e  maximum one-hour r a i n f a l l  o f  0.84 
in .  occur r ing  between 1500 and 1600 hours. Al toge ther ,  3.89 in .  f e l l  between 
0500 and 1700 hours.  
The t h r e e  s t ream gages on Arroyo Simi i n d i c a t e  l a g  t i m e  between r a i n  and 
runoff  a s  w e l l  a s  t r a v e l  time. The f i r s t  peak near  t h e  p o i n t  i n  t h e  v a l l e y  
where u rban iza t ion  begins  was a t  1430 hours.  The second, Arroyo Simi a t  Royal 
Avenue, peaked a t  1530, and t h e  t h i r d ,  Arroyo Simi a t  Madera Road ( t h e  v a l l e y  
mouth), peaked a t  1650. The t r a v e l  time from t h e  mouth o f  Simi Val ley  to 
P o i n t  ~ u g u  is a t  p r e s e n t  2-1/2 t o  3 hours  through a  s o f t  bottom channel  
s u b j e c t  to l a r g e  sand waves and l a t e r a l  e ros ion .  
During t h e  46 y e a r s  t h a t  t h e  Arroyo Simi h a s  been gaged a t  t h e  v a l l e y  
o u t l e t ,  t h e  t i m e  from maximum r a i n f a l l  i n t e n s i t y  t o  peak flow has  decreased 
cons iderably .  The two-hour l a g  between peak r a i n f a l l  and peak runoff  i n  
February 1980 may i n d i c a t e  t h e  new time of  concen t r a t ion ,  a s  t h e  9,300-cu f t / s  
peak is t h e  l a r g e s t  i n  t h e  lengthy  record. 
Another major l a t e r a l ,  t h e  Arroyo Conejo, d r a i n s  t h e  Conejo Val ley  (43 
square  mi les )  and Santa  Rosa Val ley  (14 square  miles). Although new t r a c t s  
a r e  e f f i c i e n t l y  d ra ined  wi th  p ipes  and r e in fo rced  conc re t e  channels ,  s e v e r a l  
mi l e s  of t h e  major dra inage  channels  remain i n  n a t u r a l  c o n d i t i o n  t o  r e t a r d  and 
s t o r e  floodwaters.  A s  a r e s u l t ,  even though t h e  dra inage  a r e a  is smal le r ,  t h e  
t ime t o  peak i n  Arroyo Conejo is s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  Arroyo Simi. 
I n  t h e  February 16 storm t h e  peak d i scha rges  from both major t r i b u t a r i e s  
a r r i v e d  a t  t h e  s t ream gage a t  Camar i l lo  S t a t e  Hosp i t a l  a t  approximately t h e  
same t i m e .  The 25,300-cu f t / s  d i scharge  recorded is t h e  peak of  record  and 
approximates a 50-year event  using t h e  U.S. Army Corps o f  Engineers  f requency 
curves  f o r  Cal leguas  Creek ' s  watershed. A c u r r e n t  a n a l y s i s ,  i n  view of  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a r t i f i c i a l  changes t h a t  have taken p l ace  dur ing  r e c e n t  years ,  
would decrease  t h e  event  r e t u r n .  
Sedimentation 
Arroyo Simi, Arroyo Conejo Creek, and Cal leguas  Creek a r e  a l l  n a t u r a l  
bottom channels  wi th  some l o c a l  bank p r o t e c t i o n ,  s t a b i l i z e r s ,  and l evees  along 
t h e  lower reach a s  t h e  o n l y  improvements. L a t e r a l  and v e r t i c a l  e ros ion  dur ing  
h igh  flows e s p e c i a l l y  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  downstream s i l t a t i o n .  
From 1969 through 1978 t h e  U.S. Geological  Survey monitored sediment 
d i scha rge  on Cal leguas  Creek near  Camari l lo  S t a t e  Hospi ta l .  According t o  USGS 
suspended sediment d a t a  f o r  water year  1978 a t  t h e  Cal leguas  s t a t i o n  1065 near 
Camar i l lo  S t a t e  H o s p i t a l  (U.S. Geological  Survey, 1979),  99 pe rcen t  of  t h e  
annual sediment d i scha rge  occurred dur ing  t h e  t h r e e  wet months of  January,  
February, and March. 
Also, dur ing  four  days--February 9 and 10 and March 1 and 4 ,  1978--which 
i s  only  1.1 percen t  of t h e  year ,  73 percent  of t h e  annual  sediment d ischarge  
occurred. 
By p l o t t i n g  mean d a i l y  flow ve r sus  suspended sediment d i scha rge  ( t o n s  per  
d a y ) ,  a r a t i n g  curve  w a s  developed. This  curve  was used t o  e s t ima te  t h e  
number of  t ons  of  sediment t h a t  passed by t h e  gage dur ing  t h e  1980 d i s a s t e r  
per iod  p r i o r  t o  t h e  l evee  breach. The r a t i n g  curve c a l c u l a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
1-1/2 m i l l i o n  t o n s  of suspended sediment passed t h e  gage between January  9, 
1980, and February 16, 1980 (see Figure  3 ) .  
I f  t h e  lower channel  t r a p  e f f i c i e n c y  experienced i n  1978 were repea ted ,  40 
percent  o f  t h e  t o t a l  suspended sediment could have been c logging  t h e  channel.  
Once breached, n o t  o n l y  d i d  t h e  e n t i r e  sediment load  of  t h e  s t ream sweep o n t o  
t h e  Oxnard p l a i n ,  b u t  over  100,000 cu yd eroded by headcutking upstream o f  t h e  
breach was swept o u t  o f  t h e  channel.  Using t h e  same curve,  i t  is p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  1.7 m i l l i o n  tons  o f  sediment poured on to  t h e  Oxnard p l a i n  before  t h e  gap 
was c losed  February 20. The sediment was mostly f i n e r  m a t e r i a l - - s i l t  and 
clay--much of which remained suspended a s  t h e  flow cont inued toward t h e  ocean. 
Res tora t ion  
A r e c e n t  survey  of  Cal leguas  C r e e k  between Highway 1 and Hueneme Road 
revea led  t h a t  260,000 cu yd of  sedimentary m a t e r i a l  w i l l  have t o  be cleaned 
ou t  of  t h e  channel  t o  r e s t o r e  Cal leguas  Creek t o  its des ign  capac i ty .  
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FIGURE 3 Comparison o f  mean d a i l y  discharge to est imated suspended 
sediment discharge a t  Calleguas Creek near Camarillo S ta te  Hospital  
for  the  d i s a s t e r  period January 9 ,  1980, through February 24,  1980. 
With the best of circumstances the contractor cannot begin until 
mid-October. The cleanout will take approximately 60 days, with a high 
probability of a storm during that period. At present the estimated channel 
capacity is less than 8,000 cu ft/s, with a return period of approximately 
three years. It is only natural then that the personnel at Point ~ u g u  are 
nervous about flooding. Even with the cleanout, the first significant storm 
will put the fateful process in motion again by flushing sediments from 
tributary channels. 
Solution 
Since an expensive channelization project for Callegqas Creek still lies 
low on the horizon, a reliable method to warn Point Mugu of impending flooding 
is being implemented through an unusual three-way agreement between the Navy, 
the National Weather Service River Forecast Center, and the Ventura County 
Flood Control District (VCFCD). This flood warning system will be operational 
by November 1980. There are three major parts to the system. 
1. Nine self-reporting rain gages and two stream gages that will transmit 
real-time data for watershed model calculations 
2. A rainfall-runoff model for Calleguas Creek and Revolon Slough 
3. Procedures to monitor the changing sediment elevations to provide the 
best estimate of the capacity of Calleguas Creek below Hueneme Road 
The model is being developed by the National Weather Service and will be 
refined and calibrated as data are gathered. 
The equipment was purchased by the Navy and will serve not only the 
Calleguas flood warning system but also as a backup for the Ventura County 
system as the two computers are connected with a dedicated phone line. 
Software was developed by the National Weather Service. 
Installation of the self-reporting gages is under way by VCFCD 
hydrographers. The VCFCD, as an agency of the National Weather Service, will 
issue flood warnings based upon the input from the elements of the flood 
warning system. Human judgment will be required to coordinate and interpret 
three distinct parameters: the quantitative precipitation forecasts from a 
weather consultant for the following 24-hour period; flood advisories giving 
predicted discharges for rainfall intensities; and the latest estimate of the 
channel capacity. 
It was necessary to have a means to estimate quickly the average depth of 
sediment in the channel after each streamflow event. A family of curves was 
developed showing water surface elevation versus discharge for several 
incremental depths of sediment in the channel. By plotting the actual 
discharge determined from the stream gage and the water surface elevation 
observed at a staff gage located downstream of the stream gage, the average 
depth of sediment can be estimated. 
Readings are taken during and following storms to calibrate the 
theoretical to the actual amounts. Maintenance of the system is the 
responsibility of the VCFCD. 
There are direct benefits from the flood warning system for all three 
parties: the Navy will receive 24-hour lead time to warn base personnel to 
flood-proof or evacuate the base housing; VCFCD will know what is occurring 
upstream so as to dispatch its small operations group to where it is most 
needed; and the National Weather Service will receive the real-time data base 
to assist in flood forecasts for the Southland as the storms move south and 
east. 
FLOOD ASPECTS OF THE CREEK FIRE, SEPTEMBER 1979 
As a helicopter approached the burn area several days after the Creek fire 
finally was out, aerial observers were shocked at the lack of residual 
vegetation on the 33,000 acres that were blackened. The heat was so intense 
that 50-year-old chaparral was reduced to powdery white ash. 
Ventura County Flood Control, fearful of the consequences of a possible 
wet year, set about evaluating how big a problem might be facing the area. 
Calculations of possible postfire debpis potential versus the prefire 
condition were quickly done using formulas developed by Scott and Williams 
(1974). Storms of various return periods were applied to each of the 13 
watersheds, with calculated results indicating that peak flow rates would be 
150 to 160 percent greater (Tables 1 and 2). 
Two examples of watersheds that bore out the predictions were Canada Larga 
and Arundell Barranca. Canada Larga includes more than 19 square miles of oak 
trees, large green chaparral bushes, and oat grass used primarily for grazing 
beef cattle (see Figure 4). Following each storm from November 2, 1979, 
checks were made for watershed erosion. Until February VCFCD was 
fortunate--there had been no high-intensity rainfall. Finally the combination 
of saturated soil and heavy rain began to move the material in a wave laden 
with floating and suspended debris. The result for a small home at the mouth 
of the Canada Larga watershed was total ruin. Further downstream in the 
floodway is an elementary school. Many volunteers were needed to clean up the 
unbelievable mess. 
Meanwhile, in East Ventura, Arundell Barranca overtopped its west bank for 
the first time anyone can recall. Nearly half of the drainage area was burned 
in the steep canyons near the ridge. The 3 square miles of coastal mountains 
contained in the Arundell Barranca watershed are chiefly undeveloped, with 
some oil company facilities and a few avocado orchards. At the canyon mouth 
concrete box culverts convey the flows onto the urbanized plain below. Before 
the Telegraph Road crossing the channel is a large wooded natural barranca 
with good storage capacity. East-west Telegraph Road intersects the channel, 
restricting the flow. On February 16, 1980, at Telegraph Road, the 
fire-loosened debris, accompanied by suspended silt, broke out and ran to the 
west in the road's right of way, seeking the ocean. A river of muddy 
branch-laden water rushed west and south, sweeping Volkswagon buses and stop 
signs from the streets. In the City Recreation Center at Day Road and 
Telegraph Road the Ping-Pong tables floated in the muddy water that poured 
relentlessly through the doors. 
TABLE 1 Creek F i r e  D e b r i s  Q u a n t i t i e s  and Bulking F a c t o r  
L o c a t i o n  and 
Channel 
Drainage Burned D e b r i s  Volumes 
Area Area 100-yra Q W Q ~  
(sq m i l e s )  ( s q  miles) (cu yd/sq m i l e )  100-Yr 
Flood Zone I 
S k y l i n e  
Oak View Dra in  
San Antonio  Creek 




San J o a q u i n  
Pr ince-Hal l  Canyon 




E l l s w o r t h  
N o t e :  Area to ta l  = 101.03 sq miles; burn a r e a  = 45.35 s q  m i l e s  = 29,024 
acres, by estimate; a c t u a l  area = 33,000 acres. 
a ~ o u r c e :  S c o t t  and W i l l i a m s  (1974).  
bQ Bulked o v e r  Q C l e a r w a t e r .  
TABLE 2 Creek F i r e ,Debr i s  Q u a n t i t i e s  by S c o t t ' s  Formula 
Percentage 
Expected Debris  Volumes (cu yd) Inc rease  over  
10-Y r 50-Y r 100-Yr P r e f i r e  Due 
~ o c a  t i o n  Storm storm Storm t o  F i r e  
Flood Zone I 
Skyl ine  Drain 
Oak View Drain 
San Antonio Creek 





Pr ince-Hall Canyon 
Flood Zone I1 
 rund dell-sextona 
Harmon ~ a r r a n c a ~  
wason 
Ellsworth-Aliso 
a ~ n a l y s i s  by S c o t t  a v a i l a b l e .  
FIGURE 4 Creek f i r e  map showing the  ex ten t  o f  the  33,000-acre f i r e  
that  occurred September 28-30, 1979. Canada Larga, whose drainage area 
is over 19 square miles, was the l a r g e s t  watershed a f f ec t ed ,  with 12 
others  su f f er ing  some damage and l a t e r  re la t ed  debris  f lows.  
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For a  b r i e f  t i m ~  Telegraph Road resembled a  r i v e r .  F i f t y  f e e t  above t h e  
c u r b  along t h e  c o l l e g e  grounds, d e b r i s  from t h e  f i r e  and silt s e t t l e d  o u t  a s  
t h e  floodwave receded. The d iv ide r  median prevented north-south escape f lows 
excep t  a t  major i n t e r s e c t i o n s .  Dean Drive runs  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
Arundell  Barranca, wi th  many ca t ch  bas ins  t o  i n t e r c e p t  and convey t h e  flow to  
t h e  box c u l v e r t  under t h e  o l d  streambed. 
The e f f e c t  o f  a  l a r g e  devas t a t ing  f i r e  on f loodflows was c l e a r l y  
demonstrated i n  t h e s e  sample events .  
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A CASE STUDY OF A REAL-TIME FLOOD WARNING SYSTEM ON 
SESPE CREEK, VENTURA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
by Ira Bartfeld and Dolores B. Taylor 
Sespe Creek drains an extremely mountainous, largely undeveloped area 
i n  central Ventura County before merging with the Santa Clara River near 
the c i t y  of Fillmore. On March 4, 1978, a major flood on Sespe Creek caused 
one fa ta l i ty  and over $6 mill ion i n  damage i n  the Los Serenos area of 
F i  Z Zmore . 
Subsequent t o  t h i s  flood Ventura County, i n  cooperation with the iVational 
Weather Service, used technology detteloped by the California-Nevada River 
Forecast Center of the National Weather Service t o  implement a real-time 
flood warning system on Sespe Creek. 
The value of a local real-time flood warning system i n  the saving of  
l i f e  and property was quickly realized during the southern California flood- 
ing of February 1980. A description of how the system operated i n  the 1980 
high water i s  compared with the 1978 flood situation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Death and destruction, as floodwaters ravage a southern California 
community, has become an all too familiar headline. Dangerous flooding in 
southern California communities has occurred repeatedly in recent years. 
Three major Pacific storms occurring in February and March of 1978 and in 
February of 1980 brought serious flooding to southern California's rapidly 
responding rivers. The devastation included 38 deaths and close to $400 
million in property damage. Floods of this magnitude have occurred repeatedly 
during this century. This indicates that floods of a far greater magnitude 
can and probably will occur in the future. There are river basins in southern 
California where the potential for loss of life is catastrophic. The worst of 
these is the floodplain of the Santa Ana River, where more than two million 
people live. What are the alternatives available for minimizing this threat 
to life and property? 
Ira Bartfeld is Senior Hydrologist with the California-Nevada River 
Forecast Center of the National Weather Service in Sacramento, California. 
Dolores B. Taylor is Surface Water Hydrologist with the Ventura County~Flood 
Control and water Resources District in Ventura, California. 
Structural solutions can seldom preclude all future flooding. The 
extremes of nature eventually surpass most design criteria. The resulting 
disaster may be magnified due to overreliance on structural flood control by 
floodplain residents. Frequently, even an attempt at structural solutions is 
not feasible due to physical or economic constraints. Floodplain zoning can 
reduce future encroachment but rarely offers protection to those who have 
already occupied the f$oodplain. 
There is another alternative--a relatively inexpensive warning system. 
This system by itself offers substantial lifesaving potential and is vital for 
the effective operation of flood control structures. The purpose of this 
paper is to demonstrate the impact of a modern automated flood warning system 
on a community with a serious flood problem. The initial portion of the paper 
discusses the roll of the National Weather Service in a cooperative automated 
flood warning system. The final portion traces the implementation and 
operation of the flood warning system on Sespe Creek, Ventura County, 
California. It focuses on its social and economic impact on the City of 
Fillmore during the high water of February 1980. 
ROLE OF THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE 
The National Weather Service, through its California-Nevada River Forecast 
Center in Sacramento, is implementing automated flood warning systems in 
California. These systems are being implemented in cooperation with local 
agencies in areas where there are serious flood problems. A brief discussion 
of the rationale and components of the cooperative automated flood warning 
system is necessary in order to understand fully the role of the National 
Weather Service as well as that of the cooperating agencies. 
Effective flood warnings providing the maximum response time require 
real-time hydrologic analysis of changes in field storm conditions. Networks 
of self-contained, self-powered event-reporting gages transmit via radio, to a 
specially configured data acquisition system, precipitation amounts as the 
precipitation occurs (Burnash and Twedt, 1978). The acquisition system 
consists of a radio receiver, a minicomputer system, and a display screen 
located at the local cooperating agency. Precipitation information is 
acquired and displayed in a continuous mode. The River Forecast Center, which 
is linked by phone to the local minicomputer, obtains and analyzes these data 
using a streamflow simulation system calibrated for the individual basin 
(Burnash et al., 1973). Peak streamflow advisories based on these simulations 
are updated and transmitted to the local minicomputer as required to define 
the flood potential. The object is to make available at the local level the 
information required for maximizing effective flood warning lead time. Local 
officials make decisions on flood response actions based on information 
generated by the flood warning system and a locally developed flood response 
plan. 
The National weather Service contributes substantial resources to a 
cooperative flood warning system in the following areas. 
1. System design, including hardware configuration and sensor 
requirements and location 
2. Software pqckage for collecting, processing, and displaying data and 
advisories 
3. Calibration of streamflow simulation models for the basin 
4. Continuing peak streamflow advisory service based on the streamflow 
simulation 
5. continual updating and recalibration of streamflow simulation models 
as required 
6. Training in system installation and operation 
The cooperating agency provides and maintains locally installed hardware, 
ensures development and operation of a flood response plan, monitors the 
system, and, based on National Weather Service guidance, issues local flood 
warnings as appropriate. 
'This information on flood warning systems and the roll of the National 
Weather Service provides the background for the study of the implementation 
and operation of such a system on Sespe Creek and its consequent benefits to 
the city of Fillmore. 
SESPE CREEK STUDY 
Sespe Creek rises in extremely mountainous terrain northwest of Ojai in 
Santa Barbara County. The creek flows 20 miles in an easterly direction and 
then about 10 miles south, merging with the Santa Clara River near Fillmore. 
More than 90 percent of its 270-square-mile drainage area is undeveloped U.S. 
Forest Service property, including a large portion of the Sespe Condor Refuge. 
The area prone to extensive flood damage is along the lower 2 miles of 
river channel. This area includes residential tracts in the City of Fillmore, 
commercial and industrial areas, and many orchards. The area has a history of 
flooding due primarily to prolonged periods of heavy precipitation during the 
winter months. 
Flooding of 1978 
During the storms of February 5-11, 1978, the peak flow of record, 73,000 
cu ft/s, occurred at Fillmore. There were partial evacuations and much 
confusion in response to rapidly rising creek levels. Overbank flow was 
negligible, but more than 10 ft of sediment was deposited in the channel along 
the lower reach. On March 4, 1978, a peak flow of 54,000 cu ft/s broke out of 
the sediment-laden channel, causing a major flood in Fillmore. Tons of silt 
and debris were carried into over 370 homes. There was one fatality and 
structural damage to 200 homes from floodwaters. Total damages to the Los 
Serenas area of Fillmore were estimated to be $6.2 million (Figures 1, 2, and 
3). Frantic efforts of individual homeowners to save what they could during 
the flood impeded evacuations, blocked emergency equipment and flood fighting 
equipment, and severely hampered flood fighting efforts. 
Implementation of the Sespe Creek Flood Warning System 
As a result of the flooding of March 1978, the Ventura County Flood 
Control District, in cooperation with the California-Nevada River Forecast 
FIGURE 1 Flooding in Fillmore, March 1978. 
FIGURE 2 Residential flood damage in Fillmore, March 1978. 
Center of the National Weather Service, began implementing an automated flood 
warning system on segpe Creek. By March 1979 six rain gages and a radio 
repeater installation were in place in the Sespe Creek watershed (Figures 4, 
5, and 6). The minicomputer was in place at the offices of the Ventura County 
~lood Control District (Figure 7 ) ,  receiving and displaying data from the 
remote rain gages, 'and peak flow advisories from the River Forecast Center, 
based on calibration of the streamf low simulation model for Sespe Creek, were 
being sent to the minicomputer. 
The City of Fillmore then instituted a three-phase plan for flood 
response. As part of this plan, Ventura County Flood Control District 
officials monitor the flood warning system and issue bulletins that trigger 
the appropriate phase of the plan. 
'Storm events producing minor to moderate stream levels occurred in March 
1979 and January 1980. These events provided county officials with some 
initial experience in working with the warning system. In addition, they 
provided valuable data to ~iver Forecast Center hydrologists for recalibration 
of precipitation inputs to the simulation model. 
Storms of February 1980 
On February 13, 1980, the first in a series of Pacific storms moved across 
Ventura County. On Saturday morning, February 16, the biggest storm of the 
series approached the area. Figure 8 shows the sequence of peak flow 
advisories transmitted from the River Forecast Center computer in Sacramento 
to the Ventura County minicomputer on the morning of the sixteenth. Ventura 
County had a forecast from their contract meteorologist of 3 in. of rain in 
the mountains after 10 a.m. The predicted peak flow for this amount of 
rainfall was about 34,000 cu ft/s. The capacity of Sespe Creek near Fillmore 
due to siltation from the previous storms was now reduced to approximately 
30,000 cu ft/s. These facts indicated to the Ventura County Flood Control 
District that the city of Fillmore was faced with the possibility of breakout 
and a repeat of the 1978 flooding, As a consequence, phase I of their 
response plan was instituted. At 11:15 a.m. police and firemen were placed on 
stand-by. Residents were notified door to door in designated areas of the 
possibility of flooding. Information on survival, movement of vehicles, and 
property protection measures were given to residents as part of the 
preparation for possible flooding. 
Flood Control District personnel monitoring incoming precipitation reports 
advised officials in Fillmore of the increasing flood threat. Figure 9 is a 
copy of one of the actual data base displays available to district personnel 
on a continuous basis. Fillmore instituted phase I1 of their response plan at 
11:55 a.m. Emergency centers, personnel, and communications were activated. 
Residents in flood-prone areas were again alerted and a voluntary evacuation 
program was initiated. A bulldozer was positioned along the bank at the 
weakest point of the channel, above the Los Serenos area of Fillmore. 
As precipitation amounts approached 3 in., phase I11 of the Fillmore 
response plan was initiated at 3:15 p.m. People in designated areas were 
FIGURE 3 Flooding in Fillmore, March 1978. 
FIGURE 4 Remote self-reporting rain gage. 

FIGURE 6 Sisar Peak radio repeater. 
FIGURE 7 Ventura County minicomputer. 
V E N T U F A  C O U N T Y  F L O O D  A D V I S O R Y  
Issued a t  558 Hours on 2/16/80 
Forecast Peak Flows i n  Thousand CFS Resu l t ing  from P r e c i p i t a t i o n  
F a l l i n g  A f t e r  400 on 2/16: 
P r e c i p i t a t i o n  Sespe CR NR P r e c i p i t a t i o n  Santa Paula CR 
i n  Inches F i  1  lmore i n  Inches NR Santa Paula 
Issued a t  1023 Hours on 2/16/80 
Forecast Peak Flows i n  Thousand CFS Resu l t ing  f rom P r e c i p i t a t i o n  
F a l l i n g  A f t e r  1000 on 2/16: 
P r e c i p i t a t i o n  SESPE CR NR P r e c i p i t a t i o n  Santa Paula CR 
i n  Inches F i  1  lmore i n  Inches NR Santa Paula 
FIGURE 8 Peak f low advisor ies  s en t  from the  River Forecast Center to 
the  Ventura County minicomputer. 
Federal -Sta te  Hydrologic Data Collection System ** Sespe Creek 
Sta  10 S ta  20 Sta  60 
Date, Time, Value 
of Last Transmit 
Precipi ta t ion 
Last 10 min  
Last 30 min  
Last 60 min 
For 6 Hours 
Ending a t  1600 
For 24 Hours 




1500 t h r u  1600 
1400 thru 1500 
1300 thru 1400 
1200 t h r u  1300 
1100 thru 1200 
Since 1600 
1000 t h r u  1600 
400 t h r u  1000 
2200 thru 400 
1600 thru 2200 
1000 thru 1600 
400 t h r u  1000 
2200 t h r u  400 
1600 t h r u  2200 
FIGURE 9 Example of a data base display available to district 
personnel. 
evacuated and flood fighting equipment was readied. As Sespe Creek approached 
its crest of 36,000 cu ft/s at 5:15 p.m., it began to break out of its banks 
above the Los Serenos tract. The bulldozer in position at that point was able 
to berm up the bank, preventing any further breakout. The heavy rain ended 
and the creek began receding with no flood damage to the City of Fillmore. 
Warning System Benegits 
Ventura County Flood Control District officials and Fillmore city 
officials credit the flood warning system and response plan with preventing a 
repeat of the 1978 flooding. The lead time available to the City of Fillmore 
largely eliminated the potential for loss of life during the February 1980 
high water. The capability of the system to generate discrete site-specific 
warning generated a response that prevented flood damage to over 200 homes. 
Through the investment of about $50,000 in a flood warning system, total flood 
damages of over $5 million were likely prevented in Fillmore. This was 
accomplished in an orderly manner with a minimum of unnecessary disruption to 
floodplain residents. The contrast between this event and the disorganization 
of affected residents during 1978 is yet another example of the benefits of 
the warning system. 
The benefits of the flood warning system are dramatically brought home 
when this high water event is compared with the flooding on nearby Calleguas 
Creek. A record crest of approximately 24,000 cu ft/s broke out of the 
Calleguas Creek levees on February 16, without warning, flooding the Point 
Mugu Naval Base housing area. Residents had to be evacuated in waist-deep 
water, and personal property damage was estimated at $5 to $8 million. It was 
fortunate that there were no fatalities. A flood warning system similar to 
the one on Sespe Creek could have reduced property damage and precluded the 
threat to life. It might have prevented much of the damage by providing the 
lead time warning for positioning heavy equipment to reinforce the levee. 
As a result of the Sespe Creek and Calleguas Creek flooding experiences of 
1980, the Navy realized the need for a flood warning system. The Pacific 
Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, the National Weather Service River Forecast 
Center at Sacramento, and the Ventura County Flood Control District are 
cooperatively implementing a flood warning system for Calleguas Creek that 
will be operational during the winter of 1980-81. 
CONCLUSION 
The case study of the Sespe Creek flood warning system demonstrates the 
life- and property-saving impact of a real-time cooperative flood warning 
system. This type of system is especially appropriate to the flood problems 
of southern California's rivers and creeks. It should be considered as a 
major nonstructural flood control alternative and as a necessary adjunct to 
flood control structures. 
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THE SANTA ANA RIVER IN ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA: 
A CASE HISTORY IN SEDIMENT TRANSPORT 
by Carl R. Nelson 
The Prado Dam, which has regulated peak discharges on the Santa Ana River 
since 1941, substantially reduced floodflows from the s t o m s  of 1969, 1978, 
and 1980. However, the sustained flows of 1969 caused serious lateral erosion 
and theatened t o  break out in to  the western coastal plain of Orange County. 
As a resul t ,  the Orange County Flood Control Distr ict  began a program of 
channel improvements i n  1969 t o  upgrade sideslope protection and incorporate 
additional grade reduction structures and water diversion works. These 
systems worked well i n  the storms o f  1978 and 1980 u i t h  one exception: 
sediment starvation caused significant headward scour along a reach where 
the drop structures had not been ful ly  completed. This demonstrates the 
problems that less  than peak flows can cause i n  r ivers  where bank s tabi l izat ion 
has removed previous sources of sediment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Santa Ana River watershed envelops approximately 2,200 square miles. 
The river begins at elevations above 10,000 ft in the San Bernardino 
Mountains, flows across portions of the counties of San Bernardino and 
Riverside, and enters Orange County in the narrow Santa Ana Canyon, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. In its passage across the alluvial coastal plain of 
Orange County, it runs from the mouth of Santa Ana Canyon near Yorba Linda to 
an ocean entry at Newport Beach, a distance of approximately 20 miles (see the 
profile in Figure 2). Since 1941 peak discharges have been regulated by Prado 
Dam near Corona, California. 
Large floods are known to have occurred in the years 1825, 1861, 1884, 
1916, and 1938, as indicated in Figure 3 (which also shows the rainfall 
history). For an unknown time prior to 1825 the river's course across the 
coastal plain of Orange County was westerly to an ocean entry near Seal 
Beach. During the 1825 flood the river's course was changed by alluvial 
accretion to an ocean entry at Newport Beach, approximately 10 miles 
downcoast. Since that time, man's efforts to confine floodflows to a single 
channel have been directed toward this latter ocean entry. 
Carl R. Nelson is Director of Public Works with the Orange County 
~nvironmental Management Agency in Santa Ana, California. 
FIGURE 1 Map o f  Orange County, C a l i f o r n i a ,  showing ~ a n G a  Ana River. 
The m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  of  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  has  been t h e  completion of Prado 
Dam, with a s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y  o f  215,000 acre- f t ,  i n  1941 by t h e  U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers  a t  t h e  head of  Santa  Ana Canyon near Corona. Large 
f loodflows were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduced i n  1969, 1978, and 1980 by t h e  ex i s t ence  
of Prado Dam (see Figure  4 f o r  t h e  1980 hydrograph). Although designed f o r  a 
peak d ischarge  of  9,300 cu f t / s ,  t h e  Corps l imi t ed  t h e  d ischarge  i n  each of 
FIGURE 2 Santa  Ana River p r o f i l e  from t h e  P a c i f i c  Ocean t o  Prado Dam. 
t h e s e  t h r e e  r e c e n t  f l oods  t o  no t  more than 6,000 cu f t / s  because o f  s e r i o u s  
e r o s i o n  problems, both i n  t h e  unimproved Santa  Ana Canyon a r e a  and i n  t h e  
improved channel  between Imper ia l  Highway and t h e  ocean. I n  and near t h e  
ocean, l a r g e  volumes of  sediment accumulated, reducing t h e  channel ' s  capac i ty  
f o r  subsequent f loodflows.  
FLOOD HISTORY 
The farmers of  Orange County f i r s t  channel ized t h e  Santa Ana River to 
c a p t u r e  its pe renn ia l  flow f o r  i r r i g a t i o n .  Subsequently,  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  i n f r equen t  b u t  l a r g e  f loods ,  ea r then  l e v e e s  were cons t ruc t ed  and 
r e v e t t e d  with p i p e  and wire; b u t  t hese  l evees  gave only  a f a l s e  s ense  of 
s e c u r i t y ,  t y p i c a l l y  f a i l i n g  dur ing  very  l a r g e  f loods .  
The f lood  o f  t h e  cen tu ry  occurred i n  1938, wi th  a peak flow o f  100,000 
cu f t / s  i n  Santa  Ana Canyon. This  g r e a t  f l ood  was cons idered  t o  be a 
1-in-40-year even t ,  and t h e  peak d ischarge  t o  t h e  ocean was approximately 
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45,000 cu f t / s ,  t h e  remainder of t h e  peak having been a t t e n u a t e d  i n  spreading  
a c r o s s  t h e  c o a s t a l  p l a in .  
P r i o r  t o  1969 t h e  peak d ischarge  from Prado Dam had been approximately 
2,000 cu f t / s ,  which was conta ined  wi th in  t h e  channel ized po r t ion  of t h e  r i v e r  
with l i t t l e  consequence. The channel  had been improved by t h e  Orange County 
Flood Cont ro l  Distr ict  i n  1956 by t h e  a d d i t i o n  of  an a s p h a l t  s ides lope  l i n i n g  
to  t h e  formerly unpro tec ted  levees .  The channel  i n v e r t  i n  t h e  l i n e d  s e c t i o n  
between P a c i f i c  Coast  Highway and Seventeenth S t r e e t  remained a sand bottom i n  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  of economy. Between Seventeenth S t r e e t  and Imper ia l  Highway a 
p i p e  and wire-type p r o t e c t i o n  had been i n s t a l l e d  fol lowing t h e  1938 f lood ,  and 
t h i s  p ro t ec t ion  had been un te s t ed  u n t i l  t h e  1969 f loods .  
Two f loods  occurred  i n  1969, both d e l i v e r i n g  peak f lows a t  Prado Dam 
approximating 75,000 cu f t / s  and both considered approximately 1-in-30-year 
events .  The f loods  of  1978 and 1980 were very  damaging, b u t  no t  excep t iona l ly  
s eve re  i n  terms of  peak flow. The peak d ischarges  from Prado Dam i n  1969 and 
1980 were approximately 5,000 t o  6,000 cu f t / s ,  and i n  each event  t h e  water 
s t o r a g e  a t  Prado Dam accumulated t o  a t o t a l  o f  approximately 125,000 ac re - f t ;  
t h u s  evacuat ion o f  t h e  water i n  s t o r a g e  requi red  sus t a ined  d ischarges  l a s t i n g  
s e v e r a l  weeks. 
P r i o r  t o  1969 a l a r g e  percentage of t h e  annual  storm runoff  i n  t h e  Santa 
Ana River had been conserved by spreading i n  t h e  sandy bed of  t h e  r i v e r  
between Imper ia l  Highway and K a t e l l a  Avenue. L a t e r a l  e ros ion  had been of 
r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  consequence s i n c e  cons t ruc t ion  of Prado Dam. The higher  
sus t a ined  flows of  1969 (5,000 cu f t / s ) ,  however, caused s e r i o u s  l a t e r a l  
e ros ion ,  and t h e  r i v e r  th rea tened  t o  break o u t  ac ros s  Anaheim, a s  had occurred 
with the  much l a r g e r  f l ood  of  1938. Thus, i n  1969, t h e  Orange County Flood 
Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t  began a program of  channel  improvements t h a t  included 
rock-protected s i d e s l o p e s  i n  t h e  permeable water-spreading a r e a  and grade  
r educ t ion  s t r u c t u r e s  and d i v e r s i o n  works f o r  off-channel water spreading. 
IMPROVEMENT HISTORY 
E a r l y  i n  t h e  twen t i e th  century ,  farmers  who had been adverse ly  a f f e c t e d  by 
t h e  meandering o f  t h e  r i v e r  organized stormwater p r o t e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t s .  Af te r  
t h e  f loods  of  1938 demolished t h e i r  ea r then  levees ,  a u n i f i c a t i o n  e f f o r t  was 
commenced whereby t h e  s e p a r a t e  stormwater p r o t e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t s  would convey t o  
t h e  Orange County Flood Con t ro l  District t h e  l evee  improvements and t h e  
rights-of-way. I t  was n o t  u n t i l  t h e  Flood Cont ro l  District's 1956 bond . 
e l e c t i o n  was passed, however, t h a t  a comprehensive e f f o r t  cbuld be undertaken 
t o  improve t h e  l evees  f u r t h e r .  Since t h a t  time t h e  l evee  system has undergone 
t h e  fol lowing evolu t ion .  
1. The Flood Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t  accepted ownership of  t h e  stormwater 
p r o t e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t s 1  easements and t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  maintaining t h e  
system. The then-exis t ing  p r o t e c t i v e  works were no more than p ipe  and wire  
revetment between Seventeenth S t r e e t  i n  Santa  Ana and Imper ia l  Highway, t h e  
reach where l a t e r a l  e ros ion  was most preva len t .  Between Seventeenth S t r e e t  
and t h e  ocean t h e  channel  g r a d i e n t  was f l a t t e r ,  and t h e  only  p r o t e c t i o n  
against lateral ero,sion was in vegetative cover that had been nurtured on the 
levees by the old stormwater protection districts. 
2. Although the improvements to the river, as just described, had 
sufficed reasonably well during the dry cycle of the late 1940s and 1950s, the 
value of improved property across the coastal plain had increased dramatically 
between 1950 and 1960; the county's population had grown from 216,224 to 
703,925. During that period the maximum discharge that had been released from 
Prado Dam was only 2,000 cu ft/s. Vertical erosion had never been a problem 
during that period; lateral erosion had been manageable with a modest force of 
personnel and equipment operated by the Orange County Flood Control District. 
3. Under the 1956 bond issue the Flood Control District improved the 
channel with rock~revetted sideslope from the ocean to approximately Garfield 
s venue. From Garfield to Seventeenth Street the sideslopes were improved with 
a wire-mesh-reinforced asphalt-concrete sideslope revetment. Due to an 
impermeable soil layer overlying the groundwater basin in this reach, water 
conservation was not an issue. For economy the channel invert remained 
ear then. 
4. In the early 1960s, between Seventeenth Street and Imperial Highway, 
intermittent improvements, financed from the district's annual property tax 
levy, were installed where dictated by either failures of the pipe and wire 
revetment or where improvements were made in conjunction with the state 
freeway project or county arterial highway projects. 
5. In 1964 the Board of Supervisors, recognizing that population growth 
in west Orange County depended on the foregoing improvements for flood 
protection, commissioned a study of the work that would be necessary to 
stabilize further the Santa Ana River levees between Katella Avenue and 
Imperial Highway. This was in conjuction with channelization that would 
improve water-spreading capabilities in the wide sandy bed of the river. 
6. The consultant's report (Leeds et al., 1964) recommended a 
dual-channel concept whereby a primary floodway would be constructed within 
the wide riverbed. It would have rock-revetted sideslopes and grade reduction 
structures. Gated outlet structures would release floodwaters into parallel 
off-channel spreading grounds to be operated by the Orange County Water 
District. The consultant recognized the necessity to cope with sediment 
transport and recommended that a sediment transport equilibrium be 
established. Bed load eroded from the unimproved Santa Ana Canyon area would 
be transported through the grade-reduced channel and then enter a lined 
channel section, within which it would flow along the natural gradient from 
Seventeenth Street to the ocean. Empirically, it was anticipated that 
sediment conveyed into the asphalt-lined levee section would eventually reach 
the coastline and thus replenish the sandy beaches of the area. Prior to the 
floods of 1969 this had been the Flood Control District's experience. 
The two large floods of 1969 produced peak flows of 75,000 cu ft/s into 
Prado Dam, along with record high water levels. According to the Corps of 
Engineers' operations plan, the gated discharge should have been gradually 
increased  t o  9,300 cu f t / s .  However, wi th  a d ischarge  o f  approximately 5,000 
c u  f t / s ,  p l u s  s i d e  inflow, a peak d ischarge  i n  t h e  lower Santa Ana River o f  
approximately 19,000 cu f t / s  was recorded a t  t h e  F i f t h  S t r e e t  gaging s t a t i o n  
i n  Santa Ana. The Corps of  Engineers ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r e s t r i c t e d  ga ted  r e l e a s e s  t o  
t h e  r a t e  o f  5,000 cu f t / s ,  which, a l though extremely damaging by way o f  
l a t e r a l  e ros ion  to t h e  p i p e  and wire revetmeht, was s u c c e s s f u l l y  contained by 
t h e  f lood f i g h t i n g  e f f o r t s  of  t h e  Orange County Flood Cont ro l  District and t h e  
Corps of Engineers  ope ra t ing  under Pub l i c  Law 99. 
By t h e  time t h e  r e s e r v o i r  had been emptied a f t e r  t h e  February 1969 f lood ,  
damages to t h e  p ipe  and wire revetment and t h e  asphal t -concre te  channel l i n i n g  
were extensive.  Furthermore, a d e p o s i t  o f  approximately one m i l l i o n  cub ic  
ya rds  of sediment choked t h e  mouth of  t h e  Santa Ana River ,  and a d e l t a  o f  
unmeasured q u a n t i t y  was depos i t ed  i n  t h e  o f f s h o r e  l i t t o r a l  zone. C lea r ly ,  
t h e r e  was a need t o  a c c e l e r a t e  implementation o f  t h e  dual-channel concept,  to 
avoid a d i s a s t r o u s  f u t u r e  breakout  o f  t h e  Santa Ana River a c r o s s  t h e  heav i ly  
populated west Orange County c o a s t a l  p l a in .  
Between 1969 and 1978 t h e  fol lowing improvements were i n s t a l l e d  along t h e  
Santa  Ana River. 
1. From t h e  mouth of  Santa  Ana Canyon, above Imper ia l  Highway, t o  t h e  
Garden Grove Freeway, upstream from Seventeenth S t r e e t ,  t h e  primary floodway 
was improved wi th  rock-revet ted s ides lopes  (see Figure  5b) .  Nine o f  t h e  
consultant-recommended drop  s t r u c t u r e s  (F igure  6)  had a l r eady  been i n s t a l l e d ,  
a long wi th  t h e  water conserva t ion  f e a t u r e s  betweefi Imper ia l  Highway and 
K a t e l l a  Avenue. Funds had n o t  y e t  become a v a i l a b l e  t o  complete a l l  o f  t he  
grade s t a b i l i z a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e s ;  t h e s e  had been de fe r r ed  i n  l o c a t i o n s  t h a t  
appeared l e a s t  vu lne rab le  t o  v e r t i c a l  e ros ion .  
2. Between Garden Grove Freeway and Seventeenth S t r e e t  no f u r t h e r  
improvements had y e t  been made, i n  t h a t  t h e  p ipe  and wire p r o t e c t i o n  had 
performed admirably wi th  t h e  comparat ively cohesive ea r then  m a t e r i a l s  of  t h e  
streambed and banks. 
3. The asphal t -concre te  s ides lope  paving between Seventeenth S t r e e t  and 
G a r f i e l d  had been t o t a l l y  rep laced  with a reinforced-concrete  s ides lope  paving 
( s e e  F igure  5a ) .  Th i s  s i d e s l o p e  p ro t ec t ion  has a depth below i n v e r t  o f  7 f t  
and performed very w e l l  under t h e  severe  t e s t  o f  t h e  winter  of  1977-78. 
However, evidence of sediment t r a n s p o r t  nonequilibrium was revea led  i n  t h e  
f a i l u r e  of  t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e  f u r t h e s t  downstream, below Ka te l l a  Avenue, due 
to a de f i c i ency  o f  bed load  and a t t e n d a n t  p ip ing  under t h e  i t r u c t u r e ' s  
foundat  ion. 
4. The drop s t r u c t u r e  w a s  rep laced  during t h e  summer of  1979, and four  o f  
t h e  p rev ious ly  d e f e r r e d  s t r u c t u r e s  were i n s t a l l e d  between t h e  f a i l e d  s t r u c t u r e  
and Seventeenth S t r e e t .  
5. The reinforced-concrete  s ides lope  paving p r o j e c t  was completed from 
G a r f i e l d  Avenue t o  t h e  P a c i f i c  Coast Highway during t h e  sumqer of 1979. 
A ,  CONCRETE S IDESLOPES 
B, ROCK-REVETTED S IDESLOPES 
FIGURE 5 Typical improved sections of the  Santa Ana River (sand bed). 
SEDIMENT TRANSPORT PROBLEMS 
The f lood  of  1978 was of  s e r i o u s  magnitude, aga in  c r e a t i n g  a  sus t a ined  
d i scha rge  from Prado Dam on t h e  order  o f  2,000 cu ft/s. Th i s  d ischarge  was 
e a s i l y  contained wi th in  t h e  grade-s tab i l ized  channel  improvements, wi th  one 
s i g n i f i c a n t  exception: t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e  system had n o t  been completed i n  
t h e  reach between Orangewood Avenue and Seventeenth S t r e e t  i n  Santa Ana. The 
consequence was headward scour ,  which l e d  t o  s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  l a s t  
downstream drop  s t r u c t u r e .  Under emergency a u t h o r i z a t i o n  t h e  damaged drop  
s t r u c t u r e  was removed and rep laced  with an  improved c u t o f f  wal l ,  and four  
a d d i t i o n a l  grade s t a b i l i z a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e s  were completed between Orangewood 
Avenue and Seventeenth S t r e e t .  
Not enough funds were a v a i l a b l e  t o  b a c k f i l l  t h e  new drop  s t r u c t u r e s  s o  as 
t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  streambed m a t e r i a l  l o s t  i n  t h e  headward scour .  The moderately 
wet winter  of 1978-79 d i d  n o t  produce enough sediment t o  b a c k f i l l  t h e  new drop  
s t r u c t u r e s ;  hence t h e  s t a g e  was set i n  t h e  win ter  of  1979-80 f o r  sediment 
s t a r v a t i o n  i n  t h e  soft-bottom concrete-s ideslope channel  s e c t i o n  running 
downstream from Seventeenth S t r e e t .  
The winter  of  1979-80 was t h e  t h i r d  consecut ive  win ter  of above-average 
r a i n f a l l  i n  t h e  Santa  Ana River watershed (F igu re  3 ) .  The s t e e p ,  unimproved 
channel reach from Prado Dam t o  Imper ia l  Highway produces e r o d i b l e  v e l o c i t i e s  
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(averaging appr~xim~tely 13 ft/s) and thus is the source of sediment needed to 
establish equilibrium of sediment transport in the grade-stabilized channel 
downstream (Figures 2,and 6). Figure 7 illustrates the average grain size 
distribution of Santa Ana riverbed sediment. Several very important storms 
occurred in February and March 1980, but none produced floodflows approaching 
the channel s design capacity. Unfortunately , at the moderate but sustained 
discharge rates that occurred, and with the potential for sediment starvation, 
the headward scour of 1978 reappeared in the reach downstream from Seventeenth 
Street. Figure 2 illustrates that this reach has no grade stabilization 
structures and an average gradient of 0.0025. ~uring the extended period of 
discharge, while drawing down the volume of water in storage at Prado Dam, 
headward scour resulted in a loss of invert sediment for approximately 3 miles 
downstream from Seventeenth Street. This caused erosion to vertical depths of 
as much as 18 f t under the Fifth Street bridge in Santa Ana (Figure 8) , 
expbsed the bridge's foundation pilings, and required the road to be closed 
until the stability of the foundation could be reestablished. 
The Corps of Engineers, under Public Law 99 (augmented by Orange County 
Flood Control District funds), awarded a contract to add a series of 
grouted-rock grade stabilization structures in the damaged area, repair the 
reinforced-concrete sideslope lining, and backfill the grade stabilization 
structures using sediment deposited downstream near the ocean in the reach of 
the channel where the design gradient is approximately 0.0018. The near-ocean 
deposits reduced the peak flow capacity of the leveed channel; hence the truck 
haul for upstream backfill served a dual purpose, although it was an expensive 
solution. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several observations appear pertinent to the matter of sediment transport 
equilibrium. 
1. Sediment transport equilibrium requires both a long-term upstream 
source (deep alluvium) and a downstream disposal mechanism. For the Santa Ana 
River this would optimally be a sustained sediment-carrying channel velocity, 
a steeper than natural gradient approaching the ocean, and sufficient littoral 
drift to avoid in-channel deposition and reduction of the gradient during 
storms . 
2. Bank stabilization, while removing a lateral erosion hazard, also 
removes a sediment source and can lead to a problem of vertical erosion in 
downstream locations previously believed to be in a state of equilibrium. 
3. The risks of sediment starvation should be recognized when 
implementing a grade stabilization plan with phased construction, on a "pay as 
you go" basis by a local agency, over a period of several years. 
4.  Model studies of grade stabilization and sediment transport 
equilibrium should be conducted not only for transient peak design discharges 
but also for intermediate discharges (Figure 4). These lower velocities, 
which may be sustained for a long period, may not produce erosion over the 
sediment source (e.g., the Santa Ana Canyon alluvium) and the consequence can 
be downstream sediment starvation. 
5 .  Interim flood control measures in a semiarid region may have 
appealingly low initial costs but provide a false sense of security to lay 
people unfamiliar with long-term climatic cycles (Figure 3). This is an 
aspect of risk management that is less than well understood. The general 
public complains vehemently when low-priced flood control measures fail during 
statistically predictable occurrences that exceed the level of risk previously 
adopted. 
FIGURE 7 Representative gradation of the Santa Ana riverbed downstream 
of Katella Avenue. 
FIGURE 8 Scour of  t h e  bed o f  t h e  Santa  Ana River under t h e  F i f t h  
S t r e e t  br idge  i n  Santa  Ana exposed t h e  foundat ion p i l i n g s ,  a s  a r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  prolonged d ischarge  of  moderate f lows from Prado Dam fol lowing 
t h e  f loods  of  February 1980. 
The problem on t h e  Santa Ana River is compounded by a de f i c i ency  a t  Prado 
Dam of  s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  t h e  s tandard  p r o j e c t  f lood.  The Corps of  
Engineers  d e s c r i b e s  t h i s  a s  t h e  l a r g e s t  unresolved f lood  hazard problem i n  t h e  
western United S t a t e s .  Although t h e  benef i t - to -cos t  r a t i o  is extremely 
favorable ,  t h e  approximately $1 b i l l i o n  i n i t i a l  cost of  t h e  u l t ima te  s o l u t i o n  
w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  f inance ,  even a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l .  
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STORM AND FLOOD EVENTS IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY 
by Joseph C. Hill and Carey Stevenson 
INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Robie, Director of the California Department of Water Resources, 
discusses in his paper "New Approaches to Flood Hazard Mitigationn the 
progress in developing natural hazard mitigation plans and emphasizes the 
vital goal of preserving our natural watercourses while at the same time 
preventing flood damages to developed areas. Through a floodplain management 
program that has been implemented in San Diego County, more than 200 miles of 
natural streams have been mapped (see the appendix to this paper). The 
county's general plan requires that floodways remain in their natural 
condition unless channelization is necessary to protect structures built 
before regulations were in force. 
Figure 1 shows the rivers that have received floodplain mapping. Symbols 
have also been added to show the principal areas of flood damage, road damage, 
and erosion damage during February 1980. 
The floodplain maps show excellent correlation to the actual flood areas 
and provides a valuable basis for rescue and evacuation work in addition to 
their basic function of regulating construction near flood areas. The 
accurate location of potential flood areas in relation to the existing street 
grid has proved extremely useful to police and sheriff units in times of 
emergency. 
FLOODS OF 1980 
Information provided in Storm Report, February 1980 (San Diego County 
Flood%ontrol District, 1980) on rainfall, runoff, and storm damage in San 
Joseph C. Hill and Carey Stevenson are with the San Diego County 
Department of Public Works in San Diego, California. 
Note: This report is a summary of Joseph Hill's presentation and was 
prepared by Carey Stevenson. It is based on Storm Report, February 1980 by 
the San Diego County Flood Control District and includes additional material 
on floodplain management, storm damage, and flood frequency. 
., .. . 
. . ,. . 
/ 
. , 





ONLYTHE LARGEST PROBLEM AREAS bRE SHOWN 
FIGURE 1 Stream size designation map showing the principal areas of 
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Diego County was de r ived  from t h e  county ' s  network of r a i n  gages and s t ream 
gages p l u s  information from t h e  U.S. Geological  Survey and Nat iona l  Weather 
Serv ice .  
The s torms r e s u l t e d  from a southward s h i f t i n g  of  normal jet s t ream 
p a t t e r n s ,  a s  shown by Nat iona l  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrat ion 
s a t e l l i t e  photographs. 
Runoff q u a n t i t i e s  increased  as t h e  r a i n  cont inued t o  f a l l ,  wi th  t h e  peak 
f lows  occurr ing  a t  t h e  end of  t h e  r a iny  per iod ,  when t h e  storm of February 20, 
1980, produced l a r g e  f lows i n  many streams. 
Nearly $120 m i l l i o n  i n  damages were es t imated  i n  a r e p o r t  prepared f o r  t h e  
Fede ra l  Emergency Management Agency, and f i n a l  accounting is expected to show 
higher  t o t a l s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  road damages. D i sas t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s  were made 
for San Diego County on February 20, a f t e r  many r e s e r v o i r s  had begun t o  
s p i l l .  Considerable  evacuat ion  was necessary,  and bus iness  i n  many a r e a s  was 
h a l t e d  on t h e  a f te rnoon of  February 21. 
Reservoi rs  i n  t h e  county were u s e f u l  i n  reducing peak f lows i n  t h e  major 
s t reams.  For example, San Vicente  Dam reduced t h e  peak flow i n  San Vicente  
Creek ( a  t r i b u t a r y  to t h e  San Diego River)  by nea r ly  h a l f ,  while  E l  Capi tan  
Dam rece ived  more than  t h e  100-year inf low without  s p i l l i n g ,  except ing  minor 
amounts a t  a l a t e r  t i m e .  If t h e s e  flows had passed unimpeded by t h e  dams, 
damage would hqve been much more s e r i o u s .  Table 1 shows t h e  approximate 
f r equenc ie s  of f l o o d s  i n  va r ious  loca t ions .  The San Diego River-Mission 
Va l l ey  a r e a  was one of  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  a r e a s  of  f looding.  
I n  t h e  last  t h r e e  yea r s  n e a r l y  a l l  t h e  major r i v e r s  i n  San Diego County 
have undergone s i g n i f i c a n t  changes. Seve ra l  c a s e s  t h a t  involve  changes i n  
channel  bed e l e v a t i o n  i n  excess  o f  10 f t  have been documented ( see  F igures  2A, 
2B, 3A, and 3B). 
I n  some c a s e s  channel  bed degrada t ion  has  caused damage a t  u t i l i t y  
c r o s s i n g s  and e s p e c i a l l y  a t  b r idge  c ross ings .  P i l e s  suppor t ing  br idges  were 
p a r t i a l l y  exposed a s  a r e s u l t  o f  channel  bed degradat ion.  I n  one c a s e  t h e  Via 
de Santa  Fe br idge  on t h e  San Diegui to River was ruptured  due t o  ex t ens ive  
exposure of its suppor t  p i l i n g s .  Examples of e ros ion  a r e  shown i n  t h e  r e p o r t  
Flood P l a i n  Changes During Major Floods (San Diego County Department of  
S a n i t a t i o n  and Flood Cont ro l ,  1978). 
I n  o t h e r  c a s e s  sed imenta t ion  has  a f f e c t e d  r i v e r  channel; by f i l l i n g  low 
a r e a s  near c ros s ings ,  a s  shown i n  F igures  4A and 4B. 
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TABLE 1 Return  P e ~ i o d s  o f  Recent Floodflows i n  San Diego County 
-- - -  -- - - 
Return peak 
Pe r iod  Floodf  l o w  F loodp l a in  Map 
Loca t ion  ( y e a r s )  (CU f t / s )  Completion Date 
San L u i s  Rey R ive r ,  
Oceanside 
San Diegui to ,  Hodges 
Dam in f l ow  
Dam o u t £  l o w  ' 
Ramona 
Poway 
San Diego River  
San V icen t e  Dam 
In f low 
Outflow 
E l  Cap i t an  Dam 
In f low 
Outflow 
Jan .  20, 1976, and 
20,000 Mar. 7 ,  1977 
Nov. 8 ,  1976 
28,000 
22,000 
Mar. 22, 1979 
4,500 May 25, 1977 
Mar. 5 ,  1975 
Los Coches Creek 
(lower ) 50 t o  100 4 ,OOO+' 
F o r e s t e r  Creek 10 to 20 4,600 Mar. 15 ,  1979 
San Diego River  
a t  San t ee  gage 
Sp r ing  V a l l e y  Creek 10 to 20 -- Aug. 4 ,  1977 
Sweetwater River  
Loveland Dam ou t f l ow  
Sweetwater Dam ou t f l ow  
DISTANCE, Feet 
FIGURE 2A Cross section at the damaged location on Riverford Road of 
the San Diego River. 
FIGURE 2B Aer ial photograph at the damaged location on' River ford Road 
of the San Diego River. 
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FIGURE 3A Cross s e c t i o n  a t  the  damaged l o c a t i o n  a t  Camino d e l  Rey o f  
MOOSa Canyon Creek. 
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FIGURE 3B Aer ia l  photograph a t  the  damaged l o c a t i o n  a t  Camino d e l  Rey 
of Moosa Canyon Creek. 
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FIGURE 4A Cross section at the damaged location on Olive Hill Road of 
the San L u i s  Rey River. 
FIGURE 4B Photograph (before sedimentation) at Olive H i l l  Road of the 
San L u i s  Rey River. 
I APPENDIX: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT USING 
"FLOODPWIN AND FLOODWAY STUDIES* 
HOW IT'S DONE 
1. The 100-year f l oodp la in  and t h e  floodway a r e  l o c a t e d  on a d e t a i l e d  
f lobdp la in  map l i k e  t h e  one shown i n  F igure  A l .  
2. C i t y  o r  county government r e g u l a t e s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  t h e  f loodp la in  by 
reviewing land  development proposals .  The floodway cannot  be r e s t r i c t e d ,  and 
t h e  houses cons t ruc t ed  i n  t h e  f r i n g e  a r e a s  must be above t h e  100-year f l ood  
l e v e l .  
3. Flood insurance  can  be purchased f o r  e x i s t i n g  bu i ld ings  i n  t h e  
f loodp la in  through t h e  National  Flood Insurance  Program. 
COUNTY FLOODPLAIN MAPPING PROGRAM 
The Board o f  Superv isors  i n i t i a t e d  a f l o o d p l a i n  mapping program i n  1970. 
The purposes of t h e  program are :  
1. Define f loodp la ins  and floodways on major r i v e r s  and streams. 
2. Provide a b a s i s  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n s  of f loodp la ins .  
3. Provide a basis f o r  planning and zoning. 
4. Provide a b a s i s  f o r  environmental a n a l y s i s .  
5. Avoid unwise cons t ruc t ion  i n  f l o o d p l a i n s  t h a t  would r e q u i r e  f u t u r e  
cons t ruc t ion  of  channels.  
Many of t h e  s t u d i e s  have been extended through incorpora ted  cities as 
approved by t h e  Board. 
RIVERS AND STREAMS WITH STUDIES 





San Lu i s  Rey River** 
San Diegui to  River** 
Upper San Diego River** 
Lower Moosa Canyon Creek 
*This appendix is r e p r i n t e d  from a pamphlet prepared for pub l i c  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  by t h e  San Diego County Flood Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t .  
FIGURE A1 ~ y p i c a l  floodplain map. 





FIGURE A2 Flood map ( i n v e r t e d  t o  match t h e  photograph i n  F igure  Ad). 
Note t h e  r e l a t i o n  of t h e  f lood  l i n e s  t o  t h e  s t o r e  a t  t h e  top  of  the  





Spring Valley Creek 
Upper Moosa Canyon 
Santa  Maria Creek 
Middle San Diego River** 
**Includes a r e a s  i n  c i t i e s .  
F'ood Plain I------------ --*t-------------rl 
Flood Fringe 
C+-+ \--- C 
(reserved for pdssdge of flood flows) (devclopmenr dllowcd t t  proleclton provtded) 
Flood pro<fing Provided 
( ~ ~ e r n a l ~ v e  prolecllve medrufes 
for non.rrsldunlldl u,esl 
I ,--Flood Protectioll Level I i I I /  Basenlent Floor Level (or Itrsl tloor hvel tf no bdsemcnl) Freeboard 
1 I I (used to cc~mpensate for I '\ 1 
wave actlon and flow obslrucuon) 
100-Year Flood Level 
( ex i s t i ng  condi t ions)  
O N k  FOOT M A X  
chrnnel Increase 111 Flood Stage 
1 r ( c d u \ ~ I :  b) ddJ11~unsl r uvd i>ld,n development) 
FIGURE A 3  Val ley  c r o s s  s e c t i o n .  
"100-year f lood" means a f l ood  es t imated  t o  occur  on an average of once i n  
100 y e a r s  (one pe rcen t  p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence each y e a r ) .  
"Floodplain" means a land a r e a  i n  and ad jo in ing  a r i v e r ,  s t ream, 
watercourse,  ocean, bay, o r  l a k e  t h a t  is l i k e l y  t o  be f looded.  
"Flood f r i n g e "  means a l l  t h a t  l and  l y i n g  with t h e  100-year f l oodp la in  t h a t  
i s  n o t  w i th in  t h e  floodway. 
"Floodway" means t h e  r i v e r  channel  and t h e  ad j acen t  land  a r e a s  requi red  t o  
c a r r y  t h e  100-year f l ood ,  without  i nc reas ing  t h e  water s u r f a c e  e l e v a t i o n  of ,  
t h a t  f l ood  more than  1 f t  a t  any po in t .  Addi t iona l  c r i t e r i a  used i n  t h e  
des ign  of t h e  floodway may be s p e c i f i e d  by t h e  l o c a l  government. 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
The National  Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was s t a r t e d  i n  1968 by an a c t  
of Congress, with major amendments i n  1973 and 1977. The program is 
administered by t h e  Fede ra l  Insurance  Adminis t ra t ion  (FIA). C i t i z e n s  can  buy 
f lood  insurance a t  subs id ized  r a t e s  i f  t h e i r  community is p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  
NFIP. 
Deta i led  s t u d i e s  prepared f o r  t h e  FIA inc lude  maps wi th  insurance zones. 
Af te r  t h e s e  maps a r e  i ssued ,  insurance r a t e s  vary  and a r e  a s  low a s  $0.01 per  
$100 f o r  s t r u c t u r e s  o u t s i d e  des igna ted  f lood  a reas .  Within des igna ted  f lood  
FIGURE A4 Aerial photograph taken by the Ramona Sentinel in February 
1980 after a flood of nearly 100-year frequency. Magnolia Avenue is 
in the foreground, Highway 78 is in the distance. 
areas, lending institutions regulated by the federal government must require 
flood insurance as a condition for issuing loans. 
Limits of Coverage and Subsidized Rates (dollars) 
Structure Contents 
Type of Structure Maximum Coverage Rate/$100 Maximum Coverage Rate/$100 
Single family 35,000 
Other residential 100,000 
All nonresidential 100,000 
FIGURE A5 Photograph of  t h e  5- t o  10-year f l ood  of January  17,  1978, 
taken i n  t h e  same a r e a  a s  t h e  f lood  map shown i n  F igu re  A l .  
For information c a l l  t h e  County of San Diego Department of Pub l i c  Works, 
5555 Overland Avenue, San Diego, C a l i f o r n i a  92123 (714) 565-5120. 
COMMENT ON PEAK FLOODFLOWS IN SAN DIEGO'S MISSION VALLEY, 1978-80 
by Philip R. Pryde 
The San Diego River floods of 1978, 1979, and 1980 impressed the citizens 
of San Diego in many ways. Among the most evident of these were the obvious 
effects of urbanization on downstream runoff patterns. So great was the 
increase in maximum Q in Mission Valley, as compared with that a few miles 
upstream, that one must ask if these effects are perhaps not underestimated. 
In 1976 the Corps of Engineers recalculated flood frequencies on the lower 
San Diego River and determined the 50-year flood size to be 17,000 cu ft/s. 
Within a three-year period this figure was closely approached or exceeded four 
times (Table 1). The Corps considered the effects of expected basin 
urbanization in deriving their figures, but considering that almost all of 
th,is flooding was produced by storms of recurrence intervals much less than 
the corresponding flood recurrence intervals, it seems reasonable to ask 
whether the accepted discharge-frequency curves showing the effects of basin 
urbanization may not in fact understate reality. In 1979, for example, 15- to 
25-year 24-hour precipitation in La Mesa and East San Diego produced a 50-year 
flood in Mission Valley. 
Viewed another way, the earlier large floods on the San Diego River (e.g., 
1916) were estimated to be less than 10 percent larger in Mission Valley than 
at the official gaging station in Mission Gorge (10 miles upstream). However, 
the 1978 flows were as much as 500 percent larger and surprised almost 
everyone by their magnitude. Furthermore, at no time did spillage from 
upstream dams account for more than a small fraction of the Mission Valley 
flow (El Capitan Dam, the largest, was not overflowing at the time of any of 
these peak flows). Additionally, the lower basin is still a long way from 
being at a stage of maximum development. 
In light of the above it would seem appropriate to inquire if another look 
at the existing assumptions about the effects of urbanization on downstream 
flood runoff is not in order. The San Diego experience of the last three 
years would seem to suggest that these effects might be greater than generally 
assumed. 
Philip R. Pryde is Professor in the Department of Geography at San Diego 
State University in San Diego, California. 
TABLE 1 Storm and Runoff Data for Mission Valley Floods of 1978-80 
a Peak Discharge (CU ft/s) Maximum Precipitation at SDSU (in.) 
Flood Date Mission Valley Mission Gorge 24-hour 48-hour Previous Week 
Jan. 15, 1978 15,000 3,010 2.34 2.94 4.38 
Mar. 1, 1978 14,000 2,480 1.21 1.81 2.82 
Jan. 31, 1979 17,000 Gage not 3.30 3.56 3.65 
working 
Feb. 21, 1980 27,000 Gage not 1.65 2.16 4.82 
working 
a 
The San Diego State University (SDSU) gage is 6 miles upbasin from the site of 
the flow figures given for Mission Valley. The SDSU 100-year 24-hour storm 
equals about 5 in. 
b ~ h e  24-hour precipitation was 4.25 in. in La Mesa (3 miles upstream), which 
equals a 25-year storm. 
1980 FLOODS I N  THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA 
by C h a r l e s  A. McCullough 
. Levees failea within the same hour a t  two large del ta  islands i n  the 
Sacramento-Sun Joaquin ~ e l t a  i n  January 1980, flooding about 10,000 acres. 
This occurred shortly a f t e r  the highest t ide  i n  a tuo-ueek period. Super- 
imposed on the t ide stage was an additional 2 f t  caused by an inflow to 
the del ta  of about 300,000 cu f t / s ,  and t h i s  was accompanied by north winds 
of about 60 miles an hour. 
This paper describes the e f f o r t  t o  save in ter ior  Zevees of the flooded 
tracts  from erosion by waves generated by winds blowing across the open 
bodies of water, a second period of high inflow i n  February and additionaZ 
flooding that accompanied it, the emergency Zevee repai.rs on nwnerous delta 
islands, the Corps of Engheers' Public Law 99 decision for the delta, the 
deczaration o f  emergency by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
and some of the differences between t h i s  and a declaration of a natural 
disaster, the actions to  close the breaks i n  the levee and t o  pump the water 
out of the flooded tracts,  and the hazard mitigation program proposed t o  
decrease the probability of recurrence of flooding of  the two tracts .  
The 1980 f l o o d  i n  t h e  Sacramento-San J o a q u i n  Delta o c c u r r e d  i n  a b o u t  a n  
h o u r ' s  t i m e  i n  t h e  l a te  a f t e r n o o n  of J a n u a r y  18. Heavy r a i n s  had s t a r t e d  
J a n u a r y  10 and by J a n u a r y  1 8  had b u i l t  up i n f l o w  t o  t h e  d e l t a  from i t s  u s u a l  
w i n t e r t i m e  f i g u r e  o f  550 c u  m/s (20,000 c u  f t / s )  t o  a b o u t  8,500 c u  m/s 
(300,000 cu  f t / s )  . 
T h i s  f low r a i s e d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  water s u r f a c e  i n  t h e  d e l t a  a b o u t  0.6 m 
(2 f t) above t h e  biweekly h i g h  t i d e  l e v e l ,  which also o c c u r r e d  on  J a n u a r y  18. 
T h i s  h i g h  wate r  l e v e l  was accompanied by n o r t h  winds o f  n e a r l y  100 km (60 
miles) p e r  hour.  The Webb T r a c t  l e v e e  f a i l e d  f i r s t ,  opening a breach  abou t  
250 m (800 f t )  wide i n  t h e  l e v e e  and f l o o d i n g  a b o u t  2,200 ha  (5,400 acres). 
The n o r t h  l e v e e  o f  Hol land T r a c t  f a i l e d  a b o u t  a n  hour la ter ,  opening a 75-m 
(250- f t )  b reach  and f l o o d i n g  more t h a n  1,600 h a  (4,000 acres). The few 
r e s i d e n t s  on  Webb T r a c t  were i n  b u i l d i n g s  on t h e  edges  o f  t h e  levee and were 
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n o t  in jured .  There were some r e s i d e n t s  on t h e  lower-lying l and  i n  Holland 
T r a c t ,  and they  had t o  f l e e  t h e  r i s i n g  water.  There were a few i n j u r i e s  and 
one duck hunter  has  n o t  been found. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  more than  h a l f  o f  t h e  1,500 
head of beef c a t t l e  on Holland T r a c t  drowned. 
The l e v e e s  around t h e  l and  i n  t h e  d e l t a  ( t h e  l and  is sometimes c a l l e d  
t r a c t s  and sometimes i s l a n d s )  were b u i l t  around 55 t r a c t s  about 100 yea r s  
ago. A t  t h a t  time t h e  land  e l e v a t i o n  was a t  about  mean t i d e  level--underwater 
dur ing  t h e  h ighes t  t i d e s  and o u t  of water during low t i d e s .  I n  t h e  ensuing 
100 yea r s  t h e  l evees  have changed t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r  t o  f l ood  c o n t r o l  l evees  a s  
t h e  land on t h e  i s l a n d s  o r  t r a c t s  subsided due t o  ox ida t ion  and compaction of 
p e a t  o r  its removal from t h e  a r e a  by wind eros ion .  The c e n t e r s  of t h e  i s l a n d s  
a r e  now a s  much a s  6 m (20 f t )  below s e a  l e v e l .  Although t h e  l evees  
c o n s t a n t l y  subs ide  a s  t h e  p e a t  beneath them compacts o r  f lows o u t  from under 
t h e  l evee  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  f a i l u r e s  a r e  almost  always s t r u c t u r a l  r a t h e r  than  t h e  
r e s u l t  of overtopping. The f a i l u r e  a t  Webb T r a c t  was c l e a r l y  s t r u c t u r a l .  A t  
Holland T r a c t  t h e r e  seems t o  have been a combination of wave e ros ion  and 
s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e .  F igure  1 shows t h e  l o c a t i o n  of t h e  Holland and Webb 
t r a c t s  and a l s o  t h e  h i s t o r y  of f looding  o f  d e l t a  i s l a n d s  s i n c e  1930. 
A s  soon a s  t h e  t r a c t s  f looded,  a new problem a rose .  The broad expanse of 
water i n s i d e  t h e  flooded t r a c t s ,  a long wi th  t h e  s t r o n g  nor th  wind, r e s u l t e d  i n  
high waves a t  t h e  south  end of t h e  t r a c t s  (F igure  2 ) .  Th i s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
damaging t o  t h e  i n t e r i o r  of  t h e  south l evee  a t  Holland T r a c t ,  and Reclamation 
District 2025 immediately arranged f o r  rock t o  be hauled i n  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
l evee  and t h e  road on t h e  levee.  I t  was e s s e n t i a l - t h a t  t h e s e  l e v e e s  be 
preserved i n  o rde r  t h a t  it be p h y s i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  rec la im t h e  t r a c t s .  The 
C a l i f o r n i a  Department of  Water Resources implemented its agreements with t h e  
C a l i f o r n i a  Department of F o r e s t r y  and t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Conservat ion Corps t o  p u t  
f lood  f i g h t e r s  on t h e  l evees ,  who i n s t a l l e d  canvas and sandbags a t  c r i t i c a l ,  
s p o t s  t o  p r o t e c t  l evees  from wave damage. The Corps of Engineers  s t a r t e d  its 
f lood  f i g h t  process .  I t  is s t i l l  cont inuing  t o  supply t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  
equipment, and m a t e r i a l s  t o  r e h a b i l i t a t e  t h e  threa tened  l evees  i n  an a t tempt  
t o  avoid f u r t h e r  damage and f looding.  Its e f f o r t s  have been funded by t h e  
Federa l  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
Attempts were a l s o  made t o  have t h e  P re s iden t  d e c l a r e  a "major d i s a s t e r "  
f o r  t h e  a rea .  This  e f f o r t  r e s u l t e d  on February 1 i n  a " d e c l a r a t i o n  of  
emergency," which au thor ized  FEMA t o  do some of t h e  th ings  it would have been 
a b l e  t o  do under a major d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n .  Cos ts  incur red  by s t a t e  and 
l o c a l  agencies  p r i o r  t o  February 1 a r e  n o t  e l i g i b l e  f o r  f e d e r a l  
reimbursement. The c o s t  of  pumping o u t  t h e  i s l a n d s  is e l i g i b l e  under t h i s  
d e c l a r a t i o n  only  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  necessary  t o  prevent  damage t o  t h e  l evees  from 
wave a c t i o n  ac ros s  t h e  f looded t r a c t s .  The a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  o f  pumping t o  
d r a i n  the  i s l a n d s  below t h e  water l e v e l  a t  which t h i s  damage ended has t o  be 
borne by t h e  l o c a l  reclamation d i s t r i c t s .  The f e d e r a l  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  more 
l i m i t e d  d e c l a r a t i o n  seems t o  have some of  t he  elements found i n  L e w i s  
C a r r o l l ' s  s t o r y  A l i c e  i n  Wonderland. C e r t a i n l y ,  no one who has  worked wi th  
FEMA on t h i s  f lood  event  has  been a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  from t h e  agency an 
understandable explana t ion  of t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h i s  dec is ion .  
A second Al ice  i n  wonderland-type f e d e r a l  d e c i s i o n  was reached when 

FIGURE 2 Wave damage to i n t e r i o r  l evee  of a  f looded t r a c t .  
General Morris,  Chief of  t h e  Corps of Engineers,  concluded t h a t  t h e  d e l t a  is 
n o t  e l i g i b l e  f o r  emergency f lood  a s s i s t a n c e  under Pub l i c  Law 99. The General  
explained h i s  r a t i o n a l e  dur ing  a  t ou r  of  t h e  f looded a r e a  by say ing  it was 
based on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l e v e e s  were o r i g i n a l l y  b u i l t  t o  r ec l a im t h e  land.  
T h i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  reasoning seems t o  ignore  100 y e a r s  o f  change, i n  which t h e  
lowering of  t h e  land  l e v e l  of t h e  t r a c t s  and i s l a n d s  has  c r e a t e d  a  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  which they a r e  exposed t o  t h e  t h r e a t  of  f looding;  i t  a l s o  ignores  t h e  
c r u c i a l  impact of a  8,500-cu m/s (300,000-cu f t / s )  f l o o d  inflow to  t h e  d e l t a ,  
which superimposed 0.6 m ( 2  f t )  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  water l e v e l  on t h e  r e c u r r e n t  
bimonthly h ighes t  t i d e  l e v e l s .  
The immediate ques t ion  f o r  a l l  t h e  p u b l i c  agencies  concerned was whether 
t h e  expendi ture  t o  c l o s e  t h e  breaks and pump t h e  water o u t  of  t h e  i s l a n d s  
would be j u s t i f i e d .  The f i r s t  b e n e f i t  o f  course  would be t h e  va lue  of  t h e  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  land i n  farmable cond i t i on  a s  c o n t r a s t e d  with its meager va lue  
under a  lake .  Maintenance of  s a t i s f a c t o r y  water q u a l i t y  i n  t h e  southern  
p o r t i o n  of  t h e  d e l t a  was a l s o  threa tened  because of  t h e  flooded t r a c t s .  I f  
l e f t  a s  permanent l akes ,  t h e  surrounding l e v e e s  would soon be eroded away, 
Th i s  would provide a  much shortened pa th  f o r  ocean s a l i n i t y  t o  i n t r u d e  t o  t h e  
S t a t e  Water P r o j e c t  pumping p l a n t  and t h e  two C e n t r a l  Val ley  P r o j e c t  p l a n t s .  
This Qas especially serious at Holland Tract, which is nearest the plants. 
Reclaiming the tracts avoids the water quality problem and is a second major 
benefit. 
During the summer in all years, and almost year-round in drought years, 
the fresh water consumed in the delta is released from upstream storage 
reservoirs. About 6,000 cu m/ha (2 acre-ftlacre) more water evaporates each 
year from an open water surface in the delta than from evapotranspiration from 
land and crops. The additional water would have a very high value, and 
preventing this loss was a major benefit to justify closing the breaks and 
pumping the water from the tracts. On the basis of these benefits (see Table 
1 for a summary of costs and benefits), FEMA authorized the Corps of Engineers 
to design and implement a program to drain the two tracts. 
TABLE 1 Costs and Benefits from Reclamation of Webb and Holland Tracts 
(dollars) 
Estimated Estimate of 
Estimated Actual Annual Annual 
Cost Cost Cost Benefit 
Webb Tract 10,000,000 7,330,000~ 1,500,000 2,850,000 
Holland Tract 3,700,000 3,238,000 620,000 5,720,000 
a ~ h e  dewatering cost is an estimate. 
On February 13 a second series of intense storms began in the same area of 
the state, resulting in another 8,500-cu m/s (300,000-cu ft/s) inflow to the 
delta. These storms were accompanied by very strong westerly winds and low 
barometric pressure. The delta water levels were increased by the wind and 
low-pressure effects as well as by the 0.6 m (2 ft) of additional stage caused 
by the inflow. 
The threat to many of the delta islands mounted rapidly, and in short 
order all agencies were fully involved in flood fights on the many tracts and 
islands threatened by the high water and wave erosion. Nearly all of the 
floating construction equipment in the delta--dredges, barges, barge-mounted 
drag lines, and tugs--was at work, along with many land-based construction 
firms. 
Approximately 200 California Conservation Corps personnel and a smaller 
number of California Youth Authority Conservation Camp personnel carried out 
sandbagging and wave wash protection work on numerous islands under Department 
of Water Resources supervision (Figure 3). A camp for the California 
Conservation Corps personnel was established at Antioch by the California 
Department of Forestry. A Department of Corrections crew manned the kitchen. 
FIGURE 3 Wave wash protection by the California Conservation Corps. 
The California National Guard set up a portable shower at the camp; the 
National Guard also supplied helicopters with crews for numerous inspection 
and coordination flights in the delta. The California Office of Emergency 
Services coordinated the work of a number of the agencies. An equally large 
group of federal and county agencies participated in various phases of the 
work . 
The magnitude of the effort is indicated by the claims for emergency 
repairs approved by FEMA for some 33 islands and tracts exclusive of Webb and 
Holland, a total of about $5.25 million. 
These efforts were largely successful. Only two small tracts suffered 
levee failures--Dead Horse Island, with about 80 ha (200 acres), and Prospect 
Island, with about 450 ha (1,100 acres). 
Several news articles in the months following the flood fight mentioned 
financial problems of private contractors and materials vendors who had not 
been paid by the local reclamation districts. The districts reported they had 
authorized the expenditures on verbal commitments of FEMA personnel after 
expending a11 district funds. The problem seems to be one of timing. There 
FIGURE: 4 Sand and rock closure of Holland Tract. 
was no suggestion in the articles that the commitments would not eventually be 
honored . 
The two small inundation areas have been reclaimed, one by the landowner 
and one with reimbursement from FEMA. Holland Tract was reclaimed by the 
Corps of Engineers under work assignments from FEMA and by Reclamation 
District 2025 in time for some crops to be planted in the late summer (Figure 
4). The closure of the break at Webb Tract, by the Corps of Engineers under 
work assignment from FEMA, is completed and pumping was expected to start in 
early October 1980. 
In accordance with a FEMA requirement for hazard mitigation, Reclamation 
Districts 2025 for Holland Tract and 2026 for Webb Tract plan to improve their 
levees to a significant degree to decrease the possibility of such failure in 
the immediate future. These plans, developed with the Department of Water 
Resources and the Corps of Engineers, now await action by the Office of 
Emergency Services, FEMA, and the reclamation districts. 
The Department of Water Resources and the Corps of Engineers have had a 
detailed flood management study for the delta under way for several years. 
This study is expected to be completed in 1982. It will show the areas where 
better flood protection in the delta can be justified on an economic and 
social basis. 
There are three matters I alluded to earlier that I suggest be given 
further consideration. The first is the criteria for a declaration of 
emergency as contrasted with declaration of a major disaster by the federal 
government. The rationale for this decision certainly needs to be made 
available in an understandable manner for public consideration. The second is 
the interpretation of Public Law 99 by the Corps of Engineers as applied to 
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The rationale for the Chief of Engineers' 
decision needs to be reviewed in the public forum. Finally, the procedure for 
partial payments to local districts needs to be examined to ensure that the 
payments are made as promptly as the law permits. 
The positive note from this flood disaster is the policy being enforced by 
FEMA of implementing actions to mitigate the disaster situation so that the 
next flood in this region will be less damaging than the last one. If the 
actions live up to the promise, this may rank with the flood insurance program 
in value to the state and the nation. 
by John M. Tettemer 
This paper describes the problem of sediment-laden floodflows as a major 
component of flood damage i n  the arid argas of the Southwest. The problem i s  
defined i n  terms of i t s  nature, the factors involved, the areas af fected,  and 
the impacts on individuals, comunities,  and government. 
Engineering aspects are discussed, including factors involving sediment 
production, prediction models, and hydraulics. Control measures include 
maintaining the capability for sediment t o  move through the system or 
ins ta l l ing  traps t o  remove it. PoliticaZ and engineering strategies are 
suggested, including identifying problems, set t ing levels  of protection, and 
reducing hazards. The divis ion of responsibi l i ty  among government, deve lopers, 
and homeomers i s  conceptualized. The future impacts of public works, the 
National Flood Insurance Program, and floodplain management by local agencies 
are euaZuated. 
BACKGROUND 
Nature o f  t h e  Problem 
Sediment-laden f loodflow has  caused m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s  worth o f  damage i n  
t h e  Southwest dur ing  t h e  l a s t  decade. A l m o s t  every  year  some community having 
an  annual  r a i n f a l l  of less than 20 in .  is s t r u c k  by d e v a s t a t i n g  f l a s h  f l o o d s  
of  water ,  rock,  sand, and mud. The watercourse producing t h e  damaging 
mudflows is d r y  most o f  t h e  t i m e .  The concen t r a t ion  o f  s o l i d s  i n  t h e  flow may 
range up t o  50 percent .  
To most Americans t h e  word "f lood" evokes images o f  t h e  Johnstown f lood ,  
Hurr icane Agnes, o r  t h e  unruly Missouri River sweeping o u t  o f  i ts  banks 
through t h e  Kansas C i t y  s tockyards.  Te lev i s ion  newscasts  of "eas te rn"  type  
f loods  i l l u s t r a t e  broad a r e a s  covered with s t and ing  water ,  people and 
l i v e s t o c k  c l u s t e r e d  on roo f s ,  and rowboats c a r r y i n g  people t o  s a f e t y .  I n  t h e  
a r i d  Southwest t h e r e  is a completely d i f f e r e n t  and s p e c i a l  hydrologic  event:  
t h e  sediment-laden f lood.  
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Sediment flows a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  p rocess  by which mountains a r e  worn 
away and washed toward t h e  sea.  Over geologic  t i m e  t h e  sand, rock,  and s o i l  
eroded from t h e  mountains have been l a i d  down a t  t h e i r  f e e t  i n  broad, s lop ing ,  
cone- o r  fan-shaped depos i t s .  The e n t i r e  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e s e  " a l l u v i a l  cones" is 
l aced  with abandoned g u l l i e s  and s t ream channels .  A t  one time o r  another ,  
sediment-laden f lows  have t r a v e r s e d  a l l  t h e s e  routes .  Flow p a t h s  a r e  
unpredic tab le .  Each f lood  causes  sediment d e p o s i t s ,  which o b s t r u c t  t h e  
channel  and send t h e  next  flow i n  a new d i r e c t i o n .  Over t h e  c e n t u r i e s ,  
impercept ibly,  t h e  cones grow l a r g e r  and t h e  mountains grow smal le r .  
Af t e r  t h e  cone h a s  been urbanized, a s  it has  i n  Las Vegas, Palm Spr ings ,  
Pasadena, and many o t h e r  southwestern sun b e l t  communities, t h e  
" impercept ible"  growth r a t e  can  suddenly become unmistakably apparent .  The 
f l a s h  sediment f l ood  on an  urbanized cone is an un fo rge t t ab l e  experience,  
involv ing  t h e  b a t t e r i n g  and d e s t r u c t i o n  of  homes and automobiles and t h e  
f i l l i n g  o f  houses wi th  sediments.  
F a c t o r s  I nvolved 
Sediment f l o o d s  occur  i n  t h e  southwestern United S t a t e s :  W e s t  Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, sou the rn  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Nevada, and Utah. Seve ra l  i n g r e d i e n t s  
a r e  common t o  communities s u b j e c t  t o  t h i s  hazard. The f i r s t  is an a r i d  
c l ima te .  R a i n f a l l  ranges  from 3-1/2 in .  per  year  t o  20 in .  I n  t h e  d r i e r  
i n t e r i o r  reg ions  vege ta t ion  is sparse .  Desert  s o i l s  a r e  n o t  p ro t ec t ed  by a 
canopy of  l eaves  t h a t  can absorb t h e  impact o f  r a i n f a l l .  Ground cover and 
r o o t s  a r e  no t  p r e s e n t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  s o i l  a g a i n s t  e ros ion .  I n  t h e  wet te r  
c o a s t a l  r eg ions  t h e  vege ta t ion  is hardy c h a p a r r a l  brush t h a t  can  su rv ive  
months of  drought b u t  be des t royed  i n  a few hours  by b rush f i r e .  With t h e  
p r o t e c t i v e  cover burned away, t h e  d e l i c a t e  s o i l s  a r e  exposed to eros ion .  
The next  i n g r e d i e n t  is i n t e n s e  r a i n f a l l .  Coas t a l  r eg ions  experience l a r g e  
slow-moving cyc lon ic  win ter  ra ins torms o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  no r the rn  P a c i f i c  
Ocean. Sediment product ion  is maximized when, a f t e r  s e v e r a l  days of 
s a t u r a t i n g  r a i n f a l l ,  f r o n t a l  passage is accompanied by extremely 
h igh - in t ens i ty  r a i n f a l l .  Raindrop impact, overland flow, and g u l l y  e ros ion  
can  s t r i p  tons  of  sediment from an a c r e  of land  i n  a few minutes. I n  t h e  
i n t e r i o r  d e s e r t s  t h e  f o r c e  of t h e  P a c i f i c  winter  s torms h a s  u sua l ly  aba ted  by 
t h e  time they  a r r i v e ,  s o  they  do no t  p re sen t  t h e  most c r i t i c a l  t h r e a t  of  
e ros ion .  Here it is t h e  t r o p i c a l  s torms and convect ive  thundershowers t h a t  
p r e s e n t  a t h r e a t .  T r o p i c a l  s torms o r i g i n a t e  i n  t h e  Gulf of  Mexico, t h e  Gulf 
o f  C a l i f o r n i a ,  and t h e  P a c i f i c  Ocean and occur most f r equen t ly  from J u l y  + 
through September. Summer thunderstorms r e s u l t  from t h e  hegt ing ,  convergence, 
orographic  l i f t i n g ,  o r  f r o n t a l  l i f t i n g  of  moist  a i r  pass ing  through t h e  
region.  The most dangerous flood-producing storm is one cover ing  an a r e a  o f  
about  400 square mi l e s ,  l a s t i n g  about  t h r e e  hours ,  and cha rac t e r i zed  by 
i n t e n s e  downpouring o f  r a i n f a l l .  
Eros ive  s o i l s  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  next  i ng red ien t .  I n  C a l i f o r n i a  t h e  formation 
and adjustment  of t h e  mountains by c o n t i n e n t a l  p l a t e  movement and ear thquakes 
have l e f t  t h e  mountains i n  a f r a c t u r e d ,  pu lver ized  condit ion,  .Mountainsides 
have t h i n  s o i l  l a y e r s  t h a t  erode o r  s l i d e  e a s i l y  i n  heavy r a i n .  Also, 
a l l u v i a l  cones a r e  o f t e n  no t  w e l l  cemented and a r e  uns t ab le  when e ros ion  
s t a r t s .   rushf fires on c o a s t a l  h i l l s i d e s  g l a z e  t h e  s u r f a c e ,  increas ing  t h e  
runoff  u n t i l  r i l l s  and g u l l i e s  form and s o i l  begins  t o  move. Wind-deposited 
s o i l s  i n  t h e  d e s e r t s  a r e  f i n e  gra ined  and noncohesive. A l l  of t h e s e  
s i t u a t i o n s  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  scour ing  and g u l l y i n g ,  producing a f l o w ~ o f  l i q u i d  mud 
and rock t h a t  can  be c a r r i e d  downhill  wi th  d e s t r u c t i v e  fo rce .  
Another troublesome f a c t o r  is a change o f  s l o p e ,  from s t eepe r  t o  f l a t t e r ,  
a s  e l e v a t i o n  decreases .  The h igher ,  s t e e p e r  a r e a s  o f t e n  r ece ive  more 
r a i n f a l l ,  and t h e  s t eepness  promotes h igh-ve loc i ty  runoff  and eros ion .  The 
s t e e p  canyons concen t r a t e  high-veloci ty  f lows,  provid ing  t h e  energy t o  move 
rock and mud r a p i d l y  downstream. When t h e  flow emerges from t h e  s t e e p  canyon 
and s t r i k e s  t h e  f l a t t e r  a l l u v i a l  cone, it  l o s e s  some of  i t s  k i n e t i c  energy and 
its a b i l i t y  t o  keep sediment moving. The rock and mud drop  o u t  of t h e  flow, 
clogging channels ,  f i l l i n g  s t r e e t s ,  yards ,  and houses,  and bui ld ing  up the  
ground l e v e l  f o r  t h e  next  flow. 
Brush f i r e s  a r e  an extremely important  f a c t o r  i n  t hose  a r e a s  having 
s u f f i c i e n t  r a i n f a l l  t o  suppor t  chapa r ra l .  With its compact canopy and 
tenac ious  r o o t s  t h e  c h a p a r r a l  community of  p l a n t s  provides  good p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  
t h e  f r a g i l e  s o i l s  on s t e e p  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  h i l l s i d e s .  Af te r  a burn t h e  
d r y  soils a r e  s o  uns t ab le i they  may run l i k e  hourg la s s  sand, c o l l e c t i n g  a t  t h e  
bottoms o f  s l o p e s  i n  cones. Of a l l  e r o s i v e  s o i l  cond i t i ons  t h e  s t e e p  burned 
chapa r ra l  h i l l s i d e  seems t o  be t h e  worst.  
' F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  is t h e  ing red ien t  t h a t  makes t h e  n a t u r a l  phenomena l i s t e d  
above such c o s t l y  problems: urbaniza t ion .  The a l l u v i a l  cones, with t h e i r  
b rea th t ak ing  views of  c i t y  l i g h t s  below and mountain ranges i n  t h e  d i s t a n c e ,  
and t h e  wooded canyons surrounded by c h a p a r r a l  h i l l s i d e s ,  make up t h e  suburban 
f r i n g e  t h a t  has  been undergoing ex tens ive  development dur ing  t h e  l a s t  20 
years .  The s i t e s  have p r e s t i g e  and command high p r i c e s .  For t h e  most p a r t ,  
t h e  development i n  p l ace  today was n o t  designed with adequate  r ecogn i t i on  of  
t h e  sediment flow hazard t o  which it  is exposed. 
S i z e  of  t h e  Problem 
The problem of  damge from sediment flow is s e r i o u s  no t  s o  much because 
v a s t  a r e a s  a r e  involved b u t  because high-value improvements a r e  concent ra ted  
wi th in  r e l a t i v e l y  narrow a r e a s .  Of t h e  500,000-square-mile a r e a  comprising 
t h e  n a t i o n ' s  Southwest, about  one h a l f  is mountainous and mostly i n  f e d e r a l  
ownership. Another 200,000 square mi l e s  is d e s e r t ,  much of  which is f e d e r a l  
land. Only 50,000 square mi les  is r i v e r  v a l l e y  l and ,  wi th  a g r i c u l t u r e  and 
c i t i e s .  The a r e a s  a f f e c t e d  by sediment flow a r e  t h e  s lop ing  a l l u v i a l  p l a i n s  
l oca t ed  below t h e  mountain ranges. Such p l a i n s  make up about 40,000 square 
mi les  of land .  I n  1979 it was es t imated  t h a t  o n l y  about  1,000 square  mi les  of 
t hese  p l a i n s  a r e  completely o r  p a r t i a l l y  urbanized. About 2,500,000 
s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  involved,  with a replacement va lue  of $100 b i l l i o n .  
The c o s t  of  damages inc reases  y e a r l y  a s  human occupancy expands. The Las 
Vegas sediment f l ood  of  J u l y  3 ,  1975, caused $4 m i l l i o n  worth of  damages. 
T r o p i c a l  storm Kathleen, i n  September 1976, caused $23 m i l l i o n  worth of f lood  
and sediment damage i n  t h e  C i t y  o f  Palm Desert, C a l i f o r n i a ,  p l u s  a d d i t i o n a l  
m i l l i o n s  t o  u t i l i t y ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  and communications f a c i l i t i e s .  The same 
a r e a  was s t r u c k  aga in  i n  1979, wi th  damages es t imated  a t  $50 mi l l ion .  
Sediment flow during February and March 1978 i n  Los Angeles caused $100 
m i l l i o n  worth of  damage t o  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  s t r u c t u r e s ,  roads,  u t i l i t i e s ,  
and f lood  c o n t r o l  works (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,  1978). I t  is es t imated  
t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  average annual  cost o f  sediment-related f lood  damages i n  t h e  
Southwest is $20 m i l l i o n  i n  1979 d o l l a r s .  These f i g u r e s  could double i n  t h e  
next  10 y e a r s  un le s s  development p o l i c i e s  and c r i t e r i a  a r e  modified t o  
recognize  and m i t i g a t e  sediment hazards.  
Impacts 
The most t r a g i c  impact o f  sediment fl,oods is upon ind iv idua l s  and 
fami l ies .  Unlike r i v e r i n e  f looding ,  sediment f looding  l e a v e s  behind crushed 
s t u c c o  wal l s ,  thousands o f  t o n s  o f  rock,  mud, and d e b r i s ,  and automobiles 
hammered around s t and ing  t r e e s .  The d e s t r u c t i o n  and t h e  c leanup problems a r e  
s t agge r ing .  Homes r ep resen t ing  a  fami ly ' s  major f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t  a r e  
destroyed.* Livestock and p e t s  a r e  lost forever .  One f a t h e r  l ead ing  t h e  
fami ly  horse  t o  s a f e t y  a c r o s s  a  s t ream was swept away and drowned. Others  
have been s t r i c k e n  wi th  h e a r t  a t t a c k s  whi le  shovel ing mud and l i f t i n g  
sandbags. Highway workers p l ac ing  ba r r i cades  i n  f r o n t  of  a  d i p  c ros s ing  of a  
normally d r y  s t ream have been swept away and drowned. Care taker  r e s i d e n t s  of  
a  church camp r e s o r t  a r e a  have been swept away i n ' t h e  n igh t .  Bodies no t  y e t  
recovered a r e  probably bur ied  i n  downstream r e s e r v o i r  sediments. 
A t  t h e  community l e v e l  t h e  sediment f l ood  b r ings  s e v e r a l  r eac t ions .  
During t h e  emergency t h e  shock of  t h e  d i s a s t e r  s t i m u l a t e s  h e r o i c  and u n s e l f i s h  
a c t s  of courage and s t r e n g t h .  Natura l  l e a d e r s  t ake  charge of  evacuat ions ,  
s ee ing  t o  it t h a t  t h e  e l d e r l y ,  d i sab led ,  and young are c a r r i e d  t o  s a f e t y .  
S t rapping  teenage boys and g i r l s  s e t  up sandbag ope ra t ions ,  f i l l i n g  and 
p l ac ing  t h e  heavy bags long p a s t  t h e  p o i n t  of  exhaust ion.  Emergency f o r c e s  
from every  s o u r c e - - u t i l i t i e s ,  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  and p u b l i c  agencies--al l  f i n d  ways 
to c o n t r i b u t e  without  concern f o r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o r  red  tape.  
The morning a f t e r  t h e  f l ood ,  when t h e  shock has  worn o f f ,  r e s i d e n t s  walk 
t h e  s t r e e t s  and canyons, surveying t h e  wreckage. A s  they  look a t  t h e  pa th  of 
d e s t r u c t i o n  leading  from canyon mouths and spreading randomly a c r o s s  a l l u v i a l  
cones, they  r e a l i z e  how c e r t a i n  it was t h a t  d i s a s t e r  would s t r i k e  where it 
d id .  Af te r  t h e  f lood  it  does n o t  t ake  a n  expe r t  t o  observe t h a t  mudflows t h a t  
have always poured o u t  of  t h e  canyons w i l l  cont inue  t o  occur ,  even i f  houses 
a r e  placed i n  t h e i r  way. A s  people ga the r ,  t h e  ques t ion  is asked over  and 
*At t h i s  wr i t i ng  almost  none o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e s  damaged and destroyed have 
been insured ,  a l though f e d e r a l  f lood  insurance has  been a v a i l a b l e  s i n c e  1968. 
over: "How did they ever approve a building permit in that spot?" The 
feeling of betrayal by the officials entrusted with public safety spreads 
rapidly under these circumstances. At a time when distrust of government is 
already at a high level, we do not need to add fuel to the fire or increase 
public liabilities. Past practices governing the development of sediment 
hazard areas are sure to leave the community with a feeling of bitterness, 
resentment, and betrayal toward agencies that regulate development in the name 
of public safety. 
Local Government 
The impact of sediment floods on local government is staggering in terms 
of costs of restoration, interruption of services, and regulatory and 
political quandries. In one southern California flood, damages to public 
properties, roads, bridges, and flood control facilities amounted to $84 
million. Although restoration of public facilities is eligible for federal 
disaster funding under certain circumstances, it takes about 60 days to 
receive the first payment. Local agencies must be able to finance emergency 
flood fighting activities during the interim, which may involve enormous cash 
oytlays for rental equipment, operators, and contracts. 
Diversion of local financing to flood fighting and restoration operations 
means deferring other projects and services that were scheduled and financed. 
Energy and money expended on restoring public facilities damaged by sediment 
floods can never be recovered and are permanently lost to society. 
Repeated sediment floods have had an impact on the way local officials 
view their responsibilities for controlling development. At the technical 
level attention has been drawn to the engineering aspects of sediment 
flooding. Improved procedures for evaluating proposed development, for 
predicting the quantity and location of potential sediment flows, and for 
setting criteria to mitigate their hazard have been developed. Planning, 
zoning, subdivision, and building departments have become much more aware of 
sediment hazards and receptive to procedures and techniques for avoiding or 
mitigating them. Although only a few communities have taken positive 
mitigating steps, they have demonstrated that workable procedures and criteria 
can be developed and implemented without upsetting the housing industry. 
At the political level the same thing has happened. Immediate reactions 
have included ordering reevaluations of planning and building criteria. 
Beneficial results have included a good understanding of the seriousness of 
sediment hazards and a willingness to stand behind the recommendations of 
technical staff on safety criteria. Again, this political perspective is not 
widespread, but it does indicate that concerned engineering officials can work 
effectively with elected officials to improve public safety. 
Federal and State  Government 
Disaster relief laws authorize the federal government to assume most of 
the cost of restoration of public facilities whenever the President declares a 
national disaster. Repair and restoration of public buildings, streets, 
parks, and flood control facilities due to sediment flood damage cost an 
estimated $10 million in southern California. States are also impacted, 
particularly when the situation does not qualify for a proclamation of 
national disaster. Since states do not normally maintain an appropriation for 
this purpose, it is usually necessary to enact special assistance 
legislation. The overall effort amounts to a substantial deployment of energy 
and money that the nation can ill afford. 
ENGINEERING ASPECTS 
Factors Affecting Sediment Production 
Sediment flow as used in this paper means a high concentration of rock, 
sand, and soil in floodwater such that great destructive force is generated. 
Sediment production rates for a single storm have been measured as high as 
240,000 cu yd per square mile. At peak sediment flow rates it is estimated 
that the sediments constitute up to one half the total volume of flow. The 
largest body of quantitative engineering data on sediment production is 
contained in the records of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. 
The district has several flood control reservoirs with 50 years of 
record. Of the 100 debris basins presently operated, 18 have more than 36 
years of record, and 25 have at least 25 years of record. It has generally 
been believed that sediment production is a function of watershed variables 
such as soil types, size of drainage area, steepness, vegetative cover, 
rainfall, fire frequency, aspect, and relief ratio'. Recent regression 
analyses have indicated that sediment production rates per unit of watershed 
area are most influenced by the vegetative cover (which is a measure of fire 
history), followed by relief ratio and rainfall. The other factors measured 
did not significantly improve the results. No practical way has been found to 
introduce soil and geology data into the regression analysis. 
Sediment Volume Prediction Models 
For many years the debris basin design standards of the Los Angeles County 
Flood Control District relied on enveloping curves based on historical 
sediment measurements. By 1956 sufficient data had been accumulated to 
perform regression analyses using watershed variables (Los Angeles County 
Flood Control ~istrict, 1959). In 1979 a new regression analysis was 
performed for the Federal Insurance Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development using a much expanded data base. It had as a. 
specific objective the establishment of a frequency basis sa that flood 
insurance rates for mudflows might be calculated (Los Angeles County Flood 
Control District, 1979). The procedure required (1) determining an 
appropriate frequency distribution that would fit historical data and 
extrapolate to reasonable values, (2) relating sediment production to 
measurable watershed parameters for estimating sediment production from 
ungaged watersheds, and (3) properly accounting for the effect of fires in 
expected sediment production. (See Los Angeles County Flood Control District 
(1979) for details. ) 
Hydraulics of Sediment Flow 
The hydraulics of mud and sediment flow present problems. Hydraulic 
equations used for water cannot be fully relied upon because the density and 
viscosity of sediment flows are so different from those of water; Flow 
records are scarce because gaging stations that receive sediment-laden flow 
are often buried by the event for which the record is desired. Poststorm 
observations using the slope-area method are questionable because of flow 
density and viscosity problems. Accurate velocity measurements are hard to 
get because of the difficulty of operating a current meter in 
sediment-carrying streams. It has been observed that sediment-laden 
floodflows often arrive in tremendous surges or waves many times the average 
flow rate. The effects of this slug flow are several. 
1. Instantaneous flow rates and velocities are much higher than one might 
expect. 
2. The depth of flow and corresponding damage potential are higher than 
one might expect. 
3. The tremendous kinetic energy can destroy structures on impact and can 
~verwhelm a debris basin designed for a steady inflow rate. Reliable 
postflood measurements of sediments that passed debris basins are nearly 
impossible to make. 
The evaluation of sediment hazard potential requires the ability to 
predict the location and amount of deposition, because the recession flows 
will be passing over the deposited material. Where deposits have occurred in 
the past, there is a basis for estimating future deposition and for 
extrapolating the relationships to other locations. Factors that influence 
deposition are those that influence velocity: slope and cross section. 
Changes of slope and obstructions caused by walls, fills, automobiles, and 
houses are the main indicators of sediment deposition. 
While the hydraulic flow characteristics of sediment-laden flows present 
some technical problems to the engineer, adequate representation of the 
potential hazard can be made by approximate methods. This enables the 
identification of hazardous areas and the design of mitigation measures, both 
nonstructural and structural. It is more important to recognize the hazard 
and apply a commonsense approach than to worry about the precise width and 
depth of the flow. 
Debris basin capacity has come under new scrutiny recently. As a result 
of heavy rains in 1978 following a large local brushfire after two years of 
drought, erosion and sediment production were maximized. Watersheds had been 
saturated by intermittent showers for several weeks. In Zachau Canyon 
high-intensity rainfall produced surges of sediment-laden flow containing 
10-ton boulders. The flood crest hit debris basins in a wave, overrunning the 
structures and sending boulders and mud downstream. Boulders and chain link 
fence from the channel walls plugged underground channels downstream, and 
communities were devastated by boulders and mud. This event demonstrated that 
under conditions marked by freshly burned watershed the previous understanding 
of sediment deposition, based on experience, was inadequate. The dynamics of 
the sediment-laden mass entering basins obviously governed their performance. 
The data gathered during this flood will be evaluated to establish the 
determining relationships. 
CONTROLS 
Keep it Moving 
Engineers have only two choices with sediment flow: either stop it or 
keep it moving. Where it is physically possible to keep it moving without 
causing damage, there are advantages. If the stream is a coastal stream, 
beach starvation can be avoided by allowing sediment to pass to the ocean. 
Also, if the sediment can be carried downstream by the water, it will not have 
to be cleaned out of expensive sediment containment structures and carried 
away at substantial cost. 
There are problems with and limitations to the concept of improved 
sediment-carrying channels. There may be insufficient slope to keep sediment 
moving. With insufficient slope the channel will plug and the community will 
be flooded. Where this is the case, there is no choice but to trap the 
sediment. Where there is sufficient channel slope to carry sediment to a safe 
destination, the channel will perform satisfactorily but will wear out due to 
abrasion of the channel's concrete bottom. After a few years the steel will 
be exposed and the channel bottom will have to be relined. 
Situations where sediment transport will work include streams above 
existing debris basins or reservoirs with enough capacity for the sediment. 
Also, small sediment-carrying side canyons may be introduced into a large 
channel, where the main channel flow will always be large enough to handle the 
sediment load. It is also possible to design a sediment-carrying floodway 
with a natural bottom and revetted levees. Such a floodway may act as a 
linear sediment basin. Adequate freeboard must be provided to contain the 
deposition, and arrangements must be made to excavate aggrading deposits to 
restore channel capacity. 
Sediment-carrying channels should be designed for bulked flow, should be 
free from grade breaks that flatten the grade, should be free from 
restrictions and expansions, and should be as straight as possible. The 
channel should be open for ease of maintenance. Trapezoidal and V sections 
provide better scouring velocities at low discharges than do rectangular . 
channels. Invert concrete should be extra thick to allow for abrasion, and 
scour gages consisting of colored concrete cones should be imbedded in the 
invert so that wear can be monitored. Studies show that concrete is the least 
expensive material at this time. 
Restrictions and expansions are hard to avoid in stream systems undergoing 
urbanization. Sections of leveed channel may alternate with natural 
floodplains. Special care is needed to maintain sediment transport. 
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Separation of ,Sediment from Water 
i 
If the sediment-laden flow cannot be safely carried through the community 
to a safe point of discharge, it will be necessary to remove the sediments and 
carry only the water. Sediment removal is accomplished by providing a 
reservoir or basin large enough to contain the sediment from at least one 
major flood. A spillway is provided to protect the embankment from overflow. 
A drain should be provided to dewater the basin to simplify cleanout 
operations. In areas having high sediment rates the basin capacity measured 
to the spillway crest may be as much as 240,000 cu yd per square mile of 
drainage area (equivalent to a depth of 0.23 ft or 7 cm over the watershed 
area). Sediment tends to deposit in the basin on a slope, so basin capacity 
is sometimes computed with a plane extending upstream from the spillway crest 
at a slope one-half that of the natural streambed. Sediment basins are 
usually located in populated areas, where it is necessary to fence them for 
security. The basins must be cleaned out after storms, so all-weather access 
is necessary. A sediment disposal site suitable for the long term must be 
provided as near as possible, which may be difficult where land value and 
environmental concerns stir a strong public response. The site must be 
planned with regard to the stability of the fill, access, drainage, and truck 
traffic during cleanout operations. Community public relations during 
prolonged flood fighting periods when trucks are operating day and night can 
become a significant effort. Typical design features of a sediment basin are 
shown in Figure 1. 
Sediment basins are high-cost, high-maintenance facilities that can 
provide a high level of protection. They are justified only in situations 
where land use requirements and real estate values preclude leaving the 
hazardous area open for sediment flows. Most sediment basins are built to 
protect existing communities located in hazardous areas. New developments can 
often be designed to occupy safer ground and leave the sediment-carrying 
canyons alone, if adequate information on sediment flow hazards is available 
during the planning stage. 
POLITICAL-ENGINEERING STRATEGIES 
Problem Identification 
The sediment flow hazard is not well understood by many public works 
engineers or public officials. As understanding of the relationship of 
sediment flow to other hydraulic considerations in flood control improves, it 
will be possible for governmental agencies to identify specific problems from 
drainage area to drainage area. Clear understanding of sediment flow by 
public works officials will increase confrontations with land developers and 
therefore with political leadership interested in healthy growth. Some 
agencies are already mapping areas where sediment flow is a consideration. 
This will be seen on zoning and other master-plan documents. This is a first 
step; it provides notice to prospective buyers and elected officials that a 
special problem exists. It is the responsibility of public works officials to 
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FIGURE 1 Typical sediment basin configuration. 
o b t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  knowledge t o  a l low t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  p u b l i c  agencies  t o  adopt 
l and  use manabement p l ans  t h a t  cons ider  sediment flow. Nat ional  Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) mudflow mapping w i l l  go a long way i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  
100-Year Versus Other Standards 
The NFIP mapping and r egu la to ry  s t anda rd  b a s i s  of 100-year c l e a r  water and 
100-year mudflow hazards has  s e r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  urban areas .  Grea ter  
f lows have a demonstrated record of  doing major damage. It is probable t h a t  
t h i s  f lood  p r o t e c t i o n  l e v e l  may have t o  be increased  i n  some a r e a s  a s  more 
s t a t i s t i c s  on l o s s  become ava i l ab l e .  Some f lood  c o n t r o l  agencies  use 
s t anda rds  cons ide rab ly  higher  than t h e  100-year s tandard  when designing 
f a c i l i t i e s  o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  f loodp la in  management techniques  f o r  high-densi ty  
urban development. Each agency should knowingly adopt  a f lood  p r o t e c t i o n  
s tandard  and develop s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  r e f l e c t  t h a t  s t anda rd  f o r  f l oodp la in  
management. I f  t h e  f l oodp la in  w i l l  be r e l a t i v e l y  s p a r s e l y  developed, t h e  
100-year p r o t e c t i o n  l e v e l  may be adequate ,  i f  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  r a i s e d  and 
p rope r ly  loca ted .  For higher-densi ty  urban p rope r ty  t h e  100-year p r o t e c t i o n  
l e v e l  may be inadequate ,  and sediment f lows  may cause  ex tens ive  damage. This  
is a l o c a l  problem t h a t  should be reso lved  by l o c a l  f l oodp la in  management 
r egu la t ions .  I t  is important  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  bodies  t a k e  s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n s  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a l e v e l  of  p r o t k t i o n  f o r  sediment f lows,  s i n c e  they  w i l l  be c a l l e d  
upon t o  provide p u b l i c  a s s i s t a n c e  when t h e  NFIP s t anda rds  a r e  exceeded, and 
s i n c e  they  and t h e i r  employees may incur  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  e i t h e r  i nac t ion  
o r  neg l igen t  a c t i o n s .  Pub l i c  works eng inee r s  need t o  educa te  e l e c t e d  
o f f i c i a l s  about  t h e s e  r e a l i t i e s  even though sediment f lows may occur 
r e l a t i v e l y  in f r equen t ly .  
Hazard Reduction 
The o b j e c t i v e  of f l oodp la in  management is t o  reduce hazards and economic 
lo s ses .  The reduct ion  o f  hazards has p o l i t i c a l  over tones ,  s i n c e  l and  use may 
be r e s t r i c t e d  o r  c o s t s  may be increased  by f lood  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s .  
Engineers  bear t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  develop a l t e r n a t i v e  proposa ls  t h a t  a r e  
c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e i r  d ra inage  and sediment flow master p lans .  These 
proposa ls  must be communicated t o  p o l i t i c a l  bodies  conc i se ly  and c l e a r l y  s o  
t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  and r e l a t e d  land  use  o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o s t s  a r e  
understood. Without such understanding, p o l i t i c a l  bodies  a r e  prone t o  approve 
ind iv idua l  developments because they do no t  each have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact, 
wi thout  recogniz ing  t h a t  on a long-term cumulat ive b a s i s  they  may be thwart ing 
t h e  master p lan  and committing t h e  community t o  enormous remedial c o s t s ,  o r  
perhaps s e t t i n g  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  a f u t u r e  f l ood ing  ca t a s t rophe .  
Governmental Ob l iga t ions  
I n i t i a t i v e s  by t h e  f e d e r a l  government a r e  mot iva t ing  l o c a l  governments t o  
r e g u l a t e  hazardous a reas .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h i s  is apparent  when one 
r e f l e c t s  on t h e  decades of l a i s s e z - f a i r e  developmental p o l i c i e s  by l o c a l  
governments. ~ l t h o u g h  it  is t o o  e a r l y  t o  eva lua t e  t h e  f lood  insurance 
program, i n d i c a t i o n s  a r e  t h a t  communities a r e  ready t o  r e g u l a t e  hazardous 
a r e a s  i f  they  have t h e  necessary  information and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  message t h a t  
they have no choice  under t h e  f e d e r a l  mandates. 
One important  element i n  a comprehensive s o l u t i o n  is an o b l i g a t i o n  of  t h e  
f e d e r a l  government t h a t  h a s  n o t  y e t  been implemented. Sec t ion  1362 of t h e  
Nat iona l  Flood Insurance  A c t  o f  1968 a s  amended a u t h o r i z e s  f e d e r a l  purchase o f  
s eve re ly  flood-damaged p r o p e r t i e s  provided t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  insured  under 
NFIP, t h e  l o c a l  bu i ld ing  department w i l l  n o t  a l low t h e i r  r econs t ruc t ion ,  and a 
l o c a l  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l  r e q u e s t s  t h e  ac t ion .  U n t i l  t h i s  element o f  t h e  program 
is implemented, t h e r e  is no mechanism f o r  breaking t h e  c y c l e  of  damage, 
r e p a i r ,  and resale. Homes i n  hazardous a r e a s  have been s t r u c k  a s  many a s  four  
t imes  by sediment f l oods ,  s u f f e r e d  each time by new owners. Local governments 
now must proceed wi th  c a r e  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  programs go beyond minimum f e d e r a l  
requirements  and meet t h e i r  own long-term needs. 
Developers '  Ob l iga t ions  
The key t o  sound development is  no t  governmental r e g u l a t i o n s  b u t  p r a c t i c a l  
understanding and r e s o l u t i o n  of  t h e  sediment and f lood  problems by 
developers .  When sediment f l ood  hazards  have been i d e n t i f i e d  a t  an e a r l y  
s t a g e ,  key d e c i s i o n s  can  be affected--such a s  whether to  purchase one p a r c e l  
or another ,  and what type  of  development t o  plan.  During development planning 
t h e  grading  concept ,  street l ayou t ,  and l o t  des igns  can a l l  be ad jus t ed  t o  
accommodate and m i t i g a t e  sediment hazard. F i n a l l y ,  dwell ing placement and 
o r i e n t a t i o n  on t h e  lot ,  a s  w e l l  a s  cons t ruc t ion  and e l eva t ion ,  should r e f l e c t  
awareness of sediment hazard. The b a s i c  r u l e s  a r e  a s  fol lows.  
1. Determine t h e  f lood  and sediment hazard t o  each lot. 
2. Provide a s a f e  pathway f o r  sediment-laden flow t o  a s a f e  p o i n t  o f  
d i scharge ,  without  harm t o  s t r u c t u r e s  and improvements. 
3. Do n o t  f l a t t e n  t h e  grade  o f  sediment flow p a t h s  o r  t r y  to  change t h e i r  
alignments.  
4. If a dra inage  f a c i l i t y  is necessary,  des ign  it a s  an open channel  s o  
t h a t  it can  be c leaned  ou t .  
5. Allow equipment acces s  f o r  cleanup. 
6. If  sediment cannot  be s a f e l y  c a r r i e d  through on t h e  su r f ace ,  provide 
an  adequate bas in ,  wi th  acces s  f o r  maintenance. 
Homeowner Obl iga t ions  
Homeowners must understand t h e  problem s o  a s  to m i t i g a t e  it wi th in  t h e i r  
means o r  no t  make it worse. They must p a r t i c u l a r l y  be aware o f  t h e  sediment 
flow pa th  and t h e  room it requ i r e s .  Th i s  pa th  must be l e f t  c l e a r ,  s o  block 
wa l l s ,  accessory bu i ld ings ,  and landscaping should be planned accordingly.  
Homeowners can a l s o  improve t h e i r  s a f e t y  by cons t ruc t ing  proper ly  designed 
d e f l e c t o r  wa l l s  t o  keep sediment-laden flow moving i n  t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n .  
F i n a l l y ,  they should p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  l o s s  by tak ing  o u t  f lood  insurance.  
Insurance  Aspects 
The sediment hazard t o  many e x i s t i n g  developments is so d i f f u s e  t h a t  it 
cannot be cured by a major flood control project. The only recourses 
available to owners of such properties are to maintain and improve sediment 
flow paths as well as they can and take out insurance. The insurance will 
defray the cost to individuals of restoring damaged structures and will 
significantly reduce the impact on family finances. On a longer-term basis 
the flood insurance program requires a buy-out when the structure is damaged 
by more than one-half its value. This provision will eventually eliminate 
many existing hazards by allowing hazardous lots to revert to open space or 
safe uses. 
THE FUTURE 
The Public Works Construction Outlook 
Public works construction (including flood control facilities) accounted 
for a significant portion of federal, state, and local expenditures during the 
1960s. Since that time rising costs and changing priorities, together with 
environmental awareness, have markedly reduced the amount of money available 
for public works. Now that the nation has entered an era of insufficient 
epergy and escalating costs, it appears that there will be increasing 
competition for the nation's scarce dollars. New public works construction 
will probably receive relatively low priority within the next generation. 
Consequently, people should not expect that even the existing flood and 
sediment hazards can be cured. There is certainly no reason to expect that 
public works will rescue new developments placed in unsafe areas. Local 
planners and elected officials must realize this and shift gears from the old 
viewpoint that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the local flood control 
district will correct any problems caused by unwise development. 
Impact of Federal Flood Insurance 
Despite some recognized shortcomings, the flood insurance program is still 
the only game in town in terms of an organized effort to focus the attention 
of local officials on their responsibilities for safe development. With the 
flood insurance program as a catalyst, local floodplain management programs 
can be developed that will significantly reduce future sediment damages. 
Local agencies can set standards of protection commensurate with their 
community's plans, so long as they at least satisfy fede'ral requirements. 
Mechanisms for implementation can vary, depending on local philosophy and 
existing ordinances. Most importantly, the effects of future development can 
be reflected in hazard calculations and be kept consistent with the 
community's own goals. Eventually, the need for the government to purchase 
severely damaged properties will be recognized. Implementation of this 
program will go far toward eliminating the most serious existing hazards. The 
flood insurance maps may provide the stimulus needed by communities to support 
public works flood control programs. When mandatory flood insurance is in 
full effect, property owners may find they would be better off to support a 
bond issue to eliminate the mandatory insurance than to continue paying the 
premiums. In any event, the flood insurance program does offer better 
financial protection for property owners in flood hazard areas, better public 
information about flood hazards, and better regulation of new development. 
The Impact of Local Floodplain Management 
Pressure to develop new land will continue. New lands generally are those 
that either have been passed over before or have not been reached by 
development. Either way, it often turns out that the land available for 
development has problems, such as a sediment hazard. Recognizing and 
mitigating the hazard will tend to increase the cost of development, so 
floodplain management is initially viewed in an unpopular light by 
developers. In the long run, if the criteria are reasonable and fairly 
applied by all jurisdictions in an area, the housing industry accepts them as 
part of the cost of providing quality housing. There is no question but that 
the widespread adoption of the measures to mitigate sediment hazards described 
earlier in this paper will enormously affect the future loss of life and 
property to sediment flood-related disasters. 
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THE STORMS OF 1978 AND 1980 AND THEIR EFFECT ON SEDIMENT 
MOVEMENT I N  THE EASTERN SAN GABRIEL FRONT 
by Wade G. Wells I1 
The e f f e c t s  of  three major storms, one occurring i n  1980 and two 
i n  1978, are compared using data from the  U.S. Forest Service ' s  San Dimas 
Experimental Forest. The San Dimas Experimental Forest i s  located near 
Los Angeles, Cali fornia,  i n  the  eastern San Gabriel Mountains. The 2980 
storm, although it was the  largest  ever recorded on the  experimental 
forest ,  seemed t o  be l e s s  des truct ive  than the 1978 storms. Sediment 
measurements from debris  basins tended t o  support t h i s  observation. 
Sediment production from two study watersheds on the  experimental 
forest  was about 40 percent l e s s  i n  1980 than i n  1978. Although there 
may have been several reasons for t h i s ,  it i s  probable t ha t  there simply 
was not  as much sediment available for movement i n  1980 as  there was i n  
1978. The same channels t ha t  were scoured by the 1980 storm were also  
heavily scoured by the  storms i n  1978. With only two intervening years 
for fresh sediment accumulation, these channels may s t i l l  have been 
r e l a t i v e l y  clean when the 1980 storm occurred. 
Fires play a more important ro le  i n  sediment production than do even 
the most severe storms. Sediment production from freshly burned catch- 
ments during ~ e l a t i v e l y  minor storms frequently exceeds t ha t  from the most 
severe storms. The worst sedimentation events occur, of  course, when a 
severe storm s t r i k e s  a recent ly  burned watershed, and examples of  t h i s  
are presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
The storm o f  February 13-21, 1980, is t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  s to rm eve r  
recorded  a t  t h e  U.S. F o r e s t  S e r v i c e ' s  San D i m a s  Exper imental  F o r e s t  i n  t h e  
e a s t e r n  San G a b r i e l  Mountains. During t h i s  storm 628 mm o f  r a i n  was recorded  
a t  t h e  Tanbark P l a t  r a i n  gage ( e l e v a t i o n  825 m ) ,  and 458 mm was recorded a t  
t h e  Glendora Ranger S t a t i o n  ( e l e v a t i o n  252 m) 10  km sou thwes t  o f  Tanbark F l a t  
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(see F i g u r e  1). When compared w i t h  o t h e r  storms o f  a similar magnitude,  t h e  
amount o f  sediment  produced by t h i s  s t o r m  was u n u s u a l l y  l o w .  There  are a l s o  
i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  p r o p e r t y  damage from t h i s  storm was n o t  a s  h i g h  as one  might  
expec t .  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Records have been k e p t  a t  Tanbark F l a t  s i n c e  October  1928, and d u r i n g  t h i s  
51-year p e r i o d  f o u r  u n u s u a l l y  s e v e r e  storms have o c c u r r e d .  T a b l e  1 lists t h e  
d a t e s  o f  t h e s e  storms a l o n g  w i t h  t h e i r  to ta l  r a i n f a l l  a t  bo th  Tanbark F l a t  and 
t h e  Glendora  Ranger S t a t i o n .  
TABLE 1 Unusual ly  S e v e r e  Storms a t  Tanbark F l a t  
Storm Dates  
T o t a l  R a i n f a l l  (mm) 
Tanbark F l a t  Glendor a 
Major s to rms  
Feb. 27-Mar. 3 ,  1938 
J a n .  23-26, 1969 
Feb. 27-Mar. 4, 1978 
Feb. 13-21, 1980 
L e s s e r  r e l a t e d  storms 
J a n .  18-22, 1969 
Feb. 5-10, 1978 
Before  t h e  storm of  1938 t h e  l a s t  major storm a p p e a r s  t o  b e  t h a t  o f  
January  15-18, 1916. T h i s  s t o r m  produced 344 mm o f  r a i n f a l l  a t  t h e  
100-year-old West gage i n  Glendora .  T h i s  gage,  t h e  second o l d e s t  a c t i v e  gage 
i n  Los Angeles County,  c o n s i s t e n t l y  g i v e s  r e a d i n g s  w i t h i n  2 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
F o r e s t  S e r v i c e  gage.  I t  can  be  concluded,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  1916 storm and 
t h e  1938 s t o r m  were v e r y  s i m i l a r .  
Two o t h e r  storms a r e  also l i s t e d  i n  T a b l e  1 because  o f  t h e i r  close 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  four  major s torms.  The f i r s t  o c c u r r e d  on J a n u a r y  18-22, 
1969, and dropped 335 mm o f  r a i n  a t  Tanbark and 207 mm a t  Glendora .  T h i s  
r e s u l t e d  i n  a nine-day t o t a l  o f  802 mrn a t  Tanbark, t h e  w e t t e s t  such p e r i o d  on 
record .  The second storm o c c u r r e d  on February  5-10, 1978, and does n o t  rank 
a s  a major storm for t h e  e a s t e r n  San G a b r i e l s .  I t  produced o n l y  302 mm o f  
r a i n  a t  Tanbark and 174 mm a t  Glendora .  I t  caused  ex t remely  h i g h  f lows ,  
however, and'moved u n u s u a l l y  l a r g e  amounts o f  sediment  f o r  its s i z e .  
FIGURE 1 Map of eastern San Gabriel front between Arroyo Seco and the 
Los Angeles-San Bernardino county line. 
This report compares the storm of February 13-21, 1980, with those of 
February 5-10 and February 27-March 4, 1978, by looking at their effects on 
two small watersheds in the San Dimas Experimental Forest. It is not always 
possible to separate the effects of the two 1978 storms, but, when possible, 
this has been done. The early storm showed unusually high flows and 
sedimentation rates, but the later storm apparently did more total damage. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY WATERSHEDS 
The study watersheds are located at the head of Bell Canyon, a tributary 
to Big Dalton Canyon, about 2 km west of the Tanbark rain gage in the San 
Dimas Experimental Forest (see Figure 2). These catchments, known as Bell 2 
and Bell 3, have been monitored for streamflow and sediment production since 
1933. Bell 2 is a 40-ha sauth-facing watershed that is covered with a mixture 
of California buckwheat, artificially seeded annual grasses, and occasional 
clumps of chaparral. Bell 3 is 25 ha in size, faces southeast, and is covered 
by native chaparral. The average slope for both watersheds is around 65 
percent, and their elevations range from 760 m to 1,060 m in Bell 2 and from 
760 m to 1,030 m in Bell 3. Both catchments burned in 1919 and 1960. Bell 2 
also burned in 1975, but Bell 3 did not. Sediment troughs were installed on 
the slopes of Bell 2 after the fire to monitor postfire debris production, and 
these were maintained until early 1979. 
Sediment is trapped in small concrete-lined debris basins, and streamflow 
is measured by 120-degree V-notched weirs placed below the basins (see Figure 
3). Channels are steep and well armored, with significant reaches lying 
directly on bedrock. Cascades and small waterfalls are numerous. 
FIGURE 2 Map of t h e  San Dimas Experimental Fo res t  showing l o c a t i o n  of 
Tanbark F l a t  and t h e  B e l l  watersheds. 
STORM CHARACTERISTICS 
Hyetographs f o r  each storm, a s  recorded a t  Tanbark F l a t ,  a r e  shown i n  
F igure  4. Each bar  of t h e  hyetograph r ep resen t s  t h r e e  hours of  r a i n f a l l .  I t  
is obvious t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  four  days of t h e  1980 storm were much more seve re  
than  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  1978 storms. ~ u r i n g  t h i s  four-day per iod  463 mm of  r a i n  
f e l l  (73 percent  of  t h e  t o t a l ) ,  and 204 mm (44 percent  o f  t h e  t o t a l )  f e l l  on a 
s i n g l e  day, February 16 , 1980. 
Comparing t h e  1980 s torm wi th  t h e  1978 storms, we s e e  t h a t  t h e  h e a v i e s t  
r a i n f a l l  occurred on t h e  f o u r t h  o r  f i f t h  day of  each storm. Also, an tecedent  
moisture cond i t i ons  f o r  a l l  t h r e e  storms a r e  roughly equiva len t .  There were 
12 r a i n l e s s  days preceding t h e  storm of 1980, 12 r a i n l e s s  days before  t h e  
. 
storm of ~ e b r u a r y  27-March 4, 1978, and 15 r a i n l e s s  days o u t  o f  16 before  t h e  
storm of ~ e b r u a r y  5-10, 1978. I t  is poss ib l e ,  however, t h a t  t h e  h e a v i e s t  r a i n  
i n  t h e  storm of  February 5-10, 1978, d i d  n o t  f a l l  on a f u l l y  s a t u r a t e d  
watershed. During t h e  3-1/2 days preceding its period of  heav ie s t  
p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  on ly  57 mm of  r a i n  f e l l .  I n  t h e  o the r  two storms t h e  pe r iods  
o f  h e a v i e s t  r a i n  each came a f t e r  over 200 mm had f a l l e n .  
Di f fe rences  a r e  a l s o  found i n  t h e  peak i n t e n s i t i e s  of each storm. F igure  
5 shows t h e  peak i n t e n s i t i e s  of each storm f o r  va r ious  t i m e  per iods  as 
recorded by t h e  gage a t  Tanbark F l a t .  The storm of  February 27-March 4, 1978, 
had t h e  h ighes t  short-term ( l e s s  than one hour) i n t e n s i t i e s ,  bu t  t h e  1980 
FIGURE 3 B e l l  2 d e b r i s  b a s i n .  Note c o n c r e t e  approach a t  upper end 
and well-armored c h a n n e l  above it. 
storm shows much h i g h e r  long-term i n t e n s i t i e s .  I n  f a c t ,  on February  16 ,  1980, 
it r a i n e d  a t  o v e r  30 mm p e r  hour f o r  f i v e  c o n s e c u t i v e  hours .  The s t o r m  of 
February  5-10, 1978, was m i l d e r  i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  two. 
SEDIMENTATION DURING THE 1978 AND 1980 STORMS 
T a b l e  2 shows sed iment  p r o d u c t i o n  from bo th  ca tchments  f o r  t h e  s t o r m s  o f  
1978 and 1980. The d e b r i s  b a s i n  i n  B e l l  2 f i l l e d ,  b u t  d i d  n o t  o v e r t o p ,  d u r i n g  
t h e  storm of February  5-10, 1978. I t  was n o t  p o s s i b l e  to  c l e a n  o u t  t h e  b a s i n  
b e f o r e  t h e  storm of  February  27-March 4 ,  1978, occur red .  T h e r e f o r e  no d a t a  
f o r  t h e  l a t e r  storm a r e  a v a i l a b l e  from B e l l  2 .  The B e l l  3 d e b r i s  b a s i n  was 
n o t  measured between t h e  t w o  1978 s to rms ,  so t h e  sediment  p r o d u c t i o n  d a t a  
p r e s e n t  from t h i s  ca tchment  are f o r  both  1978 s torms.  Observers  e s t i m a t e d  
t h a t  o v e r  two t h i r d s  o f  t h e  1978 d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  B e l l  3 came d u r i n g  t h e  
February  5-10 storm, b u t  t h e r e  are no a c t u a l  measurements to conf i rm t h i s .  
Two items i n  T a b l e  2 are n o t a b l e .  F i r s t ,  peak f l o w s  from t h e  s to rms  of 
February  5-10, 1978, and February  13-21, 1980, a r e  roughly  e q u i v a l e n t ,  d e s p i t e  
STORM OF 
5-10 FEB 1978 
3 0 2  mm 
STORM OF 
27 FEB - 4 MAR 1978 
419 mm 
STORM OF 
13-21 FEB 1980 
6 2 8  mm 
FIGURE 4 Hyetographs of the major storms of 1978 and 1980. (Bars 
represent rainfall for three-hour periods ending at times indicated; 
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FIGURE 5 Peak r a i n f a l l  i n t e n s i t i e s  recorded  a t  Tanbark F l a t  d u r i n g  
s e l e c t e d  t i m e  p e r i o d s  f o r  t h e  major storms o f  1980 and 1978. 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  1980 s to rm was over  t w i c e  a s  b i g  and e x h i b i t e d  much h i g h e r  
r a i n f a l l  i n t e n s i t i e s .  T h i s  is e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i n  B e l l  2. The B e l l  3 f i g u r e s  
show t h a t  peak r u n o f f  f o r  t h e  s to rm o f  February  27-March 4 ,  1978, was much 
lower ,  less t h a n  60 p e r c e n t  t h a t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  two s torms.  
Second, d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  per  c e n t i m e t e r  of r a i n f a l l * w a s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
h i g h e r  i n  1978 t h a n  i n  1980. Again, t h e  d a t a  f o r  B e l l  2 are p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s t r i k i n g .  When t h e  s i z e s  o f  t h e  t w o  storms are c o n s i d e r e d ,  sediment  
p r o d u c t i o n  ( c u b i c  meters of sediment  p e r  c e n t i m e t e r  o f  r a i n f a l l )  by t h e  s to rm 
o f  February  5-10, 1978, is a b o u t  t h r e e  times as g r e a t  a s  t h a t  i n  1980. The 
d i f f e r e n c e  found i n  B e l l  3 ,  even though bo th  1978 s t o r m s  are combined, is a l s o  
impress ive .  I f  t h e  o b s e r v e r s '  e s t i m a t e s  are a c c u r a t e ;  d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  by 
t h e  e a r l i e r  o f  t h e  1978 s t o r m s  a l o n e  would be  a lmos t  2-1/2 t imes  t h e  1980 
produc t ion .  Two views of t h e  B e l l  3 d e b r i s  b a s i n  i n  F i g u r e  6 show t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between 1976 and 1980 i n  d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  from t h a t  watershed.  
The e f f e c t  o f  t h e  1975 f l r e  In B e l l  2 appeared t o  be n e g l i g i b l e .  NO 
a p p r e c i a b l e  d e b r i s  production was no ted  i n  t h e  e r o s i o n  t r o u g h s  a f t e r  e i t h e r  
1978 s to rm ( s e e  F i g u r e  7:. 
TABLE 2 Peak Runoff and Sediment D e l i v e r y  from t h e  B e l l  Watersheds  ~ u r i n g  t h e  
Major Storms o f  1978 and 1980 
Storm 
a 
T o t a l  Sediment D e l i v e r y  
R a i n f a l l  Peak Runoff T o t a l  
( c m )  ( l i t e r  s/s) (cU m) (1) (2)  ( 3 )  
B e l l  2 (40 ha)  
Feb. 13-21! 1980 62.8 1,399 3 5 1  8.78 5.59 0.14 
Feb. 5-10, 1978 30.2 1,382 490 12.25 16.23 0.41 
B e l l  3 (25  ha)  
Feb. 13-21, 1980 62.8 599 2 6 8 10.72 4.27 0.17 
Feb. 5-10, 1978 30.2 335 
477 19.08 6.62 0.26 
Feb. 27-Mar. 4, 1978 41.9 564 
a(l) Cubic  m e t e r s  o f  sed iment  p e r  h e c t a r e ;  ( 2 )  c u b i c  meters o f  sediment  p e r  
c e n t i m e t e r  o f  r a i n f a l l ;  ( 3 )  c u b i c  m e t e r s  o f  sed iment  p e r  h e c t a r e  p e r  . 
c e n t i m e t e r  o f  r a i n f a l l .  
DISCUSSION 
While t h e  storm o f  February  13-21, 1980, was t h e  most s e v e r e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  
storms c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  it moved c o n s i d e r a b l y  less sediment .  T h i s  
is p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  i n  B e l l  2, where a 302-mm s t o r m  moved 1.4 times a s  much 
sed iment  as a storm over  twice i ts  s i z e  and i n t e n s i t y .  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  
t iming  o f  r a i n f a l l  a r e  n o t  g r e a t  enough t o  account  f o r  t h i s ,  and,  s i n c e  B e l l  3 
showed a s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  o f  sed iment  p r o d u c t i o n ,  r e s i d u a l  f i r e  e f f e c t s  c a n n o t  
f u l l y  account  f o r  it e i t h e r .  
The most p l a u s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e s e  r a t h e r  marked d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
sediment  d e l i v e r y  is t h a t  t h e r e  was c o n s i d e r a b l y  more sediment  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
movement i n  1978 t h a n  t h e r e  was i n  1980. Anderson e t  a l .  (1959) found t h a t  
wa te r sheds  i n  t h e  San G a b r i e l  f r o n t  e x h i b i t e d  r e c o g n i z a b l e  p a t t e r n s  o f  channe l  
f i l l i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  d r y  s e a s o n  and c h a n n e l  scour  d u r i n g  s to rms .  Krammes (1965) 
no ted  t h a t  channe l  f i l l i n g  o c c u r r e d  th roughout  t h e  y e a r  b u t  t h a t  c h a n n e l  scour  
o c c u r r e d  o n l y  d u r i n g  t h e  l a r g e r  storms. Because t h e  d e g r e e  o f  s c o u r  l a r g e l y  
depends on t h e  s i z e  o f  channe l  f lows ,  it would seem t h a t  a long-term c y c l e  o f  
f i l l i n g  and s c o u r i n g  a l s o  e x i s t s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  of major 
storms. Sediment t h a t  is p r o t e c t e d  from scour  d u r i n g  normal f l o w s  by armoring 
o f  t h e  bed may become v u l n e r a b l e  to s c o u r  by h i g h  f l o w s  t h a t  c a n  move l a r g e r  
p a r t i c l e s  and,  t h u s ,  t h e  s m a l l e r  p a r t i c l e s  s h i e l d e d  by them. 
IGURE 6 Views of Bell 3 debris basin in 1978 (top) and 1980 
bottom). Bell 3 had about one third of its capacity remaining aft 
.he 1980 storm but was completely filled by the 1978 storms. 
FIGURE 7 Debris trough on h i l l s l o p e  above t h e  B e l l  2 channel  a f t e r  
t h e  storm of February 5-10, 1978. T h i s  3-m-long t rough was i n s t a l l e d  
a f t e r  a f i r e  i n  1975 t o  monitor p o s t f i r e  e ros ion .  No s i g n i f i c a n t  
amounts o f  sediment were caught  i n  t h i s  trough a f t e r  January 1978. 
The trough was removed i n  1979. Note t h e  heavy g r a s s  and f o r b  cover ,  
which is t y p i c a l  of t h e  vege ta t ion  on B e l l  2. Since it was converted 
from chapa r ra l  t o  g r a s s  i n  1961, annual  sediment product ion from t h i s  
watershed has been about  2-1/4 times a s  g r e a t  a s  before  conversion.  
I f  t h i s  conclusion is c o r r e c t ,  sediment d e l i v e r y  f o r  a given storm should 
be r e l a t e d  to t h e  per iod  of  e lapsed  time between it and t h e  l a s t  p rev ious  
storm of  comparable o r  g r e a t e r  s i z e .  I t  is i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  note  t h a t  sediment 
d e l i v e r y  f o r  t h e  four  major storms of t h e  l a s t  50 yea r s  g e n e r a l l y  f i t s  t h i s  
p a t t e r n .  The s torms of  1969 y i e lded  t h e  most sediment,  a f t e r  an i n t e r v a l  o f  
3 1  yea r s  between major s torms (1938-69). The 1938 storm was second, a f t e r  an 
i n t e r v a l  of  22 yea r s  (1916-38). The year  1978 was t h i r d ,  wi th  a nine-year 
i n t e r v a l  (1969-78), and 1980 had o n l y  a two-year per iod  f o r  f r e s h  sediment t o  
collect i n  t h e  channels .  
FIRE EFFECTS 
A t  t h e  beginning of  t h e  s tudy  a synop t i c  assessment  was made of sediment 
movement along t h e  e n t i r e  San Gabr i e l  f r o n t ,  and t h e  e f f e c t  of  r ecen t  f i r e s  i n  
t h e  a r e a  between Arroyo Seco and t h e  San G a b r i e l  River was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s t r i k i n g .  Between 1977 and 1980 two major f i r e s ,  t h e  Mountain T r a i l  f i r e  o f  
October 1978 and t h e  P i n e c r e s t  f i r e  o f  September 1979, burned a l a r g e  p a r t  o f  
t h i s  a rea .  Records from 14 d e b r i s  bas ins  maintained by t h e  Los Angeles County 
Flood Con t ro l  Distr ict  were used t o  compare d e b r i s  product ion from t h i s  a r e a  
i n  1978 and 1980. 
The d a t a  from t h e s e  b a s i n s  a r e  summarized i n  Table 3 .  Sediment product ion 
from t h e  watersheds i n  t h i s  a r e a  f e l l  i n t o  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  groups, one of 
r e c e n t l y  burned watersheds and two of  unburned watersheds,  t h a t  corresponded 
t o  r a t h e r  well-defined s e c t i o n s  of t h e  mountain f r o n t .  Group 1 cons i s t ed  o f  
unburned watersheds between Arroyo Seco and Eaton Wash ( s e e  F igure  1). 
Sediment product ion from t h i s  group was about  t h r e e  t imes a s  g r e a t  i n  1978 a s  
i n  1980. Group 2 included t h e  watersheds between Eaton Wash and t h e  San 
G a b r i e l  River.  Sediment product ion from them w a s  t h r e e  t i m e s  a s  g r e a t  i n  1980 
a s  i n  1978, j u s t  t h e  r e v e r s e  of group 1. Group 3 cons i s t ed  of  watersheds i n  
both a r e a s  t h a t  had been t o t a l l y  burned i n  e i t h e r  1978 o r  1979. These burned 
watersheds produced 10 t imes a s  much sediment i n  1980 a s  i n  1978. They 
produced 5 t imes as much sediment a s  those  i n  group 2 and 17 t i m e s  a s  much 
sediment a s  those  i n  group 1. 
Of t h e  burned watersheds, Rubio and Las F l o r e s  a r e  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  group 1 
a r e a  and were burned i n  September 1979. The o t h e r  four  were loca t ed  i n  t h e  
group 2 a r e a ,  were burned i n  October 1978, and t h e r e f o r e  had a l r eady  been 
recover ing  f o r  one growing season before  t h e  1980 storm. Nevertheless ,  t h e r e  
was no apprec i ab le  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  d e b r i s  product ion among t h e  s i x  burned 
watersheds. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between f i r e s  and f looding  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  has  
been recognized f o r  over 50 yea r s  (Wells, 1981),  bu t  very  l i t t l e  work has  been 
done toward understanding t h e  processes  t h a t  cause  t h i s  p o s t f i r e  f looding.  
The f i r s t  comprehensive s tudy  of t h e  problem was done by Rowe e t  a l .  (1954) 
and, f o r  many a r e a s ,  p rovides  t h e  only  information on t h e  problem a v a i l a b l e  
today. C e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  of  t he  problem, such a s  t h e  occurrence  of  f i re- induced 
water - repe l len t  s o i l s ,  have been we l l  s t u d i e d  (DeBano, 1981; DeBano e t  a l . ,  
1979). Pre l iminary  s t u d i e s  of o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of  t h e  problem have a l s o  been 
made (Krammes, 1960; San Dimas S t a f f ,  1954; Davis,  1977; Wells,  1981; Wells 
and Brown, 1981),  b u t  d e t a i l e d  s t u d i e s  of  t h e  processes  involved have n o t  been 
done. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h i s  r e p o r t  we have examined t h e  major s torms of 1978 and 1980 and 
t h e i r  e f f e c t  on sediment movement i n  two smal l  catchments i n  t h e  e a s t e r n  San 
Gabr ie l  Mountains. W e  then  looked, b r i e f l y ,  a t  t h e  e f f e c t  of  r e c e n t  f i r e s  on 
sediment movement by t h e s e  same storms. From t h i s  b r i e f  s tudy  we can conclude 
t h a t  l a r g e  sediment movements a r e  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e l a t e d  t o  storm s i z e  but  
TABLE 3 Sediment P r o d u c t i o n  from Burned and Unburned Watersheds  i n  t h e  San 
G a b r i e l  F r o n t  Between Arroyo Seco and t h e  San G a b r i e l  River  
Watershed Name Area (ha )  
Sediment P r o d u c t i o n  
( C U  m/ha) 
1978 1980 
Group 1: Unburned wate r sheds  l o c a t e d  between Arroyo Seco and Ea ton  Wash 
Fern  7 8 72.0 21.1 
F a i r  Oaks 54 36.5 4.6 
West Ravine 65 41.9 17.9 
L inco ln  13 0 33.2 20.9 
Mean sediment  p r o d u c t i o n  ( c u  W h a )  45.9 
S tandard  d e v i a t i o n  o f  sample ( c u  m/ha) 15.4 
S tandard  d e v i a t i o n  as % of  t h e  mean 33.5 
Group 2: Unburned wate r sheds  l o c a t e d  between Eaton Wash and t h e  San 





Mean sediment  p r o d u c t i o n  (cu  m/ha) 16.7 59.4 
S tandard  d e v i a t i o n  o f  sample (cu  m/ha) 13.7 14.9 
S tandard  d e v i a t i o n  as % o f  t h e  mean 82.2 25.1 
Group 3: Burned wate r sheds  l o c a t e d  i n  a r e a s  covered  by bo th  g roups  1 and 2 
C a r t e r  3 1 
(burned 1978) 




B a i l e y  155 
(burned 1978) I 
Rubio 326 
(burned 1979) 
Las F l o r e s  116 
(burned 1979) 
Mean sediment  p r o d u c t i o n  ( c u  m/ha) 27.1 278.0 
S tandard  d e v i a t i o n  o f  sample ( c u  W h a )  14.8 102.1 
S tandard  d e v i a t i o n  as % o f  t h e  mean 54.5 36.7 
seem td be relaked to several factors. Two of these factors would be the 
amount of sediment available for movement in stream channels and the immediate 
fire history of the area. It is probable that the former is strongly 
influenced by the latter. 
We have seen an example of a relatively small (though still quite severe) 
storm moving more sediment than a much larger storm and an example of the 
tremendous effect that brushfires in southern California can have on sediment 
production. Although possible explanations for these phenomena can be 
offered, direct proof is lacking and it is clear that we have only a 
superficial understanding of the sedimentation processes that occur on natural 
watersheds. In particular, we do not really understand the exact role of the 
various hillslope processes in supplying sediment to natural channels, nor do 
we +understand how their dominance may change over time. It appears that a 
large percentage of sediment is supplied by a very small percentage of the 
total area, but sediment budget studies to confirm or refute this are not yet 
available. The effects of fire are only beginning to be understood, but it 
appears that a unique set of erosional processes dominate the postfire 
environment; more work is needed to understand them fully. Mudflows are 
common in California's mountainous areas, but relatively little is known about 
their causes or mechanics of movement. 
Erosion and sediment movement in the arid West are driven by extreme 
events like the storms of 1978 and 1980. The more frequent, lower-intensity 
events that tend to dominate in humid regions have a much lesser effect here. 
Our methods for dealing with such events are not perfect, and some practices, 
such as seeding steep slopes to grass, may not always be appropriate. A 
better understanding of the underlying processes will help us deal more 
effectively with these events and their consequences. 
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RARE AND UNUSUAL POSTFIRE FLOOD EVENTS EXPERIENCED 
IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY DURING 1978 and 1980 
by J. Daniel Davis 
Several areas i n  Los Angeles County experienced extreme floods during 
the storms of 1978 and 1980. In  most cases the most important factor 
determining the severity of the floods was the f i re  history of the area. 
Much of the debris deposited i n  debris basins can be direct ly  attributed 
t o  burned watersheds. 
This paper examines flood events i n  four separate locations--Hidden 
Springs, Zachau Canyon, Shields ~anydn, and Rubio Canyon. In a l l  four 
cases the flood waters came largely from areas that had been recently 
burned. These events havs an estimated return period of 200 t o  1,000 
years. 
Los Angeles County comprises a land area of approximately 4,000 square 
miles (10,000 sq km). Forty-seven percent of the area is mountainous, the 
remainder being alluvial valleys and coastal plains. Storms and subsequent 
flooding usually occur during the winter storm season. Periodically 
throughout the history of Los Angeles County, major flooding has occurred due 
to heavy winter rains. 
The major factors in the degree of damage incurred in 1978 and 1980 were 
the Mill fire of November 1975, the Village fire of November 1975, the Middle 
Fork fire of July 1977, and the Pinecrest fire of September 1979. These fires 
consumed 208 square miles (539 sq km) of watershed above, urban areds or above 
dams and debris basins owned and operated by the Los Angeles County Flood 
Control District. Table 1 summarizes the extent of these fires and Figure 1 
shows their locations. 
The primary impact of the storms of 1978 and 1980 was in the foothills and 
mountains. Due to the degree of drainage improvements in Los Angeles County, 
and to the fact that storm intensities were generally less than the design 
level of the systems, flooding in urban areas was held to a low level. Table 
2 summarizes the damages to public facilities for each storm year. The 
J. Daniel Davis is Head of the Operations Section, Hydraulic Division, 
with the Los Angeles County Flood Control District in Los Angeles, California. 
TABLE 1 F i r e s  C o n t r i b u t i n g  to  Storm Damages o f  1978 and 1980 
Name Date  o f  Burn 
Area Burned 
Square  Square  
Miles Kilometers 
M i l l  f i r e  
V i l l a g e  f i r e  
Middle Fork f i r e  
Kanan (Malibu) f i r e  
Mandev i l l e  f i r e  
Sage f i r e  
P i n e c r e s t  f i r e  
T o t a l  
November 1975 70.3 
November 1975 31.2 
J u l y  1977 5.9 
October 1978 39.1  
October 1978 8.4 
September 197 9 45.3 
September 1979 8.3 
208.5 
m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  damage i n  f o o t h i l l  a r e a s  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  c l e a n o u t  costs 
i n c u r r e d  i n  removing d e b r i s  from d e b r i s  b a s i n s  and emergency s t r u c t u r e s  b u i l t  
t o  c o n t r o l  runof f  from burned wate r sheds .  
The s t o r m  of February  9-10, 1978, r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  major damages o f  t h e  
1978 s t o r m  season.  R a i n f a l l  r e c o r d s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a n  i n t e n s e  ce l l  o f  r a i n  
c r o s s e d  a s t r i p  o f  t h e  county.  I t  s t a r t e d  a t  S a n t a  Monica and moved n o r t h e a s t  
a c r o s s  San Fernando V a l l e y ,  t h e  w e s t e r n  h a l f  of t h e  S a n t a  Monica Mountains,  
through t h e  Sunland-Tujunga a r e a ,  and i n t o  t h e  Big Tujunga watershed.  The 
ce l l  d i s s i p a t e d  h i g h  i n  t h e  San G a b r i e l  Mountains n e a r  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  ' 
Hidden S p r i n g s  d i s a s t e r .  R a i n f a l l  r e c o r d s  and o t h e r  e v i d e n c e  show t h a t  t h e  
cel l  sti l l  c o n t a i n e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  r a i n  a s  it passed  t h e  Middle Fork 
Canyon above Hidden S p r i n g s .  F i g u r e  2 shows t h e  p a t h  and r e c u r r e n c e  i n t e r v a l  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h i s  c e l l  and l o c a t e s  t h e  a r e a s  o f  major problems d i s c u s s e d  i n  
t h i s  paper .  
TABLE 2 Damage t o  P u b l i c  F a c i l i t i e s  During 1978 and 1980 
Storm Year 
Damage i n  F o o t h i l l s  Damage i n  Urban 











Kanan (Malibu) 10178 
Mandervi 1: e ? O /  78 
Sage 9/79 
Pinecres t 9/79 
FIGURE 1 Major fires during the period 1975-79. 
FIGURE 2 P a t h  o f  t h e  February  1 0 ,  1978, storm. 
DEBRIS PRODUCTION 
The t o t a l  d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  t h e  1978 and 1980 storm s e a s o n s  is g i v e n  
i n  T a b l e  3 .  Table  4 g i v e s  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  amounts f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  d e b r i s  
b a s i n s .  
Watershed b u r n s  were a  major c a u s e  o f  d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  storm 
y e a r s .  Of t h e  t o t a l  o f  2,250,000 c u  yd (1,720,000 c u  m) o f  d e b r i s  d e p o s i t e d  
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TABLE 3 Debris Prqduction During the 1978 and 1980 Storm Seasons 
Debris Production 
Season Debris Basins (cu yd) a Dams (cu yd) a Total (cu ydla 
a~igures in parentheses give the production amounts in cubic meters. 
in district debris basins in 1978 and 1980, 900,000 cu yd (688,000 cu m) can 
be directly attributed to watershed burns. 
The impact of a burn can best be seen from Figure 3. The graph shows the 
unit rate of production for the debris basins as a function of watershed 
area. It is obvious from the plot that almost every large event was due to a 
burned watershed. From Figure 3 it is difficult to generalize any 
relationship between debris production and watershed area. It is interesting 
to note that the median burned-area production (26,240 cu m/sq km) exceeds the 
median unburned-area production (4,220 cu m/sq km) by a factor of 6.2. 
HIDDEN SPRINGS 
Deep in the San Gabriel Mountains, above the Sunland-Tujunga area, is a 
small resort area called Hidden Springs. The area is used as a camping and 
recreational escape from the city. A couple of small restaurants, a gas 
station, a swimming pool, campsites, and other improvements associated with 
mountainous recreation areas dot the canyon floor. 
In July 1977 a fire occurred above Hidden Springs, resulting in the 
complete burn of Middle Fork Canyon, a 2,440-acre (9.87-sq-km) watershed. On 
February 8, 9, and 10, 1978, rainfall in the Big Tujunga watershed resulted in 
torrential runoff out of Middle Fork Canyon. The flow rate at the mouth of 
the canyon was estimated to be 9,000 cu ft/s (255 cu 4s). The flow was 
described by an observer as a wall of water 30 ft high (9 m). Actual cross 
sections indicated a maximum depth of flow of about 15 ft (4.5 m). 
Middle Fork Canyon is 25 percent of the total watershed area above Hidden 
Springs, which amounts to 10,000 acres (41.0 sq km). However, because of the 
watershed burn, estimates indicate that 97 percent of the peak flow that 
inundated Hidden Springs was due to the Middle Fork fire. 
The damage toll in Hidden Springs was nearly complete for all facilities 
on or near the bottom of the canyon. Several people camping in the area were 
never found and were presumed swept away by the flood. 
TABLE 4 Debris Production for Individual Debris Basins During the 1978 and 1980 Storm Seasons 
Debris Production 
Watershed 1978 1980 
Area Cu Yd/ Cu M/ I n  Terms Cu Yd/ Cu M/ I n  Terms 
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FIGURE 3 Debris production rates during 1978 and 1980. 
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The floodw,ave t h a t  swept  th rough  Hidden S p r i n g s  w a s  o f  t h e  magnitude o f  
t h e  d e s i g n  f l d o d .  However, t h e  p o t e n t i a l  power o f  t h e  watershed was n o t  
t e s t e d .  One wonders what e v e n t  would have r e s u l t e d  i f  t h e  storm had o c c u r r e d  
i n  1980, when t h e  e n t i r e  wa te r shed  above Hidden S p r i n g s  was i n  a burned 
c o n d i t i o n .  
ZACHAU CANYON 
Zachau Canyon is a 0.58-square-mile (1.50-sq-km) wate r shed  l o c a t e d  above 
Sunland. The wate r shed  was comple te ly  burned by t h e  M i l l  f i r e  o f  November 
1975. The r e s i d e n t i a l  development a t  t h e  mouth o f  t h e  canyon and i n  t h e  lower 
wa te r shed  is p r o t e c t e d  by s e v e r a l  f l o o d  c o n t r o l  improvements, i n c l u d i n g  a 
d e b r i s  b a s i n  and improved channe l .  
The Zachau d e b r i s  b a s i n  was c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  1956 to  keep d e b r i s - l a d e n  
f l o o d f l o w  from e n t e r i n g  i n t o  t h e  r a p i d l y  deve lop ing  f l o o d p l a i n  below t h e  
canyon. The p e r i o d  from t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  b a s i n  u n t i l  1978 saw few 
n o t a b l e  e v e n t s  recorded  a t  t h e  b a s i n .  The 1969 storm produced e r o s i o n  r a t e s  
o f  19,000 c u  yd/square  m i l e  (8,600 c u  m/sq km), a n  a v e r a g e  d e b r i s  runof f  f o r  
t h a t  storm. 
The 1978 s t o r m  ce l l  d e s c r i b e d  above h i t  Zachau Canyon and g e n e r a t e d  a 
r u n o f f  e v e n t  t h a t  caused  widespread damages i n  t h e  watershed.  The f i r s t  
improvement i n  t h e  canyon is a road (Seven H i l l s  D r i v e )  c r o s s i n g .  The c u l v e r t  
under t h e  r o a d  was plugged by a s i n g l e  bou lder  6 to  7 f t  (1.8 t o  2 .1  m )  i n  
d iamete r .  Once t h e  c u l v e r t  plugged, f l o w  inunda ted  t h e  roadway and proceeded 
downstream i n t o  t h e  d e b r i s  bas in .  The most d r a m a t i c  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  s t o r m  was 
a n  8 - f t  (2.4-m) d iamete r  bou lder  t h a t  was d e p o s i t e d  on  Seven H i l l s  Dr ive .  
I t  is b e l i e v e d  t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  d e b r i s  had been d e p o s i t e d  a t  t h e  Zachau 
d e b r i s  b a s i n  p r i o r  to t h e  peak f low t o  d e c r e a s e  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  d e b r i s  
b a s i n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  The floodwave went th rough  t h e  dam as i f  it were n o t  
t h e r e .  The s u r g e  was l a r g e  enough to crest t h e  dam. 
Immediate ly  downstream o f  t h e  d e b r i s  b a s i n  t h e  improved channe l  is open 
and r e c e s s e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  r each .  Flow th rough  t h e  b a s i n  l e f t  t h e  c h a n n e l  b u t  
was c o n t a i n e d  by t h e  c h a n n e l  way. Overflow e s t i m a t e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  
f l o o d  magnitude was abou t  twice t h e  c h a n n e l  c a p a c i t y .  The c h a n n e l  was 
des igned  to  c o n t a i n  t h e  r u n o f f  from a s t o r m  hav ing  a 50-year i n t e n s i t y .  
The major damages o c c u r r e d  when t h e  open c h a n n e l  went underground. 
Although t h e  underground d r a i n  f u n c t i o n e d ,  it c o u l d  n o t  a c c e p t  a l l  t h e  f low. 
Excess  f l o w  c r o s s e d  t h e  highway and e n t e r e d  t h e  urban a r e a .  From where t h e  
f low l e f t  t h e  improved c h a n n e l  t o  t h e  n e x t  adequa te  c o l l e c t i o n  p o i n t  is a 
d i s t a n c e  o f  a b o u t  7,000 f t  (2,130 m ) .  Between t h e  two p o i n t s  t h e  a r e a  is 
t o t a l l y  urbanized.  
Below t h e  open c h a n n e l  t h e  f low s p l i t  and took t w o  p a t h s .  One r o u t e  was 
t o  t h e  wes t ,  down a s t reet  named Wentworth, and t h e  o t h e r  was t o  t h e  
nor thwes t ,  down and a c r o s s  s e v e r a l  streets. Approximately  50 r e s i d e n c e s  a long  
each p a t h  o f  f low e x p e r i e n c e d  damages. 
During t h e  1978 storm year  141,800 c u  yd/square  m i l e  (41,860 c u  m/sq km) 
o f  d e b r i s  was d e p o s i t e d  i n  t h e  Zachau d e b r i s  b a s i n ,  I n c l u d i n g  d e b r i s  t h a t  
passed  through t h e  sys tem,  it is e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  t h e  e r o s i o n  r a t e  o f  t h e  burned 
watershed d u r i n g  t h e  1978 s e a s o n  was 200,000 c u  yd/square  m i l e  (59,000 c u  m/sq 
km). T h i s  r a t e  is e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  loss o f  2.3 i n .  (5.9 c m )  o f  s o i l  from t h e  
watershed.  
SHIELDS CANYON 
S h i e l d s  Canyon is a 0.23-square-mile (0.60-sq-km) wate r shed  above La 
Crescen ta .  The canyon is ex t remely  s t e e p ,  r i s i n g  from a n  e l e v a t i o n  o f  2,600 
f t  (790 m) t o  4,050 f t  (1,230 m) i n  o n l y  3,500 f t  (1,070 m ) ,  a g r a d e  of  4 1  
p e r c e n t .  Average s i d e s l o p e  g r a d e s  a r e  100 p e r c e n t .  
Development i n  t h e  1960s  encroached i n t o  t h i s  a r e a ,  l e a p f r o g g i n g  an  
e x i s t i n g  d e b r i s  b a s i n  and f i l l i n g  t h e  mouth o f  t h e  canyon. To p r o t e c t  t h e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  t h e  development,  a s m a l l  d e b r i s  b a s i n  and a n  
improved c o n c r e t e  c h a n n e l  were c o n s t r u c t e d  t o  convey f lows  through t h e  
development to o l d  d e b r i s  b a s i n s .  
The s t o r m  of  February  9-10, 1978, r e s u l t e d  i n  a tremendous s u r g e  o f  
m a t e r i a l  o u t  o f  t h e  canyon. The f l o w  q u i c k l y  f i l l e d  t h e  upper d e b r i s  b a s i n .  
A t  t h e  peak o f  t h e  s to rm,  r o c k s  and b o u l d e r s  were c a r r i e d  o u t  o f  t h e  canyon 
through t h e  dam and i n t o  t h e  improved d r a i n .  The peak f low r a t e  exceeded 
s p i l l w a y  c a p a c i t y ,  send ing  some flow down t h e  a c c e s s  road  o n t o  P i n e  Cone 
Avenue below. 
The major problem o c c u r r e d  when a 6 - f t  (1.8-m) bou lder  c a r r i e d  by t h e  
f l o o d f l o w  clogged t h e  d r a i n  and f o r c e d  a l l  f low o n t o  t h e  street.  P i n e  Cone 
Avenue r u n s  n o r t h  and s o u t h ,  g e n e r a l l y  p a r a l l e l i n g  t h e  n a t u r a l  channe l .  The 
g r a d e  o f  t h e  road is s t e e p  and t h e  road  h a s  s e v e r a l  curves .  Houses have been 
c o n s t r u c t e d  on  both  s i d e s  o f  t h e  s treet .  
On February  9,  1978, t h e  f low t h a t  e n t e r e d  P i n e  Cone Avenue from t h e  
plugged d r a i n  cou ld  n o t  be  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  s treets .  A t  t h e  f i r s t  c u r v e  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  f low l e f t  t h e  s t reet  and went through a p r i v a t e  
r e s i d e n c e ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  damage to t h e  p r o p e r t y .  A s  t h e  f low 
worked its way down t h e  s t reet ,  homes on t h e  c u r v e s  o r  below ground l e v e l  were 
inundated.  
The most s p e c t a c u l a r  damage was t o  a r e s i d e n c e  a t  t h e  end o f  P i n e  Cone 
Avenue immediately above t h e  o l d  d e b r i s  bas in .  The house  b l o c k s  t h e  p a t h  o f  
f l o w  from e n t e r i n g  t h e  o l d  d e b r i s  b a s i n .  During t h e  s t o r m  s e v e r a l  automobi les  
were p i c k e d  up by t h e  l a r g e  mudflow and swept down t h e  s t r e e t  t o  t h e  house.  
F i g u r e  4 shows what t h e  f l o o d  e v e n t  d i d  t o  t h i s  r e s i d e n c e .  
The d e b r i s  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  S h i e l d s  Canyon d u r i n g  t h e  1978 s t o r m  s e a s o n  was 
measured t o  be 117,000 c u  yd/square  m i l e  (34,500 c u  m/sq km). The t o t a l  
amount o f  d e b r i s  produced by t h e  1978 s t o r m  i n  S h i e l d s  Canyon was n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t  to f i l l  t h e  lower d e b r i s  b a s i n .  I f  t h e  c h a n n e l  through t h e  
developed a r e a  had f u n c t i o n e d ,  i t  is l i k e l y  t h a t  l i t t l e  or no damage would 
have been i n c u r r e d .  
FIGURE 4 Storm damage a t  2824 Markr idge Road. 
RUB10 CANYON 
Rubio Canyon is a  1.26-square-mile (3.26-sq-km) wate r shed  l o c a t e d  above 
t h e  Al tadena  a r e a  n e a r  Pasadena.  The a r e a  is one o f  t h e  o l d e r  developed 
s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  county.  The f i r s t  f l o o d  c o n t r o l  improvements were c o n s t r u c t e d  
i n  t h e  1930s ,  and p e r i o d i c  improvements have been added a s  r e q u i r e d .  F i g u r e  5 
shows t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  Rubio d r a i n a g e  sys tem and t h e  inunda t ion  a r e a .  
Las  F l o r e s  Canyon, a  t r i b u t a r y  t o  ~ u b i o  Canyon, is c o n t r o l l e d  by a  d e b r i s  
b a s i n  c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  1936. The Rubio d e b r i s  b a s i n  was c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  1946. 
Rubio Wash, t h e  c h a n n e l  below t h e  b a s i n ,  w a s  c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  t h e  1920s.  
However, due  t o  t h e  inadequacy o f  t h e  wash, a n o t h e r  c h a n n e l  c a l l e d  Rubio 
D i v e r s i o n  was completed by t h e  Corps o f  E n g i n e e r s  i n  1959. The Corps '  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  invo lved  i n t e r c e p t i n g  f low below t h e  Rubio d e b r i s  b a s i n  and 
t r a n s p o r t i n g  it to Eaton Wash, a  p a r a l l e l  d r a i n a g e  sys tem to t h e  e a s t  o f  Rubio. 
The Rubio d r a i n a g e  system f u n c t i o n e d  w i t h  no problem u n t i l  t h e  1980 s to rm 
season.  During one  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s t o r m s  i n  1980, sed iment  f low o u t  o f  t h e  
Rubio d e b r i s  b a s i n  d e p o s i t e d  and c logged  a  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  Rubio Divers ion  
channe l .  Subsequent  storms r e s u l t e d  i n  r e p e a t e d  d e p o s i t i o n  and f i l l i n g  o f  t h e  
c h a n n e l  due t o  f l o w s  o u t  o f  bo th  Rubio and Gooseberry  canyons,  u n t i l  f i n a l l y ,  
on February  15 ,  1980, t h e  c h a n n e l  c logged  c o m p l e t e l y  and f low was f o r c e d  
o v e r l a n d  i n t o  t h e  r e s i d e n t i a l  a r e a ,  
FIGURE 5 The Rubio Canyon dra inage  system and t h e  a r e a s  inundated by 
t h e  1980 storms. 
Two f a c t o r s  con t r ibu ted  to t h e  d e b r i s  depos i t i on  problem. F i r s t ,  i n  
September 1979 t h e  Rubio watershed burned a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  P i n e c r e s t  f i r e .  
Second, t h e  i n v e r t  g rades  of t h e  Rubio Diversion channel  were s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
decreased from t h e  n a t u r a l  g rad ien t .  Forcing t h e  flow o u t  of i ts  n a t u r a l  
waterway and a c r o s s  t o  t h e  much l a r g e r  Eaton Canyon channel  r equ i r ed  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of s e v e r a l  reaches  of channel  wi th  a grade  of  one percent .  
When t h e  debris- laden runoff  from t h e  burned watershed m e t  t h e  reaches  of 
decreased grades ,  t h e  flow l o s t  energy and depos i t i on  occurred u n t i l  t h e  
channel  plugged. 
a 
Damage from the overflow of Rubio Diversion was considerable. 
Approximately 30 homes were inundated and several automobiles were destroyed. 
Damages were recorded more than a mile downstream of the Rubio debris basin. 
The debris production from Rubio Canyon of 85,000 cu yd/square mile 
(25,000 cu m/sq km) was less than the capacity of the debris basin. Much of 
the debris that contributed to the obstruction on February 15, 1980, came from 
Gooseberry Canyon. The small debris control structure in Gooseberry Canyon 
was filled by the storm runoff, sending a significant amount of material 
downstream to the Rubio Diversion channel. 
SUMMARY 
' The storms of 1978 and 1980 resulted in major damage to the private and 
public sectors of Los Angeles County. 
The high-intensity rainfall over the county and the previous watershed 
burns combined to create several extreme floods. Although mudflows in general 
are not rare and unusual in Los Angeles County, they are when an individual 
location is considered. Most of the events discussed in this paper are 
estimated to have approximately a 200- to 1,000-year level of recurrence. 

THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY FLOOD EXPERIENCE I N  STORMS OF 1978 AND 1980 
by James M. Stubchaer 
The experience of the Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water 
Conservation Distr ict  during the 1978 and 1980 floods i s  discussed. Along 
the Santa Maria River, levees constructed by the Corps of  Engineers i n  the 
early 1960s incurred partial failure. More complete failures, with the 
probability of costly local damage, were averted largely through the 
operation of  levee patrol teams that ident i f ied  weakened areas and implemented 
makeshift repairs. Experience from these flood years has helped ident i fy  
needed improvements i n  t h i s  flood patrol system. 
On the Santa Ynez River, a flood warning system developed ZoeaZZy was 
used t o  iden t i f y  potential flood kaards  based on a real-time anaZysis of 
ra in fa l l  data. This modeling e f for t  proved accurate i n  predicting fZoodfZows 
i n  1978. Since 1978 t h i s  system has been improved upon and extended i n  
geographic coverage. 
Reclamation on the Sycamore Canyon watershed, which burned i n  July 1977, 
i s  also discussed. Poststorm observations indicate that  these e f for t s  were 
e f f ec t i ve  i n  reducing potentially severe flood damage on and below t h i s  
watershed. 
INTRODUCTION 
T h i s  paper d i s c u s s e s  t h e  experience o f  t h e  Santa  Barbara County Flood 
Con t ro l  and Water Conservat ion District wi th  t h r e e  f a c i l i t i e s  dur ing  t h e  1978 
and 1980 f loods .  
SANTA MARIA RIVER LEVEES 
The C i t y  o f  Santa  Maria and t h e  surrounding r i c h  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l ands  are 
loca t ed  i n  t h e  f l o o d p l a i n  of t h e  Santa Maria River (F igure  1). The r i v e r  
flows wes t e r ly  t o  t h e  P a c i f i c  Ocean i n  a channel  vary ing  i n  width from 1,400 
t o  2,200 f t .  I n  1960-62 t h e  Corps of  Engineers  cons t ruc t ed  t h e  Santa Maria 
James M. Stubchaer is Engineer-Manager wi th  t h e  Santa  Barbara County Flood 
Con t ro l  and Water Conservat ion District i n  Santa  Barbara,  C a l i f o r n i a .  

River l evees  to  p r o t e c t  t h e  Santa Maria Val ley.  The l e v e e s  a r e  l oca t ed  o n  a 
deep sandy al luvium and c o n s i s t  o f  an e a r t h  embankment p ro t ec t ed  from e ros ion  
by a rock fac ing  18 in.  t h i c k  on t h e  r i v e r  side. T h i s  rock f ac ing  ex tends  to 
a depth  o f  15  to  16 f t  below t h e  r i v e r  bed (F igu re  2 ) .  
w 
LEVEE SECTION - LEFT BANK 
STA 704 + 00 TO STA 950 +00 
FIGURE 2 Santa  Maria River levees .  
I n  o rde r  t o  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  rock f ac ing  below ground, it was necessary t o  
excavate  and b a c k f i l l  a t r apezo ida l  pr ism on t h e  r i v e r  side. I n  many reaches  
t h e  n a t i v e  soil had some degree of  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  e r o s i o n  and sediment 
t r anspor t .  The b a c k f i l l  has  v i r t u a l l y  no  cohesion and is e a s i l y  eroded. 
The l e v e e s  a r e  designed f o r  a s tandard  p r o j e c t  f loodflow o f  150,000 to 
160,000 cu ft/s. The maximum flows experienced s i n c e  t h e i r  completion have 
been 30,000 cu ft/s i n  1966, 25,000 cu ft/s i n  1969, 22,000 cu  f t / s  i n  1978, 
and 8,000 cu f t / s  i n  1980. The l evees  have performed a s  planned as long as 
t h e  main c u r r e n t s  o f  flow i n  t h e  r i v e r  were p a r a l l e l  wi th  t h e  levees.  There 
have been problems of  s eve re  undercut t ing  and l e v e e  e ros ion ,  however, where 
t h e  main c u r r e n t s  have impinged on t h e  l e v e e  a t  an  apprec i ab le  angle.  Th i s  
was f i r s t  experienced i n  1966 near t h e  downstream end o f  t h e  south  bank levee ,  
where t h e  main c u r r e n t  c rossed  from nor th  t o  south  and impinged on  t h e  levee  
a t  80 degrees.  The r e s u l t i n g  extreme cu rva tu re  o f  s t r eaml ines  caused 
supe re l eva t ion  o f  t h e  water s u r f a c e  and s p i r a l  flow, which undercut t h e  rock 
fac ing -and  caused two crescent-shaped slumps o f  t h e  r i p r a p  (F igure  3 ) .  
S i m i l a r ,  bu t  more severe ,  problems were experienced a t  s e v e r a l  l o c a t i o n s  
on t h e  l e v e e s  i n  1969. The worst  problem w a s  j u s t  downstream o f  t h e  Bradley 
Canyon confluence e a s t  o f  Santa  f aria, where t h e  rock f ac ing  was l o s t  f o r  
s e v e r a l  hundred f e e t  and a breach was prevented o n l y  by prompt f lood  f i g h t i n g  
e f f o r t s .  The dozing of  e a r t h  a g a i n s t  t h e  back s i d e  o f  t h e  l evee  and the  
dumping of l a r g e  rock (F igure  4 )  i n t o  t h e  eroded a r e a  were e f f e c t i v e  i n  
maintaining t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of  t h e  levee.  A breach a t  t h i s  l o c a t i o n  would have 
r e s u l t e d  i n  f l ood ing  of  t h e  c i t y .  
FIGURE 3 Slump i n  south  l e v e e  of  t h e  Santa Maria River r e s u l t i n g  from 
flow impinging bank a t  approximately 80 degrees  dur ing  1966 f lood.  
The problems with t h e  l evee  demonstrated t h e  need f o r  l evee  p a t r o l s  and 
preparedness  f o r  emergencies. A Telemark te lemet ry  u n i t  was added t o  an 
e x i s t i n g  s t ream gage j u s t  upstream of  t h e  l e v e e s  s o  t h a t  gage h e i g h t s  could be 
determined by telephone. Levee p a t r o l  teams, inc luding  personnel  from s e v e r a l  
county departments,  were organized and t r a ined .  Rock was s t o c k p i l e d  so t h a t  
it would be a v a i l a b l e  when needed. Arrangements were made with t h e  C i t y  of 
Santa Maria and p r i v a t e  c o n t r a c t o r s  f o r  quick response to c a l l s  f o r  men and 
equipment. The c i t y  organized c i v i l  defense planning based on a l evee  f a i l u r e .  
A major i tem i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g  o f  l e v e e  p a t r o l l e r s  was t h e  r ecogn i t i on  of  
c u r r e n t  impingement. Main c u r r e n t s  i n  t h e  r i v e r  a r e  v i s i b l e  by t h e  
l igh t -co lored  foam t h a t  i n v a r i a b l y  e x i s t s .  When c u r r e n t  impingement is  
observed, one p a t r o l l e r  goes down t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e  l evee  with a s a f e t y  rope t o  
check f o r  missing rock a t  t h e  water sur face .  I t  is almost  impossible  t o  
observe t h i s  from a p a t r o l  veh ic l e ,  because t h e  view of  t h e  p a t r o l l e r  is 
tangent  with t h e  rock f ac ing  (F igure  5 ) .  F a i l u r e s  begin a t  t h e  toe o f  t h e  
rock, some 15 f t  below t h e  s u r f a c e ,  and p rog res s  upward l i k e  a r i s i n g  moon. 
By t h e  time a f a i l u r e  is v i s i b l e ,  it is a l r eady  a s e r i o u s  problem. 
I n  1980 a p a t r o l  d i d  d iscover  a f a i l u r e  a t  t h e  Bradley Canyon confluence 
a t  1 a.m. Emergency p l a n s  were p u t  i n t o  a c t i o n  and emergency r e p a i r  work was 
completed by 7 a.m. 
FIGURE 4 Rock being dumped on face of levee just downstream of 
Bradley Canyon to prevent breakout and flooding sf Santa Maria dur 
,1969 flood. 
FIGURE 5 Impingement of flow on dike. 
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I n  summary, it is be l ieved  t h a t  t h e  most important  f a c t o r s  i n  d e a l i n g  with 
t h e  Santa Maria River l evee  problems are :  
1. Awareness of  t h e  problem 
2. Twenty-four-hour l evee  p a t r o l s  when flows exceed 5,000 cu f t / s  
3 .  Having rock s t o c k p i l e d  f o r  emergencies 
4. Being a b l e  t o  doze e a r t h  from t h e  a r e a  behind t h e  l e v e e  
The permanent s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  l evee  problems is t h e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  p r o j e c t  
t h a t  t h e  Corps of Engineers  w i l l  cons t ruc t .  I t  c o n s i s t s  mainly o f  bu i ld ing  
rock g r o i n s  perpendicular  t o  t h e  l evee  i n  a r e a s  of  c u r r e n t  impingement. These 
g r o i n s  w i l l  p revent  h igh-ve loc i ty  flow ad jacen t  t o  t h e  levee.  Cons t ruc t ion  is 
expected t o  begin i n  e a r l y  1981. 
SANTA YNEZ RIVER FLOOD WARNING SYSTEM 
The Santa Ynez River flows from t h e  Ventura County l i n e  on t h e  e a s t  t o  t h e  
P a c i f i c  Ocean a t  Vandenberg A i r  Force Base on t h e  west. The upper watershed 
r ece ives  t h e  h i g h e s t  r a i n f a l l  amounts i n  Santa  Barbara County. There a r e  
t h r e e  dams i n  t h e  watershed: J u n c a l  and G i b r a l t a r  a r e  smal l  (9,000 a c r e - f t )  
and Cachuma is l a r g e  (205,000 a c r e - f t ) .  None has  dedica ted  f lood  c o n t r o l  
s torage .  The r i v e r  is f a i r l y  we l l  conf ined  upstream o f  t h e  Lompoc Valley.  
There is a major f l o o d p l a i n  w e s t  o f  t h e  C i t y  of  Lompoc, which inc ludes  some 
f a c i l i t i e s  of South Vandenberg A i r  Force Base. 
I n  1969 t h e r e  were two major f l oods  t h a t  inundated t h e  Lompoc Val ley  
(F igure  6 ) ,  caus ing  damage i n  t h e  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s .  People were t rapped by 
t h e  r i s i n g  waters ,  and t h e r e  were many r e scues  (F igure  7 ) .  I t  was apparent  
t h a t  people and l i v e s t o c k  could have been evacuated i n  advance o f  t h e  f looding  
and t h a t  proper ty  damage could have been p a r t i a l l y  mi t iga t ed  i f  t h e r e  had been 
t imely  and be l i evab le  e a r l y  warnings of  impending f looding.  Therefore  t h e  
Santa Barbara Flood Con t ro l  and Water Conservat ion D i s t r i c t  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  
Santa Ynez River Flood warning System. 
A f l ood  warning system c o n s i s t s  of t h r e e  main elements.  
1. Warning o r i g i n a t i o n  
2.  Warning d isseminat ion  
3 .  Response and a c t i o n  by r e c e i v e r s  of  warnings 
The Flood Cont ro l  D i s t r i c t  i n s t a l l e d  a te lemet ry  system t o  be used f o r  
e a r l y  warnings and hydrologic  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n .  There a r e  r a i n  gages a t  
s e v e r a l  l o c a t i o n s ,  water l e v e l  s enso r s  on t h e  t h r e e  r e s e r v o i r s  and t h e  r i v e r ,  
and sp i l lway g a t e  p o s i t i o n  i n d i c a t o r s  on G i b r a l t a r  and Cachuma. These senso r s  
a r e  connected t o  16-channel d i g i t a l  encoders  and sending u n i t s  t h a t  were 
custom designed and b u i l t  t o  d i s t r i c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  The d a t a  a r e  s e n t  a t  
very h igh  r a t e s  over phone l i n e s  o r  microwaves t o  t h e  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e ,  where 
t h e  d a t a  a r e  decoded and e i t h e r  p r i n t e d  on a t e l e t y p e  o r  f e d  i n t o  a 
minicomputer f o r  processing.  Inf low and outf low a t  t h e  t h r e e  r e s e r v o i r s  a r e  
c a l c u l a t e d  d i r e c t l y  from t h e  da t a .  These flow d a t a  a lone  al low a six-hour 
f lood  warning f o r  t h e  Lompoc Valley.  
FIGURE 6 Inundated a r e a s  i n  Lompoc Val ley  by f looding  from Santa 
Ynez River i n  1969. 
FIGURE 7 Rescue ope ra t ions  i n  Lompoc Val ley  dur ing  1969 f loods .  
There a r e  s t i l l  c h i l d r e n  i n  t h e  c a r .  One has  a l r eady  been rescued. 
A computer model of  t h e  Santa  Ynez watershed was developed t o  p r e d i c t  
runoff from te lemetered  r a i n f a l l  d a t a  [Figure 8 ) .  The runoff  volume is 
ca l cu la t ed  using an  an tecedent  index method developed by t h e  National  Weather 
Serv ice  River Fo recas t  Center  i n  Sacramento. The runoff is d i s t r i b u t e d  by t h e  
uni tgraph method, r i go rous  r e s e r v o i r  rou t ing ,  and channel  rout ing .  The model 
a l lows an a d d i t i o n a l  6-hour advance warning time, f o r  a t o t a l  o f  12 hours. I f  
used wi th  p red ic t ed  r a i n f a l l ,  a 24-hour warning can be given.  However, 
experience has shown t h a t  q u a n t i t a t i v e  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  f o r e c a s t s  a r e  no t  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  accu ra t e  f o r  meaningful warnings. 
The d isseminat ion  phase of  t h e  system inc ludes  a procedures  manual, 
s tandard ized  warning messages, a map showing a r e a s  inundated a t  va r ious  flow 
r a t e s ,  and a communication p lan  wi th  backup systems. The emergency planning 
and implementation is t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  agencies  t h a t  r ece ive  t h e  
f lood warnings. 
The system rece ived  its f i r s t  r e a l  t e s t  i n  t h e  1978 storms. Because of  
t h e  drought i n  t h e  preceding yea r s ,  a program o f  cloud seeding t o  i nc rease  
r a i n f a l l  was i n i t i a t e d  i n  December 1977. Cachuma Reservoir  was 75,000 a c r e - f t  
below f u l l  when t h e  February 18 s torm occurred. Af t e r  9 in .  o f  r a i n  was 
measured by t h e  te lemet ry ,  computer f o r e c a s t s  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  r e s e r v o i r  
would f i l l  and seeding was terminated.  Cachuma d i d  indeed j u s t  f i l l ,  bu t  t h e  
s p i l l  was very minor and no f looding  occurred. I n  t h e  e a r l y  evening o f  March 
3 a f o r e c a s t  o f  5 in .  was rece ived  from the  d i s t r i c t ' s  p r i v a t e  weather 
consu l t an t .  A computer f o r e c a s t  with t h i s  r a i n  i nd ica t ed  a major s p i l l  from 
t h e  a l r eady  f u l l  Cachuma, and an advisory  message was issued.  Overnight,  7 t o  
8 i n .  o f  r a i n  a c t u a l l y  f e l l ,  and f lood  warnings were i ssued  a t  8 a.m., March 
4 ,  f o r  a f lood  o f  50,000 cu f t / s  t h a t  evening. The warnings were q u i t e  
accu ra t e ,  and e f f e c t i v e  advance measures were taken. F igure  9 shows t h e  
observed and f o r e c a s t  inf low i n t o  Lake Cachuma. 
Subsequent t o  1978 a f a s t e r  computer was acqui red  and t h e  f o r e c a s t  model 
was extended t o  inc lude  a l l  major t r i b u t a r i e s  o f  t h e  Santa  Ynez River. The 
system funct ioned e f f e c t i v e l y  dur ing  t h e  1980 storms. 
SYCAMORE FIRE EMERGENCY FLOOD PROTECTION WORK 
I n  J u l y  1977 an i n t e n s e  w i l d f i r e  burned some 320 homes and t h e  Sycamore 
Canyon watershed i n  and a d j a c e n t  t o  t h e  C i t y  of Santa  Barbara. Experience 
fol lowing previous  f i r e s  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  s e r i o u s  f looding  and d e b r i s  flows 
usua l ly  r e s u l t  from r a i n s  on newly burned watershed (F igure  10 ) .  Therefore.  
t h e  d i s t r i c t  immediately began planning f o r  emergency f lood  p r o t e c t i o n  
measures i n  and downstream of t h e  burned a rea .  
The f i r s t  s t e p  was t o  determine and map problem a r e a s ,  inc luding  a r e a s  
s u b j e c t  to f looding ,  mudslides,  d e b r i s  movement, and s o  f o r t h .  Roads t h a t  
would probably be c losed  dur ing  s torms were i d e n t i f i e d  s o  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  
rou te s  could  be planned. Inadequate  br idges  and c u l v e r t s  were i d e n t i f i e d .  
P o s s i b l e  d e b r i s  dam and check dam s i t e s  were loca t ed .  The maps were used by 
pub l i c  s a f e t y  agencies  t o  p l an  evacuat ion and rescue  a c t i v i t i e s ,  by the  
d i s t r i c t  t o  p l a n  f lood  c o n t r o l  measures, and f o r  pub l i c  information a t  
meetings with homeowner groups. 
FIGURE 8 Desktop computer used i n  f o r e c a s t i n g  f loodflows i n  Santa 
Ynez River.  
Sp r ink le r  tests on burned s l o p e s  were conducted t o  determine runoff 
p o t e n t i a l .  The r e s u l t s  were compared wi th  t h e  e f f e c t s  of previous f i r e s .  
A bookle t  t e l l i n g  homeowners how t o  p r o t e c t  themselves was d i s t r i b u t e d .  
The d i s t r i c t  supp l i ed  sandbags and sand a t  va r ious  l o c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  burned 
a r e a  and gave t e c h n i c a l  advice  on ind iv idua l  p r o t e c t i o n  (Figure 11). Grass  
seed  and sp reade r s  were furn ished  to homeowners w i l l i n g  t o  seed and i r r i g a t e  
burned s l o p e s  i n  advance of  t h e  rains. The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  f lood  insurance  
was publ ic ized .  
A l o c a l  analog r a i n f a l l  and s t ream l e v e l  te lemet ry  system was i n s t a l l e d ,  
and a f lood  f o r e c a s t i n g  program was devised. Flood hazard cond i t i ons  were 
ca t egor i zed  a s  green ,  yel low,  o r  r ed  and were g iven  t o  r e s i d e n t s  by means of  
r a d i o  broadcas ts  and a f l a g  flown a t  t h e  en t r ance  t o  t h e  canyon. Fo recas t s  
were a l s o  supp l i ed  t o  c i t y  and county emergency ope ra t ion  cen te r s .  
Revegetat ion of  burned a r e a s  was an important  element of  t h e  p lans .  
C e r t a i n  c r i t i c a l  s l o p e s  were hydromulched. Th i s  process ,  which c o n s i s t s  of 
spraying  a waterborne mixture o f  seeds,  f e r t i l i z e r ,  and wood f i b e r s  (mulch),  
is expensive b u t  e f f e c t i v e .  The balance of  t h e  burn was seeded and f e r t i l i z e d  
by h e l i c o p t e r  (F igu re  1 2 ) .  The a e r i a l  seeding was delayed u n t i l  j u s t  before  
t h e  f i r s t  p r e d i c t e d  r a i n f a l l .  I t  was important  t o  apply t h e  seed before  a 
c r u s t  formed on t h e  ash  b u t  a s  l a t e  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  avoid l o s s  of  t h e  seed t o  
t h e  wind and b i r d s .  
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FIGURE 9 Observed f low r a t e  i n t o  Lake Cachuma during f lood o f  March 
1978 compared with f low f o r e c a s t s  based on r a i n f a l l  data.  
FIGURE 1 0  Damage from f lood  r e s u l t i n g  from r a i n  on a  r e c e n t l y  burned 
watershed. 
FIGURE 11 Wood w a l l  and sandbags i n s t a l l e d  wi th  advice  of  t h e  Flood 
Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  f looding  fo l lowing  a  f i r e .  
FIGURE 12 Seeding and f e r t i l i z i n g  burned watershed by h e l i c o p t e r .  
S t r u c t u r a l  measures included c u l v e r t  replacement by road agencies ,  removal 
o f  br idges wi th  inadequate  waterways, c l e a r i n g  and en la rg ing  Sycamore Creek, 
p r o t e c t i n q  'raw banks wi th  p ipe  and wire  revetment (F igu re  1 3 ) ,  and 
c o n s t r u c t i n g  grouted  rock check dams and d e b r i s  b a r r i e r s  (F igures  14 and 1 5 ) .  
The emergency measures were accomplished i n  about  e i g h t  weeks with 
concurren t  des ign ,  right-of-way, and c o n s t r u c t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s .  The 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  wa$ done through a combination o f  f o r c e  account ,  equipment 
r e n t a l ,  and c o n t r a c t .  The t o t a l  c o s t  was $225,000, which w a s  shared  e q u a l l y  
by t h e  d i s t r i c t  and t h e  s t a t e  under Sec t ion  128 of  t h e  Water Code. (Federa l  
funds were t h e o r e t i c a l l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  b u t  paperwork requirements  would have 
delayed implementation i n t o  t h e  r a i n y  season.) 
The 1977-78 r a i n y  season was very  wet,  wi th  s e v e r a l  i n t e n s e  storms. There 
was heavy runoff  from t h e  Sycamore burn b u t  no major f looding.  The emergency 
p r o t e c t i o n  measures seemed t o  work very  w e l l .  The d i s t r i c t  cannot c l a im  t o t a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  low damage f i g u r e s ,  b u t  we l i k e  t o  be l i eve  t h a t  our 
expendi tures  had a very  high r a t i o  of  b e n e f i t s  t o  c o s t s .  
FIGURE 1 3  P i p e  and wire revetment  i n s t a l l e d  i n  Sycamore Canyon as  
p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  f l o o d s  a n t i c i p a t e d  a f t e r  f i r e  o f  J u l y  1977. 
FIGURE 1 4  Grouted rock check dam i n s t a l l e d  i n  Sycamore Canyon a f t e r  
f i r e  o f  J u l y  1977. 
FIGURE 15 Grouted rock check dam i n s t a l l e d  i n  Sycamore Canyon a f t e r  
f i r e  of J u l y  1977.  
EROSION AND DEPOSITION AT A SAND AND GRAVEL MINING 
OPERATION IN SAN JUAN CREEK, ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
by Vito A. Vanoni, Robert H. Born, and Hasan M. Nouri 
. Sand and gr6veZ have been mined from a 2-mile reach of Sun Juan Creek, 
about 6 miles upstream o f  the City of San Juan Capistrano, for over a decade. 
The reach i n  which mining occurred i s  immediately downstream of the Caspers 
Regional Park of Orange County. The mining proceeded upstream and the rate  
of gravel extraction increased with time. In  9 6 5  the mining p i t  was over 1 
mile from the park boundary and 15 f t  deep. In  1976 the upstream edge of the 
p i t  was approximately I Z O  f t  from the park and 60 f t  deep. 
The only appreciable flows i n  Sun Juan Creek from 1965 t o  the fa l l  of 
1976 occurred i n  the winters o f  1965 and 1969, which produced peak flows of 
4,000 cu f t / s  and 22,000 cu f t / s ,  respectively, a t  a gaging station 
approximately 5 miles downstream of the park. The 2 969 f lood i s  reported 
t o  have completely f i l l ed  the preflood p i t  i n  the creek bed with sediment 
carried by the flood. This p i t  was approximately 3,500 f t  downstream of the 
park, and no erosion i n  Sun Juan Creek occurred i n  the park area. 
Unusually high flows occurred i n  the three water years 2977-78 through 
2979-80. These flows deepened and widened the creek channel upstream of the 
gravel p i t  and raised the bottom of the p i t  by depositing most of the sediment 
carried i n t o  it. 
Data are given on ra in fa l l ,  runoff, and erosion upstream of the grave2 
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p i t  and deposition i n  the p i t  s tarting from the fa l l  o f  1977. The progress 
of erosion i s  given b y  prof i les  and cross sections, and to ta l  quantit ies o f  
erosion and deposition are given. The mechanics of the process i s  discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents detailed information on the impacts of the 
January-March 1978 floods on a sand and gravel mining operation along San Juan 
Creek in Orange County. Headward erosion in the upstream tributary channels 
and deposition in the mining excavation are described and evaluated as a 
result of the fortuitous availability of topographic surveys accomplished 
between the storms. 
The paper is organized in three sections. The first section briefly 
describes the history of the mining operation and the tributary watershed. A 
second section presents information on the local hydrology of the 1978 
storms. A concluding section presents an analysis of the events with 
particular attention to the evaluation of channel slopes and the quantities of 
erasion and deposition. The objective of the paper is to present a case study 
of channel erosion and sediment deposition rates and their relation to 
runoff. It is hoped that the presentation of such quantitative data will be 
helpful in other similar cases. 
HISTORY OF MINING 
Sand and gravel have been mined from a 2-mile reach of San Juan Creek, 
about 6 miles upstream from the City of San Juan Capistrano, for over a 
decade. Most of the early activity was concentrated at the lower site (see 
Figure 1). By the fall of 1977 the excavation had been extended to the upper 
site, shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
Caspers Regional Park, an Orange County-owned facility, is located 
immediately above and adjacent to the lease site. By 1965 the lower pit was 
about 1 mile from the park and about 15 ft deep at its deepest point. 
Material was processed at a plant located adjacent to the site. By the end of 
1977 the upper pit had been developed to a depth of 60 ft at its upper end, 
and to within a distance of 120 ft from the upper end of the lease. Side 
slopes of the excavations were limited to 1.5 to 1 horizontal to vertical. 
Description of Tributary Area 
Figure 1 also shows the extent of the three principal watersheds tributary 
to the upper mining site, which will be the principal focus of this paper. 
The three watersheds comprise a total area of nearly 77 square miles, the 
majority of which falls within Cleveland National Forest. San Juan Creek, the 
largest, covers 55.6 square miles. Bell Canyon covers 17.2 square miles and 
Verdugo Canyon, the smallest, covers only 4.0 square miles. Elevations range 
from about 360 ft above sea level in the streambed at the park boundary to 
approximately 4,500 ft in the upper reaches of the watershed, with most of the 
upper watershed lying above 2,500 ft. 
FIGURE 1 Location map of mining operation. 
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FIGURE 2 Vicinity map of mining operation, showing upper and lower 
excavation sites. 
The t r i b u t a r y  wate r sheds  are u n d e r l a i n  by a complex o f  igneous ,  
metamorphic, a'nd sed imenta ry  r o c k s  and have a h i s t o r y  o f  f r e q u e n t  f i r e s .  
Numerous l a n d s l i d e s  are found th roughout  t h e  a r e a ,  w i t h  r e s i d u a l  bedrock 
l a n d s l i d e  d e b r i s  c o v e r i n g  more t h a n  3.7 s q u a r e  miles w i t h i n  t h e  San J u a n  Creek 
wate r shed  a l o n e .  I t  h a s  been e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  more t h a n  a b i l l i o n  t o n s  o f  
l a n d s l i d e  d e b r i s  are ready  f o r  t r a n s i t  down t h i s  one  d r a i n a g e  a r e a  d u r i n g  
major f l o o d  e v e n t s .  B e l l  Canyon is u n d e r l a i n  by a wide v a r i e t y  o f  coarse 
c l a s t i c  g e o l o g i c  u n i t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  s e v e r a l  massive  l a n d s l i d e s  (Converse ward 
Davis Dixon, 1978) . 
Large q u a n t i t i e s  o f  l o o s e  s u r f a c e  m a t e r i a l s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  r o c k s l i d e s  
and muds l ides  o r  o t h e r w i s e  g e n e r a t e d  through n a t u r a l  e r o s i o n  p r o c e s s e s .  The 
upper San Juan d r a i n a g e  produces  a h i g h  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  c o a r s e  sand and g r a v e l ,  
p r i n c i p a l l y  because  o f  t h e  ha rd ,  c o a r s e  s o u r c e  m a t e r i a l s ,  and B e l l  Canyon 
produces  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of even c o a r s e r  m a t e r i a l .  
P o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  upper wa te r sheds  and deeper  canyons are h e a v i l y  f o r e s t e d ,  
and much of t h e  e n t i r e  watershed c o n t a i n s  a d e n s e  cover  o f  c h a p a r r a l .  
S c a t t e r e d  oak trees a r e  found th roughout  t h e  lower and medium e l e v a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  t r i b u t a r y  a r e a .  
RAINFALL AND RUNOFF 
A t  t h e  San J u a n  Creek guard s t a t i o n ,  a s h o r t  d i s t a n c e  above C a s p e r s  Park ,  
r a i n f a l l  i n t e n s i t i e s  o f  0.4 to 0.8 in . /hr  a r e  common. Normal annua l  r a i n f a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  wa te r shed  r a n g e s  from approx imate ly  14 i n .  i n  t h e  mining area t o  
approx imate ly  25 i n .  i n  t h e  upper r e a c h e s  o f  t h e  t r i b u t a r y  d r a i n a g e  a r e a .  On 
March 4 a maximum h o u r l y  r a i n f a l l  o f  1 .9  i n .  was r e c o r d e d ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  
t h i s  storm may have had a r e t u r n  p e r i o d  i n  e x c e s s  o f  100 y e a r s  f o r  one-hour, 
two-hour, and three-hour  d u r a t i o n s .  
Our f o c u s  o f  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be on t h e  t h r e e  s t o r m s  o f  January  15-20, 
February  9-13, and March 4,  1978. While r e c o r d s  a r e  o n l y  p a r t i a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  
due to o p e r a t i n g  problems a t  key r e c o r d i n g  gages ,  some i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
s t o r m s '  magni tudes  c a n  be  o b t a i n e d  by examining t h e  r a i n f a l l  r ecord  a t  nea rby  
S a n t i a g o  Peak. 
During t h e  February  s t o r m  a t o t a l  o f  5.7 i n .  f e l l  d u r i n g  an  18-hour p e r i o d  
a t  S a n t i a g o  Peak,  w i t h  f i v e  c o n s e c u t i v e  h o u r s  o f  0.4 in. /hr o r  more. The 
February  storm produced 9.9 in .  o f  r a i n ,  w i t h  3.4 i n .  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  a 
f ive-hour  p e r i o d .  Hourly  r e c o r d s  a t  t h i s  s t a t i o n  are n o t  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t h e  March storm, b u t  d a i l y  t o t a l s  show t h a t  a t o t a l  o f  2.21 i n .  f e l l  on 
March 4 and 0.58 on March 5 ,  f o r  a two-day storm t o t a l  o f  2.79 i n .  A summary 
o f  r a i n f a l l  o c c u r r i n g  a t  S a n t i a g o  Peak d u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e  s t o r m s  is p r e s e n t e d  i n  
T a b l e  1. 
Hydrographs d u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e  major 1978 storms a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  F i g u r e  3. 
A s  shown, t h e  peak f lows  i n  t h e  major s to rms  o f  1978 became p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
l a r g e r ,  w i t h  t h e  l a r g e s t  peak d i s c h a r g e ,  o f  11,600 c u  f t / s ,  o c c u r r i n g  o n  March 
4. These  hydrographs  are based on measurements by t h e  U.S. G e o l o g i c a l  Survey 
a t  a gag ing  s t a t i o n  on San J u a n  Creek a t  San J u a n  C a p i s t r a n o  abou t  0.2 m i l e  
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TABLE 1 Recorded R a i n f a l l ,  1978 ( i n . )  
San Juan 
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T o t a l s  
a ~ e c o r d  began i n  March 1978. 
b ~ a i n f a l l  r ecord  a t  Sant iago Peak; 0.9 i n .  on January 19,  none on January 20. 
upst ream of  i ts  c o n f l u e n c e  w i t h  Arroyo Trabuco. The d r a i n a g e  a r e a  o f  San J u a n  
Creek a t  t h e  gag ing  s t a t i o n  is 117 s q u a r e  miles, compared w i t h  77 s q u a r e  m i l e s  
immediately downstream o f  t h e  c o n f l u e n c e  w i t h  Verdugo Canyon ( a t  t h e  new 
mining s i t e ) ,  Hydrographs o b t a i n e d  from t h e  gag ing  s t a t i o n  were t r a n s p o s e d  t o  
t h e  s t u d y  area by means o f  methodology s u g g e s t e d  by Creager  e t  a l .  (1947).  
EROSION AND DEPOSITION 
A s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  t h r e e  major s to rms  o c c u r r i n g  i n  1978, t h e  c h a n n e l s  of 
San J u a n  Creek,  B e l l  Canyon, and Verdugo Canyon upst ream o f  t h e  sand and 
g r a v e l  e x c a v a t i o n  were s u b j e c t e d  t o  s e v e r e  headward e r o s i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  
c o n c u r r e n t  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a d e l t a  o f  eroded material a t  t h e  upper end of t h e  
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excavat ion.  During each f lood  event  headward e r o s i o n  proceeded up each of t he  
t h r e e  channels  while  t h e  d e l t a  i n  t he  excavat ion  became progress ive ly  l a r g e r ,  
even tua l ly  forming a c o n t r o l  a g a i n s t  f u r t h e r  v e r t i c a l  scour  immediately 
upstream of  t h e  former p i t  boundary. T h e r e a f t e r ,  a s  t h e  channel bottoms were 
e l eva t ed  t o  confqrm t o  t h e  con f igu ra t ion  of t h e  d e l t a ,  t h e  channels  widened by 
l a t e r a l  scour  and bank c u t t i n g .  
F igures  4-7 i l l u s t r a t e  channel cond i t i ons  fol lowing t h e  d i f f e r e n t  f l ood  
events .  F igure  4 shows t h e  eroded cond i t i on  of  t h e  r i g h t  bank of  t h e  San Juan 
Creek channel  downstream of  B e l l  Canyon on January  17,  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  passage 
of a p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  January f lood.  The channel c u t t i n g  through t h e  r i g h t  bank 
was formed by a d i s t r i b u t a r y  of B e l l  Canyon. F igure  5 shows t h e  condi t ion  of 
t h e  mouth of Verdugo Canyon a t  t he  g r a v e l  p i t  on t h e  same date .  The d e l t a  
formed by Verdugo Creek i n  t h e  mining excavat ion has  been eroded by flows from 
San Juan  C r e e k ,  a s  shown by Figure  5. 
F igure  6A shows t h e  e x t e n t  of exposure of a s e m i r e s i s t a n t  sandstone 
outcropping on San Juan  Creek, some 900 f t  above t h e  park boundary, on 
February 2. A similar ex tens ion  of t h i s  outcropping was a l s o  exposed i n  B e l l  
Canyon. A s  headward e ros ion  proceeded, t h e  outcropping s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
i n h i b i t e d  f u r t h e r  v e r t i c a l  e ros ion  a t  t hese  loca t ions .  Concurrent ly,  
downstream g r a d i e n t s  from t h e  outcroppings f l a t t e n e d  a s  t h e  d e l t a  i n  t h e  p i t  
r o s e  i n  he igh t .  Both upstream headward e ros ion  and l a t e r a l  bank c u t t i n g  
cont inued from t h e s e  new c o n t r o l s .  By A p r i l  11 t h e  channel  had eroded both 
v e r t i c a l l y  and l a t e r a l l y  t o  expose more of  t h e  outcropping,  a s  shown i n  Figure 
6B. F igure  7 shows t h e  e x t e n t  of  v e r t i c a l  and l a t e r a l  e ros ion  a t  t h e  park 
boundary on January  17 ,  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  passage of  on ly  p a r t  o f  t h e  January 
f lood.  Note t h e  suspended fence t h a t  is loca t ed  along t h e  alignment of  the  
park boundary, some 100 f t  above t h e  edge of  t h e  upper l i p  o f  t h e  mining 
excavat ion.  
P l ans  and p r o f i l e s  of e r o s i o n  and depos i t i on  i n  and above t h e  excavat ion 
fol lowing t h e  va r ious  f loods  of  1978 a r e  shown i n  F igu re  8. These p r o f i l e s  
and t h e  schematic  p lan  show t h e  growth of  t h e  d e l t a  i n  t h e  p i t  and the  
p rog res s  of  degrada t ion  i n  t h e  upstream channels ,  based on topographic surveys 
performed a f t e r  each f lood  event .  Line a-b, which has a g rad ien t  o f  0.01, 
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  n a t u r a l  s lopes  of both San Juan  Creek and B e l l  Canyon p r i o r  t o  
t h e  1978 f loods .  
The s torms of January 1978, having peak d i scha rges  of  only 160 cu f t / s  or  
l e s s ,  qu ick ly  caused major degradat ion,  a s  shown by t h e  p r o f i l e  g-h, which has 
a s l o p e  of  0.03. Storms occurr ing  between February 9 and 13,  1978, produced 
f u r t h e r  growth of  t h e  d e l t a  i n  t h e  p i t  and a f u r t h e r  deepening and widening of 
t h e  upstream channels .  The r e s u l t i n g  s lopes  a r e  shown by l i n e s  e-f and f-k, 
wi th  va lues  of  0.02 and 0.015, r e spec t ive ly .  The March 4 f lood ,  with a peak 
d ischarge  of 11,600 cu f t / s ,  produced t h e  p r o f i l e  represented  by t h e  l i n e  
c-d- j . 
The s lope  between p o i n t s  c and d f l a t t e n e d  t o  0.016, while between po in t s  
d and j i n  t h e  d e l t a  t h e  s lope  approached t h e  n a t u r a l  g rad ien t  of 0.01 t h a t  
e x i s t e d  between p o i n t s  a and b p r i o r  t o  t h e  occurrence of  t h e  1978 f loods.  
FIGURE 4 San Juan  Creek downsteam of  B e l l  Canyon, January  17, 1978. 
FIGURE 5 Mouth of  Verdugo Canyon a t  mining excava t ion ,  January 17, 
1978. 
FIGURE 6A s emires i s tan t  sandstone outcropping, San Juan Creek above 
B e l l  Canyon, February 2 ,  1978. 
FIGURE 6B Semiresistant  sandstone outcropping, San Juan Creek above 
B e l l  Canyon, Apri l  11, 1978, 
FIGURE 7 V i e w  toward r i g h t  bank o f  San Juan Creek channel a t  Caspers 
Regional Park boundary, January 17,  1978. 
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FIGURE 8 Plan and p r o f i l e  o f  San Juan Creek a t  upstream edge of  
grave l  p i t  during f l oods  o f  1978. 
Figure  8 shows t h e  l o c a t i o n s  of c r o s s  s e c t i o n s  1 and 2 used i n  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  e r o s i o n  and depos i t i on  zones. F igu res  9 ,  10,  and 11 d e p i c t  t h e  
progress  o f  e r o s i o n  and depos i t i on  a t  t h e s e  s e c t i o n s  dur ing  t h e  t h r e e  f lood  
events  . 
MECHANISM OF SEDIMENT MOVEMENT 
A s  can  be noted from F igu res  9-11, t h e  channel  beds remained r e l a t i v e l y  
f l a t  t r a n s v e r s e l y  i n  both t h e  depos i t i ng  and eroding sec t ions .  The d e p o s i t s  
were b u i l t  up more o r  less uniformly a c r o s s  t h e  mine excavat ion o r  p i t  a s  t h e  
s t ream moved from s i d e  t o  s i d e  i n  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  de l ta -bui ld ing  fashion.  The 
l e v e l s  i n  t h e  channel  upstream o f  t h e  p i t  were c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  l e v e l  of  t h e  
d e p o s i t s  i n  t he  p i t  a r e a  when t h e  channel  was eroding a s  we l l  as when it was 
aggrading. For t h i s  reason  t h e  channel  bed remained r e l a t i v e l y  f l a t  i n  
s e c t i o n  during t h e  sequence of  storms, a s  shown by s e c t i o n  2 of F igu res  9-11. 
The beds of  t h e  degraded creeks have coa r se  g rave l ,  cobbles ,  and boulders  
on t h e  su r f ace ,  which form an armor l a y e r  and tend t o  l i m i t  degradat ion.  A 
c l o s e  view of t h e  bed armor i n  San Juan  Creek a f t e r  t h e  January 1978 f loods  is 
shown i n  F igure  12. P a r t i c l e s  over 1 f t  i n  maximum dimension a r e  common a t  
t h i s  site. Sediment of  s i z e s  comparable with those  shown i n  F igu re  12 a l s o  
e x i s t e d  i n  San Juan  Creek and i ts  t r i b u t a r i e s  even before  degrada t ion  
occurred,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  armoring is common i n  t h e s e  streams. 
I t  is v i s u a l i z e d  t h a t  a f l ood  degrades t h e  streambed by removing p a r t i c l e s  
t h a t  it is competent t o  t r a n s p o r t ,  l e av ing  t h e  coa r se  p a r t i c l e s  and those  
sh i e lded  by the  coa r se  ones. Presumably t h e  maximum competency of a f lood  t o  
move bed sediment co inc ides  with t h e  peak flow, so t h a t  a s  t h e  f lood  and i ts  
competency wanes t h e  bed w i l l  be armored and t h e r e f o r e  s t a b l e .  Sands and f i n e  
g rave l s  t h a t  a r e  t r anspor t ed  i n t o  an armored reach of  a s t ream w i l l  tend t o  be 
c a r r i e d  through t h e  reach much a s  i f  they c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  wash load  of  t h e  
flow. The bed armor is expected t o  p e r s i s t  u n t i l  a f lood  occurs  with f lows 
exceeding t h e  one t h a t  formed t h e  armor. When t h i s  happens t h e  bed w i l l  
degrade, expose more of  t h e  l a r g e  p a r t i c l e s ,  and f i n a l l y  s t a b i l i z e  a t  a lower 
l eve l .  Hollingshead (1971) a c t u a l l y  de t ec t ed  with a hydrophone t h e  beginning 
of movement of bed sediment i n  a g r a v e l  r i v e r .  He found t h a t  bed motion 
s t a r t e d  a t  a flow o f  300 cu f t / s ,  which on t h e  average occurred dur ing  30 days 
per  year .  The median s i z e  o f  t h e  bed sediment was 28 mm. 
The d e p o s i t s  i n  t h e  c r eeks  and i n  t h e  p i t  were sampled a t  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  
t i m e s .  The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  samples can  be judged from 
Figure  13,  which is a photograph of t h e  d e p o s i t s  i n  t h e  p i t  approximately 300 
f t  downstream from t h e  park a f t e r  t h e  January f loods .  To r ep resen t  t h e  
cobbles  proper ly  one needs a very  l a r g e  sample. The weight of  t h e  sample 
shown i n  t h e  bag i n  F igu re  13,  and of o t h e r s ,  was from 10 t o  15 l b .  The 
cobbles  showing on t h e  s u r f a c e  of  F igure  13 appear t o  form a s m a l l  f r a c t i o n  of  
t h e  depos i t .  The photograph sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  cobbles  a r e  p a r t  of  an  
i n c i p i e n t  armor r e s u l t i n g  from e r o s i o n  by t h e  receding f lood  of  d e p o s i t s  
formed a t  h igher  flows. 
Table 2 shows t h e  s i z e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  10 samples of  sediment d e p o s i t s  i n  
the  t h r e e  Greeks i n  and near the park. The s u b s c r i p t  of d i n  t h e  t a b l e  g ives  
SECTION 2 (LOOKING UPSTREAM) SECTION 1 f LOOKING UPSTREAM) 
FIGURE 9 Erosion and deposition at upstream edge of gravel pit in 
San Juan Creek after floods of January 1978. 
SECTION 2 [LOOKING UPSTREAM) SECTION 1 (LOOKING UPSTREAM) 
FIGURE 10 Erosion and deposition at upstream edge of gravel pit in 
San Juan Creek after floods of February 10 and February 13, 1978. 
SECTION 2 [ LOOKING UPSTREAM) SECTION 1 l LOOKING UPSTREAM) 
FIGURE 11 Erosion and deposition at upstream edge of gravel pit in 
San Juan Creek after flood of March 4, 1978. 
the percentage by weight of the sediment that is finer than the size indicated 
in the table. For example, the first figure in the dS0 column indicates 
that 50 percent of the sediment in sample 1 is finer than 6.0 mm--i.e., it has 
a median size of 6.0 mm. All the samples except sample 10 were taken from 
deposits in the mine excavation. As seen in the d50 column, the median size 
varies. The samples taken after the most recent and largest storm, on August 
9, 1980, tend to be coarser than the others. This seems reasonable; however, 
FIGURE 12 Bed of  San Juan  C r e e k  approximately 1,000 f t  upstream of 
park l i n e ,  February 2, 1978. 
because t h e  samples were small t h i s  r e s u l t  may n o t  be s i g n i f i c a n t .  I t  should 
be noted t h a t  t h e  3 pe rcen t  s i z e s  a r e  from 0.14 t o  0.32 mm, o r  i n  t h e  f i n e  t o  
medium sand s i z e s .  The percentage of t h e  samples f i n e r  than  0.074 mm ( n o t  
shown i n  Table 2) ranged from 0.2 percent  t o  0.9 percent .  These d a t a  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  t h e  d e p o s i t s  sampled con ta in  very l i t t l e  s i l t  and c l a y  and t h a t  any of  
t hese  f i n e  sediments  reaching  t h e  p i t  a r e a  were mostly c a r r i e d  through t h e  
p i t .  During t h e  January  f l o o d s  and p a r t  o f  t h e  February flows, when a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  pond formed i n  t h e  p i t ,  a s  i nd ica t ed  by Figure  8 ,  some o f  t h e  s i l t  
and c l a y  i n  t r a n s p o r t  was probably depos i ted .  
Table 3 g ives  d a t a  on t h e  f loods  o f  1978 and t h e  sediment depos i ted  i n  t h e  
p i t  and eroded from t h e  creek channels .  The second and t h i r d  columns show 
t h a t  t h e  f l oods  increased  i n  i n t e n s i t y  from January t o  March. Column 4 g ives  
t he  volume of  t h e  d e p o s i t s  accumulated i n  t h e  p i t  s t a r t i n g  with t h e  January  
f lood ,  and column 5 g i v e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  cumulative volumes of  
sediment depos i ted  i n  t h e  p i t  and eroded from t h e  channels .  The q u a n t i t i e s  
shown i n  column 5 were assumed t o  be t h e  cumulative sediment y i e l d  f o r  t h e  
1978 f loods  up t o  t h e  d a t e s  ind ica ted .  The sediment volumes given i n  Table 3 
were developed from surveys  made a f t e r  t h e  January  and t h e  March f loods.  A 
survey was a l s o  made a f t e r  t h e  February f loods  bu t  proved t o  be inadequate  f o r  
determining t h e  needed sediment volumes. 
The mean sediment concen t r a t ions  i n  t h e  flow e n t e r i n g  t h e  p i t  and i n  t h e  
flow e n t e r i n g  t h e  degraded reaches  of  t h e  c r eeks  a r e  given i n  columns 6 and 7 
FIGURE 13 Sur face  o f  d e p o s i t s  i n  mine excavat ion  300 f t  downstream of 
park l i n e ,  February 6 ,  1978; s i te  o f  sample 2 i n  Table 2. 
o f  Table 3.  I n  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e s e  concen t r a t ions  no account  was taken of  any 
of  t h e  f i n e  sediments  t h a t  may have been c a r r i e d  through t h e  p i t .  It  is 
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  concen t r a t ions  f o r  t h e  January  f l o o d s  were over four  t imes 
t h e  means f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  1978 f loods  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  flow r a t e s  f o r  
January  were much smal le r  than those  f o r  t h e  subsequent  f loods.  Two f a c t o r s  
t h a t  tended t o  cause  high sediment concen t r a t ion  i n  t h e  January f loods  were 
t h a t  t h e s e  f loods  followed s e v e r a l  y e a r s  of  r e l a t i v e l y  low r a i n f a l l ,  so t h a t  
l a r g e  amounts of  sediment probably accumulated i n  t h e  dra inage  ways, and t h a t  
t h e  s l o p e s  i n  t h e  degrading reaches  near t h e  p i t  were h igher  i n  January than  
i n  subsequent f l oods ,  causing unusually r a p i d  e ros ion .  The concept  t h a t  
TABLE 2 S i z e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  of  Bed Sediment of  Creeks i n  and near  Caspers  
Reg i o n a l  Park 
S i z e  (mm) Notes ( d s  = down- 
No. Date d3  d16 d50 d84 d97 Creek s t ream from) 
San Juan  
San Juan  
San Juan  
San Juan  
San Juan  
Verdugo 
San Juan  
San Juan  
San Juan  
B e l l  
100 f t  d s  park 
300 f t  d s  park 
640 f t  d s  park 
500 f t  d s  park 
1,000 f t  d s  park 
Near mouth 
300 f t  d s  parka 
300 f t  ds parkb 
300 f t  d s  parkC 
A t  mouth 
- 
a200 f t  from l e f t  bank o f  g r a v e l  p i t .  
b300 f t  from l e f t  bank o f  g r a v e l  p i t .  
C500 f t  from l e f t  bank o f  g r a v e l  p i t .  
sediment accumulates i n  a watershed i n  d r y  y e a r s  to be washed away i n  s torms 
is supported by t h e  f i n d i n g s  of  Anderson, Coleman, and Zinke (1959). During 
a five-year s tudy  they  found t h a t  t h e  amount o f  sediment y i e l d e d  from s t e e p  
sou the r ly  s l o p e s  o f  t h e  San G a b r i e l  Mountains i n  sou the rn  C a l i f o r n i a  i n  t h e  
d ry  summer exceeded t h a t  eroded from t h e s e  s l o p e s  dur ing  t h e  r a i n y  season. 
\ 
The o v e r a l l  mean sediment concen t r a t ion  i n  t h e  1969 f l o o d s  i n  San Juan 
Creek was approximately t h e  same a s  i n  t h e  1978 f loods ,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  
footnote  of Table 3. The two f l o o d s  i n  January  and February 1969 had peak 
d ischarges  of 16,000 and 19,000 cu f t / s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a combined runoff  o f  
37,000 ac re - f t ,  a sediment y i e l d  o f  775,000 cu  yd, and a mean concen t r a t ion  
of 24 g / l i t e r .  The 1978 and 1969 f loods  were s i m i l a r  i n  t h a t  t hey  followed 
s e v e r a l  yea r s  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  r a i n f a l l .  
The l a s t  column of  Table  3 g i v e s  an  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  sediment 
y i e l d  of  each 1978 f lood  based on a sediment t r a n s p o r t  r e l a t i o n  i n  which t h e  
sediment d ischarge  r a t e ,  Gs, is p ropor t iona l  t o  q l m 5 ,  where Q equa l s  t h e  
water d i scharge  r a t e ,  Th i s  gave a n e g l i g i b l e  y i e l d  f o r  January  compared wi th  
a measured y i e l d  o f  approximately 20 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  f o r  1978. T h i s  
sugges ts  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  t r a n s p o r t  r e l a t i o n  f o r  San Juan  Creek does n o t  
resemble t h e  simple power r e l a t i o n s  of water d i scharge  found normally. I t  
a l s o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  are d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  r ep re sen t ing  sediment d i scha rge  
i n  s t reams such a s  San Juan  C r e e k  by s tandard  power formulas.  
TABLE 3 Sediment Deposited i n  Gravel P i t  and Eroded from Watershed 
Cumulative Sediment Sediment concentrat ionb Estimated Percentage Peak Yield (cu yd) ( g / l i t e r )  o f  Yield from Dates i n  Discharge Runoff 
a a 
1978 (cu f t / s )  ( ac re - f t )  In P i t  P i t  - Eras I n  P i t  P i t  - Eros watershedC 
a ~ h e  d i f fe rence  between t h e  volume of sediment deposi ted i n  t h e  p i t  and t h a t  eroded from channels is 
taken a s  the  sediment y i e l d  from t h e  watershed. 
b ~ a l c u l a t e d  average based on cumulative sediment y i e l d  and cumulative runoff through da tes  indica ted .  
1.5 
' ~ s t i rna te  based on sediment discharge % Q . Floods of January-February 1969: sediment y i e l d  = 
775,000 cu yd, runoff = 37,000 acre- f t ,  concentrat ion = 24 g / l i t e r .  
One can  ask what w i l l  be  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  s t reams i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  
g r a v e l  p i t .  I t  is seen  from F igu re  8 t h a t  t h e  s l o p e s  upstream of  t h e  p i t  
went from a n a t u r a l  va lue  of 1 pe rcen t  i n  1977 t o  over  3 pe rcen t  i n  e a r l y  
February t o  2.0 pe rcen t  and then  back t o  1.6 pe rcen t  i n  t h e  s p r i n g  of  1978. 
The s lope  of San Juan  Creek, about  1,500 f t  downstream o f  t h e  park,  is now 
( i n  1980) l e s s  t han  1 percent .  Despi te  recovery i n  s lope ,  t h e  beds of  t h e  
c r eeks  i n  t h e  park i n  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1978 were over  10 f t  lower than  i n  t h e i r  
undisturbed s t a t e ,  a s  shown by F igu re  8. Fu r the r  r a i s i n g  of  t h e  s t reams w i l l  
r e q u i r e  r a i s i n g  o f  t h e  bed downstream. Th i s  l e v e l  is now c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  
channel  shown i n  F i g u r e  14 ,  which is approximately 1,800 f t  downstream o f  t h e  
park and is excavated i n  rock. To r a i s e  t h e  l e v e l  of  t h i s  channel  and t h a t  
of t h e  channels  i n  t h e  park w i l l  r e q u i r e  aggrada t ion  of  t h e  bed downstream of  
t h e  rock channel ,  which p r e s e n t l y  is i n h i b i t e d  by cont inuing  g r a v e l  mining. 
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LANDSLIDES OF 1978 AND 1980 
by James E. S l o s s o n  and James P. Krohn 
Tlze high-intensity ra in fa l l s  of 1978 and 1980 brought devastation i n  
the form of lands Zides, debris f lows, and mudflows. Losses from the storm- 
related phenomena within the City of Los Angeles alone amounted i n  1978 t o  
an estimated $50 mil l ion for private property and approximately the same 
amount for public property. In  1980, with in f la t ion  greatly affecting the 
value of the dollar, the losses are estimated t o  have reached $70 mill ion 
for private property and approximately the same amount for public property. 
Severe damage and losses from landslides, debris flows, and mudflows are not 
uncommon t o  southern California (or the United States,  for that  matter), with 
the high-intensity or abnormally high ra in fa l l s  of 1938, 1952, 1958, 1962, 
and 1969 also damaging or destroying large numbers of structures. 
Deaths have been recorded from these landslide-type failures, but a t  a 
lower rate than from other natural hazards, considering the equivalent dollar 
loss. Available records indicate that these storms have caused 6 t o  12 
deaths per event. Mudflows and debris flows have been the k i l l e r s ,  with 
only one death direct ly  attributed t o  a bedding plane or arcuate landslide 
and one t o  the failure of a retaining wall. 
Storm damage data collected by the Department of Building and Safety 
of the C i t y  of Los Angeles for the s t o m s  of 2969, 2978, and 2980 substantiated 
the opinion that  proper use of science and technology, coupled with r e a l i s t i c  
and enforceable codes, can reduce losses from natural hazards. The C i t y  of 
Los Angeles was the f i r s t  jurisdiction t o  adopt a grading ordinance; t h i s  
followed the multimillion dollar losses from the storm of 2952. This ordinance 
was modified again a f t e r  the 2958 storm losses. Finally, a modem, e f fec t ive  
code was developed and put in to  e f f e c t  i n  2963 following the storm of 2962. 
Damage and loss  data coZlected and computerized by the City of Lss 
Angeles from the 2969, 2978, and 2980 storms lucidly i l l u s t ra te s  that  over 
90 percent of the losses were associated with the pre-2963 properties (and 
structures).  The remaining 20 percent of the losses appear t o  be related 
p r i m a r i l y  t o  natural and post-2963 engineered f i l l  slopes. The nwnber of 
s i t e s  developed before and a f t e r  2963 are both i n  the 30,000+ range. 
James E. S l o s s o n  and James P. Krohn are Engineer ing  G e o l o g i s t s  w i t h  
S l o s s o n  and Associates i n  Van Nuys, C a l i f o r n i a .  
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Damage from debris flows and mudflows appears t o  be increasing i n  
magnitude and i s  caused, i n  part, by the increased construction of homes 
at the base of natural sZopes or partial natural slopes associated with older 
subdivisions. Most severely h i t  appear t o  be those s i t e s  or l o t s  that were 
a part of pre-1963 or even pre-1952 subdivisions but were not b u i l t  upon 
unt i l  recent years. This genera2 relationship i s  especiaZZy true for Topanga 
Canyon, MandeviZZe Canyon, Stone Canyon, and portions o f  Sherman Oaks, Encino, 
Tarzana, and Woodland Hills.  The potential for mudflow and debris flow hazard 
i s  easily recognized, but few consultants w i Z Z  acknowledge evidence unless 
required by code. 
INTRODUCTION 
The high-intensity rainfalls of 1978 and 1980 brought devastation in the 
form of landslides, debris flows, and mudflows (Figures 1 and 2). Losses from 
the storm-related landslide phenomena within the City of Los Angeles amounted 
in 1978 alone to $50 million for private property and an assumed equal amount 
for public property. The 1980 losses for the City of Los Angeles have been 
estimated at $75 million for private property, with probably an equal loss for 
public properties and facilities. The estimated total loss within the six 
southern counties affected from landslides, debris flows, mudflows, etc. in 
1980 approximates $500 million. 
As determined by our studies and those of others (e.g., Fleming and 
Taylor, 1980), record keeping by most local, state, and federal agencies 
regarding landslide designations, damages, and losses ranges from less than 
adequate to none. The City of Los Angeles is an exception to this 
generalization, as it keeps excellent records and subsequently makes them 
available for research. 
The high-intensity rainfalls of 1978 and 1980 and their associated floods 
and landslides are not an isolated storm hazard for southern California. 
Similar storms with associated floods and landslides were recorded in 1952, 
1958, 1962, and 1969. Earlier years witnessed similar rainfall and flood 
relationships, but no records are available to determine the extent of 
landslide losses. Aerial photos taken during this period between 1927 and 
1952 indicate that landslide activity did occur during these years of 
high-intensity rainfall. However, (1) there were fewer homes to be affected, 
(2) there was no television to highlight the problem, (3) governmental 
agencies and the courts were assuming landslides and the associated losses 
were an "act of God" and were not recognizable or preventable, (4) most of the 
geologists during the pre-1952 era had not been trained to recognize and/or 
mitigate landslides, (5) very few universities offered courses in engineering 
geology and/or soil mechanics prior to the 1950s, and (6) civil engineers did 
not appreciate the involvement of geologists until the early 1960s. 
Records prior to the first use of aerial photographs in southern 
California (in 1927) were limited to newspaper articles and a few case 
histories. However, even with the poor records there is still indication of 
disastrous landslides (including mudflows and debris flows) during periods of 
high-intensity rainfall. Figure 3, a bar graph of the annual rainfall for Los 
FIGURE 1 The Bluebird Canyon landslide (in October 1978) damaged or 
affected more than 50 homes in a hillside development in Laguna Beac 
FIGURE 2 Debris flows and mudflows on natural slopes of a pre-1952 
subdivision from a 1980 storm in Woodland Hills, California. 
FIGURE 3  Annual r a i n f a l l  i n  L o s  Angeles, 1877-1980. 
Angeles ( i n  t h e  c e n t e r  of  t h e  c i t y ) ,  d e p i c t s  t h e  r a i n f a l l  p a t t e r n  f o r  t h e  p a s t  
103 years .  The average annual  r a i n f a l l  f o r  Los Angeles is 15.06 in .  Flood 
and l a n d s l i d e  damage is g e n e r a l l y  a s soc i a t ed  with those  y e a r s  when t h e  
r a i n f a l l  h a s  been g r e a t e r  than  average by about  30 pe rcen t  o r  more (i.e., over  
20 in . ) .  The year  1884 may have been t h e  most s eve re  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  a r e a  
of f looding  and l a n d s l i d e  a c t i v i t y .  News a r t i c l e s  and o t h e r  r e f e rences  
desc r ibe  widespread f lood ing  extending from southern  C a l i f o r n i a  t o  c e n t r a l  
Arizona. Some r e f e r e n c e s  sugges t  t h a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  a l l  b r idges  were des t royed  
between L o s  Angeles and Tucson. Ten ta t ive  age d a t i n g  o f  some o f  t h e  l a r g e r  
previous l a n d s l i d e s  of  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  i n d i c a t e s  an approximate age o f  100 
years ,  which would be i n  agreement with t h e  assumed damage a t t r i b u t e d  t o . t h e  
storms of 1884. 
A review o f  t h e  r a i n f a l l  bar  graph i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  have been y e a r s  
when t h e  r a i n f a l l  was above 20 in .  (130 percent  of  average) wi thout  t h e  
damaging l a n d s l i d e s  and flow t h a t  occurred i n  1978 and 1980. This  caused 
specu la t ion  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  au tho r s  and o t h e r s  a s  t o  what o t h e r  parameters  
were involved i n  t h e  g e n e s i s  of  l ands l ides .  Review of r a i n f a l l  d a t a  i nd ica t ed  
t h a t  n o t  on ly  has  t h e r e  been above average r a i n f a l l  bu t  t h e r e  has  been a 
p a t t e r n  of a t  l e a s t  f i v e  or more days of h igh- in tens i ty  r a i n f a l l  dur ing  which 
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at least 7 iq. of rainfall has been recorded. The most disastrous years 
appear to be those when the greatest rainfall in a 24-hour period occurs after 
five days of rain amounting to over 7 in. 
In 1980 the rainstorm started on February 8. The sequence of five days of 
continuous rain and 7 in. of precipitation had occurred by February 14. Slope 
failures were beginning to develop by February 15 and then very-high-intensity 
rainfall occurred on February 16. Examples of short-period high-intensity 
rainfall were available from the recording stations at Encino Reservoir, where 
8 in. of rain fell between noon and 6:00 p.m., and at Sepulveda Dam, where 7 
in. fell during the same six-hour interval. 
Records and personal observations in the field on February 16 and 17 show 
that the mountains and slopes literally fell apart on those two days. One of 
us (Slosson) was in the Pacific Palisades area from 11:OO a.m. to 1:00 p.m.; 
at the Pacific Coast Highway-Malibu from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.; at Topanga 
Canyon, Saddle Peak Road, Piuma Road, Stunt Road, and Mulholland Drive from 
3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.; at Woodland Hills, Encino, and Sherman Oaks from 5:00 
p.m. to 6:00 p.m.; and in Calabasas, Agoura, the Santa Monica Mountains 
between Topanga Canyon and Kanan Drive Road, and Malibu on the seventeenth. 
During these two days landslides, debris flows, mudflows, and aggressive 
erosion activity were witnessed and photographed. The greatest frequency of 
landslides appeared, from personal observation, to occur between 11:OO a.m. 
and 6:00 p.m. on Saturday (the sixteenth) and between 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. 
on Sunday (the seventeenth). 
Similar but less extensive observations made during the high-intensity 
rainfall and associated landslide activity in 1952, 1958, 1969, 1978, and 1980 
indicated a similar sequence of events: five or more days of rainfall 
amounting to at least 7 in. Superimposed over these were short periods of 
high-intensity rainfall. 
Continued rainfall of five days or more causes saturation of not only the 
soil but other loose surficial materials (such as alluvium, colluvium/- 
slopewash, nonengineered fill) and underlying rock materials. This saturation 
causes the following changes in the physical characteristics of these 
materials . 
1. Increase in bulk weight as water fills the poor space 
2. Reduction in strength as (a) the availability of water between the 
particles reduces friction and (b) water separates clay and silt particles, 
reducing cohesion 
3. A general increase in pore water pressure 
4. Solution (the removal of natural cementing materials) 
Statistics collected by the Los Angeles City Department of Building and 
Safety over the past 30 years have provided a good data base from which to 
estimate the dollar loss from landslides, mudflows, etc. These estimates are 
listed in Table 1. During this 30-year period the number of structures 
increased by approximately 50,000 (from 15,000-20,000 to approximately 70,000) 
while the values of homes increased by a factor of almost ten. Construction 
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TABLE 1 Losses from Landslide ~ctivity (adjusted to inflation) 
Year 
Loss 
(millions of dollars) 
Sample Cost of Hillside Tract House 
(dollars) 
costs during this.era increased from about $7.50/sq ft to $35.00-$55.00 to 
$60.00/sq ft, and lot costs increased from $2,500-$5,000 to $35,000-$60,000. 
Thus inflation may have a very important control on the dollar losses. The 
skyrocketing increase in the dollar losses can be misleading. Equating the 
losses to 1952 dollar equivalents, the estimated dollar loss per home (i.e., 
considering the increase in the number of houses) has decreased. 
Statistics derived from the City of Los Angeles Department of Building and 
Safety for the high-intensity rainfall of 1969 and 1978 have been scanned to 
determine the relationship between losses to storms and the development and 
enforcement of grading codes.   able 2 shows previously developed statistics 
for 1969, and Table 3 shows statistics for the 1978 storm. The excellent 
methodology for collecting and computerizing landslide loss was not 
established by the City of Los Angeles until 1969. Thus statistics of similar 
quality are not available for earlier storms in 1952, 1958, and 1962. 
Computerized data from the 1980 storm were not completed by the date of this 
conference. 
It is obvious from both the 1969 and 1978 computerized storm data that the 
codes developed and enforced by the City of Los Angeles have been extremely 
effective in mitigation. Table 2 (the 1969 storm) shows that damages related 
to landslides, mudflows, etc. have been reduced by 97 percent. Table 3 (the 
1978 storm) shows an effective reduction of approximately 95 percent. It is 
estimated that the 1980 storm statistics will show a loss reduction (or 
mitigation factor) of at least 92 to 95 percent. 
This slight decrease in loss reduction (mitigation factor) from 97 to 92 
to 95 percent we believe to be attributed to the following. 
1. Relaxed enforcement, with the axiom being "the further from the last 
storm (in years), the less rigorous the enforcement and concern1' 
2. Loss of well-trained grading inspectors through promotion or retirement 




TABLE 2 ~ a m g g e  to B u i l d i n g  S i t e s  Under D i f f e r e n t  B u i l d i n g  Codes (1969 s t o r m s )  
1 
1963 to Present 
No grading code, no soils 







I sites damaged. 
Semiadequate grading code, 
soils engineering re- 
quired, very limited 
geology, but no status 





Approximately 350 sites 
damaged. 
New modern grading codes; soils 
engineering and engineering 
geology required during 
design: soils engineering 
and engineering geology re- 
quired during construction; 
design engineer, soils engineer, 
and engineering geologist all 
assume legal responsibility. 
Approximately 11,000 sites 
constructed . 
a 
Approximately $182,400 damage. 
Approximately 17 sites 
damaged. 
An average of $330 per An average of $100 per An average of $7.00 per site 
site for the total 
number produced: 
$3,000,000 
' 10,000 sites 
site for the total for the total number 
number produced: produced : 
$2,767,000 $80,000 
27,000 sites 11,000 sites 
Predictable failure Predictable failure Predictable failure 
percentage: 10.4 percentage: 1.3 percentage: 0.15 
percent percent percent 
1,040 damaged 350 damaged 17 damaged 
10,000 total sites 37,000 total sites 11,000 total sites 
Note: The storms of 1962, 1957-58, 1962, 1965, and 1969 all produced similar 
total losses associated with similar destructive storms. 
a Over $100,000 of the $182,000 was incurred on projects where grading was in 
operation and no residences were involved; thus less than $80,000 occurred on 
sites constructed since 1963. 
Source: Slosson (1969). 
4. Loss  o f  s o i l  e n g i n e e r s  from t h e  s t a f f  
5. Change i n  t h e  membership o f  b o t h  t h e  b u i l d i n g  s a f e t y  commission and 
t h e  c i t y  counc i l - -genera l ly  w i t h  peop le  who have n o t  gone through t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  a d i s a s t r o u s  w i n t e r  being r e p l a c e d  
T a b l e s  2 and 3 show t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  codes  c a n  reduce  l o s s e s .  I n  1952 t h e  
C i t y  of Los Angeles  recognized  t h a t  h i g h - i n t e n s i t y  r a i n f a l l  may c a u s e  
l a n d s l i d e s  and a s s o c i a t e d  monetary l o s s e s .  I n  an  a t t e m p t  t o  reduce t h e s e  
l o s s e s ,  t h e  Department o f  B u i l d i n g  and S a f e t y  proposed t h e  f i r s t  g r a d i n g  code  
TABLE 3 Slope Failures in the City of Los Angeles (1978 storms) 
Description 
Dollar 
Number of Number of Percent value 
Sites Failures Failure (millions) 
Pre-1963 (before modern code) 37,000 2,790 7.5 40-49 
Post-1963 (modern code) 30,000 210 0.9 1- 2 
Note: The categories of failure are (1) soil slippage and erosion (28 percent); 
(2) mudflow and debris flow (30 percent); (3) slump/arcuate landslides, 
pre-1963 and natural slopes (22 percent); (4) reactivation of old failures, 
pre-1963 (8 percent); (5) new bedrock landslides, pre-1963 ( 5  percent); 
(6) shallow fill slope and some natural slope failure, post-1963 (7 percent, 
with the modern code promulgated in April 1963). 
Source: Slosson and Krohn (1979). 
that was ever used. Many believed that this code, which was minimal in 
nature, would solve the problem. This code required that the soil engineer or 
design civil engineer determine the geologic hazards. The cQncept that one 
discipline could decide on the need for expertise from another discipline was 
proven to be in error, as the geologic problems were overlooked by those who 
had neither the training nor the experience to determine whether a hazard 
existed or not. Another factor was that the developers were usually more 
interested in keeping the "up front" costs to a minimum than in reducing 
landslide losses. 
Unfortunately (or fortunately, for the more recent buyers of new homes), 
the 1958 storm proved the 1952 code to be inadequate and ineffective. 
Following the 1958 storm the City of Los Angeles established an ad hoc 
committee composed of engineers and geologists to assist in the preparation of 
a revised and upgraded code. This code required that geologic reports be 
submitted, but did not specify by whom. In addition, the geologist was seldom 
involved in the development of design criteria and/or concepts and was seldom 
required to inspect the tract during grading. As a result, the geologic input 
and involvement were of very limited value for disaster mitigation. 
The high-intensity rain of the winter of 1962 again brought devastation to 
California, and particularly to the hillside areas of Los Angeles. The mayor, 
the city council, the Department of Building and Safety, the professions of 
civil engineering, engineering geology, and soil engineering, homeowners 
organizations, and the news media all asked for a stop to losses and damage 
from landslides; some asked for a moratorium on all hillside construction. 
Cooperative efforts between the professions of engineering and geology, 
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working with ;the City of Los Angeles, resulted in a new and modern grading 
code that bedame effective in April 1963. Statistics from the 1969 and 1978 
storms show that this code has reduced losses by 95 to 97 percent. The most 
important additions to the 1963 code were (1) the requirement that each 
professional (the design [civil] engineer, the soil [civil] engineer, and the 
engineering geologist) is required to provide inspection during the grading of 
tracts; (2) the requirement that these professionals perform adequate 
professional analysis prior to issuance of a grading permit; (3) the 
requirement that these professionals certify and sign (with the appropriate 
license/registration numbers noted) the grading plan and the "as-built" 
grading plan; (4) the requirement that the project be certified as being 
completed in accordance with the plans and good professional standards; and 
(5) the requirement that the engineering geologist and soil engineer comply 
with standard procedures established by the City of Los Angeles for 
exploration and slope stability analysis. 
Appendix A contains excerpts from the 1963 codes for the City of Los 
Angeles. Appendix B consists of similar provisions in the grading codes for 
Ventura County, which have produced very good results in reducing losses from 
landslides. In addition to the codes, the Board of Registration for 
Geologists and Geophysicists in California has submitted "Recommended 
Guidelines for the Preparation of Engineering Geologic Reports" to all 
gdologists registered in California. The guidelines, which were prepared by 
the California Division of Mines and Geology, appear in Appendix C. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that not only has there been a reduction in total 
dollar (or monetary) losses and the number of sites af fected but also that the 
loss per site for those damaged has been reduced. A review of the data base 
indicates that there have been no landsl'de failures (slump, arcuate and f planar, or bedding plane) on tracts developed after 1963. The post-1963 
losses have been related to engineered fill failures (not geologic failures) 
and mudflows or debris flows from natural or engineered fill slopes (Figures 
4, 5, and 6). 
In 1978 the predominant problem noted in the post-1963 tracts was shallow 
slump or flow failures in the outer face (slope face) of engineered fills 
(Figure 1). These failures usually occurred within the outer 2 to 5 ft of the 
fill slope. This problem should be addressed by the engineering profession, 
or a warranty similar to a product warranty (such as a one-year warranty on an 
appliance) should be provided to ensure repair--possibly it should be a 
10-year warranty. This warranty could be financed by the buyer, such as is 
done for some major appliances, or by the seller (distributor). In lieu of a 
warranty, insurance should be made available, just as flood insurance was made 
available when it became apparent that homeowners needed assistance. 
In 1980 the number of mudflows and debris flows from natural slopes 
increased. Possible reasons for the increase in this damage factor include 
the following. 
1. Construction on isolated lots in the older tracts (almost all dated 
from before 1963) where a potential for mudslides or debris flows existed 
(Figure 7). 
FIGURE 4 Rear yard  and house o f  a  pre-1963 subd iv i s ion  inundated by 
mudflow o f f  a  n a t u r a l  s l o p e  du r ing  a  1980 storm i n  Tarzana, C a l i f o r n  i a .  
FIGURE 5 House o f  a pre-1963 subd iv i s ion  des t royed  by mudflow from 
n a t u r a l  s l ope  f a i l u r e  i n  Woodland H i l l s ,  C a l i f o r n i a .  ( N o t e :  Two 
deb r ig  f ences  from r e p a i r s  made a f t e r  a  1978 s torm,  upslope from t h e  
house, proved to  be t o t a l l y  i n e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  t h e  mudflow.) 
FIGURE 6 S u r f i c i a l  f a i l u r e  i n  compacted engineered f i l l  s l ope  from 
1980 s torm i n  La Habra, C a l i f o r n i a .  
I 
- \ 
FIGURE 7 N e w  c o n s t r u c t i o n  occu r r ing  downslope from 1980 s torm debr 
flow and mudflow s c a r s  i n  S tud io  C i t y ,  C a l i f o r n i a .  
2. The requirement by some regulatory provisions that hilltops be 
retained in their natural condition and/or that homes be constructed, wherever 
possible, on natural slopes. This inadvertently allows houses to be 
constructed where a potential for mudflows or debris flows exists. 
3. Failure by some geologists, soil engineers, and governmental officials 
to recognize the hazard. 
It is hoped that future code revisions will address both of these 
problems: (1) failure on the outer face of fill slopes and (2) mudflows or 
debris flows from natural slopes. We believe that mitigation is possible in 
both cases. New technology or construction practices may be necessary to 
correct the problem of fill slope failures in conjunction with better 
methodology and guidelines for recognizing the potential for mudflows and 
debris flows. For instance, R. H. Campbell (1975) wrote an excellent paper on 
why, where, and when mud£ lows and debris flows have occurred and should 
occur. Technical reports of this type should be required reading for all 
geologists and civil engineers associated with hillside construction. 
We have continually referred to the City of Los Angeles because (1) the 
City of Los Angeles has the best and most complete records; (2) the City of 
Los Angeles has the best and most effective grading code; (3) the City of Los 
Angeles provides good review and inspection; and (4) the reduction in losses 
for post-1963 tracts within the City of Los Angeles has been approximately 95 
percent, which from all available data is the most effective loss reduction 
known. Other jurisdictions, such as the City of Thousand Oaks and the 
counties of Los Angeles, Orange, and Ventura, have had noticeable improvements 
while others have had little to none. All cities and counties are required by 
California statutes to use Chapter 70 of the Uniform Building Code (UBC) where 
there is hillside grading. Some are using Chapter 70, some have adopted it 
but are not enforcing it, and others have not even bothered to adopt it. 
The news media and politicians frequently refer to the losses in Los 
Angeles and southern California with the suggestion that landslides, mudflows, 
and debris flows only occur here. This concept is false, as losses per capita 
or per home are higher in the San Francisco area than in Los Angeles (e.g., 
the losses in 1969 in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles were 
approximately $20 million, whereas an equivalent number of homes in the San 
Francisco Bay area received approximately $25 to $35 million damages). 
Fleming and Taylor (1980) suggest that very few jurisdictions keep good 
records, with some placing landslide losses under other categories. The 
estimated losses in the 48 conterminous states per year, even with incomplete 
records, total $1 billion per year. 
Lessons learned from storm-related landslide damage within the southern 
California area (and especially the City of Los Angeles) can be of great value 
to the remaining portions of the country. Acting on such lessons (e.g., 
implementing grading codes) could be instrumental in reducing the estimated $1 
billion landslide-related losses that occur annually in the United States. 
Data suggest further that landslides may cause greater domestic or social 
strife (such as divorce, separation, and suicide) than any other natural 
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hazalid or disaster&. ' D a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  and r e sea rch  should be encouraged. 
Earthquake-related d o m e s t i c , ' s o c i a l ,  o r  psychologica l  problems have rece ived  
much a t t e n t i o n  and funding. I t  appears  t h a t  very  l i t t l e  has  been earmarked t o  
s tudy  t h e  e f f e c t s  of l a n d s l i d e s  and f loods  and t h e  long-range consequences of 
t h e s e  even t s  t o  .the f a m i l i e s  involved. Th i s  appears  t o  be an important  
lacuna,  s i n c e  t h e  d o l l a r  l o s s e s  appear t o  be about  t h e  same. 
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.t. APPENDIX A: EXCERPTS FROM THE CITY OF 
LOS ANGELES OFFICIAL GRADING REGULATIONS 
DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING AND SAFETY, CITY OF LOS ANGELES BUILDING BUREAU, 
RULE OF GENERAL APPLICATION--RGA 4- 6 7 
Subject: Rules and Regulations for Supervision on Hillside Tract Grading--RR 
23352 
The permittee shall employ a registered civil engineer or land surveyor to 
prepare the design of grading plans for all hillside grading. The design 
civil engineer or land surveyor shall prepare his design in accordance with 
good planning practice, applicable Codes and to the restrictions imposed 
tl-iereon as determined by detailed studies of the site and materials to be 
graded. These studies shall be performed by a soils engineer and an 
engineering geologist approved by the City of Los Angeles and shall be 
submitted prior to issuance of permits. The design civil engineer or land 
surveyor shall furnish sufficient supervision during construction to obtain 
compliance with the plans, as approved. 
The permittee shall employ a soils engineer and an engineering geologist 
prior to planning the tract, whose duties shall be: to work closely with the 
design civil engineer or land surveyor, to examine surface and subsurface 
conditions in accordance with the Rule of General Application dealing with 
"Subsurface Exploratory work" and to submit reports thereon. These reports, 
in conjunction with the Ordinance, shall form the basis for the design of the 
grading project. These reports shall be based upon a detailed topographic 
base map of the area to be graded and shall include specific conclusions and 
recommendations for avoidance or correction of all known existing or 
anticipated geologic hazards on or affecting the site or contiguous property. 
The soils engineer, in addition to his pre-grading exploratory work, shall 
provide inspection during the placement of all compacted fill in accordance 
with the requirement of the Ordinance, the approved plans and good engineering 
practice. In addition, he shall follow the progress of the job sufficiently 
close to determine that the recommendations of his pre-grading report are 
followed. If conditions which require modification of plans are encountered 
during grading, he shall submit a report of his findings and recommendations 
for change of plans to the permittee and the design civil engineer, the 
enginper ing geologist and the Department . 
The engineering geologist, in addition to his pre-grading exploratory 
work, shall provide inspection during the actual grading process at least as 
often as determined to be appropriate by the Department or Board, with 
periodic in-grading inspection reports submitted at intervals determined by 
the Department. Such grading inspection by the engineering geologist is to 
determine that the conditions of his pre-grading report are as anticipated. 
If conditions which require modification of the plans are encountered during 
grading, he shall submit a report of his findings and recommendations to the 
committee, design civil engineer or land surveyor, soils engineer and the 
Department . 
The soils engineer, at the completion of grading, shall submit a certified 
report of compaction tests for all fill located within the limits of the tract 
and/or offsite grading areas. The soils engineer's final report shall also 
include: a statement that all sub-drains were installed, his professional 
opinion of the suitability of the fill placement area and the ability of the 
natural materials to support the compacted fill without excessive settlement 
of the fill or potential damage to structures erected thereon, a statement to 
the effect that he has inspected all cuts and fills and that in his opinion 
they meet the design requirements. The report shall be referenced to a dated 
as-graded plan prepared by the design civil engineer or land surveyor. 
The engineering geologist at the completion of grading shall submit a 
final geologic report stating that: he had maintained the required in-grading 
inspection, the recommendations of his pre-grading report(s) have been 
followed, that in his professional opinion all known adverse geologic 
conditions have been corrected or provided for, future adverse geologic 
conditions are not anticipated, and all lots or sites are geologically 
suitable and safe for construction. The report shall include the geologist's 
certification that he has inspected all cut slopes and sidehill fill placement 
areas prior to placement of fill. He shall also certify that all sub-drain 
placement areas were inspected prior to installation of the sub-drains. The 
report shall be referenced to a dated as-graded plan prepared by the design 
civil engineer or land surveyor. 
Upon completion of grading, the civil engineer or land surveyor 
responsible for the design shall submit an as-graded plan to the Department 
for approval of all work covered by the grading permit(s) and shall include 
the following: 
1. The plan shall be at a 1 inch = 40 feet scale and shall show the 
locations of streets, pads, slopes, structures, pertinent elevations, original 
contours and finished elevations, other pertinent information required to show 
the as-graded condition, and shall be dated. 
2. The plan shall bear the signature of the design civil engineer or land 
surveyor which shall certify that he has inspected the site, reviewed the 
plans and that the work shown and completed is in accordance with his design. 
If, for any reason any of the three professional persons is terminated 
during the progress of the grading work, he and the committee shall 
immediately notify the Department in writing. Such termination may result in 
temporary delays in the grading operations until satisfactory arrangements are 
made to assure the Department that competent professional supervision is 
provided. When one or all three of the professionals of record are 
terminated, the new'professional(s) shall submit to the Department a letter of 
certification that the previous professional's designs, reports and 
recommendations have been reviewed, all provisions of the Board or Department 
required as conditions of the grading permit will be complied with during the 
course of the work, and he or they shall review the detailed 40-scale gLrading 
plans and thus assume his or their responsibility as herein specified for all 
future grading on the project. The letters shall be referenced to the 
approved grading plans prepared by the design civil engineer or land surveyor. 
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The certificat$on submitted by the civil engineer or land surveyor shall 
pertain to the tract as built. The certification shall apply to the angle of 
stability of cut and fill slopes, compaction requirements, drainage 
provisions, and in general, all safety features incorporated in a well-graded 
hillside job. Engineers and geologists employed for the development shall not 
be deemed to be responsible for the work if alteration work not under their 
control is undertaken after the grading certificate has been issued. 
RULE OF GENERAL APPLICATION--RGA 5-67 
Subject: Rules and Regulations for Hillside Bxploratory Work--RR 23353 
The following rules and regulations shall apply on required hillside 
surface and subsurface exploratory work: 
Surface and subsurface exploratory work shall be performed by a soils 
engineer and an engineering geologist approved by the City of Los Angeles on 
all hillside grading work, except wherein waived by the Department Staff or 
Board. Such exploratory work shall be performed for the purpose of obtaining 
detailed information on which the soils engineer and the engineering geologist 
shall base recommendations for a grading project. The work shall be based 
upon a detailed, accurate topographic base map prepared by the registered 
civil engineer or land surveyor. The map shall be of suitable scale, and 
shall cover the area to be graded, as well as adjacent areas which may be 
affected by the grading. The map shall include the existing and proposed 
contours, locations of streets, pads, slopes, structures, and pertinent 
elevations. 
The engineering geologist's and soils engineer's exploratory work shall be 
conducted at locations considered most likely to reveal any subsurface 
weaknesses which may lead to landslide, slump or settlement failures. 
Particularly, an investigation shall be conducted where the stability will be 
lessened by the grading or where any of the following conditions are 
discovered or proposed: 
1. At fault zones where past land movement is evidenced by the presence 
of fault gouge. 
2. At contact zones between two or more geologic formations. 
3. At zones of trapped water or high water table quite often associated 
with conditions 1 and 2 above. 
4. At bodies of intrusive materials. 
5. At historic landslides or where the topography is indicative of 
prehistoric landslides. 
6. At adversely sloped bedding planes, short range folding, overturned 
folds, etc. 
7. At locations where a fill slope is to be placed above a cut slope. 
8. At proposed cuts exceeding 25 feet in height unless in competent rock 
or of lesser heights in rock of questionable stability. 
9. At the locations of all proposed fills. 
10. Where any side hill fills are proposed. 
11. Wherever water from rainfall, irrigation, private sewage disposal 
systems, or other probable sources from both the grading project and adjoining 
properties is likely to reduce the subsurface stability. 
12. Where the proposed grading may adversely affect the existing or future 
stability of adjoining properties. The investigation shall be sufficient to 
outline the problems and solutions to these problems. 
The soils engineer and engineering geologist shall submit written reports 
of their findings to the permittee and the design engineer or land surveyor. 
Their reports shall include but not necessarily be limited to the following 
minimum data based upon detailed surface and subsurface investigation: 
a. The engineering geologist's report shall include a detailed geologic 
map showing bedrock, soil, alluvium, faults, shears, prominent joint systems, 
lithologic contacts, seeps or springs, soils or bedrock slumps, landslides or 
failures and other pertinent geologic features existing on the proposed 
grading site. Geologic cross-sections, prepared to reasonably depict 
anticipated geologic substructure, shall also be included in sufficient number 
and detail. The report also shall include detailed logs of all borings, test 
pits or other subsurface data obtained during the course of his 
investigation. The subsurface exploration shall extend to sufficient depth 
into the bedrock to expose the deepest rock affecting the proposed grading. 
The report shall include specific details and observations for the soils 
engineer's use in analysis of the stability of cut slopes in zones of shallow 
or perched subsurface waters that may affect slope stability. 
b. The soils engineer's report shall include a map of the proposed 
grading site showing the locations of all subsurface exploratory test pits or 
borings. Detailed logs of the test pits or boring, including the approximate 
locations of all soil or rock samples taken for laboratory testing, shall also 
be included. In addition, laboratory test results, soil classification, shear 
strength characteristics of the soils and other pertinent soil engineering 
data shall be presented. 
Sufficient cross-sections and cut and fill slope stability analyses shall 
be included to substantiate recommendations concerning the vertical height and 
angle of all slopes on the project. 
Other aids in exploratory work may be used but subsurface exploratory work 
sufficient to support the findings shall be performed. 
Both the engineering geologist's and soil engineer's reports shall 
describe the grading project as to its location, topographic relief, drainage, 
geologic and soils types present, the grading proposed, the effects of such 
grading on the site and adjoining properties, and-shall contain specific 
conclusions concerning the feasibility and anticipated future stability of the 
overall project and an analysis of the property on a lot-by-lot basis. 
Specific recommendations for the correction of all known and/or anticipated 
geologic hazards on the grading project must be included. 
Subject: Board Ruling--Stilt Supported Buildings Erected on Slopes Exceeding 
Two ~orizontal" to bne Vertical--RR 22851 
Recommendation 
Approval forsthe Department to issue permits for stilt supported dwellings 
on.caissons or piers where located over a fill slope exceeding two horizontal 
to one vertical. The Superintendent of Building shall determine that good 
engineering practice would permit the conditional use of such a dwelling 
subject to compliance with the following conditions and such other precautions 
found to be reasonable and necessary. 
1. All footings shall be designed by a licensed engineer and extend 
through the fil1.a minimum of 3'-0" into the underlying bedrock but not less 
than the depth required to resist the lateral load by friction or passive 
resistance as determined by the foundation engineer. 
2. All caissons shall be reinforced for their full length with a minimum 
of four No. 4 bars tied with 1/4" hoops at 12" O.C. 
3. All caissons or pier footings shall be tied laterally in two 
directions at the ground surface with grade beams or tie beams a minimum of 
12" x 12" in cross-section reinforced with a minimum of four No. 4 bars tied 
with 1/4" hoops at 12" O.C. 
4. All roof drainage is collected and conducted to the street in a 
non-erosive device. 
5. No additional fill from the footing excavation is placed on the slope. 
6. All loose brush and debris shall be removed from the site prior to 
starting construction. 
7. The fill placed upon this property is susceptible to downhill creep 
which must be presumed and allowed for in the design. The designing engineer 
shall provide support against downhill creep which shall not be less than 1000 
lbs. per linear foot acting upon each caisson or pier for the full length of 
its penetration through the fill. If the designing engineer or the Department 
finds that a greater force is probable, the design shall be modified 
accordingly. 
The above requirements do not preclude consideration of other design 
methods if performed by an engineer versed in soil mechanics; and if the 
design is based upon exploratory evidence substantiated by engineers who are 
approved by the Board to make such investigations. 
Exception: Where there is no fill or fill is less than 12" in depth, 
caissons or piers shall be designed to resist a minimum horizontal force of 
1000 lbs. acting downhill on each caisson or other type of footing. Caissons 
or piers shall be tied together in two directions by grade beams as required 
in Item No. 3. 
8. The site shall be planted as required by the Department to prevent 
surface erosion. 
9. Items 1, 2, 3 and 7 listed above may be omitted if continuous footings 
are used throughout. Continuous footings shall be reinforced with a minimum 
of two No. 4 bars at top and bottom of the footing. 
APPENDIX B: VENTURA COUNTY LAND DEVELOPMENT MANUAL (reproduced in part) 
CHAPTER 7: GRADING 
7000. General. All grading for land development is subject to the 
Ventura County Ordinance Code (UBC Chapter 70). Although grading plans are 
required as part of the improvement plan package, the plan check fees, 
agreements, bonding, inspection and certifications are handled under the 
provisions of the Grading Ordinance. Appurtenances to grading (i.e., drainage 
devices, fences, walls, etc.) must conform to the Standard Land Development 
Specifications. 
7107. Preliminary Grading Plan. The Developer may desire to accomplish 
some grading of the site prior to approval of the grading plans. In this case 
the grading plan may be approved, and a grading permit issued on a preliminary 
basis. Soils and geologic reports will be required and all other conditions 
of approval of a grading plan must be met. Grading plans processed in this 
manner must bear the following statement: CAUTION: PRELIMINARY GRADING 
PLAN. This plan is approved as a preliminary grading plan only. This 
approval does not include approval for placement of base materials, or 
construction of curb and gutter or any other street improvement. Grades are 
subject to change before approval of the road improvement plans. This note 
must be removed by change order at the time the road improvement plans are 
submitted for approval. 
7108. Modification to Requirements of the Grading Ordinance. 
Modification of engineering requirements of the Grading Ordinance, such as 
steeper slopes or use of rock in shallow fills, will be made only on the basis 
of soils engineering reports, geological reports, etc., including 
recommendations for grading procedures and design criteria. Such reports must 
include calculations, where appropriate, allowing a quick check by County 
personnel. Anticipated modifications should be indicated at the tentative map 
stage prior to engineering design. Approval of modifications shall be 
obtained prior to the issuance of a grading permit for either a grading plan 
or a preliminary grading plan. 
7109. Caution in Regard to Cut/Fill Line. Where a cut/fill line crosses 
a building pad, see UBC Section 29-03(e) as modified by the Ventura County 
Ordinance Code. 
7110. Engineering Geology and Soils Engineering Reyrts. Engineering 
geology and soils engineering reports must be submitted if required by the 
Building Official (UBC Sections 7006(e) and ( f ) ) .  Reports required by the 
Building Official must be submitted through the developer's engineer. Three 
copies of each report required plus one grading plan must be submitted to 
Subdivision Engineering for review . County review of such reports shall be 
transmitted to the Engineer as well as the Soils Engineer and Engineering 
Geologist, as applicable. 
The following criteria are for determining whether soils and geologic 
reports are required: 
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1. A soils engineering report may be required if: 
X 
a. The depth of cut or fill is 3 feet or greater, or 
b. The fill is to support structural footings, or 
c. An engineered cut or fill is required. 
2. An engineering geology report as well as a soils engineering report 
may be required for projects in hillside areas and in other areas within the 
County wherein the County Staff Engineering Geologist believes geologic 
hazards may exist. A hillside area is defined as one where any of the 
following conditions exist or are proposed within the project area or the area 
of any off-site work in connection with the proposed project: 
a. Finish cut or fill slope faces with vertical heights in excess of 
16 feet. 
b. Existing slope faces steeper than 10 horizontal to 1 vertical, 
having a vertical height in excess of 10 feet. 
7111. Employment of Engineering Professionals. The owner of land on 
which engineered grading is to be performed shall execute an agreement with 
the County to provide professional services. Such agreement shall be 
acknowledged by each of the professionals involved. 
7112. Responsibilities of Engineering Professionals. The Engineering 
Professionals employed by the property owner on grading work will include the 
Civil Engineer, the Soils Engineer and the Engineering Geologist. The Civil 
Engineer's duties will include: 
1. Preparation of the grading plan. 
2. Design of surface drainage, irrigation and other surface features. 
3. Survey and staking of the work. 
4. Coordination of the other engineering professionals. 
5. Provide "Rough Grading and Final Grading Certification." 
6. Preparation of the "As-Built" grading plan. 
7. Representing the owner for contacts by the County. 
8. Certification of "As-Built" grading plan. 
9. Perform such other work as is necessary to comply with the ordinance 
and to insure proper completion of the work in accordance with good 
engineering practice. 
The Soils Engineer's duties will include: 
1. Investigation and report on existing soil conditions. 
2. Advising the Civil Engineer on soils problems affecting grading. 
3. Inspection and testing of soils moved, exposed, disturbed or processed 
during construction. The Soils Engineer or his representative shall be on the 
site at all times when grading is in progress. 
4 .  Testing completed soil masses to determine building foundation 
requirements. 
5. Certifying that the plans and specifications are in conformance with 
his recommendations and to the final acceptability of the grading. 
6. Design of subdrainage, erosion control, buttresses, and other soil 
connnected features. 
7. Perform such other work as is necessary to comply with the ordinance 
and to insure proper completion of the work in accordance with good 
engineering practice. 
The Engineering Geologist's duties include: 
1. Investigation, mapping, and report of existing geological conditions. 
2. Advising the Civil Engineer and Soils Engineer on geological 
conditions which may affect grading. 
3. Reviewing geological conditions during construction to see if 
modification of the grading plan is required. 
4. Certifying that the plans and specifications are in conformance with 
his recommendations and the final grading is stable in regard to geological 
conditions. 
5. Perform such other work as is necessary to comply with the ordinance 
and to insure proper completion of the work in accordance with good 
engineering geological practice. 
As each of the engineering professionals employed in grading has a 
responsibility for certification of the work on completion of the project, 
none of the engineering professionals should be changed during the course of 
the project. If a change occurs, the new engineering professional must 
satisfy himself as to the work performed by his predecessor through 
certifications from his predecessor, field review, soil explorations and 
testing, or combinations of these or by other methods so that he will be able 
to certify to the entire project on completion. When changes are being made, 
grading will be stopped until the new professional has agreed to take 
responsibility for the work. 
The Civil Engineer shall sign and place his registration stamp or number 
on the grading plan. The Soils Engineer and Engineering Geologist shall 
indicate, by a suitable statement, signature, registration or certification 
stamp of number and date on a print of the grading plan submitted to the 
County, that the plan incorporates all recommendations made by them. 
7400. Standard Variances from the Code. Sections 7009 through 7012 of 
UBC allow the Building Official to approve variances from the UBC where such 
variance is recommended by the Soils Engineer or Engineering Geologist. 
CHAPTER 8: CONSTRUCTION 
8000. General. When the improvement and grading plans have been signed 
and the permits issued by the County Surveyor, the County responsibility for 
control of the land development is transferred from Subdivision Engineering to 
Construction Inspection. A construction engineer and an inspector will be 
assigned by the County to watch the construction to insure that the grading 
and the construction of road improvements meet the minimum requirements of 
County ordinances and standards.  his assignment in no way relieves the 
developer from the responsibility for inspection and supervision of 
construction, or of any responsibility for meeting the requirements of the 
plans,, permits, Grading Ordinances, and the Standard Land Development 
Specifications or %or assuming construction in accordance with recommendations 
of the Soils Enginee,rs and Engineering Geologist. 
8300. Grading Inspection. Inspection of grading is accomplished under 
the Grading ordinance. It is emphasized that the Grading Ordinance is 
directed particularly to grading of private property, and that the 
responsibilities of the Developer, Developer's Engineer, Developer's Soils 
Engineer, and Developer's Engineering Geologist are assigned under the Grading 
Ordinance. Omissions from the plans of any work required by the Grading 
Ordinance will not excuse the developer from any responsibility for compliance. 
. 8306. Grading Reports. The Building Official requires that the 
compaction test data, including results, location and elevation, be available 
for inspection on the site at all times during business hours; or, reports are 
to be mailed daily to the Building Official's designated representative. The 
method of reporting shall be determined at the preconstruction conference at 
the option of the Soils Engineer. 
The Building Official requires sufficient inspection by the Engineering 
Geologist to assure that all geologic conditions have been adequately 
considered. Where geologic conditions warrant, the Building Official may 
require interim geologic reports. These reports may be required to include, 
but need not be limited to reporting, inspection of cut slopes, canyons during 
clearing operations for groundwater and earth material conditions, benches 
prior to placement of fill, and possible spring locations. 
8309. As-Built Grading Plans. Upon completion of the grading work, the 
Civil Engineer shall prepare an "As-Built" grading plan. The Soils Engineer 
and the Engineering Geologist shall indicate by a suitable statement, 
signature, and date on a print of the "As-Built" grading plan that it agrees 
with the results of the work for which they were responsible as determined by 
field inspection. The Civil Engineer shall indicate on the reproducible copy 
of the "As-Built" grading plan that he has received from the Soils Engineer 
and the Engineering Geologist and has submitted to the County the signed 
prints of the grading plans prepared by them. The Civil Engineer shall also 
sign the reproducible "As-Built" grading plan, certifying that it is correct. 
GRADING CONTRACTOR CERTIFICATION 
Job Address or 
Tract NO. Locality 
Owner Permit No. 
I certify that the grading was done in accordance with the plans and 
specifications, the grading ordinance, and the recommendations of the 
Civil Engineer, Soils Engineer and Engineering Geologist. It is 
understood that  t h i s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  includes only  those appects o f  the  
work that  can be determined by m e ,  a s  a competent grading contractor,  
without s p e c i a l  equipment or profess ional  s k i l l s .  
Grading Contractor 
License N o .  
Ins truct ions:  The owner s h a l l  s i g n  i f  the  grading was not done by a 
l i c ensed  grading contractor.  
The following guidelines are required for engineering geologic reports 
submitted to theSDepartment of Public Works, County of Ventura. This 
information was originally printed in California Geology, November 1974. 
These guidelines are an example of "state of the art," and all the elements 
should be considered during the preparation and review of geologic reports. 
Item V was provided by the Southern California Section, Association of 
Engineering Geologists; the State Building Safety Board; and the California 
Division of Mines and Geology. 
I. GEOLOGIC MAPPING 
A. Each report must be a product of independent geologic mapping of the 
subject area at an appropriate scale and in sufficient detail to yield a 
maximum return of pertinent data. In connection with this objective, it may 
be necessary for the geologist to extend his mapping into adjacent areas. 
B. All mapping should be done on a base with satisfactory horizontal and 
vertical control--in general a detailed topographic map. The nature and 
source of the base map should be specifically indicated. For sub-divisions, 
the base map should be the same as that to be used for the tentative map or 
grading plan. 
C. Mapping by the geologist should reflect careful attention to the 
lithology, structural elements, and three-dimensional distribution of the 
earth materials exposed or inferred within the area. In most hillside areas 
these materials will include both bedrock and surficial deposits. A clear 
distinction should be made between observed and inferred features and 
relationships. 
D. A detailed large-scale map normally will be required for a report on a 
tract, as well as for a report on a smaller area in which the geologic 
relationships are not simple. 
E. Where three-dimensional relationships are significant but cannot be 
described satisfactorily in words alone, the report should be accompanied by 
one or more appropriately positioned structure sections. 
F. The locations of test holes and other specific sources of subsurface 
information should be indicated in the text of the report or, better, on the 
map and any sections that are submitted with the report. 
I I. GENERAL INFORMATION 
Each report should include definite statements concerning the following 
matters: 
A. Location and size of subject area, and its general setting with 
respect to major geographic and geologic features. 
B. Who did the geologic mapping upon which the report is based, and when 
the mapping was done. 
C. Any other kinds of investigations made by the geologist and, where 
pertinent, reasons for doing such work. 
D. Topography and drainage in the subject area. 
E. Abundance, distribution, and general nature of exposures of earth 
materials within the area. 
F. Nature and source of available subsurface information. Suitable 
explanations should provide any technical reviewer with the means for 
assessing the probable reliability of such data. (Subsurface relationships 
can be variously determined or inferred, for example, by projection of surface 
features from adjacent areas, by the use of test-hole logs, and by 
interpretation of geophysical data, and it is evident that different sources 
of such information can differ markedly from one another in degree of detail 
and reliability according to the method used.) 
111. GEOLOGIC DESCRIPTIONS 
The report should contain brief but complete descriptions of all natural 
materials and structural features recognized or inferred within the subject 
area. Where interpretations are added to the recording of direct 
observations, the bases for such interpretations should be clearly stated. 
The following check list may be useful as a general, though not 
necessarily complete, guide for descriptions: 
A. Bedrock--igneous, sedimentary, metamorphic types. 
1. Identification as to rock type (e.g., granite, silty sandstone, 
mica schist) . 
2. Relative age, and, where possible, correlation with named 
formations (e.g., Rincon formation, Vaqueros sandstone). 
3. Distribution. 
4. Dimension features (e.g., thickness, outcrop breadth, vertical 
extent). 
5. Physical characteristics (e.g., color, grain size, nature of 
stratification, foliation, or schistosity, hardness, coherence). 
6. Special physical or chemical features (e.g.,.calcareous or 
siliceous cement, concretions, mineral deposits, alteration other than 
weathering) . 
7. Distribution and extent of weather zones; significant differences 
between fresh and weathered rock. 
8. Response to natural surface and near-surface processes (e.g., 
raveling, gullying, mass movement). 
B. Structural features--stratification, foliation, schistosity, folds, 
zones of contortion or crushing, joints, shear zones, faults, etc. 
1. Occurrence and distribution. 
2. ~imensxional characteristics. 
3. Orientation, and shifts in orientation. 
4. Relative ages (where pertinent). 
5. Special effects upon the bedrock. (Describe the conditions of 
planar surfaces)". 
6. Specific features of faults (e.g., zones of gouge and breccia, 
nature of offsets, timing of movements); are faults active in either the 
geological sense or the historical sense? 
C. Surficial (unconsolidated) deposits--artificial (manmade) fill, 
topsoil, stream-laid alluvium, beach sands and gravels, residual debris, lake 
and pond sediments, swamp accumulations, dune sands, marine and nonmarine 
terrace deposits, talus accumulations, creep and slopewash materials, various 
kinds of slump and slide debris, etc. 
1. Distribution, occurrence, and relative age: relationships with 
present topography. 
2. Identification of materials as to general type. 
3. Dimensional characteristics (e.g., thickness, variations in 
thickness, shape) . 
4. Surface expression and correlation with features such as terraces, 
dunes, undrained depressions, anomalous protuberances. 
5. Physical or chemical features (e.g., moisture content, mineral 
deposits, content of expansible clay minerals, alteration, cracks and 
fissures, fractures). 
6. Physical characteristics (e.g., color, grain size, hardness, 
compactness, coherence, cementation). 
7. Distribution and extent of weathered zones, significant 
differences between fresh and weathered material. 
8. Response to natural surface and near-surf ace processes (e .g . , 
raveling, gullying, subsidence, creep, slope-washing, slumping and sliding). 
D. Drainage--surface water and groundwater. 
1. Distribution and occurrence (e.g., streams, ponds, swamps, 
springs, seeps, subsurface basins), 
2. Relations to topography. 
3. Relations to geologic features (e.g., previous strata, fractures, 
faults) . 
4. Sources and permanence. 
5. Variations in amounts of water (e.g., intermittent springs and 
seeps, floods) . 
6. Evidence for earlier occurrence of water at localities now dry 
(e.g., vegetation, mineral deposits, historic records). 
7. The effect of water on the properties of the in-place materials. 
E. Features of special significance (if not already included in foregoing 
descriptions) . 
1. Features representing accelerated erosion (e.g., cliff reentrants, 
badlands, advancing gully heads). 
2. Fea tu re s  i n d i c a t i n g  subsidence of s e t t l emen t  (e.g., f i s s u r e s ,  
s c a r p l e t s ,  o f f s e t  r e f e rence  f e a t u r e s ,  h i s t o r i c  records  and measurements). 
3. Fea tu re s  i n d i c a t i n g  c reep  (e.g., f i s s u r e s ,  s c a r p l e t s ,  d i s t i n c t i v e  
p a t t e r n s  of c r acks  and/or vege ta t ion ,  topographic bulges,  d i sp l aced  o r  t i l t e d  
r e f e rence  f e a t u r e s ,  h i s t o r i c  records  and measurements). 
4. Slump and s l i d e  masses i n  bedrock and/or s u r f i c i a l  d e p o s i t s ,  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  geometr ic  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  c o r r e l a t i o n  wi th  topographic and 
geologic  f e a t u r e s ,  age and r a t e s  of movement. 
5. Depos i t s  r e l a t e d  t o  r e c e n t  f l oods  (e.g., t a l u s  aprons, d e b r i s  
r i d g e s ,  canyon-bottom t r a s h )  . 
6. Act ive  f a u l t s  and t h e i r  r ecen t  e f f e c t s  upon topography and 
drainage.  
IV .  THE BEARING OF GEOLOGIC FACTORS UPON THE INTENDED LAND USE 
Treatment of  t h i s  gene ra l  t op ic ,  whether presented a s  a s e p a r a t e  s e c t i o n  
or i n t e g r a t e d  i n  some manner with t h e  geologic  d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  normally 
c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  con t r ibu t ion  of t h e  r epo r t .  I t  involves both (1) 
t h e  e f f e c t s  of  geo log ic  f e a t u r e s  upon t h e  proposed grading,  cons t ruc t ion ,  and 
land  use, and ( 2 )  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  t hese  proposed modi f ica t ions  upon f u t u r e  
geo log ica l  processes  i n  t h e  a r ea .  
The fol lowing check l ist  inc ludes  t h e  t o p i c s  t h a t  o r d i n a r i l y  should be 
considered i n  submi t t ing  d i scuss ion ,  conclus ions ,  and recommendations i n  t h e  
geologic  r epo r t s :  
A. General c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of  n a t u r a l  f e a t u r e s  with proposed land use: IS 
it b a s i c a l l y  reasonable t o  develop t h e  s u b j e c t  a rea?  
1. Topography. 
2. L a t e r a l  s t a b i l i t y  of  e a r t h  mater ia l .  
3. Problems of f l ood  inundat ion,  e ros ion ,  and depos i t ion .  
4. Problems caused by f e a t u r e s  o r  cond i t i ons  i n  ad jacent  p rope r t i e s .  
5. Other gene ra l  problems. 
B. Proposed c u t s .  
1. P r e d i c t i o n  of what m a t e r i a l s  and s t r u c t u r a l .  f e a t u r e s  w i l l  be 
encountered. 
2 .  P r e d i c t i o n  of  s t a b i l i t y  based on geologic  f a c t o r s .  
3. Problems of  excavat ion (e.g., unusually hard o r  massive rock, 
excess ive  flow of  groundwater).  
4. Recommendations f o r  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o r  reposi&oning of  c u t s ,  
reduct ion  of c u t  s lopes ,  development of  compound c u t  s lopes ,  s p e c i a l  s t r i p p i n g  
above day l igh t  l i n e s ,  b u t t r e s s i n g ,  p ro t ec t ion  a g a i n s t  e ros ion ,  handling of  
seepage water,  s e tbacks  f o r  s t r u c t u r e s  above c u t s ,  e t c .  
C. Proposed masses of f i l l .  
1. General eva lua t ion  of  planning with r e spec t  t o  canyon-f i l l ing and 
s i d e h i l l  masses o f  f i l l .  
2. Comment on suitability of existing natural materials for fill. 
3. ~ecomm"endations for positioning of fill masses, provision for 
underdrainage, buttressing, special protection against erosion. 
D. Recommendations for subsurface testing and exploration. 
1. Cuts and test holes needed for additional geologic information. 
2. Program of subsurface exploration and testing, based upon geologic 
considerations, that is most likely to provide data needed by the soils 
engineer . 
E. Special recommendations: 
1. Areas to be left as natural ground. 
2. Removal or buttressing of existing slide masses. 
3. Flood protection. 
4. Protection from wave erosion along shorelines. 
5. Problems of groundwater circulation. 
6. Position of structures with respect to active faults. 
V. SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The following published guidelines should be considered when preparing 
seismic information. 
1. California Department of Mines and Geology Note No. 37, 
"Guidelines to Geologic/Seismic Reports. 'I 
2. California Department of Mines and Geology Note No. 43, 
"Recommended Guidelines for Determining the Maximum Credible and the Maximum 
Probable Earthquakes." 
VI. DOCUMENTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A .  The report should consider as the minimum requirement Chapter 70, 
Uniform Building Code (1973). Refer to California Administration Code, Title 
25, Section 1090, Excavation and Grading. 
B. All material in the report should be relevant to the purpose of the 
report. 
C. All statements should be documented by references or by accurate field 
observations. 
D. Areal photos (originals or suitable copies) should be included to 
document any discussion on landslides and faults. 
E. The method(s) of field analysis should be discussed in a lucid manner. 

LANDSLIDING AND FLOODING I N  SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
DURING THE WINTER OF 1979-80 
by F. Harold Weber, J r .  
. The s i x  stogms that  swept through southern California during the period 
February 13- 22, 1980, caused widespread damage i n  southern Ca l i fornia.  Some 
of the areas damaged, such as the Santa Monica Mountains and Puente Hills,  
su f fer  damage during every winter with prolonged intense ra in fa l l ,  but 
probably suffered less  damage i n  1980 than i n  1978. Others, however., such 
as the Monterey Park area i n  the Repetto Hills, Bradbury i n  the footh i l l s  of  
the San Gabriel Mountains, and communities o f  coastal San Diego County, 
suffered more damage from shallow debris s l ides  and flows i n  1980 than i n  1978 
Damage may have been less  i n  the Santa Monica Mountains, Puente Hills,  and 
Baldwin Hills i n  1980 than i n  1978 partly because the 1978 rains removed most 
of the so i l  and colluviwn (slopewash) from the s i t e s  most vulnerable to  
sliding. Additionally, the areas more seriously damaged i n  1980 than i n  
previous years may not have received a su f f ic ien t  amount of sustained intense 
ra in fa l l  t o  have triggered widespread landsliding since their  development 
30 t o  40 years ago, 
The improvement i n  grading codes and tu~act development techniques i n  the 
las t  15  or more years has considerably lessened the chances for damage t o  more 
recent l y  constructed bui Zdings i n  southern California, but lands Ziding i n  
1978 and 1980 also damaged many recently developed properties. 
INTRODUCTION 
I n  mid-February 1980 a  s e r i e s  of s i x  s torms swept through southern 
C a l i f o r n i a ,  b r inging  nea r ly  13 in .  of r a i n  i n  n ine  days t o  downtown Los 
Angeles and more than  double t h a t  amount t o  h i l l y  and mountainous a reas .  The 
r e s u l t i n g  l a n d s l i d e s  and f loods  caused an es t imated  $408 m i l l i o n  i n  damage t o  
homes, bus inesses ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  lands,  and p u b l i c  f a c i l i t i e s .  
F. Harold Weber, Jr . ,  is Senior  Geologis t  wi th  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Divis ion of 
Mines and Geology, Los Angeles, Ca l i fo rn i a .  
Note: Adapted from a  r e p o r t  of t he  same t i t l e  prepared f o r  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  
Div is ion  of Mines and Geology (Weber, 1980). 
H a r d e s t  h i t  by l a n d s l i d e s  was t h e  C i t y  of Monterey Park  i n  t h e  s o u t h e r n  
R e p e t t o  H i l l s  ( F i g u r e  1). L a n d s l i d e s  and d e b r i s  f l o o d i n g  a l s o  caused  heavy 
damage i n  p a r t s  o f  t h e  S a n t a  Monica Mountains and P u e n t e  H i l l s  i n  Los Angeles  
County,  i n  t h e  Ventura-Oxnard a r e a  o f  Ventura  County,  i n  s o u t h e r n  Orange 
County, i n  t h e  coastal r e g i o n  o f  San Diego County, and i n  t h e  C i t y  o f  San 
B e r n a r d i n o  i n  San Bernard ino  County, where t h e  H a r r i s o n  Canyon d e b r i s  b a s i n  
overf lowed.  I n  R i v e r s i d e  County t h e  San J a c i n t o  River  overf lowed,  f l o o d i n g  
t h e  C i t y  o f  San J a c i n t o  and c a u s i n g  E l s i n o r e  Lake to r ise above its o u t l e t  
l e v e l  and f l o o d  developments  around t h e  l a k e  and below its outlet .  
More damage may have been caused  i n  s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a  by t h e  February  
1980 r a i n s  t h a n  by e i t h e r  t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  heavy 1978 o r  1969 r a i n s .  T h i s  is 
p r i m a r i l y  because  t h e  heavy r a i n f a l l  d u r i n g  t h e  1980 r a i n s  was c o n c e n t r a t e d  
over a wider r e g i o n  o f  s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a  t h a n  it was d u r i n g  t h e  t w o  p r e v i o u s  
y e a r s  o f  e x c e p t i o n a l  r a i n .  
GEOLOGIC ASPECTS 
The 1980 r a i n s  a p p a r e n t l y  caused more damage i n  s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a  t h a n  
d i d  t h e  r a i n s  o f  1978, and a l s o  p robab ly  more damage t h a n  d i d  t h e  r a i n s  of 
1969. But a  g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  damage i n  1980 was caused by water and 
d e b r i s  f l o o d i n g  t h a n  i n  1969 and 1978, when l a n d s l i d e s  seem t o  have been a  
more dominant c a u s e  o f  damage t h a n  i n  1980. I n  1980 l a n d s l i d e s  were a  
s u b s t a n t i a l  cause o f  damage o n l y  i n  s e l e c t e d  areas and a c a u s e  o f  c a l a m i t o u s  
damage o n l y  i n  t h e  Monterey Park  a r e a  o f  t h e  R e p e t t o  H i l l s  i n  Los Angeles 
County ( F i g u r e  2 ) .  
Areas  r e l a t i v e l y  free o f  damaging l a n d s l i d e s  i n  t h e  r e c e n t  p a s t  t h a t  
s u f f e r e d  a t  l e a s t  moderate damage from l a n d s l i d e s  i n  1980 a r e  Bradbury,  abou t  
12  m i l e s  n o r t h e a s t  o f  Monterey P a r k ,  and p a r t s  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  c o a s t a l  San 
Diego r e g i o n  (Oceanside ,  C a r l s b a d ,  E n c i n i t a s ,  Rancho Bernardo,  and Poway). 
Graded s l o p e s  o f  b o t h  o l d e r  and newer t r a c t s  o f  t h e  Puen te  H i l l s  t h a t  s u f f e r e d  
widespread damage i n  1978 also were damaged by t h e  1980 r a i n s ,  b u t  n o t  to t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  1978. Only a  few l o c a l i t i e s  were s e r i o u s l y  damaged i n  1980 i n  t h e  
Baldwin H i l l s ,  where widespread damage o c c u r r e d  i n  1978. L a n d s l i d e s  were 
l o c a l l y  common i n  t h e  S a n t a  Monica Mountains i n  1980 b u t  a p p a r e n t l y  caused 
less damage t h a n  i n  1969 (Campbell, 1975) and i n  1978 (Weber e t  a l . ,  1978) .  
Shal low d e b r i s  s l i d e s  and bedrock l a n d s l i d e s  o c c u r r e d  a l o n g  t h e  Mal ibu-Pac i f i c  
P a l i s a d e s  c o a s t  ( F i g u r e  3 ) .  
The t o t a l  d o l l a r  l o s s  from damage caused by water  and d e b r i s  f l o o d i n g  was 
l a r g e  i n  1980, b u t  p robab ly  o n l y  because  v e r y  l a r g e  p a r t s  o f  s o u t h e r n  
C a l i f o r n i a  r e c e i v e d  voluminous r a i n f a l l  and runof f  d u r i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
nine-day s torm p e r i o d  and a t  o t h e r  times. I n  1969 and 1978 s m a l l e r  p a r t s  o f  
s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a  s u f f e r e d  t h e  most i n t e n s e  l a n d s l i d i n g  and f l o o d i n g  (such 
a s  t h e  Ventura-Santa Monica Mountains r e g i o n  i n  1969 and t h e  sou thwes te rn  San 
G a b r i e l  Mountains i n  1978) .  I n  1980, however, i n t e n s e  f l o o d i n g  and 
l a n d s l i d i n g  o c c u r r e d  i n  such wide ly  s e p a r a t e d  r e g i o n s  a s  Ventura ,  t h e  S a n t a  
Monica Mountains, San J a c i n t o - E l s i n o r e  Lake, Palm Springs-Coachel la  V a l l e y ,  
San Clemente,  and Rancho Bernardo-Carlsbad ( t h e  La C o s t a  a r e a )  . 
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FIGURE 1 Map of southern  C a l i f o r n i a  showing p r i n c i p a l  a r e a s  o r  loca l -  
i t i e s  t h a t  rece ived  damage from 1980 r a ins .  
Apparently anomalously, southern  C a l i f o r n i a  has  had in t ense ,  d e s t r u c t i v e  
r a i n s  i n  two of t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  years ,  bu t  t h i s  appears  t o  be unusual on ly  when 
cons ider ing  very  r e c e n t  h i s t o r y .  Southern C a l i f o r n i a  had per iods  of c l o s e l y  
spaced r a i n y  yea r s  during t h e  1930s and e a r l y  1940s: f o r  example, t he  win te r s  
of 1934-35, 1936-37, 1937-38, 1939-40, and 1940-41 y i e lded  19 in .  o r  more of 
r a i n  a t  t he  Los Angeles C i v i c  Center.  Y e t  r eco rds  show t h a t  o n l y  29 of the 
103 win te r s  from 1878-79 t o  1980-81 ( t h e  per iod  f o r  which records  have been 
kept )  have y i e lded  a t  l e a s t  19 i n .  o f  r a i n  a t  t h e  C i v i c  Center (and 
p ropor t iona l ly  l a r g e r  amounts, up t o  twice a s  much o r  more, i n  higher  reg ions  
such a s  t h e  Santa  Monica and San Gabr i e l  mountains).  Other per iods  were 
r e l a t i v e l y  dry: f o r  example, dur ing  t h e  20-year per iod  inc luding  t h e  win te r s  
of  1944-45 and 1964-65 only  t h e  win te r s  o f  1951-52 and 1957-58 y ie lded  19 in.  
o f  r a i n  o r  more a t  t h e  C i v i c  Center .  (The w r i t e r  cons ide r s  t h e  f i g u r e  of 19 
in .  t o  be t h e  apparent  th reshold  f o r  t o t a l  annual  r a i n f a l l  a t  t h e  Los Angeles 
C i v i c  Center t o  i n d i c a t e  those  yea r s  when moderate t o  severe  l ands l id ing  and 
FIGURE 2 Photograph showing p a t h  o f  d e b r i s  f low t h a t  s e r i o u s l y  
damaged t h e  house  a t  r i g h t  on  Div ina  V i s t a  S t r e e t  i n  Monterey Park .  
f l o o d i n g  may o c c u r  i n  s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a . )  A long-range view o f  a n n u a l  
r a i n f a l l  d a t a  f o r  t h e  103-year p e r i o d  no ted  above i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  complete  
c y c l e s  from d r y  th rough  w e t  to d r y  a r e  abou t  25 y e a r s  i n  l e n g t h .  On t h a t  
b a s i s ,  t h e  t r e n d  o f  t h e  d a t a  i n  1978 i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  r e g i o n  was l e a v i n g  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  d r i e r  p e r i o d  and e n t e r i n g  a wetter p e r i o d  ( a s  p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d  by 
Weber e t  a l , ,  1978, p. 22) .  
The l a c k  o f  widespread s e v e r e  l a n d s l i d i n g  i n  1980 i n  such a r e a s  as t h e  
S a n t a  Monica Mountains and S a n t a  P a u l a ,  a s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  1969, and  i n - t h e  
Baldwin H i l l s  a r e a ,  a s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  1978, might  be e x b l a i n e d  as f o l l o w s .  
R a i n f a l l  d u r i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  nine-day storm p e r i o d  o f  1980 may n o t  have 
been prolonged enough, o r  spaced o u t  s u f f i c i e n t l y ,  i n  most a r e a s  f o r  t h e  
ground f i r s t  to have become s a t u r a t e d  by g e n t l e  t o  moderate  r a i n f a l l  and t h e n  
to have been s t r u c k  by a n o t h e r  p e r i o d  o f  prolonged ( r o u g h l y  from 6 to  12 
hours )  moderate to i n t e n s e  r a i n f a l l - - t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  is a p p a r e n t l y  needed 
to t r i g g e r  r e g i o n a l l y  widespread s h a l l o w  d e b r i s  s l i d e s  and f lows ,  bedrock and 
f i l l  s lumps,  and bedrock g l i d e s .  Only i n  t h e  Monterey Park a r e a  o f  t h e  
R e p e t t o  H i l l s  d i d  t h i s  c l a s s i c  two-step r a i n f a l l  p a t t e r n  occur  and c a u s e  
FIGURE 3 Aerial view north across Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu, 
Los Angeles County, shows sloughing and sliding that has damaged 
residential properties built too close to the edge of the ancient sea 
cliff. Rocks along the coast here are commonly highly fractured and 
deeply weathered and, hence, very susceptible to slope failure. 
(Photograph courtesy of A. L. Parmer, California Department of 
Transportation. ) 
widespread d e s t r u c t i v e  l ands l id ing .  There about 6.5 in .  of r a i n  f e l l  dur ing  
two storms t h a t  occurred  on February 13 and 14,  s a t u r a t i n g  t h e  ground. Then 
an  es t imated  5 i n .  of r a i n  f e l l  i n  some p a r t s  of  t h e  c i t y  from mid-morning t o  
e a r l y  evening on February 16, causing d e b r i s  s l i d e s  and f lows between 5:00 and 
8:00 p.m. t h a t  damaged more than  100 dwell ings (pe r sona l  communication, Lloyd 
DeLlamas, C i t y  Manager of  Monterey Park) .  These s l i d e s  and f lows s t r i p p e d  
away t h e  mantle o f  s o i l  and colluvium over ly ing  t h e  c layey  s i l t s tone - sands tone  
of  t h e  P l iocene  Fernando formation t h a t  unde r l i e s  t h e  damaged area.  
Espec ia l ly  a f f e c t e d  was a s lope  along Divina V i s t a  S t r e e t  t h a t  had no t  
su f f e red  ubiqui tous  s e r i o u s  damage s i n c e  development began on it i n  t h e  late 
1930s. Apparently,  c o n d i t i o n s  were r i g h t  i n  1980 f o r  s e r i o u s  widespread s lope  
f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  Monterey Park area f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime i n  more than  40 years .  
These cond i t i ons  included: (1) buildup of  s u r f i c i a l  m a t e r i a l  on t h e  s lope ;  
( 2 )  probable weakening o f  t h e  s lope  because of  t h e  modi f ica t ion  of dra inage  
caused by cont inuing  development over t h e  l a s t  40 years ;  and (3) i n t e n s e  
r a i n f a l l  f a l l i n g  f o r  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  lengthy per iod  of t ime on a l r eady  
s a t u r a t e d  ground t o  cause  pore p re s su re  t o  i nc rease  t o  t h e  p o i n t  where many 
s l i d e s  and f lows were t r i gge red .  
No doubt,  cons ide r ing  t h e  l a r g e  amount of r a i n  t h a t  h a s  f a l l e n  on southern  
C a l i f o r n i a  i n  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  yea r s ,  anc i en t  o r  o lde r  h i s t o r i c a l  l a n d s l i d e s  may 
become a c t i v e  (and d e s t r u c t i v e )  l a t e r  i n  t h e  year  (Figure 4 ) .  (For example, 
t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  Bluebird Canyon l a n d s l i d e  i n  Laguna Beach d i d  no t  occur u n t i l  
October 1978, more than s i x  months a f t e r  t h e  preceding i n t e n s e  r a i n s ;  it is 
g e n e r a l l y  be l ieved  t h a t  t h e  water from t h e  r a i n  pe rco la t ing  i n t o  an anc i en t  
l a n d s l i d e  helped t o  t r i g g e r  t h a t  1978 s l i d e  [Tan, 19781 .) 
A second f a c t o r  may be t h a t  a g r e a t  many of  t h e  s l o p e s  t h a t  developed an 
uns t ab le  cond i t i on  i n  t h e  1970s responded t o  t h e  sequence of  s a t u r a t i n g  and 
then in t ense  ( t r i g g e r i n g )  r a i n s  i n  1978 by s l i d i n g ,  slumping, and flowing s o  
t h a t  t h e  uns t ab le  m a t e r i a l  was removed. This  appears  t o  have been e s p e c i a l l y  
t r u e  of t h e  Baldwin H i l l s ,  where f a i l u r e s  were spa r se  i n  1980 compared with 
1978. Conversely, i n  Monterey Park t h e  r a i n s  of 1978 may n o t  have been 
pervas ive  and i n t e n s e  enough t o  loosen s t e e p  uns tab le  c o l l e c t i o n s  of 
colluvium, soil,  and vege ta t ion ,  whereas t h e  1980 r a i n s  were. I n  add i t i on ,  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  s u b s t a n t i a l  amount o f  time must pass  before  massive new c o l l e c t i o n s  
o f  soil, colluvium, and vege ta t ion  can b u i l d  up t o  an uns t ab le  degree aga in  on 
s lopes  t h a t  have f a i l e d  (commonly bare t o  bedrock) i n  h i s t o r i c a l  o r  
p r e h i s t o r i c a l  t i m e s .  (Some s lopes ,  however, f a i l e d  only  p a r t l y  i n  1978 and 
1980, t hus  s i g n a l i n g  probable f u t u r e  danger p o i n t s  f o r  more massive and 
widespread f a i l u r e s .  ) 
SOCIAL-GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS 
Pub l i c  U t i l i t i e s  
A s  i n  most n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r s ,  t h e  p u b l i c  u t i l i t y  agencies  and companies 
seem t o  have been a b l e  t o  r e s t o r e  s e r v i c e  t o  most a r e a s  f a i r l y  quickly;  even 
i n  a r e a s  s e v e r e l y  damaged, most s e r v i c e s  were r e s t o r e d  wi th in  two o r  t h r e e  
days. 
FIGURE 4 Damaging bedrock l a n d s l i d e  t h a t  occurred  i n  mid-April 1980 
i n  t h e  Mount Washington-Glassell Park s e c t i o n  of t h e  C i t y  of  L o s  
Angeles. The l a n d s l i d e  probably r e s u l t e d  from t h e  r e a c t i v a t i o n  of an 
a n c i e n t  bedrock l ands l ide .  (Photograph by John Shadle,  Los Angeles 
C i ty . )  
Flood Cont ro l  
Most of  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  of t h e  Los Angeles County Flood Cont ro l  ~ i s t r i c t  
were r epo r t ed  t o  have performed well .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  d i s t r i c t  was ab le  t o  
c l e a n  its d e b r i s  b a s i n s  a s  they  f i l l e d .  Only a few b a s i n s  overflowed, and 
those  were p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  dra inages  where f i r e s  had r e c e n t l y  burned upstream. 
A measure approved by Los Angeles County v o t e r s  l a s t  year  t o  r e s t o r e  revenue 
l o s t  by t h e  d i s t r i c t  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  of P ropos i t i on  13 becoming law was 
g e n e r a l l y  given c r e d i t  f o r  providing t h e  d i s t r i c t  with nea r ly  adequate funds 
f o r  t h e i r  c leanup work. Seve ra l  spokesmen f o r  t h e  d i s t r i c t  provided e x c e l l e n t  
s t a t u s  r e p o r t s  on t h e  r a d i o  dur ing  t h e  r a i n s ,  a s s u r i n g  o r  warning t h e  p u b l i c  
a s  t o  t h e  s a f e t y  o f  f lood  c o n t r o l  f a c i l i t i e s .  Some r u s t i c  a r e a s  most a f f e c t e d  
by water and d e b r i s  f l ood ing ,  such a s  t h e  communities of  Topanga, Mandeville 
Canyon, and Monte Nido, have very minimal f lood  c o n t r o l  f a c i l i t i e s .  
One c i t i z e n  of t h e  Santa Monica Mountains descr ibed  e ros ion  and f lood  
c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of he r  t r a c t  r e s idence  t h a t  appa ren t ly  were 
p r i v a t e l y  cons t ruc t ed  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  tract, bu t  f o r  which now t h e r e  is a 
ques t ion  a s  to who is re spons ib l e  f o r  t h e i r  maintenance. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  maintenance f o r  such s t r u c t u r e s  may need t o  be f i x e d  and c l a r i f i e d .  
I n  San Bernardino t h e  Harr i son  Canyon d e b r i s  bas in  and accompanying 
f a c i l i t i e s  proved woeful ly inadequate  t o  p r o t e c t  a t r a c t  o f  houses, d i r e c t l y  
downstream, from water and d e b r i s  coming from a r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  canyon t h a t  
was burned over by a b r u s h f i r e  i n  1979. 
The Corps of Engineers  is planning t o  c o n s t r u c t  adequate f lood  c o n t r o l  
f a c i l i t i e s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  P a c i f i c  M i s s i l e  Tes t  Center i n  Ventura County from 
Calleguas Creek, which broke through its l evee  and f looded dur ing  heavy 
runoff .  I n  R ive r s ide  County t h e  channel f o r  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River proved 
inadequate t o  con ta in  t h e  flow o f  runoff  i n  1980; downstream, much permanent 
o r  semipermanent development has  been allowed around t h e  edge of E l s i n o r e  Lake 
below i ts  apparent  s a f e  l e v e l  ( a t  l e a s t  above t h e  maximum l e v e l  a t t a i n e d  
during t h i s  y e a r ' s  ra ins--nearly 1,266 f t  above s e a  l e v e l . )  
A s s  is tance  t o  C i t i z e n s  
I n  most c a s e s  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  homeowners and o t h e r s  was gene ra l ly  considered 
t o  be exped i t i ous  and s a t i s f a c t o r y .  The Red Cross  e s t a b l i s h e d  its s h e l t e r s  
very qu ick ly  i n  many p laces .  "One-stop" c e n t e r s  f o r  people t o  apply f o r  
government r e l i e f  programs a l s o  were e s t a b l i s h e d  very quickly.  Radio and 
t e l e v i s i o n  s t a t i o n s  and newspapers c o n t i n u a l l y  provided telephone numbers f o r  
people t o  c a l l  i n  t h e i r  emergency r eques t s  t o  government agencies  and u t i l i t y  
companies and t o  r e q u e s t  information.  
C i t i z e n  Response 
A t  l e a s t  10 people were k i l l e d  when they  drove i n t o ,  o r  attempted t o  c r o s s  
by f o o t ,  water t h a t  was running t o o  s w i f t l y  and t o o  deeply i n  normally d r y  
p laces .  A s  i n  1978 and 1969, people i n  dwel l ings  and o t h e r  bu i ld ings  were 
in ju red  o r  k i l l e d  when s l o p e s  behind gave way suddenly and watery masses of  
mud, si l t ,  sand, rock, and vege ta t ion  c rashed  i n t o  o r  through t h e  bui ld ings .  
Even i f  they  a r e  no t  i n ju red ,  most people whose houses and belongings a r e  
badly damaged o r  ru ined  s u f f e r  mild t o  s eve re  psychologica l  problems, and some 
mental hea l th  agencies  announced during t h e  a f te rmath  o f  t h e  r a i n s  t h a t  they 
were prepared t o  g i v e  h e l p  t o  people s o  a f f e c t e d .  Psychological  problems of 
adjustment t o  t h e  sudden ca lami ty  appear t o  be e s p e c i a l l y  s e r i o u s  i n  
communities (such a s  Monterey Park i n  1980 and Baldwin H i l l s  i n  1978) t h a t  
have n o t  su f f e red  previous  seve re  and widespread damage from s lope  f a i l u r e s  o r  
f looding ,  where r e s i d e n t s  tend t o  be unaware of  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  hazards 
surrounding them. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  r e s i d e n t s  of Topanga, for '  example, a r e  
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r e l a t i v e l y  used to+f lood ing  and l a n d s l i d e s .  Also, communities downslope o r  
downstream from r e c e n t l y  burned a r e a s  tend t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  aware t h a t  i t  is 
l o g i c a l  t o  expect  poss ib l e  problems i n  heavy rainstorms.  
I n  t h e  Monterey Park a rea  many s lopes  f a i l e d  t h a t  had been p lan ted  wi th  
common ice p l a n t ,  which because it is heavy and has  very  shal low r o o t s  is  no 
longer  recommended f o r  p l an t ing  t o  p r o t e c t  s lopes ,  and i n  some a r e a s  is 
banned. I n  some newer t r a c t s  ( i n  Hacienda Beights  and i n  t h e  Puente H i l l s ,  
f o r  example) s l o p e s  have been p lan ted  with a l i g h t e r  ground cover ,  e i t h e r  by 
t h e  developer o r  by t h e  homeowner with i n s t r u c t i o n s  from t h e  developer o r  t h e  
l o c a l  government. Because engineering measures t o  r e s t o r e  and p r o t e c t  damaged 
s l o p e s  on s i n g l e  l o t s  may c o s t  a s  much a s  $50,000 t o  $100,000 and poss ib ly  
more, it is v i t a l  f o r  homeowners t o  p r o t e c t  and maintain s lopes  a s  w e l l  a s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  minimize t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of f a i l u r e .  
A volunteer  group, "The Tree  People," o r i g i n a l l y  formed t o  p l a n t  t r e e s ,  
rece ived  much p r a i s e  f o r  its e f f o r t  to sandbag and h e l p  c l e a n  up r e s i d e n t i a l  
p roper ty  dur ing  t h e  1980 storms, mostly i n  t h e  Santa Monica Mountains, where 
they  had an o f f i c i a l l y  des igna ted  headquar te rs  i n  a l o c a l  park f a c i l i t y .  The 
a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Conservat ion Corps seemed to  be l e s s  n o t i c e a b l e  
and were r ece iv ing  less media a t t e n t i o n  during t h e  1980 r a i n s  than they had in  
1978, b u t  i n  e a r l y  March, a f t e r  t h e  r a i n s ,  they  were repor t ed  to be providing 
h e l p  i n  Monterey Park, Lake E l s ina re ,  and o t h e r  a reas .  Los Angeles C i t y  
Councilman Robert Ronka set up a d i s a s t e r  emergency headquar te rs  a t  h i s  
d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e  i n  Sunland-Tujunga where people could seek a s s i s t a n c e  o r  
vo lunteer  a id .  
Some c i t i z e n s  of t h e  Los Angeles C i t y  a r e a  of  t h e  Santa Monica Mountains 
were outraged when they  were i ssued  c i t a t i o n s  by c i t y  i n spec to r s  f o r  having 
dumped d e b r i s  t h a t  had come down from t h e i r  backyard s l o p e s  i n t o  c i t y  s t r e e t s  
i n  f r o n t  of t h e i r  residences.  The c i t y  had picked up such m a t e r i a l  without  
comment a f t e r  t h e  1978 r a i n s .  By law t h e  c i t y  is allowed only  t o  c l e a n  up 
d e b r i s  from t h e  s t r e e t s  t h a t  is placed t h e r e  n a t u r a l l y  by f looding  o r  by 
d e b r i s  s l i d e s  and flows, even though most of t h i s  d e b r i s  is der ived  from 
n a t u r a l  and graded s lopes  t h a t  a r e  on p r i v a t e  property.* The c i t y  l a t e r  
rece ived  $500,000 i n  f e d e r a l  funds t o  be used t o  pick up from p r i v a t e  proper ty  
d e b r i s  t h a t  owners could document was der ived  from t h e  storms. 
Many r e s i d e n t s  of damaged a r e a s  interviewed by t h e  p r e s s  seemed only  
vaguely aware of  t h e  dangers of  l i v i n g  i n  canyons t h a t  e x i s t  on ly  because 
through geologic  time they have been carved o u t  of bedrock by t h e  s t r e n g t h  of 
voluminous runoff  dur ing  i n t e r m i t t e n t  heavy r a ins .  Furthermore, many 
r e s i d e n t s  a r e  apparent ly  unaware of t h e  i m p l i c i t  dangers  of apparent ly  
innocent s lopes  i n  t h e i r  neighborhood f a i l i n g  dur ing  such r a i n s ,  inc luding  
n a t u r a l  s lopes  t h a t  have not  f a i l e d  i n  h i s t o r i c a l  time and brushy, gently t o  
moderately p i tched  s lopes  developed i n  rocks  t h a t  appear t o  be r e s i s t a n t  to 
s l i d i n g .  Even rocky vo lcan ic  t e r r a i n  can y i e l d  d e b r i s  s l i d e s  and flows, given 
t h e  r e q u i s i t e  amount and spacing o f  r a i n f a l l ,  a s  t h e  w r i t e r  observed i n  AgOUra 
i n  1969. Many people l i v i n g  i n  l ands l ide -  and flood-prone a r e a s  simply do not  
seem t o  be aware of  what can happen dur ing  heavy r a i n s  o r  to  have g iven  even 
b r i e f  thought t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of p o t e n t i a l  geologic  hazards.  
Building Codes 
Grading codes of Los Angeles County and C i t y  and those  of o t h e r  coun t i e s  
and c i t i e s  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  have evolved g radua l ly  s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  
1950s. L o s  Angeles County and C i t y  adopted s o p h i s t i c a t e d  ordinances i n  1962 
and 1963, r e spec t ive ly ,  and have updated them s i n c e  those  years .  C a l i f o r n i a  
S t a t e  law now r e q u i r e s  a l l  coun t i e s  and c i t i e s  t o  use Chapter 70 of  t h e  
Uniform Building Code a s  t h e  minimum grading code f o r  h i l l s i d e  development i f  
they  do n o t  have t h e i r  own equal  o r  more s t r i n g e n t  code. 
P r o p e r t i e s  a long Divina V i s t a  S t r e e t  i n  t h e  C i t y  of Monterey Park t h a t  
were s e r i o u s l y  damaged by t h e  1980 r a i n s  were developed i n  t h e  1930s, before  
grading codes were developed f o r  any county o r  c i t y  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  
Other p r o p e r t i e s  damaged i n  Monterey Park were developed dur ing  t h e  per iod  
extending from t h e  1930s through t h e  1970s. Although t h e  c i t y  has  not  
developed a grad ing  code o f  its own, it has  used Chapter 70 of t h e  Uniform 
Building Code i n  r e c e n t  years;  bu t  it s t i l l  does no t  r e q u i r e  a g e o l o g i s t ' s  
i npu t  i n t o  grading p lans .  P r o p e r t i e s  developed i n  t h e  County and C i t y  of  Los 
Angeles dur ing  t h e  mid t o  l a t e  1960s and 1970s ( a f t e r  adopt ion of modern 
codes) were a l s o  damaged by t h e  1980 ra ins :  i n  t h e  county, on Lamplighter 
Lane and o the r  roads  i n  Malibu, i n  Calabasas Park,  i n  L ibe r ty  Canyon i n  
Agoura, i n  Diamond Bar, and a t  o t h e r  l o c a l i t i e s ;  i n  t h e  c i t y ,  on Paseo Miramar 
i n  P a c i f i c  Pa l i s ades ,  on Topeka Drive i n  Tarzana, i n  Mandeville Canyon, and a t  
o the r  l o c a l i t i e s .  
N e w  S t a t e  L e g i s l a t i o n  
The s igning ,  i n  mid-March 1980, by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,  o f  
Assembly B i l l  1571, which was authored by Assemblywoman Gwen Moore of Los 
Angeles, i n i t i a t e d  a s l o p e  s t a b i l i t y  s tudy by t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Divis ion of Mines 
and Geology i n  t h e  Baldwin H i l l s ,  which were seve re ly  damaged by s lope  
f a i l u r e s  dur ing  t h e  March 4-5, 1978, r a i n s  (Ca l i fo rn i a  Div is ion  of  Mines and 
Geology, 1980).  Assembly B i l l  1571 a l s o  adds Sec t ion  5105 t o  t he  S t r e e t s  and 
Highways Code, r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  Improvement A c t  o f  1911. This  a c t  au tho r i zes  
l e g i s l a t i v e  bodies  of c i t ies  and coun t i e s  t o  c r e a t e  s p e c i a l  assessment 
d i s t r i c t s  f o r  paying t h e  c o s t s  and expenses of va r ious  improvements t o  
proper ty  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  benef i ted  by t h e  work done. Sec t ion  5105 f u r t h e r  
au tho r i zes  "work t o  prevent ,  mi t iga t e ,  aba t e  o r  cont ro l .  a geologic  hazard, a s  
def ined ,  o r  t o  r e p a i r  damages therefrom, and t h e  performance of  such work on 
p r i v a t e  proper ty  under s p e c i f i e d  condit ions."  
Senate  B i l l  1195 by Senator  Robert Beverly was enacted i n t o  law i n  1979. 
Th i s  law provides a mechanism f o r  pub l i c  f inanc ing  of  p r o j e c t s  f o r  t h e  
mi t iga t ion ,  abatement, o r  c o n t r o l  of a geologic  hazard through t h e  
es tab l i shment  of  "geologic  hazards abatement d i s t r i c t s . "  
*Proposi t ion 4, approved by s t a t e  v o t e r s  on June 3,  1980, w i l l  al low a 
change i n  t hese  procedures.  
The l o c a l l y  d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t s  of t h e  1980 (and 1978) r a i n s ,  viewed i n  
l i g h t  of  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  southern C a l i f o r n i a  r eg ion  has en t e red  a  per iod  
of c l o s e l y  spaced r a i n y  yea r s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  wet c y c l e  t h a t  occurred i n  t h e  
1930s and e a r l y  1940s, p l a i n l y  show t h a t  more needs t o  be done t o  prevent  
d i s a s t e r s  caused by l o c a l  l ands l id ing  and f looding.  
I n  r ecogn i t i on  of  t h i s  need, t he  Department of Conservat ion and the  
Div is ion  of Mines and Geology recommend t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  Leg i s l a tu re  c r e a t e  a 
program t o  i d e n t i f y  and zone a r e a s  of high l a n d s l i d e  hazards.  The d i v i s i o n  
a l s o  recommends t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e  c r e a t e  a  program t o  conduct s p e c i a l  
s lope  s t a b i l i t y  s t u d i e s  of p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  a r e a s ,  such a s  t h e  c o a s t a l  
Santa  Monica Mourltains, f o r  use by l o c a l  agencies  i n  t h e i r  admin i s t r a t i on  o f  
codes. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  recommends a number o f  measures--many of 
which a r e  a l r eady  i n  e f f e c t  i n  some areas-- that  could  be i n s t i t u t e d  a t  t h e  
l o c a l  l e v e l .  These inc lude  mandatory n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  p rospec t ive  buyers of  
houses o r  apartment bu i ld ings  of known s lope  s t a b i l i t y  problems; t h e  
es tab l i shment  of  assessment d i s t r i c t s  f o r  upgrading and maintaining the  
adequacy of  s l o p e s  ( s imi l a r  t o  brush c o n t r o l  i n spec t ions  f o r  f i r e  s a f e t y )  t o  
ensure  t h a t  d r a i n s  and vege ta t ion  a r e  maintained adequately;  more e f f e c t i v e  
m i t i g a t i o n  of t h e  hazard o f  f looding ,  d e b r i s  f looding ,  d e b r i s  flows, and 
bedrock l ands l id ing  posed by burned-off a reas ;  more s t r i n g e n t  enforcement o f  
grading codes, inc luding  on-s i te  i n spec t ions  before,  dur ing ,  and a f t e r  grading 
f o r  r e s i d e n t i a l  t r a c t s  and f o r  i nd iv idua l ly  s i t e d  r e s idences  and o the r  
bu i ld ings ;  improvement of bu i ld ing  codes and f i l l  s l ope  engineering;  and 
formal programs t o  educate  people about t h e  hazards of p o t e n t i a l  l a n d s l i d e s  
and f loods .  
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THE MALIBU SLIDE 
by Raymond A. Forsyth and Marvin L. McCauley 
What has become well known as the Malibu slide occurred adjacent to the 
Pacific Coast Highway in the central part of the Santa Monica Mountains one 
and one half miles west of Topanga Canyon. Sliding in this area is a common 
occurrence as the result of bluff recession due to oversteepening by sea 
erosion. 
On April 13, 1979, a rock slide resulted in closure of the Pacific Coast 
Highway. A field review disclosed a system of cracks and fissures above the 
bluff face, suggesting the possibility of a mass movement of 60,000 cu yd of 
slide debris onto and across the highway. The primary problem posed by the 
slide was that of keeping the Pacific Coast Highway at least partially open 
while ensuring the safety of traffic on the highway during the course of an 
investigation to develop a recommendation for permanent correction. To 
accomplish this a barrier suitable for the catchment of small earth and rock 
falls was erected, along with a monitoring system to provide advance warning 
of mass movement. The early warning system consisted of the following four 
elements : 
1. Subaudible rock noise stations ( S m )  
2. Steel pins for surface measurements 
3. Surface extensometers that would trigger an alarm at the roadway level 
in the event of movements in excess of 0.15 ft in a 24-hour period 
4. Continuous visual observation 
The investigation to develop a permanent correction consisted of geologic 
mapping, seismic investigation, vertical and horizontal borings, and a 
laboratory testing program involving residual shear strength tests on 
recovered samples. Analysis of the data indicated that a slope flattening 
necessary to achieve stability would involve removal of 1-l/2 to 3 million cu 
yd of material. The plan ultimately selected involved removal of 150,000 cu 
yd plus slope reinforcement with rock dowels. 
Raymond A. Forsyth is Chief of the Soil Mechanics and Pavement Branch and 
Marvin L. McCauley is Senior Engineering Geologist with Caltrans 
Transportation Laboratory in Sacramento, Calfornia. 
The c o n t r a c t  f o r  f i n a l  c o r r e c t i o n  was approved on September 12, 1979. 
Excavation and rock doweling began i n  e a r l y  October. Excavated material was 
pushed down t h e  face o f  t h e  slide i n t o  t h e  catchment area on a 12-hour- 
per-day, 6-day-a-week bas i s .  Removal o f  t h e  slide was accomplished a t  an  
average r a t e  of 3,500 cu yd per day, wi th  dowels being i n s t a l l e d  a t  an  average 
r a t e  o f  30 per  day. The c o r r e c t i o n ,  which included i n s t a l l a t i o n  of  a steel 
mesh on t h e  most a c t i v e  p a r t  of t h e  b l u f f  face, was completed i n  June  1980. 
GEOTECHNICAL O R I G I N  AND REPAIR OF THE BLUEBIRD CANYON LANDSLIDE, 
LAGUNA BEACH, CALIFORNIA 
by F. Beach Leighton 
Total damage from the Bluebird Canyon landslide of October 2, 1978, was 
$15 million. Although t h i s  s l ide resulted i n  the destruction of 25 homes, 
a l l  u t i l i t i e s  i n  the area, and portions of thxee roads, no serious injuries  
were sustained. A l l  geologic studies i n  the area postdated construction o f  
t h i s  20- t o  30-year-old residential section of south Laguna Beach. 
The s l ide occupied 1.5 ha and was a portion of a pre-Holocene rock block 
s l ide of 2.5 ha with similar l i thologic and s t ruc twal  control, namely, a dip 
slope i n  sandstone and si l ts tone of the Topanga formation (middle Miocene). 
The 1978 sl ide broke along preexisting discontinuities: (1)  a fault  zone 
along the r ight  flank, ( 2 )  a former head scarp a t  the head, and ( 3 )  a fracture 
zone on the l e f t  flank. I t  s l id  along an inclined bedding surface with a 
synclinal warp. 
The basal rupture surface of the oldest of two major episodes o f p r e -  
Holocene sliding l i e s  an average of 6 m below the rupture surface of the 1978 
slide,  a t  27 m vert ical  depth. These two principal rupture surfaces represent 
i l l i t e - r i c h  plast ic  clay seams 0.75 t o  4 em thick.  
The abnomnally heavy 1977-78 rainfal l  i s  believed t o  have percolated 
deeply in to  the old slide mass t o  the impermeable clay seams, permitting 
saturation and leaching of them, buildup of pore pressures along them, and 
buildup of a hydrostatic head i n  the open-structured materials of the large 
preexisting graben i n f i l l i n g .  Cumulative channel entrenchment that removed 
toe support was a second triggering factor. 
F. Beach Leighton is Pres ident  of Leighton and Associates i n  I rv ine ,  
Cal i fornia .  
Note: My thanks are extended to a l l  t h e  members of our geotechnical  
l ands l ide  team a t  Leighton and Associates on t h i s  p r o j e c t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  I r a j  
Poormand, Larry Cann, and Bruce C l a r k .  Dorothy Bergman provided d r a f t i n g  
support and Maria Bo t toms  l i b r a r y  ass i s t ance  on t h i s  paper. Their work  and 
t h a t  of Brent Taylor i n  h i s  role of publ ica t ions  e d i t o r  i n  spurring and 
guiding t h i s  paper are g r a t e f u l l y  acknowledged. 
Remedial construction between October 1978 and June 1979 consisted of 
pZacing a horseshoe-swed shear key buttress a t  the head of the s l ide  and 
a gravity buttress a t  the toe.  This ear thork  involved about 260,000 cu m and 
was integrated with a subdrain system and a storm drain system. Soldier pi les  
were placed t o  keep the backslope of the shear key excavation from retreating. 
They were e f f ec t i ve  except for one backsZope failure that  destroyed one 
residence and undermined another. The reconstruction o f  the s l ide area was 
successfuZ i n  saving public property and 22 residences around the periphery 
and i n  restoring 25 Zots without need of further s igni f icant  grading. Nm 
residences have now been b u i l t  upon most of these 25 Zots. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bluebird Canyon disaster of October 2, 1978, came unexpectedly to this 
20- to 30-year-old residential section of south Laguna Beach, as none of the 
typical forewarnings had been associated with this event. No serious injuries 
were sustained, although the landslide occurred while most residents were 
still sleeping or just rising, between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. This fortunate 
record can be attributed to the slow sliding over a period of about 40 
minutes, the dominantly translational movement, the restriction of severe 
internal deformation to the head and foot of the slide, the existence of 
mostly single-story, wood-frame residences, and the development of scarps and 
fissures outside most building areas. The horseshoe-shaped main scarp 7 to 10 
m in height left six homes overhanging, but the residents were able to escape 
through unsuspended portions (see Figure 1A) .  
The stricken area became uninhabitable and was declared a disaster area by 
federal and state proclamations. Total damage was estimated at $15 million. 
Twenty-five homes had to be demolished, and access was cut off to other homes 
by the destruction of utilities (sewer, water, gas, and overhead electricity) 
and critical portions of three roads (Meadowlark Lane, Meadowlark Drive, and 
Oriole Drive). Of ominous portent was the blockage of the natural Bluebird 
drainage channel by the foot of the landslide (Figure 2). This dam, with a 
reservoir capacity of 12,000 to 19,000 cu m, could have catastrophically 
failed in the event of subsequent heavy winter rains, resulting in damage to 
properties downstream and possible isolation of over 280 properties upstream. 
Most homes in the slide area were built in the 1950s directly on the 
natural soils of an undetected preexisting landslide mass. This building 
program occurred prior to the requirement that engineering geology be applied 
to residential construction within the incorporated limiks of the City of 
Laguna Beach. 
GENERAL GEOLOGIC SETTING 
The landslide occurred on the southwest flank of the San Joaquin Hills 
underlain in this area by the Topanga formation of middle Miocene age. The 
triangular-shaped cuesta on which the recent and at least two pre-Holocene 
episodes of sliding occurred is bounded on the south by Bluebird Canyon and on 
the north and west by Rim Rock Canyon. The modified dip slope of the cuesta 
has a slope of 6 to 8 degrees with a change to 30 to 36 degrees at the foot 
FIGURE 1 A  Aer ia l  view o f  Bluebird Canyon lands l ide  immediately 
fol lowing the  October 2 ,  1978, event .  
FIGURE 1B View o f  t h e  same area i n  1981 i n  res tored  s t a t e .  
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FIGURE 2 Photogeologic index map of Bluebird Oanyon area, Laguna Beach. 
owing to entrenchment of Bluebird Canyon. The overall median slope angle of 
17 degrees approximates the average dip angle of 21°s of the bedrock 
bedding. As shown in Figure 3, the dip slope is complicated by a synclinal 
warp in the sandstone-siltstone section and a normal fault zone along the 
western slide boundary. Subsurface exploration prior to remedial grading and 
detailed geologic mapping during remedial grading permitted identification of 
a myriad of small but significant structural features, such as clay gouge 
zones, joint sets, minor faults and shears, gypsum-filled fractures, and 
flexural slip surfaces along bedding planes. 
FIGURE 3 Block diagram showing Bluebird Canyon landslide. 
GEOTECHNICAL STUDIES 
Previous geotechnical studies included a general planning study (Leighton, 
1969b) supplemented by a seismic safety element (Leighton and Associates, 
1975) and an engineering geologic report of storm damage (Leighton, 1969a). 
These studies were mostly field and office compilations without detailed 
original mapping beyond the earlier agency work (Vedder et al., 1957). 
Geoenvironmental maps of Orange County (Morton et al., 1973) and engineering 
geologic maps of the Laguna Beach quadrangle (Tan and Edgington, 1976) were 
important geotechnical contributions, but all of these studies postdated 
construction of the residences. 
Previous published studies did not identify the area as an old slide, 
other than designating the general area in the 1969 general planning study as 
a "major bedrock area subject to potential instability." 
Studies of the landslide following its October 1978 occurrence were 
undertaken by Leighton and Associates for the City of Laguna Beach (Leighton 
and Associates, 1978a,b, 1979). These studies were only partially summarized 
in published form (Leighton, 1979, 1980). Other published papers include 
those by Miller and Tan (1979), Sydnor (1979), and Tan (1979). 
The principal geotechnical steps taken in the postslide work included: 
1. Study of stereoscopic pairs of aerial photographs taken in every 
decade since the 1920s 
2. Field investigation, including geologic mapping on postslide and 
preslide base maps and aerial photographs 
3. Monitoring of postslide deformation at 20 tiltmeter locations, 9 
extensometer sites, dozens of cracks and boring offsets, and three slope 
indicators in the head scarp area for the soldier pile system 
4. Measurement of the groundwater regime and geochemical parameters of 
both natural water and domestic water 
5. Clay mineralogy by Gerald Henderson 
6. Subsurface logging of 24 holes 0.7 m in diameter ranging in depth from 
9 to 35 m, and 45 lineal meters of backhoe excavation 
7. Soil sampling and laboratory testing of earth materials 
8. Preparation of detailed maps and illustrations, stability analyses, 
and reports in three stages 
9. Remedial geotechnical design and continuous in-grading inspections 
10. Compilation of final reports 
LANDSLIDE RELATIONSHIPS 
The 1978 landslide and the preexisting landslides at the site were rock 
block slides (block glides) with essentially no rotation of the main block and 
only slight rotation at the foot (see Figures 3 and 4). The "ancient" slide 
has an area of 2.5 ha, compared with an area of 1.5 ha for the 1978 slide; the 
basal rupture surface of the "ancient" slide lies an average of 6 m below that 
of the 1978 slide, at 27 m vertical depth. 
The base of the rupture zone of 1978 was a plastic clay seam that ranged 
in thickness between 0.75 and 4 cm. This seam was found to be continuous.but 
slightly undulating. X-ray diffraction studies of the clay revealed 50 to 70 
percent illite and 25 percent montmorillonite. Conservative soil engineering 
back calculations indicated a residual angle of internal friction of 9 
degrees, with a cohesion of 0.5 tons/sq m. 
The rupture surface of the 1978 slide coincides with the base of a large 
colluvial infilling, interpreted as a pre-Holocene graben (Figure 4). Both 
the 1978 and the deeper "ancient" rupture surfaces conform to bedding surfaces 
and are crudely saucer-shaped. However, the deeper rupture surface is more 
gypsiferous, iron-manganese rich, and coarsely grooved. Because both rupture 
"A' 
- 
FIGUFLE 4 Longitudinal section of Bluebird Canyon landslide. 
s u r f a c e s  were bur i ed  by a g r a v i t y  b u t t r e s s  f i l l  and were n o t  exposed i n  t h e  
f o o t  of t h e  slide excep t  i n  widely spaced borings,  radiocarbon d a t i n g  of  
e a r l i e r  l a n d s l i d e  ep isodes  was impossible.  S t r a t i g r a p h i c  and geometric 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  documented a t  l e a s t  two pre-Holocene s l i d e  events ,  a t  l e a s t  one 
along t h e  1978 b a s a l  r u p t u r e  s u r f a c e  and a t  l e a s t  one along t h e  "anc ien t"  
rupture  sur face .  The "anc ien t"  l a n d s l i d e  is be l ieved  t o  be a s  o l d  a s  e a r l y  
P l e i s tocene  because its e n t i r e  head and graben a r e a  have disappeared by r i d g e  
decap i t a t i on .  
LANDSLIDE ORIGIN 
Four p r i n c i p a l  f a c t o r s  a r e  be l i eved  t o  have i n t e r a c t e d  t o  produce t h e  
l a n d s l i d e  of  October 2, 1978. 
1. Clayey s i l t s t o n e  and p l a s t i c  c l a y  seams of low s t r e n g t h  within-  t h e  
Topanga formation d i p  toward Bluebird Canyon. A p r e e x i s t i n g  p l a s t i c  c l a y  seam 
behaved somewhat l i k e  peanut  b u t t e r  i n  a t i l t e d  and soaked sandwich, being 
s t r i a t e d  and grooved a s  it was overr idden.  
2. The rock s e c t i o n  con ta in ing  t h e  p l a s t i c  c l a y  seams was unsupported i n  
t he  channel area.  The s l i d e  broke along p r e e x i s t i n g  d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s :  a f a u l t  
zone along t h e  r i g h t  f l a n k ,  a former head s c a r p  a t  t h e  head, and a f r a c t u r e  
zone on t h e  l e f t  f lank .  I t  s l i d  along an adverse ly  i n c l i n e d  bedding s u r f a c e  
with a s y n c l i n a l  warp. 
3. The Bluebird channel  was deepened and s u r f i c i a l  mass movements 
occurred  a t  t h e  f o o t  of  t h e  o lde r  l a n d s l i d e s  dur ing  t h e  p a s t  50 years .  Th i s  
cumulative channel  entrenchment and s l o p e  r e t r e a t  extended from t h e  
P le i s tocene  and culminated i n  t h e  mass movements and e ros ion  of  1978. A 
comparison of  d e t a i l e d  topographic maps prepared i n  1960 and 1978 i n d i c a t e s  5 
t o  10 f t  of downcutting immediately downstream o f  t h e  1978 l ands l ide .  
4. The abnormally heavy and extended r a i n f a l l  of 1977-78 percola ted  i n t o  
the  subsurface,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  l a r g e  o l d e r  graben a rea ,  t o  a g r e a t e r  
degree than  normal. T h i s  is evidenced both by a r e l a t i v e l y  high and f l a t  
piezometr ic  s u r f a c e  i n  t h e  graben a r e a ,  with a s t e e p  g r a d i e n t  beneath t h e  
s l i d e  mass, and by a s u b s t a n t i a l  d i l u t i o n  of  t h e  s a l i n i t y  of groundwater i n  
t h e  graben a rea  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  n a t u r a l l y  s a l i n e  groundwater i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  of 
t h e  s lope.  In t roduc t ion  of  t h e  water was f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  open s t r u c t u r e  of 
p r e e x i s t i n g  s l i d e  m a t e r i a l s ,  b u t  t h e  low permeabi l i ty  of  t h e  main s l i d e  block 
probably delayed mass i n s t a b i l i t y  u n t i l  October. The impermeable shear  . 
s u r f a c e s  a t  depth t rapped  water ,  pe rmi t t i ng  s a t u r a t i o n  and- leaching  of  c l a y s ,  
bui ldup of pore p r e s s u r e s  along p o t e n t i a l  s l i d e  su r f aces ,  and bui ldup of  a 
hydros t a t i c  head and an  adverse  load  i n  t h e  p reex i s t i ng  graben ma te r i a l s .  
Supporting evidence of  t hese  perched zones was obtained during t h e  r e p a i r  
s t a g e  of  excavation. 
LANDSLIDE STABILIZATION 
Remedial measures can  be d iv ided  i n t o  two phases: (1) win te r i za t ion  
measures i n i t i a t e d  i n  December 1978 fol lowing t h e  October event ,  and ( 2 )  
remedial grading and c o n s t r u c t i o n  between January and June  1979. 
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Win te r i za t ion  Teasures  cons i s t ed  o f :  (1) c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  a 2-m-diameter 
s torm d r a i n  200 m i n  l eng th  i n  Bluebird Canyon, a p r o j e c t  t h a t  was completed 
14 hours  before  t h e  f i r s t  major winter  storm, (2 )  grad ing  o f  access  roads  to 
sa lvage  c a r s ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  and o t h e r  belongings of  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  and t o  provide  
acces s  f o r  ~ e r i p h ~ e r a l  r e s i d e n t s  and exp lo ra t ion  equipment, ( 3 )  cons t ruc t ion  of 
a s p h a l t  berms and o t h e r  devices  t o  d i v e r t  s u r f a c e  runoff  away from t h e  a c t i v e  
l a n d s l i d e ,  (4)  f l a t t e n i n g  of  t h e  head and f l ank  s c a r p s  and s e a l i n g  o f  c r acks  
and f i s s u r e s ,  and (5) i n s t a l l a t i o n  of fences  and b a r r i e r s  t o  prevent  v i s i t o r s  
and s p e c t a t o r s  from e n t e r i n g  a r e a s  s u b j e c t  t o  f u r t h e r  l a n d s l i d e  hazard. 
Remedial grad ing  and cons t ruc t ion  cons i s t ed  o f  t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l  measures 
t h a t  achieved deep-seated s t a b i l i t y :  (1) a horseshoe-shaped shear  key 
b u t t r e s s ,  (2) an  e longa te  g r a v i t y  b u t t r e s s  i n  Bluebird Canyon, and ( 3 )  a n  
e l a b o r a t e  network of  subdrainage. A schematic block diagram (Figure  5) 
d & i c t s  t hese  elements  and t h e  s o l d i e r  p i l e s  i n s t a l l e d  a t  t h e  head o f  t h e  
s l i d e  i n  advance o f  grading t o  h e l p  minimize f a i l u r e  of  t h e  backslope o f  t h e  
excavated shear  key. 
The shear  key b u t t r e s s  cons i s t ed  o f  a 10-ce l led  pr ism o f  compacted f i l l  
placed i n  bedrock beneath t h e  o l d e s t  rup tu re  s u r f a c e  t o  suppor t  the  upslope 
property.  Th i s  massive f i l l  was placed by grading  machinery, c h i e f l y  
bul ldozers ,  s c r a p e r s ,  and compactors, ope ra t ing  round t h e  clock. The 1978 
s l i d e  and a n c i e n t  s l i d e  m a t e r i a l s  were e n t i r e l y  removed from t h e  shear  key, 
s tockp i l ed ,  and then  placed i n  t h e  shear  key excavat ion  and a l s o  i n  Bluebird 
Canyon a s  a g r a v i t y  b u t t r e s s .  A l l  l oose  s l i d e  d e b r i s  r e s u l t i n g  from backslope 
and s ides lope  f a i l u r e s  was removed by s t r i p p i n g  and benching. 
The g r a v i t y  b u t t r e s s  cons i s t ed  of  compacted f i l l  placed i n  t h e  
s l ide-modif ied canyon bottom. Brush and l o o s e  s u r f i c i a l  s l i d e  d e b r i s  were 
c l e a r e d  from t h e  f l o o r  of t h e  g r a v i t y  b u t t r e s s ,  b u t  most of  t h e  1978 s l i d e  
d e b r i s  and al luvium i n  t h e  canyon bottom were l e f t  i n  p l ace ,  a s  t h e r e  w a s  to  
be no r ebu i ld ing  i n  t h i s  a rea .  This  b u t t r e s s  was en larged  a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  
cons t ruc t ion  phase by 14,000 cu m of excess  yardage obta ined  from excavat ion  
of  t h e  shear  key. The g r a v i t y  b u t t r e s s  r a i s e d  t h e  channel  e l e v a t i o n  between 6 
and 7.5 m. 
The subdrainage system cons i s t ed  of  a main subdra in  and a lacework o f  
c o l l e c t o r  pe r fo ra t ed  p ipes  and permeable m a t e r i a l s  p laced  i n  t renches.  Th i s  
system was designed t o  d r a i n  groundwater from t h e  s l i d e  a r e a  t o  t h e  s torm 
d r a i n  i n  Bluebird Canyon on both t h e  e a s t  and w e s t  s i d e s  of  t h e  l ands l ide .  
Perched water i n  t h e  a n c i e n t  l a n d s l i d e  graben was confirmed dur ing  excavat ion  
of t h e  shear  key. I n  add i t i on ,  s c a t t e r e d  seepages were encountered i n  t h e  
backslope a r e a  and along t h e  f a u l t  and b a s a l  s l i d e  r u p t u r e  su r f aces ,  b u t  a 
permanent water t a b l e  was deeper.  Terminal s e c t i o n s  of  t h e  main subdra in  were 
unper f o r a t e d  i n  o rde r  t h a t  f u t u r e  groundwater could  n o t  e n t e r  t h e  f i l l  and 
s l i d e  m a t e r i a l s  a t  t h e  f o o t  of  t h e  s l i d e .  F i l t e r  m a t e r i a l  was placed beneath 
t h e  s torm d r a i n  to provide subdrainage of  t h e  s l i d e  m a t e r i a l  n o t  removed 
dur ing  emergency grading.  
S ix ty-s ix  v e r t i c a l  s o l d i e r  p i l e s  c o n s i s t i n g  of  s t e e l  beams interconnected 
a t  t h e  s u r f a c e  by welded grade beams were cons t ruc t ed  upslope o f  t h e  
horseshoe-shaped head scarp .  They were placed i n  0.7-m h o l e s  and then 

re inforced  wi th  conc re t e  grout .  The p i l e s  reduced t h e  number and e x t e n t  of 
major backslope f a i k u r e s  dur ing  t h e  wet season. Although 16 small  f a i l u r e s  
occurred dur ing  excavat ion of t h e  shear  key, o n l y  one produced damage. Th i s  
f a i l u r e  bent  and t i l t e d  p i l e s ,  destroyed a s e c t i o n  of  s t r e e t  and one 
res idence ,  and undermined a second residence.  A l l  o t h e r  f a i l u r e s  were 
downslope o f  t h e  alignment of  t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  emergency p i l e s .  
Geologic mapping and s t r a i n  monitoring du r ing  grading  were u s e f u l  i n  
p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  l o c a t i o n ,  geometry, and t i m e  o f  occurrence  of t he  backslope 
f a i l u r e s .  Temporary s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  backslope and s ides lope  f a i l u r e s  was 
achieved by a combination of  removal, s lope  trimming, unloading t h e  t o p  o f  t h e  
s lope ,  and cons t ruc t ing  smal l  b u t t r e s s e s  trackwalked by bul ldozers .  These 
measures provided s u f f i c i e n t  time t o  excavate  t h e  shear  key b u t t r e s s  t o  des ign  
grade,  i n s t a l l  a subdrainage system, and commence t h e  placement o f  t h e  f i n a l  
coinpacted f i l l .  A s  t h e  b u t t r e s s  f i l l  increased  i n  t h i ckness ,  t h e  temporary 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  f i l l s  were removed. 
The n e t  volume of earthwork f o r  remedial g rad ing  was approximately 261,000 
cu  m. Th i s  volume does no t  inc lude  yardage moved a second time (60 t o  75 
pe rcen t  of  t h i s  volume) owing t o  phys i ca l  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by t h e  work a r e a  
ava i l ab l e .  The c o s t  of  l a n d s l i d e  r e p a i r  was about  $1,920,000, compared with 
nea r ly  double t h i s  amount f o r  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  This  r e p a i r  was s u c c e s s f u l  
i n  saving pub l i c  proper ty  and 22 res idences  around t h e  per iphery ,  i n  r e s t o r i n g  
25 l o t s  without  need o f  f u r t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  grad ing ,  and i n  prevent ing s e r i o u s  
human in jury .  New re s idences  have now been b u i l t  upon most o f  t h e s e  25 l o t s  
( s e e  F igure  1 B ) .  
REFERENCES 
Leighton, F. Beach (1969a) Engineering Geologic Report o f  Storm Damage, C i t y  
of  Laguna Beach, prepared f o r  t h e  C i t y  of  Laguna Beach, September 19,  
- 
1969, a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n spec t ion  a t  C i t y  of Laguna Beach. 
Leighton, F. Beach (1969b) F i n a l  Geologic Report on t h e  General P lan  Study f o r  
t h e  C i t y  o f  Laguna Beach, prepared f o r  Daniel ,  Mann, Johnson, and 
Mendenhall, December 20, 1969, a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n spec t ion  a t  C i t y  of Laguna 
Beach. 
Leighton, F. Beach (1979) Or ig in  and r e s t o r a t i o n  of  Bluebird Canyon l a n d s l i d e ,  
Laguna Beach, C a l i f o r n i a  (abs . ) ,  Geological  Soc ie ty  of  America Abs t r ac t s  
with Programs, I1 (7):465, wi th  L. R. Cann and I r a j  Poormand. 
Leighton, F. Beach (1980) Bluebird Canyon l a n d s l i d e ,  Laguna Beach--a 
geomorphic t h re sho ld  event ,  Thresholds i n  Geomorphology, eds. D. R. Coates 
and J. D. Vitek,  George Allen and Unwin, pp. 387-400. 
Leighton and Assoc ia tes  (1975) Background Data and Geotechnical  Information 
f o r  t h e  Seismic Sa fe ty  and Sa fe ty  Element, C i t y  o f  Laguna Beach, prepared 
f o r  t h e  C i t y  of  Laguna Beach, A p r i l  8 ,  1975, a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n spec t ion  a t  
C i t y  of Laguna Beach. 
Leighton and Assoc ia tes  (1978a) Prel iminary Geotechnical  Report, Bluebird 
Canyon Landsl ide,  Laguna Beach, C a l i f o r n i a ,  prepared f o r  t h e  C i t y  of  
Laguna Beach, October 14, 1978, a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n spec t ion  a t  C i t y  of Laguna 
Beach. 
Leighton and Assoc ia t e s  (1978b) Geotechnical  Report o f  t h e  Bluebird Canyon 
Landsl ide,  Emergency Measures, Phase 2, C i t y  of  Laguna Beach, C a l i f o r n i a ,  
prepared f o r  t h e  C i t y  of Laguna Beach, December 16, 1978, a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
i n spec t ion  a t  C i t y  of  Laguna Beach. 
Leighton and Assoc ia tes  (1979) F i n a l  Geotechnical  Report of Emergency Repair 
Operat ions,  Bluebird Canyon Landsl ide of  October 1978, prepared f o r  t h e  
C i t y  of Laguna Beach, August 24, 1979, a v a i l a b l e  f o r  inspec t ion  a t  C i t y  of  
Laguna Beach. 
Mi l l e r ,  Russe l l  V., and Tan, Siang S. (1979) Bluebird Canyon l a n d s l i d e  of  
October 2, 1978, Laguna Beach, C a l i f o r n i a ,  C a l i f o r n i a  Geology (32):s-7. 
Morton, Paul  K. ,  M i l l e r ,  R u s s e l l  V., and F i f e ,  Donald L. (1973) 
Geoenvironmental Maps of Orange County, C a l i f o r n i a ,  Pre l iminary  Report 15, 
C a l i f o r n i a  Div is ion  of Mines and Geology, Sacramento. 
Sydnor, Robert (1979) Bluebird Canyon l a n d s l i d e ,  Laguna Beach, C a l i f o r n i a ,  
Geoloqic Guide of San Onofre Nuclear Generating S t a t i o n  and Adjacent 
Regions of Southern C a l i f o r n i a ,  Guide Book 46, P a c i f i c  Sec t ion ,  American 
Associat ion of Petroleum Geologists ,  Tulsa,  pp. A25-A37. 
Tan, Siang S. (1979) Case study: t h e  Bluebird Canyon l a n d s l i d e ,  Laguna Beach, 
Orange County, Landsl ides  i n  t he  Los Angeles Region, C a l i f o r n i a ,  Open F i l e  
Report 79-4 LA, C a l i f o r n i a  Div is ion  of  Mines and Geology, Los Angeles 
District Of f i ce ,  Los Angeles, pp. 224-233. 
Tan, Siang S., and Edgington, William J. (1976) Geology and Engineer ins  
Geologic Aspects of t h e  Laguna Beach Quadrangle, Orange County, 
C a l i f o r n i a ,  S p e c i a l  Report 127, C a l i f o r n i a  Div is ion  of Mines and Geology, 
Sacramento. 
Vedder, J. G., Yerkes, R. F., and Schoellhamer, J. E. (1957) Geologic Map o f  
t h e  San Joaquin Hills-San Juan  Capis t rano  Area, Orange County, C a l i f o r n i a ,  
United S t a t e s  Geological  Survey O i l  Map 193, s c a l e  1:24,000, U.S. 
Geological  Survey, Reston, Vi rg in ia .  
FAILURE OF THE SAN JACINTO RIVER LEVEES NEAR SAN JACINTO, 
"CALIFORNIA, FROM THE FLOODS OF FEBRUARY 1980 
by Kenneth L. Edwards 
In 1959-60 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Riverside County 
Flood Control Distr ict  began t o  construct improved levees along the San 
~ i c i n t o  River and Bautista Creek i n  the v i c in i t y  of San Jacinto, California. 
The levees had revetment extending below the streambed t o  protect against 
scour and undercutting. But during the floodflows of February 1980, which 
had an estimated frequency of occurrence of once i n  25 years for the combined 
flow, sections of the levees on both sides of the San Jacinto River and along 
Bautista Creek failed. The engineer team charged with investigating the 
failures concluded that the most probable cause of failure was undermining 
of bank protection. Repairs are under uay t o  extend the toe revetments and 
reinforce the faces of the levees, although additional major improvements 
remain t o  be made. 
The San J a c i n t o  River o r i g i n a t e s  i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  Mountains i n  c e n t r a l  
Rivers ide  County, d ra in ing  t h e  southwest s l o p e s  of those  mountains. The 
s t ream is f e d  by a  s e r i e s  of gene ra l ly  p a r a l l e l  s t reams a s  it works its way t o  
t h e  v a l l e y  f l o o r  about 4  mi les  e a s t  of t h e  C i t y  of Hemet, C a l i f o r n i a .  The 
s t ream courses  about  28 mi les  t o  t h e  mouth of t h e  canyon a t  t he  v a l l e y  f l o o r  
and then  t r a v e r s e s  t h e  v a l l e y ,  f i r s t  i n  a  nor thwes ter ly  d i r e c t i o n  through t h e  
e a s t e r l y  l i m i t s  of t h e  C i t y  of San J a c i n t o ,  and then  i n  a  southwester ly 
d i r e c t i o n  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of Lake P e r r i s  t o  Lake E l s i n o r e ,  a  d i s t a n c e  o f  about 
32 m i l e s  ( f o r  a  map of t h e  watershed s e e  F igu re  2  of t h e  fol lowing paper by 
J o e  Sciandrone e t  a l . ) .  The drainage a r e a  of t h e  watershed a f t e r  i t s  
confluence wi th  B a u t i s t a  Creek, a  major t r i b u t a r y ,  is about  250 square mi les .  
The B a u t i s t a  Creek dra inage  a rea  is  52 square miles.  E leva t ions  i n  the 
watershed vary from 10,805 f t  a t  t h e  peak of  Mount San J a c i n t o  t o  about  1,460 
f t  near t h e  C i t y  s f  San Jac in to .  Stream g r a d i e n t s  vary from about 450 f t / m i l e  
i n  t h e  headwaters t o  about  30 f t /mi l e  along t h e  reach c o n t r o l l e d  by levees.  
The San J a c i n t o  River is an ephemeral s t ream t h a t  has  a  h i s t o r y  of 
i n t e r m i t t e n t  f looding  during t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  winter  storm season. 
A s t ream gage opera ted  by t h e  U.S. Geological  Survey is loca t ed  a t  the  
Cranston Bridge on t h e  r i v e r  about  5  mi les  upstream of  t h e  confluence with 
Kenneth L. Edwards is Chief Engineer with t h e  R ive r s ide  County Flood 
Cont ro l  and Water Conservation D i s t r i c t  i n  ~ i v e r s i d e ,  C a l i f o r n i a .  
B a u t i s t a  C r e e k .  T h i s  gage  h a s  p rov ided  a c o n t i n u o u s  s t reamf low r e c o r d  s i n c e  
1921. The l a r g e s t  peak f l o w  recorded  a t  t h i s  gage was 45,000 c u  f t / s  on 
February  16,  1927. The peak d i s c h a r g e  recorded  on February  21, 1980, was 
17,300 c u  f t / s ,  t h e  second l a r g e s t  r ecorded  peak. However, t h e r e  have been a n  
a d d i t i o n a l  f i v e  h i s t o r i c a l  f l o o d s  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  100 y e a r s  e s t i m a t e d  to  have 
equa led  o r  exceeded t h e  February  21, 1980, peak d i s c h a r g e .  
The upper r e a c h  o f  s t r e a m  a long  t h e  v a l l e y  f l o o r  is an  a l l u v i a l  stream 
w i t h o u t  a n  i n c i s e d  c h a n n e l  to c o n t a i n  even moderate f lows.  I n  t h e  e a r l y  
1900s ,  w i t h  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  development i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  V a l l e y ,  
man began to erect l e v e e s  to c o n t a i n  t h e  r i v e r .  I n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  t h e  most 
b e n e f i c i a l  use  o f  t h e  l a n d  a r e a ,  c o n t r o l  e f f o r t s  were made a t  keeping t h e  
stream i n  a c o u r s e  a l o n g  t h e  b a s e  o f  t h e  mountains,  where it c o u l d  r e a d i l y  
i n t e r c e p t  t h e  v a r i o u s  t r i b u t a r y  f lows  from t h e  mountains.  The l e v e e s  were 
c o n s t r u c t e d  from t h e  s i l t y ,  sandy s o i l s  i n  t h e  streambed. Revetment, i f  any,  
c o n s i s t e d  o f  p i p e  and wire backed wi th  brush and c u t t i n g s  from t h e  p r o l i f i c  
a p r i c o t  g r o v e s  i n  t h e  v a l l e y .  Because o f  t h e  h i g h l y  e r o s i v e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
soils, t h e  s t e e p  stream g r a d i e n t s ,  and t h e  h igh  f low v e l o c i t i e s ,  t h e  l e v e e s  
f a i l e d  a f t e r  e v e r y  f low o f  any s i g n i f i c a n t  magnitude. 
The U.S. Army Corps  o f  Engineers ,  i n  t h e i r  1946 s u r v e y  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  S a n t a  
Ana River  and i ts  t r i b u t a r i e s ,  found t h a t  improvements a long  t h e  San J a c i n t o  
River  near  San J a c i n t o  and B a u t i s t a  Creek e a s t  o f  H e m e t  were economical ly  
f e a s i b l e  and recommended to Congress  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e s e  improvements. 
Funding f o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  w a s  n o t  made a v a i l a b l e  u n t i l  1959, and i n  1960 work 
s t a r t e d  on  t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek p r o j e c t .  The Corps c o n s t r u c t e d  a c o n c r e t e - l i n e d  
t r a p e z o i d a l  c h a n n e l  a long  B a u t i s t a  Creek from near  t h e  canyon mouth downstream 
3-1/4 miles t o  S t a t e  Highway 74. A l e v e e  was c o n s t r u c t e d  a long  t h e  l e f t  bank 
o f  B a u t i s t a  Creek from Highway 74 downstream 1-1/4 miles to t h e  c o n f l u e n c e  
w i t h  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River .  A l e v e e  was a l s o  c o n s t r u c t e d  a long  t h e  l e f t  bank 
o f  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River  from t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek c o n f l u e n c e  downstream f o r  3.7 
m i l e s  ( s e e  F i g u r e  I ) . *  The B a u t i s t a  Creek channe l  and l e v e e  were des igned  f o r  
a s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  f l o o d  d i s c h a r g e  o f  16,500 c u  f t / s ,  and t h e  San J a c i n t o  
River  l e v e e  w a s  d e s i g n e d  f o r  a s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  f l o o d  d i s c h a r g e  o f  86,000 c u  
f t / s .  The s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  f l o o d  h a s  a f requency  o f  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  abou t  once 
i n  250 y e a r s .  
The B a u t i s t a  Creek l e v e e  was abou t  5 f t  h igh  above s t reambed,  and t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  River  l e v e e  was a b o u t  11 f t  high.  The exposed f a c e  o f  each l e v e e  was 
p r o t e c t e d  from e r o s i o n  and scour  by 18 i n .  o f  q u a r r i e d  rock p laced  upon a 
6-in.- thick g r a v e l  f i l t e r  b lanke t .  The revetment  extended about  5 f t  below 
t h e  streambed a l o n g  B a u t i s t a  Creek and abou t  10 f t  below t h e  streambed a long  
t h e  San J a c i n t o  River .  The revetment  below t h e  streambed was to p r o t e c t  
a g a i n s t  scour  and u n d e r c u t t i n g ,  which c o u l d  c a u s e  a d i sp lacement  o f  t h e  rock 
f a c i n g  and e r o s i o n  and f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  l e v e e  (see F i g u r e  2 ) .  The rock was 
p l a c e d  as l o o s e  rock r i p r a p .  G r a d a t i o n s  were such to e n s u r e  a g a i n s t  l a r g e  
v o i d s  and p r o v i d e  i n t e r l o c k i n g  o f  t h e  i r r e g u l a r  p l a n e s  o f  t h e  rock s u r f a c e s  t o  
*See a l s o  F i g u r e  3 o f  t h e  fo l lowing  paper  by Joe ~ c i a n d r o n e  e t  a l .  
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FIGURE 1 Flood control improvements and overflow area on the San Ja- 
cinto River and Bautista Creek. 
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prevent  e ros ion  of,rOck from t h e  t r a c t i v e  and v e l o c i t y  f o r c e s  of t h e  r i v e r ' s  
flow a g a i n s t  t h e  l evee  f a c e  ( s e e  F igure  4 of t h e  fol lowing paper f o r  t h e  s i z e  
g rada t ion ) .  
I n  1959-60 t h e  Rivers ide  County Flood Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t  cons t ruc ted  a l evee  
improvement along t h e  r i g h t  bank of  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River downstream o f  t h e  
Highway 79 c ros s ing  of t h e  r i v e r  f o r  about  1.5 m i l e s  ( s e e  F igure  1). Th i s  
l e v e e  was about 8 f t  high. The d i s t r i c t  e l e c t e d  t o  r e v e t  t h e  f a c e  of t h e  
l evee  wi th  a 4-in.-thick unreinforced conc re t e  s l ab .  The concre te  s l a b  was 
extended 4 f t  below t h e  streambed t o  provide p r o t e c t i o n  from scour and 
undercut t ing  of t h e  concre te  and l evee  t o e  ( s e e  F igure  2 ) .  
I n  1965 t h e  d i s t r i c t  cons t ruc ted  about 1.3 m i l e s  o f  l evee  along t h e  r i g h t  
bank of t h e  San J a c i n t o  River oppos i t e  a p o r t i o n  of t h e  U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers  l evee  ( s e e  F igure  1). The des ign  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h i s  
reach of  l evee  were i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  used by t h e  Corps o f  Engineers  along t h e  
l e f t  bank. 
The Corps' lef t -bank l evee  terminated i n  an open f i e l d  a t  a po in t  where 
t h e  C i t y  of San J a c i n t o  w a s  p ro t ec t ed  from f looding.  A low-level t r a i n i n g  
d i k e  was cons t ruc ted  t o  d i r e c t  low f lows back i n t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  nonrevet ted 
levees.  The f loods  of November 1965, December 1966, and January and February 
1969 breached t h e  t r a i n i n g  d ike ,  f looding  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l ands  and c l o s i n g  
Highway 79. The d i s t r i c t  cons t ruc t ed  a 5-ft-high l evee  i n  l a t e  1969 t o  
con ta in  these  l e s s  f requent  f loodflows by d i r e c t i n g  them t o  t h e  r i v e r  channel  
j u s t  upstream of t h e  Highway 79 br idge  c ross ing .  A 4-in.-thick conc re t e  s l a b  
was placed on t h e  l evee  face .  The s l a b  extended 4 f t  below t h e  streambed to  
p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  scour  a t  t h e  t o e  of t h e  levee.  
Five d i f f e r e n t  f l ood  events  from 1961 t o  1978, wi th  peak d ischarges  
ranging from about  6,000 t o  10,000 cu f t / s ,  passed through t h e  system with no 
damage o r  d i s t r e s s  t o  e i t h e r  t h e  Corps' o r  d i s t r i c t ' s  l evees .  There was 
sediment accumulation i n  t h e  s t ream below Highway 79 t h a t  was removed a f t e r  
t h e  1969 and 1978 f loods .  The Bau t i s t a  Creek channel  streambed experienced 
s i g n i f i c a n t  scour  dur ing  t h e  1965 and 1969 f loods.  I n  an e f f o r t  t o  c o n t r o l  
t h e  channel  degrada t ion ,  t h e  d i s t r i c t  cons t ruc t ed  a s e r i e s  of seven 
rock - f i l l ed  gabion s t r u c t u r e s  ac ros s  t h e  channel  i n v e r t  normal t o  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  of flow. 
A s e r i e s  of  s i x  P a c i f i c  winter  s torms passed through southern  C a l i f o r n i a  
beginning on February 13, 1980, and cont inuing  f o r  n ine  consecut ive  days 
through February 21, 1980. The l a s t  four  days of  t h e  s torm gene ra l ly  produced 
t h e  l a r g e s t  amount of r a i n f a l l  on t h e  San J a c i n t o  watershed. The r i v e r  
s t a r t e d  flowing on February 14,  1980, and by l a t e  a f t e rnoon  on February 15, 
1980, f lood  f i g h t  ope ra t ions  had commenced along t h e  l e f t  bank of t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  River downstream from Highway 79.  his reach  of  r i v e r  has  only 
unreve t ted  sand l evees ,  b u t  very va luable  a g r i c u l t u r a l  land and s e v e r a l  major 
highway c o r r i d o r s  would be damaged o r  c u t  o f f  i f  t h e  r i v e r  were allowed t o  
breach t h e s e  levees .  On February 16, 1980, a s e c t i o n  o f  conc re t e  s l a b  f a i l e d  
on t h e  right-bank l evee  below Highway 79. ~ o c k  was dumped and placed to t r y  
t o  f i l l  t h e  void c r e a t e d  a t  t h e  s l a b  f a i l u r e .  A t  2:00 a.m. on February 17 
f lows were a t  such a volume t h a t  t h e  flqod. f i g h t  had t o  be abandoned along t h e  
l e f t  bank downstream of Highway 79. InF f a c t ,  t h r e e  D-9 bu l ldoze r s  were 
swamped and had t o  be abandoned a t  t h a t  time. E f f o r t s  cont inued a t  t r y i n g  t o  
save t h e  r i g h t  l e v e e  a s  more conc re t e  s e c t i o n s  were f a i l i n g .  Flows were a l s o  
a t t a c k i n g  t h e  d i s t r i c t ' s  5 - f t  concrete-faced l e v e e  upstream of Highway 79, and 
f lood  f i g h t  a c t i v i t i e s  concent ra ted  a long  t h a t  s e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  next  t h r e e  
days. P a t r o l s  and obse rva t ions  along t h e  Corps of ~ n g i n e e r s '  l evee  ind ica t ed  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  performance o f  t h i s  l evee  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  floodflows. 
A t  about  7:00 a.m. on February 21, 1980, a r e p o r t  was c a l l e d  i n  through 
t h e  Hemet S h e r i f f ' s  S t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  Corps of Engineers '  San J a c i n t o  River 
l e v e e  was being breached. The f lows i n  t h e  r i v e r  were a t t a c k i n g  t h e  l e v e e  a t  
t h e  breach a t  about  a 25-degree angle  ( s e e  F igure  1 of t h e  fol lowing paper ) .  
A s  t h e  f lows breached they  p a r a l l e l e d  t h e  l evee  f o r  some d i s t a n c e ,  fanning o u t  
over a wide path.  By t h e  time these  f lows reached Main S t r e e t  i n  San J a c i n t o ,  
they  moved away from t h e  l evee ,  flowing through t h e  c i t y  and surrounding 
county a r e a s  and cover ing  a wide f loodp la in  f o r  about 6 t o  8 mi l e s  before  
j o in ing  t h e  o l d  s t ream channel  and h i s t o r i c a l  f l oodp la in .  By 8:30 a.m. t h e  
breach was about  700 f t  wide, and it is es t imated  t h a t  75 t o  95 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  
r i v e r ' s  flow was going through t h e  breach and through t h e  C i t y  of  San J a c i n t o  
(F igures  3 and 4 ) .  The Corps of Engineers  mobilized a f o r c e  of  equipment and 
about  100 rock t r u c k s  and s t a r t e d  haul ing  rock and dozing m a t e r i a l  i n t o  t h e  
breach. By about 2:00 a.m. on February 23 t h e  breach was c losed  t o  t h e  p o i n t  
oh£ f o r c i n g  f lows back i n t o  t h e  r i v e r  channel.  Flood f i g h t  and emergency 
r e p a i r  a c t i v i t i e s  cont inued f o r  another  10 days,  secur ing  a l l  o f  t h e  l evee  
systems to con ta in  t h e  remaining flows. 
B a u t i s t a  Creek a l s o  experienced l a r g e  f lows,  and t h e  lef t -bank l evee  
completely f a i l e d  a t  one l o c a t i o n  (F igure  5 ) .  B a u t i s t a  Creek was degrading 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  along t h e s e  reaches ,  and a s  a r e s u l t  t h e  f loodflows d i d  no t  
over top  t h e  banks. 
The flow i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River a t  t h e  U.S. Geological  Survey gage 
peaked a t  about 17,300 cu f t / s .  Th i s  peak is r a t e d  a t  about  a 1-in-30-year 
frequency event .  The peak flow i n  B a u t i s t a  Creek was es t imated  t o  be 6,000 cu 
f t / s ,  a 1-in-70-year frequency peak flow. The combined flow of  both s t reams 
a t  t h e  p o i n t  of  t h e  l e v e e  breach was es t imated  t o  be 25,000 t o  27,000 cu f t / s ,  
a 1-in-25-year frequency peak flow. 
The L o s  AngeleS District o f  t h e  Corps o f  Engineers  formed an  engineer  team 
t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  cause  of  t h e  f a i l u r e  and d i s t r e s s  t o  t h e i r  l evee  
(Sciandrone e t  a l . ,  1980).  S t a f f  members of t h e  Rivers ide  eoun ty  Flood 
Cont ro l  D i s t r i c t  a s s i s t e d  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  team by providing d a t a ,  
photographs, and o t h e r  background and eyewitness  accounts.  A c a r e f u l  review 
was made of a l l  des ign  d a t a  and c r i t e r i a ,  and a e r i a l  photographs c l e a r l y  
d e p i c t i n g  t h e  pa th  of f l o w s  i n  t h e  channel  were taken. Tes t  bor ings  were made 
o f  t h e  l e v e e  embankment, and t renches  were excavated i n  t h e  streambed around 
t h e  l o c a t i o n  of t h e  l e v e e  breach,  
Seve ra l  probable causes  of l evee  f a i l u r e  were considered.  They were: 
1. Over topping 
FIGURE 3 The San J a c i n t o  River breach ( looking  downstream). 
2. I n t e r n a l  e ros ion  (p ip ing)  
3.  S l i d e s  w i th in  t h e  l evee  embankment o r  foundat ion  
4. Sur face  e ros ion  
5. Undermining of  bank p r o t e c t i o n  ( scour)  
6. Channel con f igu ra t ion  
Af t e r  c a r e f u l  eva lua t ion  it was determined t h a t  t h e  most probable cause 
was undermining o f  bank p r o t e c t i o n  (F igure  6 ) .  T e s t  t r enches  revealed 
scour ing  of t h e  streambed t o  a t  l e a s t  t h e  bottom o f  t h e  t o e  rock, a f t e r  which 
e ros ion  took t h e  rock away, leav ing  t h e  unprotected embankment s u b j e c t  t o  
r a p i d  e ros ion  and f a i l u r e  along o t h e r  reaches  of  t h e  levee .  There was a l s o  
undercut t ing  of  t h e  rock t o e  and some s u r f a c e  e ros ion  of  t h e  rock f ac ing  along 
o the r  reaches of t h e  levee.  The design c r i t e r i a  used i n  1959-60 were t h e  
then-current  s t a t e  of  t h e  a r t  and i n  accordance wi th  p re sc r ibed  Corps of 
Engineers  c r i t e r i a .  Curren t  p r a c t i c e  c a l l s  f o r  much t h i c k e r  and heavier  rock 
facing.  The alignment of t h e  levee  and d i r e c t i o n  o f  f lows impinging on t h e  
l evee  caused g r e a t e r  scour  along t h e  t o e  of  t h e  l evee ,  t h u s  con t r ibu t ing  to 
t h e  f a i l u r e .  Flow impingement a t  an angle  ( r a t h e r  than  p a r a l l e l  flow) has 
been shown t o  cause  more scour;  t h u s  t h e  alignment of  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River 
l evee  con t r ibu ted  t o  t he  f a i l u r e .  
FIGURE 4 Overflow i n t o  t h e  C i t y  of San J a c i n t o .  
FIGURE 5 The Bau t i s t a  Creek l e v e e  f a i l u r e  ( looking upstream). 
The f a i l u r e s  a long  t h e  d i s t r i c t ' s  concrete-faced l evee  were due t o  deep 
scour  and undercut t ing  o f  t h e  t o e  of  t h e  conc re t e  s l a b .  This  caused e ros ion  
and evacuat ion o f  t h e  levee  embankment under t h e  s l a b  and thus  l o s s  of suppor t  
f o r  t h e  s l a b .  The conc re t e  then  cracked and f a i l e d .  The right-bank 
concrete-faced l evee  downstream from Highway 79 was nea r ly  completely 
destroyed.  The lef t -bank l evee  upstream f r ~ m  Highway 79, while  never 
breached, neve r the l e s s  was s o  seve re ly  damaged t h a t  it must be replaced i n  
t o t a l .  
The Corps of Engineers  is now r e p a i r i n g  t h e i r  Levee throughout i ts  e n t i r e  
length .  They a r e  extending the  t o e  revetment some 10 f t  deeper beyond t h e  
o r i g i n a l  t o e  and a r e  grout ing  t h e  e n t i r e  rock f a c e  of  t h e  levee.  An ungrouted 
rock apron 10 f t  wide and 5 f t  t h i c k  is being p laced  along t h e  t o e  of t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  River l e v e e  a t  t h e  l o c a t i o n  of  t h e  breach p l u s  500 f t  upstream and 
downstream from t h e  breach. Their  c o n t r a c t  f o r  t h i s  work is $3.7 mil l ion .  
They a r e  a l s o  r e p a i r i n g  t h e  d i s t r i c t ' s  l evee  upstream from Highway 79. A 
grouted  s tone  f ac ing  w i l l  be used i n  l i e u  of  a  conc re t e  s l a b ,  and an  ungrouted 
rock apron w i l l  be p laced  along t h e  t o e  9 f t  wide and about  3  f t  th ick .  The 
rock placed on t h e  l evee  dur ing  the  f lood  f i g h t  is being used f o r  t h e  apron. 
Addi t iona l  major improvements w i l l  have t o  be made along Bau t i s t a  C r e e k  
from Highway 74 downstream t o  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River ,  inc luding  improving the  
confluence wi th  t h e  r i v e r .  The s t o n e  revetment along t h e  f a i l e d  o r  d i s t r e s s e d  
reaches  o f  t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek l evee  is being extended a t  t h i s  t i m e  a t  least 5 
f t  deeper  with a  9-ft-wide, 5-f t - thick rock apron p laced  i n  t h e  streambed next  
t o  t h e  l evee  t o e  f o r  about  3,300 f t .  Th i s  is considered t o  be an in t e r im  
r e p a i r .  Permanent r e p a i r s  w i l l  be completed a f t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s  can 
be evaluated.  
FIGURE 6 Eroded l evee  t o e  on  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River (looking upstream). 
Cons idera t ion  is a l s o  being given t o  cons t ruc t ing  a  s e r i e s  of  very th i ck  
heavy rock g r o i n s  bur ied  i n  t h e  streambed along two d i f f e r e n t  reaches of t h e  
l evee  where angled impingement of  flows can be expected. These g r o i n s  w i l l  be 
bur ied  j u s t  below t h e  streambed, w i l l  extend from t h e  l evee  i n t o  t h e  channel  
fo r  about 100 f t ,  and w i l l  be about 12 f t  th ick .  They would be spaced about  
150 f t  a p a r t  along t h e  two c r i t i c a l  reaches of t h e  levee.  
The f a i l u r e  of t h e  San J a c i n t o  River has  taught  us  an important Lesson. 
The o l d  r u l e  of thumb t h a t  scour  depth equals  flow depth is inco r rec t .  Scour 
along t h e  f a c e  of  a l evee  can go much deeper,  perhaps two t o  t h r e e  t imes t h e  
flow depth. Future  des igns  w i l l  have t o  cons ider  t h i s  phenomenon. 
The C i t y  of San J a c i n t o  and surrounding a r e a s  su f f e red  $10 t o  $12 m i l l i o n  
i n  damages ( see  F igure  4 ) .  Thei r  confidence i n  agencies  such a s  t h e  Corps of  
Engineers  and o u r s  h a s  been s e r i o u s l y  damaged. I t  behooves those  of us  i n  
t h i s  bus iness  t o  determine t h e  cause  of t h e  problem and qu ick ly  r e c t i f y  it. 
We be l i eve  we have made a  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  
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LEVEE FAILURES AND DISTRESS, SAN JACINTO RIVER LEVEE AND BAUTISTA 
CREEK CHANNEL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY, SANTA ANA RIVER BASIN, CALIFORNIA 
by J o e  Sciandrone, Ted Albrecht ,  J r . ,  Richard Davidson, 
Jacob  Douma, Dave Hammer, Cha r l e s  Hooppaw, and A 1  Robles, J r .  
. The San ~ a c z n t o  River levee project, located i n  Riverside County, con- 
s i s t s  of a 3.7-mile levee on the l e f t  side o f  the San Jacinto River and a 
1.3-mile levee on the l e f t  side of Bautista Creek. The project i s  designed 
t o  protect San Jacinto, Hemet, Val Ze Vista,  and nearby agricultural lands. 
A t  about 7 a.m. on February 21, 2980, the San Jacinto River Zevee was 
breached by a flood event estimated t o  be about a 25-year event. Estimates 
by eyewitnesses of the flow though  the breach ranged from 75 t o  95 percent 
of the r i ver ' s  flow. 
A team of engineers was fomed t o  determine the probable cause or 
causes of failure and t o  provide "lessons learned." The i n i t i a l  investiga- 
t ion  consisted of data review and s i t e  reconnaissance, which formed the 
basis for recommended f ie ld investigations. Four major types of f ie ld 
investigations were conducted: (1) gradations of in-place riprap, ( 2 )  so i l  
borings, (3) t e s t  trenches, and ( 4 )  scour gage recovery along the Bautista 
Creek reach. 
The engineer team considered the following possibZe causes of levee 
failure : ( 1)  overtopping, ( 2 )  internal erosion (piping),  ( 3 )  s Zides 
within the levee embankment and/or foundation so i l s ,  ( 4 )  surface erosion, 
J o e  Sciandrone is a Consul t ing Geotechnical  Engineer i n  Sacramento, 
C a l i f o r n i a ;  Ted Albrecht ,  J r . ,  is Hydraul ics  Engineer wi th  t h e  U.S. Army 
Engineer South P a c i f i c  Div is ion  i n  San Franc isco ,  C a l i f o r n i a ;  Richard Davidson 
is Geotechnical  Engineer with t h e  Of f i ce  of t h e  Chief of  Engineers i n  
Washington, D.C.; Jacob  Douma is a Consul t ing Hydraul ics  Engineer i n  Great 
F a l l s ,  V i rg in i a ;  Dave H a m m e r  is Chief of t h e  Geotechnical  Branch with t h e  U.S. 
Army Engineer Ohio River Div is ion  i n  C i n c i n n a t i ,  Ohio; Char les  Hooppaw is  
Chief  of  t h e  Santa Ana River Resident  Of f i ce  wi th  t h e  U.S. Army Engineer 
D i s t r i c t  i n  Los Angeles, Ca l i fo rn i a ;  and A 1  Robles, Jr., is Chief of t h e  
Hydrology and Hydraul ics  Branch with t h e  U.S. Army Engineer District i n  Los 
Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a .  
Th i s  paper is an abridged ve r s ion  of t h e  r e p o r t  (Sciandrone e t  al . ,  1980) 
prepared by t h e  seven au tho r s  a c t i n g  as an engineer ing  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  team f o r  
t h e  U.S. Army Engineer Dis t r ic t  i n  Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a .  I t  was submitted 
(5) undermining of bank protection (soowl ,  and (6) channel configuration. 
The  team concluded that  (f) undeminhg o f  the bank protection by scour 
appears t o  be the prhc ipa l  cause of the Sun Jacinto River levee failure; 
(2) channel configuration contributed indirect ly  t o  Zevee failures by 
producing flow impingement on levees that,  i n  turn, produced deeper scour 
and undermining of the levees; and (3) although no evidence was found 
that  surface erosion was a significant factor i n  Zevee failure,  the 
undersized riprap protection compared with present c r i t e r ia  would l i ke l y  
be subject t o  failure by surface erosion during larger floods up t o  the 
design f Zood magnitude. 




During February 1980 flooding caused the San Jacinto River flood control 
project to undergo distress. Levees on both the San Jacinto River and 
Bautista Creek reaches were, in fact, breached, as evidenced in the aerial 
mosaic presented in Figure 1. Because of this occurrence, and at the request 
of the U.S. Army Engineer District in Los Angeles, an engineer team was formed 
and asked to determine the probable cause or causes of failure, recommend 
remedial construction measures, and make recommendations as to the application 
of this experience to existing and future projects. 
to Norman Arno, Chief of the Engineering Division for the Los Angeles 
District, in August 1980. This paper was not presented orally at the 
symposium because the internal reviews of the report were still in progress at 
that time. 
Due to space limitations, sections entitled "Interim Remedial Measures" 
and "Recommendations for Additional Remedial Measures," Appendix A ("Field 
Investigations of San Jacinto Levee"), and Appendix B ("Field Investigations 
of Bautista Creek Channel Scour Gages") have been omitted from this paper. 
For them see the complete report. 
Dave Mann of the Riverside County Flood Control and Water Conservation 
District supported the team by providing data and observations from his 
agency. Personnel of the Los Angeles District who also supported the team 
include Vance Carson, Civil Design Section B, who was the team's liaison with 
the flood control district; Dave Cozakos, Hydraulics Section, who provided 
hydrologic and hydraulic information; and Terry King, Construction Operations 
Division, who had first-hand knowledge of flooding and emergency 
construction. The field investigations were conducted under the supervision 
of Richard Gutschow, Chief of the Materials and Investigation Section for the 
Foundation and Materials Branch. 
A preliminary seport was submitted by the engineer team following an 
initial investigation consisting of data review and site reconnaissance. This 
investigation was the basis for the field investigations conducted. This 
paper briefly describes the project design and construction, presents results 
of field investiqations and findings on the cause of failures, and suggests 
how to apply this experience to other projects. 
Project Description 
The San Jacinto River levee and the Bautista Creek channel improvements 
are located in Riverside County. They consist of a 3.7-mile levee on the left 
side of San Jacinto River, a 1.3-mile levee on the left side of Bautista 
Creek, and a 3.25-mile concrete-lined channel on Bautista Creek upstream from 
State Highway 74: The federal cost of constructing this project was $3 
million. The project units are designed to protect San Jacinto, Hemet, Valle 
Vista, and nearby agricultural areas. Since their completion in November 1961 
the units have been maintained by the Riverside County Flood Control and Water 
Conservation District (RCFC and WCD). ~uring the 1969 floods they prevented 
damages estimated at $1.3 million. 
PROJECT DESIGN 
The bases for design are detailed in three reports prepared by the Los 
Angeles District (U.S. Army Engineer District, Los Angeles, 1959a,b, 1960). 
The following sections contain pertinent information on the bases for design 
presented in these three reports. 
Hydrology 
Design Memorandum No. 1 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1959a) presents the 
hydrologic information pertaining to the design of the project. After 
publication of that report the project plan was changed to provide for the 
extension of the upstream end of the San Jacinto River levee to the downstream 
end of the Bautista Creek channel. A map of the project drainage area, 
showing the location of rain gages, appears as Figure 2. 
The San Jacinto River project drainage area, which includes the Bautista 
Creek drainage area, comprises about 253 square miles. The drainage area lies 
generally on the southwest slopes of the San Jacinto Mountains. Elevations in 
the San Jacinto River subarea range from 10,805 ft at San Jacinto Peak to 
ab0ut.1~500 ft at the downstream end of the improvement. The main watercourse 
is fed principally by a series of generally parallel streams from the San 
Jacinto Mountains. The longest watercourse is about 35 miles. The gradient 
ranges from about 450 ft/mile in the headwaters to about 30 ft/mile near the 
downstream end of the improvement. 
The Bautista Creek project drainage area, which comprises about 50 square 
miles, adjoins the San Jacinto River drainage area on the southwest. Bautista 
Creek enters the San Jacinto River about 4 miles east of the City of Hemet. 
Elevations in the area range from about 6,800 ft in the headwaters to about 
1,600 ft at the confluence with the San Jacinto River. The longest 
FIGURE 1 A e r i a l  mosiac o f  
t h e  San J a c i n t o  River .  
wa te rcourse  i n  t h e  B a u t i s t a  C r e e k  d r a i n a g e  a r e a  is about  19 miles. The 
g r a d i e n t  r a n g e s  from 1,050 f t / m i l e  i n  t h e  headwaters  to a b o u t  50 f t / m i l e  n e a r  
t h e  mouth. 
The s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  f l o o d  was used a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  des ign .  The f l o o d  
was developed i n  accordance  w i t h  g u i d e l i n e s  p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  
Chie f  o f  Engineers  (1952a) .  The s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  storm, i e n e r a l  w i n t e r  t y p e ,  
was employed f o r  t h e  d r a i n a g e  a r e a  t r i b u t a r y  t o  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River  l e v e e s .  
T h i s  storm is based  on  t h e  assumed o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a storm e q u i v a l e n t  to t h a t  o f  
J a n u a r y  1943 t r a n s p o s e d  and c e n t e r e d  over  t h e  a r e a  t r i b u t a r y  t o  t h e  p e r t i n e n t  
a r e a .  The s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  storm, l o c a l  t y p e ,  was used f o r  t h e  d r a i n a g e  
t r i b u t a r y  to t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek improvement. T h i s  storm is based on t h e  
assumed o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a storm e q u i v a l e n t  i n  magnitude to t h a t  o f  March 1943 
t r a n s p o s e d  and c e n t e r e d  over  t h e  a r e a .  
The r e s u l t i n g  s t a n d a r d  p r o j e c t  f l o o d  peak d i s c h a r g e s  a r e  86,000 cu f t / s  
for the San Jacinto River improvement and 16,500 cu ft/s for the Bautista 
Creek improvement. The standard project flood peak discharge for the San 
Jacinto River is about 50 percent larger than the peak discharge that occurred 
during the flood of record of February 1927. 
Hydraulics 
The hydraulic design was based on the theoretical analyses and design 
practices previously approved for similar projects. The design conformed to 
the criteria, which applied at the time, in published chapters of the 
engineering manual Civil Works Construction and Civil Works Engineer Bulletin 
No. 52-15 (Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1952b). 
Design Memorandum No. 3 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1960) describes the 
proposed plan of improvement and functional characteristics. Levee alignment, 
curve data, and profiles are shown on contract drawings in file No. 172/90 
FIGURE 2 Map of the  San Jac in to  River and Baut i s ta  Creek drainage area. 

through 172/94 (D.O. S e r i e s ) .  The p r e p r o j e c t  f l ood  c o n t r o l  l evees  o f  t h e  San 
Jac in to  River channel  were cons t ruc t ed  by l o c a l  i n t e r e s t s  and were p r o t e c t e d  
on t h e  channelward sid-e wi th  p ipe  and wire fencing. The es t imated  channel  
capac i ty  was about  8,000 t o  20,000 cu f t / s ,  and t h e  s l o p e  ranged from 0.00526 
t o  0.00935 f t / f t .  
The l evee  along B a u t i s t a  Creek was b u i l t  i n  a reach where l o c a l  i n t e r e s t s  
had cons t ruc t ed  sand l evees  and a p i l o t  channel.  The channelward s i d e s  were 
p ro t ec t ed  wi th  p ipe  and wire  fencing.  The c a p a c i t y  of  t h e  p r e p r o j e c t  B a u t i s t a  
Creek channel  was about  75 percent  of t h e  des ign  f loodflow, and t h e  s l o p e  of 
t h e  channel ranged from 0.0100 t o  0.0182 f t / f t .  
The water-s-urface computations were made by t h e  reach method, using t h e  
Manning formula. The computations were made on t h e  b a s i s  of a des ign  
d ischarge  of  86,000 c u  f t / s  i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River downstream from t h e  
confluence with B a u t i s t a  Creek and a des ign  d ischarge  o f  16,500 cu f t / s  i n  
B a u t i s t a  Creek. The maximum water-surface computations used t o  determine 
l evee  h e i g h t s  were based on an n va lue  o f  0.040 i n  t h e  Manning formula. 
Depths ranging from 5.7 t o  13.0 f t  were computed f o r  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River,  
and from 3.0 t o  6.6 f t  f o r  B a u t i s t a  Creek. The maximum mean v e l o c i t i e s  used 
t o  determine t h e  s l o p e  and t o e  p r o t e c t i o n  were based on an  n va lue  o f  0.025. 
V e l o c i t i e s  ranging from 7.3 t o  15.5 f t / s  were computed f o r  t h e  San J a c i n t o  
River ,  and from 9.4 t o  16.9 f t / s  f o r  B a u t i s t a  Creek. The water s u r f a c e  f o r  
t h e  San J a c i n t o  River w a s  computed based on  t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
l e f t  l evee  would be removed and t h e  e x i s t i n g  r i g h t  l evee  would remain i n  
p lace .  However, f o r  B a u t i s t a  Creek t h e  water s u r f a c e  was computed based on 
t h e  assumption t h a t  flow would be conta ined  i n  an a r e a  bounded on t h e  l e f t  by 
t h e  l evee  and on t h e  r i g h t  by h igh  ground. 
A minimum f reeboard  of 3 f t  above t h e  computed water s u r f a c e  is provided 
along both streams. Supere leva t ion  was computed by t h e  formula V ~ T / ~ R C ,  
where V is t h e  v e l o c i t y  of flow, T is t h e  t o p  width of flow, g is t h e  
g r a v i t a t i o n a l  cons t an t ,  and R c  is the  r a d i u s  of  t h e  curve. The supe re l eva t ion  
of  t h e  water s u r f a c e  ranged from 0.2 to 1.0 f t .  
Confluence computations were based on a flow of  74,000 c u  f t / s  i n  t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  River upstream from t h e  confluence and a flow of 12,000 cu f t / s  i n  
B a u t i s t a  C r e e k .  T h i s  combination produces t h e  maximum water-surface e l e v a t i o n  
i n  t h e  confluence f o r  t h e  des ign  d ischarge  i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River downstream 
from t h e  confluence. 
Under t h e  p r o j e c t  document p l an ,  t h e  th i ckness  of t h e  revetment would 
range from 2 f t  a t  t h e  t o p  of  t h e  l evee  t o  5 f t  a t  t he  t oe ;  t h e  revetment 
would be under la in  by a 1 - f t  l a y e r  of f i l t e r  ma te r i a l .  The adopted s t o n e  
revetment,  a 1.5-ft  l a y e r  of  r i p r a p  over a 6-in. f i l t e r  b lanket ,  is shown i n  
F igure  3. The r ev i sed  th i cknesses  were based on t h e  then  "present-day 
c r i t e r i a .  " 
The depth of t o e  was an i t e m  o f  cons ide rab le  concern dur ing  t h e  des ign  of  
t h e  p r o j e c t ,  a s  i nd ica t ed  by a review of  d i s t r i c t  records.  The adopted depths  
o f  t o e  f o r  t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek channel  and t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l e v e e  were 5 
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FIGURE 3 The San Jac into  River l evee  a n d B a u t i s t a  Creek channel. 
and 10 f t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  below t h e  low p o i n t  of  t h e  streambed. Scour gages 
were cons t ruc ted  along t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek levee.  
Embankment and Foundation 
The foundat ion m a t e r i a l s  a r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  s i l t y  sands,  s and- s i l t y  sands ,  
and silts, with occas iona l  g r a v e l  and cobbles.  The upper 6 t o  12 f t  a r e  loose  
t o  medium dense. 
Groundwater was no t  found i n  any of  t h e  t e s t  ho le s  t h a t  were d r i l l e d  t o  a 
maximum depth of 35 f t  along t h e  p r o j e c t  reach. The 1957 w e l l  records  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  groundwater was about  10 f t  below t h e  streambed a t  t h e  
downstream end of  t h e  p r o j e c t  l evees  and 60 f t  below t h e  streambed a t  t h e  
upstream end. 
A t y p i c a l  embankment s e c t i o n  is shown on t h e  p r o j e c t  map i n  F igure  3 .  
Analysis  of t h e  s l o p e s  was based on dra ined  s t r eng ths .  Using the  i n f i n i t e  
s l o p e  method, t h e  f a c t o r  of  s a f e t y  f o r  t h e  end of t h e  cons t ruc t ion  cond i t i on  
is 1.4. Steady seepage and drawdown cond i t i ons  were not  analyzed because t h e  
inf luence  of seepage i n t o  t h e  l evee  f i l l s  and foundat ions was considered t o  be 
n e g l i g i b l e  due t o  shor t -dura t ion  flows. 
PROJECT CONSTRUCTION 
The d a t e s  f o r  t h e  completion of cons t ruc t ion  of t h e  va r ious  reaches of t h e  
San J a c i n t o  River l e v e e  and t h e  Bau t i s t a  Creek channel a r e  presented i n  F igure  
3 .  The Bau t i s t a  Creek channel  p r o j e c t  is  a concrete- l ined t r apezo ida l  channel 
with an energy d i s s i p a t o r  a t  t h e  downstream end. The po r t ion  o f  t h e  Bau t i s t a  
Creek channel downstream of  t h e  conc re t e  channel is a left-bank levee  with a 
t y p i c a l  s e c t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  shown f o r  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River levee. I t  was 
cons t ruc t ed  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l evee  p ro j ec t .  
B a u t i s t a  Creek 
The Bau t i s t a  Creek l evee  has  a maximum he igh t  of  10 f t ,  and t h e  s t o n e  
revetment t o e  is 8 t o  9 f t  below t h e  l i n e  of b a c k f i l l  a t  t h e  f a c e  of t h e  
levee.  Th i s  d i s t a n c e  corresponds t o  5 f t  below t h e  low p o i n t  of t h e  
streambed. The l e v e e  s e c t i o n  was b u i l t  with streambed m a t e r i a l s  and borrow 
t h a t  was obta ined  by removing an  e x i s t i n g  riverward levee.  These m a t e r i a l s  
were placed i n  12-in. l a y e r s  and compacted with four  passes  of a 50-ton 
rubber - t i red  r o l l e r .  
San J a c i n t o  River 
The borrow f o r  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River levee  was obtained by removing about  
4 mi les  o f  e x i s t i n g  l evee  between Cedar Avenue and the  downstream end of t he  
p r o j e c t .  The remainder of t h e  l evee  f i l l  came from streambed m a t e r i a l s  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  foundat ion m a t e r i a l s  prev ious ly  descr ibed.  Construct ion of t h e  
l e v e e  was t h e  same a s  f o r  B a u t i s t a  Creek. The cons t ruc t ion  c o n t r o l  d a t a  show 
t h a t  t he  d e n s i t i e s  va r i ed  from 96 t o  106 percent  of t h e  s tandard  maximum 
d e n s i t y  o f  t h e  American Assoc ia t ion  of S t a t e  Highway and   ran sport at ion 
O f f i c i a l s .  
S t o n e  f o r  t h e  p r ~ j e c t  was o b t a i n e d  from t h e  Bernascon i  P a s s  Quarry and t h e  
J u a r o  Quarry.  The l o c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  q u a r r i e s  a r e  shown on quadrang le  s h e e t s  
on f i l e  i n  t h e  Geology S e c t i o n  o f  t h e  Los Angeles  D i s t r i c t .  The s t o n e  t e s t e d  
had a bu lk  specific g r a v i t y  o f  2.71 to 2.76 and a n  a p p a r e n t  s p e c i f i c  g r a v i t y  
of 2.73 to  2.78. 
The c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o n t r o l  r i p r a p  g r a d a t i o n s  are l i m i t e d  to t h e  d a t a  shown 
i n  F i g u r e  4. These  g r a d a t i o n s ,  which were t a k e n  a t  t h e  p l a n t  l o c a t e d  a t  t h e  
q u a r r y ,  a r e  n o t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  s t o n e  g r a d a t i o n  on t h e  l e v e e ,  i n  p a r t  
because  o f  s e g r e g a t i o n  t h a t  r e s u l t s  from h a n d l i n g  and placement.  I t  h a s  been 
v e r i f i e d  t h a t  a j a w  c r u s h e r  was used to c o n t r o l  t h e  maximum s i z e  o f  s t o n e ,  b u t  
it is n o t  known whether a s c r e e n  was used to  remove t h e  f i n e r  s t o n e  throughout  
th'e p roduc t ion .  The s t o n e  was t r a n s p o r t e d  t o  t h e  l e v e e  crown i n  end-dump 
t r u c k s  and t h e n  was dumped i n t o  a " sk ip"  t h a t  w a s  o p e r a t e d  by c rane .  The s k i p  
was used t o  p l a c e  t h e  s t o n e  and d r a g  t h e  s l o p e .  
MODIFICATIONS AFTER CONSTRUCTION 
San J a c i n t o  River  
The r i g h t  l e v e e  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  Main S t r e e t  (Soboba Road) c r o s s i n g  
w a s  c o n s t r u c t e d  by t h e  RCFC and WCD i n  1965. The r i g h t  l e v e e  h a s  t h e  same 
cross s e c t i o n  as t h e  l e f t  l e v e e ,  t h e  d e p t h  o f  toe reve tment  is  t h e  same a s  
t h a t  of t h e  o p p o s i t e  bank o f  t h e  l e f t  l e v e e ,  and t h e  s t o n e  revetment  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  t h e  same a s  t h o s e  f o r  t h e  l e f t  l e v e e .  
B a u t i s t a  Creek 
A 12-in. concrete-encased s a n i t a r y  sewer l i n e  crosses t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek 
c h a n n e l  a t  abou t  s t a  80+00. During t h e  1969 f l o o d  t h e  sewer l i n e  w a s  
exposed. T h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  prompted t h e  d e s i g n  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  anchored,  
c a b l e - t i e d ,  gab ion  s t a b i l i z e r s .  Seven s t a b i l i z e r s  were c o n s t r u c t e d  and 
s t r e n g t h e n e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  from 1969 t o  1978. 
FLOOD HISTORY 
Major F loods  
Major f l o o d s  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  b e f o r e  and  a f t e r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  River  l e v e e  i n  1961  are shown i n  T a b l e  1. 
February  1980 Flood 
R a i n f a l l  o c c u r r e d  o v e r  t h e  watershed f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  n i n e  c o n s e c u t i v e  
d a y s ,  from February  1 3  t o  21,  1980. The d a i l y  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  f o r  seven 
s t a t i o n s  i n  o r  n e a r  t h e  p r o j e c t  a r e a  is summarized i n  T a b l e  2. The l o c a t i o n s  
o f  t h e s e  s t a t i o n s  are shown i n  F i g u r e  1. Mean s e a s o n a l  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  ranged 
from a b o u t  1 4  i n .  a t  San J a c i n t o  to a b o u t  45 i n .  a t  San J a c i n t o  Peak,  
a v e r a g i n g  abou t  20 i n .  over  t h e  t o t a l  a r e a .  I s o h y e t s  f o r  t h e  mean s e a s o n a l  
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  a r e  a l s o  shown i n  F i g u r e  2. 
TABLE 1 Major Floods on t h e  San J a c i n t o  River 
- 
Date of Flood 
Peak   is charge^ 
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a ~ b o v e  confluence wi th  Bau t i s t a  Creek a t  USGS 
gage No. 11069500, San J a c i n t o  River near San 
J a c i n t o  (above B a u t i s t a  Creek) .  
b ~ o w  runoff  due t o  extremely d ry  ground condi- 
t i o n s  a t  t h e  beginning of  t h e  storm. 
TABLE 2 ~ a i l y  ~ a i n f a l l  on February 18-21, 1980 
S t a t i o n  Name 
Daily R a i n f a l l  ( in . )  
Feb. 18 Feb. 19 Feb. 20 Feb. 21  
Anza S D F ~  
E l s ino re  SDF 
Hemet Reservoir 
Idy l lw i ld  F i r e  
P ine  Cone SDF 
Poppet F l a t  
San J a c i n t o  SDF 
a~~~ s t a t i o n s  a r e  S t a t e  Department o f  Fo res t ry  s t a t i o n s .  












The peak d ischarge  o f  February 21, 1980, i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River above 
B a u t i s t a  C r e e k  is 17,300 c u S f t / s .  F igu re  5 shows t h e  f lood  hydrograph. The 
17,300-cu f t / s  d i scha rge  r e p r e s e n t s  a 30-year f lood.  The e s t ima te  o f  a 
6,000-cu ft/s peak d i scha rge  on B a u t i s t a  C r e e k  r e p r e s e n t s  about  a 70-year 
f lood .  Based on t h e s e  t w o  d i scharges ,  t h e  peak d ischarge ,  which occurred  a t  
t h e  San J a c i n t o  l evee ,  is es t imated  t o  be about  25,000 cu ft/s, r ep resen t ing  a 
f lood  frequency of about  once i n  every 25 years .  
PROJECT PERFORMANCE 
Before t h e  February 1980 Flood 
Since  t h e  completion o f  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  high f lows have occurred i n  1965, 
1966, 1969, and 1978. I n  November 1965 a mul t ip l e  (10) corrugated-metal p ipe  
and d i p  c r o s s i n g  wi th  conc re t e  overf low a t  Main S t r e e t  was washed out .  - ~ u r i n g  
t h e  February 1969 storms t h e  B a u t i s t a  C r e e k  channel  was degraded. Afterward, 
t h e  seven s t a b i l i z e r s  p rev ious ly  mentioned were cons t ruc ted .  F ive  of t h e  
s t a b i l i z e r s  were damaged dur ing  t h e  1978 storm and were repa i r ed  i n  1978 by an 
RCFC and i C D  c o n t r a c t .  The RCFC and WCD has  kept a record  of  degrada t ion  and 
aggrada t ion  i n  B a u t i s t a  C r e e k  and has  fu rn i shed  a drawing showing streambed 
p r o f i l e s  a t  va r ious  times. Severe degrada t ion  o f  t h e  streambed, about  1 0  f t ,  
was noted before  t h e  f loods  o f  1969. The RCFC and WCD has  noted t h a t  t h e  
energy d i s s i p a t o r  d e r r i c k  s t o n e  has  been r e p a i r e d  s i n c e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
cons t ruc t ion .  
A review of t h e  a e r i a l  mosaics presented  i n  Design Memorandum No. 3 (U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers,  1960) and pos t cons t ruc t ion  a e r i a l  photographs 
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  topographic f e a t u r e s  have d i r e c t e d  f lows i n t o  t h e  San J a c i n t o  
River  l evee  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  v i c i n i t y  of  t h e  February 1980 breach. A long-time 
r e s i d e n t  of  t h e  a r e a  commented after t h e  break t h a t  it was t h e  t h i r d  t i m e  t h a t  
t h e  water broke through t h e  same reach. The f i r s t  two breaks occurred i n  
l o c a l l y  cons t ruc t ed  l e v e e s  before t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of t h e  Corps o f  Engineers  
levee .  
During t h e  February 1980 Flood 
On February 21, 1980, t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek and San J a c i n t o  River l evees  were 
breached. The breach i n  t h e  B a u t i s t a  C r e e k  l evee  extended from approximately 
s t a  61+00 t o  59+00. The breach i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l evee  extended from 
approximately s t a  169+00 to 154+00 before  f lood  f i g h t i n g  ope ra t ions  c o n t r o l l e d  
t h e  e ros ion .  A t  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  l o c a t i o n s  e ros ion  occurred,  g e n e r a l l y  below-the 
" l i n e  of back f i l l . "  
The RCFC and K D  h a s  provided eyewitness  accounts  of t h e  San J a c i n t o  River 
l e v e e  breach. One exce rp t  from these  eyewitness  r e p o r t s  s t a t e s :  "Water 
Master f o r  t h e  Hemet-San J a c i n t o  Area of Eas t e rn  Municipal Water District . . 
. was on Mountain Avenue a t  approximately 7:00 a.m. and observed a 20-ft-wide 
breach i n  t h e  l e v e e  a t  t h a t  t i m e  and r epor t ed  t o  t h e i r  headquarters." Other 
eyewitness  accounts  fo l lowing  t h e  i n i t i a l  breach g i v e  an  account  o f  t h e  
p rog res s  of t h e  f a i l u r e .  An eyewitness account o f  obse rva t ions  a t  7:45 a.m. 
r e p o r t s :  "Levee d i s i n t e g r a t i n g  on t h e  upstream s i d e  o f  breach rap id ly .  Flood 
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FIGURE 5 Hydrograph of the 1980 flood on the San Jacinto River near 
San Jacinto. Drainage area equals 141 square miles. 
through breach surging in river in waves 5 to 10 ft high . . +8:30 a.m. 
. _  
Breach 2700 ft wide at this time. . . . At the location of breach the main 
direction of the river flaw was +25O to the downstream tangent as 
obser~ed.~ Estimates by eyewitnesses of the flow through the breach ranged 
from 75 to 95 percent of the river's flow. 
INVESTIGATIONS 
The initial investigation consisted of data review and site 
reconnaissance, which formed the basis for recommended field investigations. 
The following sections describe the site reconnaissance and field 
investigations, present observations and conclusions, and evaluate results. 
S i t e  Reconnaissance 
Cont rac t  drawings, topographic Surveys, and a e r i a l  photographs were 
reviewed be fo re  s i te  reconnaissance. The s i te  reconnaissance i t s e l f  c o n s i s t e d  
of a h e l i c o p t e r  t ou r  and an  on - s i t e  i n spec t ion  of t h e  p r o j e c t .  During t h i s  
reconnaissance s e v e r a l  photographs were taken of  breached and d i s t r e s s e d  
a reas .  Typica l  photographs a r e  presented  i n  F igures  6 and 7. A news 
photograph of t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l evee  breach ( B a u t i s t a  Creek) is shown i n  
Figure 8. Observat ions made dur ing  reconnaissance and from photographs 
revealed t h e  a r e a s  t h a t  needed f i e l d  i nves t iga t ions .  
The t h r e e  a r e a s  of  major damage c i t e d  on t h e  p r o j e c t  were (1) B a u t i s t a  
Creek, wi th  one breach; ( 2 )  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River ,  with one breach; and ( 3 )  
t h e  r i v e r s i d e  l e v e e  downstream of  Main S t r e e t ,  which su f f e red  ex tens ive  l o s s .  
Other a r e a s  of e ros ion  on both p r o j e c t s  were noted. 
The ex i s t ence  o f  a r i n g  l e v e e  around a w e l l  f i e l d  near t h e  mouth of  
B a u t i s t a  Creek, t h e  bar  d e p o s i t  a t  t h e  mouth of B a u t i s t a  Creek, and t h e  upper 
end of t h e  Soboba Ind ian  l evee  appear t o  have caused flow t o  be d i r e c t e d  i n t o  
t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l evee  breach area .  Subsequently,  flow was d i r e c t e d  i n t o  
t h e  r igh t - s ide  l evee  and then  back ac ros s  t h e  streambed i n t o  t h e  Corps of 
Engineers l evee  downstream of Main S t r e e t .  A s  p rev ious ly  mentioned, damage 
was sus t a ined  a t  both a r e a s  of t h e  Corps of  Engineers  l evees  a s  we l l  a s  a t  t h e  
r i gh t - s ide  l evee  where these  impingements occurred. 
Ex i s t i ng  r i p r a p  is sound, e x h i b i t i n g  no evidence o f  d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  Areas 
having near-surface concen t r a t ions  of  smal le r  s tone  were noted. I n  each case  
where e ros ion  of  r i p r a p  was observed, it was i n  an a r e a  where t h e  l evee  was 
d i r e c t l y  a t t acked  by flow. 
There was no evidence o f  overtopping o r  of water l e v e l s  even approaching 
t h e  top  of t he  levees .  Minor rodent  a c t i v i t y  was observed i n  and near t h e  
levees.  Minor e ros ion  a t  t h e  l ands ide  t o e  o f  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l evee  
upstream of t he  breach was noted. Th i s  f e a t u r e  had a l s o  been observed i n  t h e  
l a s t  annual i n spec t ion  r e p o r t .  
F i e ld  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
Four major types  of  f i e l d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  were conducted: (1) grada t ions  
of in-place r i p r a p ,  ( 2 )  s o i l  borings,  ( 3 )  t e s t  t renches ,  and ( 4 )  scour gage 
recovery. A l l  o f  t h e  above i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  were performed along t h e  San . 
J a c i n t o  River l evee  reach except  f o r  t h e  scour gage recovery, which was along 
t h e  Bau t i s t a  Creek reach. No scour  gages were loca t ed  along t h e  San J a c i n t o  
River reach. Appendix A of  t h e  f u l l  r e p o r t  (Sciandrone e t  a l . ,  1980) p r e s e n t s  
l o c a t i o n s  of  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  along t h e  San Jac in to  River reach a s  w e l l  a s  
t e s t  r e s u l t s .  Appendix B of  t h e  f u l l  r e p o r t  con ta ins  r e s u l t s  from t h e  scour  
gage i n v e s t i g a t i o n  along t h e  B a u t i s t a  Creek levee.  
Riprap g rada t ions  were performed on samples from s i x  a reas ;  each a rea  was 
approximately 10 x 1 0  f t .  Tes t  a r e a s  1 and 1 A  were loca t ed  j u s t  upstream of 
FIGURE 6 Baut i s ta  Creek l e v e e  with f l o o d  f i g h t  embankment i n  the 
background. 
FIGURE 7 San Jac in to  River l e v e e  i n  the  foreground and f l ood  f i g h t  
embankment i n  the  background. 
FIGURE 8 San J a c i n t o  River l evee  breach a t  B a u t i s t a  Creek. (Photo- 
graph cour t e sy  t h e  Hemet News.) 
t h e  San J a c i n t o  l evee  breach, whi le  2 and 2A were j u s t  downstream of  t h e  
breach. Tes t  a r e a s  3 and 4 were loca t ed  f u r t h e r  downstream of t h e  breach i n  
a r e a s  of  appa ren t ly  coa r se r - s i ze  s t o n e  and appa ren t ly  f i n e r - s i z e  s tone ,  
r e spec t ive ly .  Resu l t s  of  t hese  g rada t ions  a r e  shown i n  F igures  9 and 10. 
Resul t s  of t h e  s i x  r i p r a p  g rada t ions  made dur ing  cons t ruc t ion  f o r  c o n t r o l  
purposes a r e  presented  i n  F igure  4. Resu l t s  of  t e s t s  1 A  and 2A were judged t o  
be erroneous a f t e r  it was discovered t h a t  t h e  s c a l e  used f o r  determining s t o n e  
weights was not  c a l i b r a t e d  properly.  Therefore t e s t s  1 and 2 were performed 
t o  r ep l ace  1 A  and 2A. Resu l t s  of t e s t s  1 through 4 a r e  cdnsidered v a l i d .  
The g rada t ion  d a t a  were analyzed by determining t h e  mean and t h e  s tandard  
dev ia t ion  f o r  both t h e  s i x  cons t ruc t ion  c o n t r o l  p l a n t  g rada t ions  and t h e  four  
v a l i d  in-place g rada t ions .  The mean p l u s  o r  minus one s tandard  dev ia t ion  was 
then used a s  a b a s i s  f o r  eva lua t ing  d a t a  f i t .  Gradat ion C-1 d i d  n o t  f i t  
because it was taken a t  t h e  s ta r t  of product ion,  before p l a n t  adjustments  were 
made. Gradat ion 4 is cons idered  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  f i n e r - s i z e  r i p r a p .  
Gradat ions 1 and 2, taken i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of t h e  breach, a r e  f i n e r  than 
g rada t ion  4.  The in-place g rada t ions  a r e ,  on t h e  whole, f i n e r  than t h e  
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FIGURE 9 Riprap gradation curves for the San Jacinto levee. 1A: Original gradation (March 10) 
upstream of breach. 1: Gradation  arch 26) located 10 ft upstream of 1 ~ .  2A: Original gradation 
(March 10) downstream of breach. 2: Gradation (March 27) located 25 ft downstream of 2A. 
FIGURE 10 Riprap gradation curves for the San Jacinto levee. 1: Gradation taken 100 ft upstream 
of breach and 10 ft upstream of previous gradation (#I). 2: Gradation taken 25 ft downstream of 
previous gradation (located downstream of breach) . 3: Taken at area visu'all~ judged to be coarse. 
4: Taken at area viqually judged to be fine. 
cons t ruc t ion  c o n t r q l  grada t ions .  I t  was observed dur ing  sampling t h a t  some 
a r e a s  con ta in  near-surface f i n e  rock under la in  by c o a r s e r  rock. 
Soi l  Borings 
Five  16-in. diameter bucket auger ho le s  were d r i l l e d  during e a r l y  March t o  
determine t h e  types  and condi t ion  of embankment and foundat ion ma te r i a l s .  
Borings TH-1, 2, and 3 were d r i l l e d  from t h e  l e v e e  c r e s t  through t h e  
embankment and i n t o  t h e  foundation. T o t a l  depths  va r i ed  from 18 t o  23 ft.  
Borings TH-4 and 5 were d r i l l e d  t o  approximate dep ths  of  35 f t  i n  t h e  breach 
a r e a  a t  t h e  l ands ide  t o e  of  t h e  r econs t ruc t ed  levee.  For reasons subsequent ly 
explained,  t h r e e  a d d i t i o n a l  bor ings  (TH-6 through TH-8) were d r i l l e d  
downstream o f  t h e  breach during l a t e  June. 
A l l  borings i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  l evee  and i ts  foundat ion c o n s i s t  o f  sands 
with some silts,  both h ighly  e rod ib l e  ma te r i a l s .  They a l s o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  
groundwater t a b l e  was a t  o r  near t h e  o r i g i n a l  ground l e v e l  during t h e  f lood.  
Borings TH-1 (immediately upstream of t h e  breach) and TH-3 (approximately 275 
f t  downstream o f  t h e  breach) had high blow counts  ( N  v a l u e s ) ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
t h e  l evee  embankment c o n s i s t s  of  well-compacted m a t e r i a l  i n  a r e l a t i v e l y  dense 
s t a t e .  However, boring TH-2, l oca t ed  approximately 200 f t  downstream o f  t h e  
breach, had low blow counts  (1 t o  2) i n  a 7.5-ft t h i ckness  of embankment 
ma te r i a l .  Blow counts  of t h i s  order  of  magnitude denote very  loose  m a t e r i a l ,  
no t  a t  a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of a compacted f i l l .  Thus t h r e e  a d d i t i o n a l  bor ings  
(TH-6 through TH-8) were d r i l l e d  t o  check boring TH-2. These t h r e e  borings 
were a l l  l oca t ed  on t h e  levee  c r e s t ,  each approximately 5 f t  from TH-2; TH-6 
r iverward,  TH-7 upstream, and TH-8 downstream. Since no loose  m a t e r i a l  was 
encountered i n  any of t hese  borings,  e i t h e r  t h e  blow count  from boring TH-2 
was i n c o r r e c t  o r  t h e  cond i t i on  is  loca l i zed .  Fu r the r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  (most 
l i k e l y  excavat ion by backhoe) w i l l  be undertaken by t h e  d i s t r i c t ,  and 
appropr i a t e  remedial measures w i l l  be implemented a s  necessary 
Test Trenches 
Three t e s t  t renches  were excavated wi th  a hydrau l i c  backhoe t o  determine 
t h e  depth t o  which scouring occurred i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  l evee  toe.  Scour 
depth was determined i n  t h e  t renches  by observing t h e  c o n t a c t  between a f a i r l y  
dense s i l t y  sand l a y e r  t h a t  exh ib i t ed  no s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  and over ly ing  sands 
t h a t  were h ighly  s t r a t i f i e d .  The underlying u n s t r a t i f i e d  s i l t y  l a y e r  was 
assumed t o  be undisturbed ma te r i a l  t h a t  e x i s t e d  from t h e  time of  o r i g i n a l  
cons t ruc t ion ,  and t h e  over ly ing  s t r a t i f i e d  sands were assumed t o  be m a t e r i a l  
depos i ted  by streamflow; hence the  c o n t a c t  between t h e  two could reasonably be 
taken a s  t h e  maximum depth of scouring.  
I t  can  be s a f e l y  concluded t h a t  i n  both a r e a s  explored ( i . e . ,  about 1,500 
f t  downstream of Main S t r e e t  and j u s t  downstream of  t h e  main breach) scouring 
could  have occurred t o  depths a t  o r  below t h e  l evee  toe .  
Scour Gages 
B a u t i s t a  Creek is about  400 t o  500 f t  wide a t  t h e  s e c t i o n s  where scour 
gages were i n s t a l l e d  a t  t he  t ime of l evee  cons t ruc t ions .  During i n s t a l l a t i o n  
t h e  t ops  of  t h e  scour  gages were set even with t h e  channel  i n v e r t  e x i s t i n g  a t  
the  t i m e  of cons t ruc t ion .  #However, the survey  records  f o r  t h e  o r i g i n a l  i n v e r t  
e l e v a t i o n s  a r e  unavai lab le .  Consequently, t h e  e l e v a t i o n s  of t h e  two r iverward 
gage tops  had t o  be es t imated  from t h e  o r i g i n a l  l evee  b a c k f i l l  l i n e .  
Resul t s  from t h e  excavat ion  and l o c a t i o n  of t h e  scour gages a r e  presented  
i n  Appendix B of  t h e  f u l l  r e p o r t  (Sciandrone e t  a l . ,  1980). The depos i t i on  
l i n e  given was t h e  streambed e l e v a t i o n  on t h e  day of  t h e  survey, May 8 ,  1980. 
The scour  l i n e  was loca t ed  t h e  same day by excavat ing t h e  streambed a t  t h e  
gage l o c a t i o n s  u n t i l  t h e  reddish  s t o n e s  of  t h e  gages were encountered. The 
measured magnitude of  t h e  e l e v a t i o n  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  i n i t i a l  i n v e r t  and 
the  scour l i n e  is t h e  accumulated scour t h a t  has  occurred s i n c e  t h e  time t h e  
gages were i n s t a l l e d  i n  1960. These i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  (1) scour is 
no t  uniform a c r o s s  t h e  c reek ,  (2) a new gage w i l l  be needed a t  s t a  54+58 f o r  
f u t u r e  measurement s i n c e  on ly  a smal l  f r a c t i o n  of  t h e  f i r s t  gage remains, and 
( 3 )  t h e  scour l i n e  is lower than  t h e  l evee  t o e  a t  s t a  47+58, 54+58, and 64+58. 
CAUSES OF LEVEE FAILURES 
The engineer team considered t h e  fol lowing p o s s i b l e  causes of l evee  
f a i l u r e s  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  p ro j ec t .  
1. Over topping 
2. I n t e r n a l  e ros ion  (p ip ing )  
3. S l i d e s  wi th in  t h e  l evee  embankment and/or foundat ion 
4. Sur face  e ros ion  
5. Undermining of bank p r o t e c t i o n  ( scour)  
6. Channel con f igu ra t ion  
Over topping 
Based on high-water marks, t h e  probable maximum h e i g h t  of ride-up, and t h e  
specu la t ive  he igh t  of  waves and t h e i r  in f luence  on probable maximum water 
l e v e l s ,  overtopping d i d  n o t  occur  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  was n o t  a cause of f a i l u r e .  
I n t e r n a l  Erosion (P ip ing)  
There was no evidence t o  sugges t  t h e  occurrence of  p ip ing ,  even though t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  embankment and foundat ion ma te r i a l s  make them s u s c e p t i b l e  
t o  i n t e r n a l  e ros ion .  Observed rodent  a c t i v i t y  is no t  considered t o  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t .  The smal l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  head does not  produce s u f f i c i e n t  
hydrau l i c  g r a d i e n t  i n  l e v e e  s e c t i o n s  t o  develop piping.  Zhus i n t e r n a l  er'osion 
(p ip ing)  was n o t  a cause  of  levee  f a i l u r e .  
S l i d e s  Within t h e  Levee Embankment and/or Foundation 
Levee design exp lo ra t ion  and s t a b i l i t y  ana lyses  ind ica ted  t h e  l evee  
embankment and foundat ions t o  be s t a b l e .  Minor e ros ion  a t  t h e  lands ide  t o e  of 
t he  l evee  upstream of t h e  San J a c i n t o  River l evee  breach is not  considered t o  
be s i g n i f i c a n t .  The l e v e e  has a conserva t ive  c r o s s  s e c t i o n ,  embankment >nd 
foundat ion m a t e r i a l s  have high s t r e n g t h s ,  and no evidence of  through o r  
underseepage e x i s t s .  ,Consequently, it is  concluded t h a t  s i n c e  s l i d e s  d i d  n o t  
occur  w i th in  t h e  leSee  embankment o r  foundat ion,  they  were no t  a cause of  
l evee  f a i l u r e .  
S ur f a c e  E r  os ion 
hevee f a i l u r e s  can be caused by su r f ace  e r o s i o n  of r i p r a p  bank p r o t e c t i o n  
because of  a c t i o n  from excess ive  s t ream c u r r e n t s  and/or waves. When r i p r a p  
bank p r o t e c t i o n  is subjec ted  t o  c u r r e n t s  without  waves, s u r f a c e  e ros ion  w i l l  
occur  when t h e  t r a c t i v e  fo rce  produced by flow v e l o c i t y  exceeds the  c r i t i c a l  
t r a c t i v e  fo rce  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  of  t h e  s tone .  Waves, caused by uns t ab le  
streambed formations near t h e  bank or f l o w  impingement on t h e  bank (both 
c o n d i t i o n s  occurred i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  R ive r ) ,  produce u p l i f t  p ressures  on 
bank p r o t e c t i o n  s t o n e  t h a t ,  i n  combination wi th  s t ream v e l o c i t y ,  can cause 
s u r f a c e  e ros ion  when t r a c t i v e  f o r c e s  a r e  smal le r  than  t h e  c r i t i c a l  l e v e l .  
Consequently,  when r i p r a p  bank p r o t e c t i o n  is designed f o r  flow v e l o c i t y  a lone  
and s i g n i f i c a n t  waves occur along t h e  bank, s u r f a c e  e r o s i o n  may occur with 
flows s u b s t a n t i a l l y  smal le r  than t h e  des ign  d ischarge .  
I n  order  t o  determine whether s u r f a c e  e ros ion  was a cause  of l evee  f a i l u r e  
on t h e  San J a c i n t o  River ,  observa t ions  o f  in-place s t o n e  were made and four  
in-place g rada t ions  were taken, a s  p rev ious ly  noted. Based on v i s u a l  
obse rva t ions ,  t h e r e  w a s  no evidence t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  s u r f a c e  e ros ion  had 
occurred,  a l though some l o c a l i z e d  a r e a s  of  s t o n e  were judged t o  be f i n e  and 
o t h e r s  t o  be coarse.  The g rada t ions ,  shown i n  F igu re  10, i n d i c a t e  one sample 
t o  be undersized with r e spec t  t o  p r o j e c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  However, t h e  
o r i g i n a l  design appears  t o  be fol lowing t h e  c r i t e r i a  used a t  t he  t i m e  of 
cons t ruc t ion ,  namely, g rada t ion  c o n t r o l  a t  t h e  qua r ry  only.  Therefore t h e  
a r e a s  of undersized s tone  may be due, i n  p a r t ,  t o  s eg rega t ion  t h a t  occurred 
during handling and placement. 
Observat ions and sampling of  in-place r i p r a p  i n d i c a t e  t h a t ,  s i n c e  removal 
of t h e  bedding l a y e r  from beneath t h e  r i p r a p  has  no t  occurred,  it is an 
u n l i k e l y  cause of  s u r f a c e  e ros ion  leading  t o  l e v e e  f a i l u r e .  Although t w o  of 
t h e  in-place g rada t ions  show t h e  bedding l a y e r  to  be f i n e r  than s p e c i f i e d ,  
t h i s  cond i t i on  could  have r e s u l t e d  from s i l t i n g  by flow sediments and/or 
contaminat ion from sampling procedures,  s i n c e  t h e  demarcation between bedding 
and embankment m a t e r i a l s  probably was n o t  d i s t i n c t .  I n  any event  it is 
be l ieved  t h a t  t h e  f i n e r  g rada t ion  of t h e  bedding m a t e r i a l  was n o t  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  i n  l evee  f a i l u r e .  
1 n  t r ench  T2, where scour depths were near t h e  bottom of t h e  r i p r a p  
p r o t e c t i o n ,  some r i p r a p  was loca t ed  a t  t h e  scour  l e v e l  r iverward of t h e  r i p r a p  
toe. Th i s  s t o n e  was e i t h e r  removed from t h e  r i p r a p  l a y e r  by s u r f a c e  e ros ion  
o r  undermined i n  t h e  breach a r e a  and t r anspor t ed  downstream along t h e  scoured 
streambed. The l a t t e r  ca se  appears  t o  be t h e  most l i k e l y  reason f o r  f ind ing  
d i sp l aced  r i p r a p  i n  t rench  T2. 
Based on p r e s e n t  c r i t e r i a  (Off ice  o f  t h e  Chief of  Engineers,  1971),  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t h i cke r  l a y e r  of  heavier  s t o n e  would be requi red  t o  withstand 
f lood  v e l o c i t i e s  (F igure  11). Although no evidence was found t h a t  su r f ace  

erosZon was a s i g n 4 f i c a n t  f a c t o r  i n  l evee  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  undersized r i p r a p  
p r o t e c t i ~ n ,  compared with p re sen t  c r i t e r i a ,  would probably be s u b j e c t  t o  
f a i l u r e  by s u r f a c e  ecosion dur ing  l a r g e r  f l oods  up t o  t h e  design f lood  
magnitude. 
Undermining of Bank P r o t e c t i o n  (Scour) 
In spec t ion  of Bau t i s t a  Creek upstream of t h e  l evee  sugges ts  t h a t  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  t h e  concre te  channel caused sediments,  n a t u r a l l y  c a r r i e d  by 
t h e  c reek ,  t o  be depos i ted  upstream of t h e  channel  i n l e t .  The r e s u l t a n t  
d e l i v e r y  of  r e l a t i v e l y  sediment-free water t o  t h e  leveed  reach,  a long with t h e  
s t e e p  s l o p e  of t h i s  reach ( g r e a t e r  than one p e r c e n t ) ,  caused gene ra l  streambed 
degrada t ion  downstream of  t h e  concre te  channel.  The subsequent nea r ly  complete 
f i l l i n g  of  t h e  v a l l e y  immediately upstream of t h e  conc re t e  channel  i n l e t  wi th  
depos i ted  sediment and t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of channel  s t a b i l i z e r s  by t h e  RCFC and 
WCD have reduced, and i n  t h e  upstream p a r t  o f  t h e  reach have reversed,  t h e  
g e n e r a l  tendency of  t h e  streambed t o  degrade. 
The RCFC and WCD has  documented t h e  gene ra l  degrada t ion  of Bau t i s t a  Creek 
through most of t h e  leveed reach. The l e v e l  of b a c k f i l l  (sti l l  ev ident  a long  
much of t h e  l evee )  provides a re ference  p lane  f o r  eva lua t ing  t h e  approximate 
depth of  scour  and/or channel degradat ion.  Comparing t h e  design depth o f  t h e  
r i p r a p  t o e  with t h e  depth of t he  e x i s t i n g  streambed below t h e  b a c k f i l l  
r e f e rence  l e v e l  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  streambed is a t  about  t h e  same l e v e l  as t h e  
r i p r a p  t o e  along much of t he  levee.  Visua l  i n spec t ion  of exposed r i p r a p  a t  
t h e  streambed tends  t o  confirm t h a t  t h e  r i p r a p  t o e  is exposed and damaged i n  
some loca t ions .  Examination of t h e  scour gage d a t a  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  scour along 
t h e  l e v e e  was approximately t o  t h e  rock t o e  except  i n  t h e  breach a r e a ,  where 
scour  was s e v e r a l  f e e t  below t h e  rock toe.  These f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  scour  
was 4 t o  5 f t  below t h e  l evee  t o e  a t  s t a  54+58 and 64+58, upstream and 
downstream of t h e  breach. Based on observed cond i t i ons  and scour gage 
information,  it is q u i t e  ev iden t  t h a t  undermining o f  t h e  bank p r o t e c t i o n  
caused t h e  l evee  f a i l u r e  a t  B a u t i s t a  Creek. 
During t h e  i n i t i a l  f i e l d  inspec t ion  and p repa ra t ion  o f  t h e  pre l iminary  
r e p o r t ,  t h e r e  was no r e a d i l y  apparent  o r  ob ta inab le  information with which t o  
determine t h e  cause  o r  causes of l evee  f a i l u r e  a t  t h e  main breach i n  t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  River l evee ,  o the r  than the  evidence t h a t  most of  t h e  r i v e r ' s  flow 
impinged on and then flowed along t h e  l evee  i n  t h e  a r e a  where t h e  breach 
subsequent ly occurred. This  evidence suggested t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  deep 
scour .occurred along t h e  l evee  i n  t h e  a r e a  of f low impingement, which 
undermined t h e  l evee  toe  and caused f a i l u r e  of  t h e  levee.  Subsequent 
excavat ion and in spec t ion  of t r enches  provided p o s i t i v e  evidence of  scour  
depths.  Trench T 2 ,  l oca t ed  a s h o r t  d i s t a n c e  downstream of  t h e  breach, 
revea led  t h a t  t h e  depth of  scour  was approximately t o  t h e  bottom of  t h e  rock 
toe. Trench T3, l oca t ed  wi th in  t h e  breach a r e a  and approximately 50 f t  
r iverward of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  levee  rock toe ,  i nd ica t ed  t h e  depth of scour to be 
approximately a t  t h e  same l e v e l  a s  t h e  bottom of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  rock toe.  
Considering t h e  magnitude of t h e  1980 f lood  compared wi th  o the r  f l oods  t h a t  
occurred subsequent t o  completion of t h e  p r o j e c t ,  it is reasonable t o  conclude 
t h a t  t h e  maximum depth of pos t cons t ruc t ion  scour occurred  during t h e  1980 
flood. Th i s  evidence sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  maximum depth o f  scour a t  t h e  rock t o e  
r e s u l t i n g  from impingement of  flow on me l e v e e  f a c e  dur ing  t h e  February 1980 
f lood  was a t  o r  below t h e  bottom ot t h e  rock t o e  a t  t h e  t ime of  t h e  l evee  
breach. Consequently, undermining of  t h e  bank p r o t e c t i o n  by scour appears  to 
be the p r i n c i p a l  cause  of t he  San J a c i n t o  l evee  f a i l u r e .  
Below t h e  Main S t r e e t  c ros s ing  t h e  s i m i l a r  evidence of  impingement and 
flow along t h e  l evee  f a c e  sugges ts  t h a t  t h e  l evee  d i s t r e s s  t h e r e  was caused i n  
t h e  same manner a s  a t  t h e  main breach. 
Channel Conf igura t ion  
The channel con f igu ra t ion  i n  p lan  appears  t o  have been a s i g n i f i c a n t  
f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  l evee  f a i l u r e ,  inasmuch a s  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  flow 
impingement on t h e  l e v e e  caused deeper scour a t  t h e  t o e  of  t h e  rock - 
pro tec t ion .  Flow impingement was p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  on t h e  l e f t  l evee  
of t h e  San J a c i n t o  River between s t a  164+00 and 169+00. Upstream of t h i s  
l o c a t i o n  t h e  abrupt  junc t ion  of B a u t i s t a  Creek wi th  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River and 
t h e  p ro t ec t ion  wa l l  upstream o f  t h e  water w e l l  a r e a  r e s u l t e d  i n  impingement of 
flows a t  t h e  upstream end of  t h e  r i g h t  Indian  levee ,  with some d i s t r e s s  a t  
t h a t  po in t .  The upstream end o f  t h e  Indian  l evee  d e f l e c t e d  flows ac ros s  t h e  
San J a c i n t o  River t o  impinge a t  an angle  of  approximately 25 degrees on t h e  
l e f t  l evee  a t  t h e  l o c a t i o n  of f a i l u r e .  This  angle  of impingement con t r ibu ted  
t o  75 to  95 pe rcen t  of t h e  flow t h a t  passed through t h e  levee  break. S imi l a r ,  
bu t  l e s s  no t i ceab le ,  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  i n  t h e  alignment of  t h e  channel bank 
f a r t h e r  downstream on t h e  San J a c i n t o  River and on B a u t i s t a  Creek r e s u l t e d  i n  
flow impingement a t  s e v e r a l  l o c a t i o n s  where l evee  d i s t r e s s  occurred. Thus it 
is evident  t h a t  channel  con f igu ra t ion  con t r ibu ted  t o  l evee  f a i l u r e s  by 
producing flow impingement on l e v e e s  t h a t ,  i n  t u rn ,  produced deeper scour and 
undermining of t h e  levees .  
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on t h e  information a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  engineer  team has reached t h e  
following conclus ions  regard ing  the  causes  of levee  f a i l u r e s .  
1. F a i l u r e  of  t h e  levees ,  i n  whole o r  i n  p a r t ,  was caused by undermining 
of t h e  l evee  toe ,  in f luenced  by flow impingement due t o  adverse channel 
conf igura t ion .  
2. There is no evidence t h a t  inadequate o r  improper maintenance 
cont r ibu ted  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  . 
3 .  Considering t h e  customary p r a c t i c e s  and procedures a t  t h e  time of  
cons t ruc t ion ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  was cons t ruc ted  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  according t o  p l ans  and 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  These procedures  d i d  r e s u l t ,  however, i n  r i p r a p  levee  s lope  
p r o t e c t i o n  t h a t  was, a t  some loca t ions ,  somewhat smaller  than was c a l l e d  f o r  
i n  t h e  design.  
4. The r i p r a p  p r o t e c t i o n  was designed based on t h e  c r i t e r i a  i n  e f f e c t  a t  
t h e  t ime ' .  P r e sen t  c r i t e r i a  would c a l l  f o r  a t h i cke r  1 a y e r " o f  heavier  and more 
uniformly graded r ip rap .  
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5. The depth yf scour was properly recognized in the original design of 
the levee slope protection as an important design consideration. However, the 
effect of flow impingement in producing greater depths of scour in certain 
locations was not recognized, as riprap toe protection was not taken to 
greater depths in those locations. 
6. Two factors contributed to the failure of the Bautista Creek levee: 
(a) an inability to provide sufficient depth of riprap protection to 
accommodate the increased streambed degradation caused by a reduction in 
sediment load due to the presence of the upstream concrete channel and inlet, 
and (b) the excessively steep streambed slope in the levee reach. 
APPLICATION OF EXPERIENCE TO OTHER PROJECTS 
Ex'isting Projects 
Project Review 
The experience with the San Jacinto River project and other experiences 
suggest that existing nonrectilinear channels should be reviewed to determine 
if conditions exist that would produce flow impingement on channel banks. 
Priority review and evaluation should be given to nonrectilinear, leveed, 
soft-bottom channels. Particular attention should be given to adverse channel 
alignment and to wide streams in which flows smaller than the design flow are 
free to meander, producing cross streamflow and levee impingement. Aerial 
photographs of preproject and postconstruction conditions may be useful in 
determining locations of adverse channel alignment, reaches of probable levee 
impingement, and adverse conditions at stream junctions. 
The Bautista Creek experience suggests that existing nonrectilinear, 
leveed, soft-bottom channels on relatively steep slopes should be reviewed to 
determine if conditions exist that might cause excessive streambed 
degradation, in addition to possible flow impingement. Also, tributary 
streams that produce adverse flow conditions at the junction with larger 
streams, as does Bautista Creek, should be reviewed. 
Several reports on slope protection have been prepared by the Los Angeles 
District. An updating and expansion of the 1971 Report on Criteria for Riprap 
Bank Protection, prepared by the Los Angeles District Hydraulic Section, may 
be used in an initial evaluation of soft-bottom channel performance. The 
report indicates that "layer thicknesses requirements of riprap may be larger 
for flows less than the maximum." It is noteworthy that damages to the Santa 
Maria levees in 1969 and to the Bautista Creek and San Jacinto River levees in 
1980 occurred during flows that were less than maximum. As with the San 
Jacinto River levee, the Santa Maria levees were damaged by meandering flows 
that undermined the stone protection at isolated points and by cross 
streamflows that eroded parts of the levees. 
For those reaches of levees identified for investigation and additional 
evaluation, in-place riprap gradation tests should be obtained. Riprap 
gradations taken at the plant are not representative of in-place gradations. 
Current criteria (Office of the Chief p,f Engineers, 1970) require testing of 
in-place samples of r iprap* material 
Inspection and EvaZuation Progrm 
The failure of the San Jacinto River levee signifies the need for a levee 
safety assurance program. An authorized program of inspection and evaluation 
by engineering personnel would permit reviews of soft-bottom channels that 
would consider current criteria, practices, and experience. The most 
meaningful time for such an inspection would be during periods of flow. The 
purpose of the program would be to identify, through data collection and 
review, those levees requiring early detailed, investigation because of actual 
or suspect conditions. The detailed investigations, the determination of the 
need for additional defensive measures, and their construction where needed to 
ensure project integrity could be included under the periodic inspection and 
continuing evaluation program. 
After evaluating existing projects and identifying locations that are 
likely to be damaged by design or smaller flows, defensive measures should be 
provided, as described below, to improve project integrity. 
Future Projects 
In a wide stream free to meander, the points of impingement during low 
water flow vary and may be indeterminate. Considering the uncertainties 
involved in the design and construction of bank protection, defensive measures 
should be provided in locations where the bank may be subject to severe angles 
of attack. The use of groins, as constructed on the Santa Clara levee, 
proposed for the Santa Maria levees, and recommended in the full report for 
the San Jacinto levees, should be considered, as well as deeper stone toe 
protection, in reaches subject to impingement. The use of channel stabilizers 
and/or deeper stone toe protection should be considered for channels with 
relatively steep slopes. Improvements in channel alignment should be made at 
abrupt junctions. 
The construction of a rectilinear low-flow channel would channelize flow 
away from the bank. Considering the ephemeral nature of an excavated low-flow 
channel, local interests would not likely provide assurances; therefore the 
low-flow channel cannot be considered part of the permanent works. The 
low-flow channel would have to be designated as a borrow area so that local 
assurances for maintenance would not apply. Solutions requiring less . 
maintenance, such as groins or deeper toe protection, are more desirable, 
because it seems that soft-bottom, nonrectilinear channels require more 
maintenance than is considered in project planning. 
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LAKE ELSINORE FLOOD DISASTER OF MARCH 1980 
by Cha r l e s  R. White 
The severe storms i n  southern California throughout the early part of 
1980 caused a prolonged r i se  i n  the water level  of Lake Elsinore, which 
f Zooded nearly 300 homes, nwnerous mobi Ze homes, and many businesses. The 
flooding also displaced nearly 2,000 residents. On February 19, 1980, 
President Carter declared Riverside County (which includes Lake Elsinore) 
a federal disaster area. On March 5 Governor Brown signed an Executive 
Emergency Order for Lake Elsinore. 
Because of t h i s  flooding, s ta f f  from the Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) was assigned t o  Lake Elsinore t o  as s i s t  the Office of Emergency Services 
beginning on March 3, 1980. During the month of March DWR s t a f f ,  together 
with the California Conservation Corps and the U. S. A m y  Corps of Engineers, 
provided flood protection for many structures i n  the flood-damaged area. 
This paper describes the situation and the preventative measures taken during 
t h i s  time a t  Lake Elsinore. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lake E l s ino re ,  which is loca t ed  i n  western R ive r s ide  County approximately 
65 miles s o u t h e a s t  of  L o s  Angeles, occupies  a t e rmina l  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  San 
J a c i n t o  dra inage  a rea .  The dra inage  a r e a  f o r  t h e  r i v e r  is 768 square  mi l e s  
(F igure  1). The e x i s t i n g  dam on t h e  San J a c i n t o  River is i n  Rai l road  Canyon 
and has  a maximum s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y  of  about  15,000 ac re - f t .  
Lake E l s i n o r e  is roughly r ec t angu la r  i n  shape when t h e  water s u r f a c e  is a t  
i ts normal overflow e l e v a t i o n  o f  1,260 f t  (F igure  2 ) .  Under t h a t  cond i t i on  
t h e  l a k e  is about  5.5 miles long from s o u t h e a s t  to  northwest ,  1.8 mi les  wide, 
and has  a s u r f a c e  a r e a  of  6,200 acres. Its average  a r e a  s i n c e  1916 has  been 
about  3,800 ac re s .  The l a k e  is q u i t e  shal low,  having a maximum depth o f  on ly  
36 f t ,  and has  a c a p a c i t y  o f  about  130,000 a c r e - f t  when a t  an e l e v a t i o n  of 
1,260 f t ,  The out f low o f  t h e  l a k e  goes e v e n t u a l l y  to Prado Dam and i n t o  t h e  
Cha r l e s  R. wh i t e  is Senior  Engineer wi th  t h e  Planning Branch of t h e  









Santa Ana River.  The out f low channel ,  which goes through downtown Lake 
E l s ino re  i n t o  Temescal Wash and thq,;$&ta Ana River ,  had n o t  been used s i n c e  
1916, t h e  l a s t  t i m e  t h a t  t h e  l a k e  bad overflowed. 
The proximity of Lake E l s i n o r e  t o  t h e  l a r g e  popula t ion  c e n t e r s  of  southern  
C a l i f o r n i a  has  made it a popular r e c r e a t i o n  area, p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  water s p o r t  
en thus i a s t s .  The comparat ively calm l a k e  s u r f a c e  is w e l l  adapted to 
motorboating, water  s k i i n g ,  and swimming. Consequently, many homes, t r a i l e r  
parks,  and o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e s  were b u i l t  around t h e  lakeshore.  
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  t h e  E l s i n o r e  a r e a  has  a t t r a c t e d  p a r a c h u t i s t s ,  g l i d e r  f ans ,  
and hang g l i d e r  e n t h u s i a s t s .  Lake E l s ino re  is p a r t  o f  a s t a t e  park t h a t  has  
overn ight  campground f a c i l i t i e s .  
CLIMATE 
The c l ima te  o f  t h e  E l s i n o r e  a r e a  is cha rac t e r i zed  by warm d r y  summers and 
coo l  win ters .  The mean annual  temperature a t  E l s i n o r e  is 63O~.  The mean 
annual p r e c i p i t a t i o n  a t  E l s ino re ,  almost a l l  o f  which occu r s  dur ing  win ter  
months, is about  13  in .  Lake E l s ino re  is almost  e n t i r e l y  surrounded by 
mountains. Consequently,  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  inc reases  sharp ly :  t h e  annual  mean is 
about 25 in .  on ly  1.5 m i l e s  from t h e  lakeshore.  
An important  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  Lake E l s i n o r e  a r e a  is t h e  occurrence of c y c l e s  
of a l t e r n a t i n g  h igh  and low p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  extending f o r  pe r iods  o f  
cons iderable  length .  R a i n f a l l  v a r i e s  between wide l i m i t s .  Normal runoff  i n t o  
t h e  l a k e  is on t h e  o rde r  o f  10,000 to 15,000 acre-f t /yr .  
The water l e v e l  i n  Lake E l s i n o r e  has  f l u c t u a t e d  depending upon t h e  
r a i n f a l l  and corresponding runoff  i n  t h e  San J a c i n t o  River (F igure  3 ) .  I n  t h e  
e a r l y  1960s t h e  l a k e  was d r y  (wi th  an  e l e v a t i o n  of 1,223 f t ) .  A s  r e c e n t l y  a s  
1977 t h e  l a k e  was i n  danger of  becoming d r y  again. The e l e v a t i o n  was 1,228 
f t .  The above average r a i n f a l l  i n  1977-78 and 1978-79 r a i s e d  t h e  l a k e  l e v e l  
t o  1,246 f t  by October 1979. 
1980 FLOOD 
During t h e  10-day pe r iod  o f  February 13 t o  February 23, 1980, over  13  in .  
of r a i n  f e l l .  On February 13 t h e  e l e v a t i o n  of  t h e  water s u r f a c e  of  t h e  l a k e  
was 1,247 f t ,  wi th  62,000 a c r e - f t  o f  water i n  s t o r a g e  (F igure  4 ) .  On February 
23 t h e  l e v e l  had r i s e n  t o  1,259 f t .  The amount of  water i n  s t o r a g e  was . 
124,000 acre- f t .  
I t  was dur ing  t h i s  per iod  i n  February t h a t  a c t i o n s  were i n i t i a t e d  t o  
prevent  what was c e r t a i n  to be a d i s a s t e r  of major propor t ions .  The S t a t e  
Of f i ce  o f  Emergency S e r v i c e s  (OES), t h e  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,  and t h e  
Federa l  Emergency Management Agency were a l l  c a l l e d  i n  to  a s s i s t  t h e  l o c a l  
agencies  i n  coping wi th  t h e  damages t h a t  were caused by t h e  cont inued rise i n  
t h e  l a k e ' s  water l e v e l .  
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FIGURE 3 Lake Elsinore water surface elevation and rainfall prior to 1980. 
FIGURE 4 Lake E l s ino re  water s u r f a c e  e l e v a t i o n  and r a i n f a l l .  
FLOOD FIGHT 
Under Pub l i c  Law 84-99 t h e  Corps i n i t i a t e d  t h e  dredging of t h e  overflow 
channel  t h a t  l e a d s  from Lake E l s ino re  t o  Temescal wash. 
Because t h i s  channel had no t  been used s i n c e  1916, s i l t  and o t h e r  
accumulated d e b r i s  had b u i l t  up t h e  e l eva t ion  over t h e  normal s p i l l  l e v e l  of 
1,260 f t .  I n  some p l a c e s  t h e  e l e v a t i o n  of  t h e  channel  bottom was a s  much a s  8 
f t  above t h i s .  The Corps l e t  c o n t r a c t s  t o  dredge t h e  channel t o  an e l e v a t i o n  
of 1,260 f t .  To c l e a r  t h i s  channel  requi red  r e l o c a t i o n  of  a l l  u t i l i t i e s ,  
b r idges ,  and roads  t h a t  c rossed  it. I n  e f f e c t ,  t h i s  c u t  t h e  c i t y  i n t o  two 
s e p a r a t e  p a r t s ,  i s o l a t i n g  one p a r t  of t h e  town from t h e  o the r .  The Corps l e t  
t h e  f i r s t  c o n t r a c t  on February 24. 
On Sunday, March 2, t h e  l a k e  l e v e l  was 1,262.58 f t .  During t h e  day about  
1.5 i n .  o f  r a i n  f e l l .  The next  day OES e s t a b l i s h e d  a  command p o s t  i n  t h e  
c i t y .  I was c a l l e d  upon t o  r ep re sen t  t h e  Department of  Water Resources a t  t h e  
command pos t .  
Work on t h e  channel  dredging cont inued 24 hours  a  day a s  t h e  l e v e l  of  t h e  
l a k e  continued to  rise. On March 7 t h e  outf low channel  began to al low Lake 
E l s ino re  water t o  flow i n t o  Temescal Wash. On t h a t  d a t e  t h e  l a k e  l e v e l  was 
1,264.05 f t  (F igure  5 ) .  
FIGURE 5 A e r i a l  photograph of  Lake E l s i n o r e  a t  f l ood  s t a g e  (an eleva-  
t i o n  of 1,265 f t )  i n  March 1980. (Photograph cour t e sy  of Rivers ide  
County ~ l o o d  Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t . )  
Simultaneously wi th  t h i s  a p l an  of a c t i o n  w a s  being formulated t o  assist 
t h e  r e s i d e n t s  of Lake E l s ino re  i n  coping wi th  t h e  cont inued  r i s e  i n  water 
l e v e l  and r e s u l t i n g  encroachment o f  water i n t o  s t r u c t u r e s  along t h e  lakeshore.  
The s t r a t e g y  t h a t  was developed was t o  save  a s  many homes, bus inesses ,  and 
t r a i l e r  parks  around t h e  l a k e  a s  poss ib l e .  Already, numerous homes, 
bus inesses ,  mobile home parks,  and o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e s  had been inundated by t h e  
r a p i d  r i s e  i n  t h e  l a k e  l e v e l s  (F igures  6 and 7 ) .  
I n  a l l ,  t h r e e  measures were taken i n  March (Department of Water Resources, 
1980) t o  h e l p  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  r i s i n g  l a k e  l e v e l  on t h e  res idences  
of Lake E l s ino re .  One measure has  a l r e a d y  been mentioned, t h e  dredging of t he  
o u t l e t  channel  t o  c a r r y  o f f  some o f  t h e  l a k e  water .  
The second measure taken was t o  evacuate  people and proper ty ,  inc luding  
mobile homes t h a t  were i n  danger of being f looded (F igure  8 ) .  
The t h i r d  s t e p  was sandbagging and t h e  bu i ld ing  of  l evees  t o  p r o t e c t  homes 
and o t h e r  developments from f looding  (F igures  9 and 1 0 ) .  
FIGURE 6 Lakes ide  home under water .  (Photograph c o u r t e s y  o f  U.S. 
Army Corps  of Engineers .  ) 
FIGURE 8 Evacuation of a double-wide mobile home at Lakeside Trailer Park. 
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FIGURE 9 The DWR sandbagging a home on Grand Avenue. 
FIGURE 10 CCC crews sandbagging a  home on Grand Avenue. 
A f l ood  f i g h t  s i t u a t i o n  of t h i s  type--a p r e d i c t a b l e  r i s e  of about  6 t o  8 
in .  per  day i n  t h e  l a k e  l e v e l  was occu r r ing  even i n  t h e  absence of new 
ra infa l l - -had  n o t  occurred  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  We knew 
t h a t  t ime was c r i t i c a l .  Consequently, I recommended t o  t h e  OES t h a t  
a s s i s t a n c e  be provided by personnel  of DWR's Sacramento maintenance yard,  who 
a r e  e x p e r t s  and experienced i n  f i g h t i n g  f loods .  
A s  time was c r i t i c a l  i n  t h e  f i r s t  week ,  an a l l - o u t  e f f o r t  was made t o  
c i r c l e  t h e  l a k e  and p inpo in t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  were i n  t h e  most danger from 
the  r i s i n g  l a k e  l e v e l s .  Each s t r u c t u r e  was v i s i t e d  by a  DWR team of two f lood  
f i g h t e r s ,  then a  p l a n  of  a c t i o n  was taken immediately wi th  OES concurrence. 
Sandbags, Visqueen, and d i r t  were brought i n  and were placed i n  p o s i t i o n  by 
t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Conservat ion Corps (CCC) under t h e  supe rv i s ion  of  t h e  DWR f l o o d  
f i g h t e r s .  The CCC c o n s i s t e d  of  crews o f  young men and wom'en whose work was 
outs tanding  dur ing  t h i s  f lood .  
The Corps of Engineers  b u i l t  four  l e v e e s  i n  Lake E l s i n o r e  (F igures  11 and 
1 2 ) .  They were a t  E l s i n o r e  Vi l l age ,  Four Corners ,  Mission T r a i l ,  and Corydon 
Road. Coordinat ion with t h e  Corps was e s s e n t i a l  because a l l  f ou r  d i k e s  had t o  
be sandbagged and p ro t ec t ed  with Visqueen t o  prevent  damage from wave a c t i o n  
and o the r  fo rces .  These l evees  were sandbagged by t h e  CCC under t h e  
superv is ion  of DWR f lood  f i g h t e r s .  
FIGURE 11 Levee at Mission Trail Road. 
The above actions were taking place simultaneously; the dikes were being 
constructed and sandbagged and homes and other structures were being 
protected. In all, over 400 members of the CCC were used in fighting the 
Elsinore flood. We worked 16 hours a day, 7 days a week during this emergency. 
Because of the relatively slow rise of the lake in March and the hard work 
and dedication of all public and private agencies, the damages to property in 
Lake Elsinore were minimized. Consider that if no outflow channel had been 
dredged the lake would have risen an estimated additional 1.5 to 2 ft in 
height. A number of homes were saved from serious flood damage by the 
building of levees and the sandbagging operation. 
Many steps remain to be taken to prevent damages at Lake Elsinore from the 
rains this fall and winter. A task force of all public agencies involved in 
the flood fight (federal, state, and local) was formed. The purpose of the 
task -force is to advise the governor of necessary steps and actions, including 
relocations to prevent and mitigate future flooding and loss or damage to 
public and private property in the vicinity of Lake Elsinore. A subcommittee 
of this task force has recommended a pumpout scheme to get the lake down below 
its current elevation--1,260 ft. The pumpout scheme, if all goes well, will 
lower the lake to an elevation of 1,255 ft, thus allowing space for water from 
new rains this coming winter. It is hoped that the pumping can begin by 
October 15. 
Estimates of flood damages at Lake Elsinore are on the order of $50 
million--over $40 million damage to private property and about $9 million to 
FIGURE 12 Lake Elsinore levees. 
public property. yithout the measures taken during February and March by 
federal, state, local, and private agencies and contractors, these damages 
could have been much greater. The cooperation and teamwork shown in the Lake 
Elsinore flood fight are to be commended. 
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FLOOD CONTROL WORKS ON THE SALT RIVER IN PHOENIX, ARIZONA 
by Ramsey M. McDermid, George J.  Geiser,  
Daryl B. Simons, and Ruh-Ming L i  
The Sal t  River near Phoenix, Arizona, has been subjected t o  repeated 
floods over the past few years. The Interstate  20 bridge across the r iver  
i s  a v i t a l  transportation link for the metropolitan area, Local scour, 
general bed degradation, and lateral channel migration during successive 
flows have altered the riverbed over and around the piers of the bridge. 
Floods i n  1978 and 1979 caused the se t t l ing  of Pier No. 2 1 .  The Arizona 
Department o f  Transportation concluded that the bridge may be susceptible 
t o  further damage i n  the future. A hydraulic and erosion analysis for 
various flood control facilitzj design alternatives,  including the as-is 
condition and short-term channelization plans, was conducted. A 300-ft- 
wide low- f low channe Zization p Zan was adopted and i m p  Zemented for short- term 
protection. In  February 1980 a flaod comparable i n  s i ze  with the design 
fZood passed through the channel. This paper presents analyses o f  the 
suscept ibi l i ty  of the pier foundations t o  scouring during future floods. 
The degradation and aggradation problem i s  very complicated. Simplifying 
assumptions are needed to  obtain practical and economical solutions. The 
dominant physical processes include water runoff, sediment transport, sediment 
routing, degradation, aggradation, breaking and forming of the amnor Zayer, 
etc.  These processes are unsteady i n  natme. In  order t o  simplify the 
solution and t o  make the resul t s  af the analysis compatible with the HEC-2 
flood profile analysis, a known discharge assumption i s  used. The known 
discharge soZution i s  appropriate i n  t h i s  study because of the short distances 
involved i n  the analysis. In  addition, t o  save computer time the degradation 
and aggradation analysis i s  conducted on a reach basis using the average 
hydraulic parameters from the HEC- 2 analysis. The amount o f  predicted 
aggradation and degradation i s  distributed t o  the ver t ica ls  of a cross 
section according t o  the channel conveyance t o  yield a s e t  of new cross 
sections. 
The developed mathematical model routes the sediment by s ize  fractions. 
The transporting capacity o f  each reach i s  determined using the average 
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hydrauZic conditions of the reach. The ged<ment routing procedure i s  
accomp Zis hed by app Zy ing the sediment dcntinuity equation and considering 
the size distribution of the upstream sediment supply and the bed material 
for both surface and subsurface Zayers. 
The mode2 shows the design configuration t o  be stable during passage 
of the design hydrograph. The model i s  also used t o  predict conditions 
under which additional flood control works w i l l  be required. 
INTRODUCTION 
A s  p a r t  o f  t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  10 (1-10) freeway system, a br idge  was 
cons t ruc t ed  dur ing  1962 a c r o s s  t h e  S a l t  River i n  Phoenix, Arizona. The 
conc re t e  s t r u c t u r e  c o n s i s t s  of p a r a l l e l  and ad jo in ing  twin br idges ,  each- 
supported by 19 p i e r s  based on spread foot ings .  The Arizona Department of  
T ranspor t a t ion  (ADOT) lowered t h e  foundat ions of four  p i e r s  on each br idge  and 
i n s t a l l e d  a 250-ft-wide r iprap- l ined  low-flow channel  a t  t h e  t i m e  of 
cons t ruc t ion .  The 1,760-ft-long s t r u c t u r e  spanned t h e  channel  and t h e  de f ined  
f loodp la in .  
After  t h e  1-10 b r idge  was opened t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n  1965, its s ix- lane  
capac i ty  quick ly  developed i n t o  a v i t a l  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  l i n k  connect ing c e n t r a l  
Phoenix and t h e  urban communities t o  t h e  south  and e a s t ,  a s  shown i n  F igure  
1. During pe r iods  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  flow i n  t h e  S a l t  River most smal le r  br idges  
and t h e  numerous unbridged c r o s s i n g s  c l o s e ,  t h u s  i nc reas ing  t h e  importance of  
keeping t h e  1-10 b r idge  open f o r  l o c a l  commuters and emergency v e h i c l e s  a s  
w e l l  as i n t e r s t a t e  commercial t r a f f i c .  
During t h e  win ter  of  1965-66 t h e  f i r s t  major flow s i n c e  1941 damaged t h e  
upstream f a c e  of t h e  south  br idge  approach. Successive high flows i n  1973, 
1978, and 1979 r e s u l t e d  i n  g e n e r a l  r iverbed  degradat ion and 250 f t  o f  channel  
migrat ion t o  t h e  south ,  away from t h e  four  deeper p i e r s  and t h e  low-flow 
channel.  A s  a r e s u l t ,  one sha l low p i e r  s e t t l e d  and moved l a t e r a l l y ,  
n e c e s s i t a t i n g  c l o s u r e  o f  t h e  bridge. Dames & Moore was r e t a i n e d  by ADOT t o  
provide  engineering s e r v i c e s  t o  exped i t e  r e p a i r s  and reopening of  t h e  
eastbound bridge s t r u c t u r e .  Repairs  cons i s t ed  of a two-state g r o u t  i n j e c t i o n  
program, followed by c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a new foo t ing  and conc re t e  c o l l a r  t o  
r e i n f o r c e  the  p i e r .  The br idge  deck was then jacked back t o  design grade  and 
shimmed . 
Foundation suppor t  f o r  a l l  of t h e  p i e r s  of t h e  S a l t  River Bridge is 
provided by spread f o o t i n g s ,  many of which a r e  based a t  approximately t h e  same 
e l e v a t i o n  a s  t h e  p i e r  t h a t  f a i l e d .  Consequently, ADOT was concerned t h a t  
o t h e r  p i e r  foundat ions a t  t h e  br idge  were s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  scour  damage. Dames 
& Moore was author ized  by ADOT t o  conduct a phased design s tudy  t o  ana lyze  t h e  
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of t h e  e x i s t i n g  p i e r  foundat ions t o  scour damage during f u t u r e  
f loodf lows  and t o  develop and compare a l t e r n a t i v e  f lood  c o n t r o l  p l ans  t o  
p r o t e c t  t h e  p i e r  foundat ions  a g a i n s t  scour;  Dames & Moore then  prepared 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p l ans  f o r  t h e  most s u i t a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e .  
FIGURE 1 V i c i n i t y  map of the  1-10 bridge. 
Dames & Moore con t r ac t ed  wi th  Simo~s;..Li & Associa tes  t o  provide hydrau l i c  
and sediment t r a n s p o r t  computer mode1%nng of t h e  S a l t  River. A subsequent 
progress  r e p o r t  included recommendatxons f o r  i n t e r i m  measures t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
b r idge  a g a i n s t  scour  f o r  a f loodflow of up t o  130,000 cu  f t / s .  These 
recommendations b a s i c a l l y  suggested r econs t ruc t ing  t h e  b r i d g e ' s  low-flow 
channel  as it was o r i g i n a l l y  cons t ruc t ed  i n  1962. Reconstruct ion of t h e  
low-flow channel  was c a r r i e d  o u t  immediately by ADOT. 
Before t h e  des ign  s tudy  could  be completed, t h e  l a r g e s t  flow of  record  i n  
t h e  S a l t  River s i n c e  t h e  1-10 br idge  was b u i l t  (185,000 cu f t / s )  occur red  on 
February 16, 1980. The r i v e r ' s  p e r s i s t e n t  high flow r a t e  caused ADOT t o  c l o s e  
t h e  b r idge  on February 19 a s  a precaut ion  i n  c a s e  t h e  p i e r  foo t ings  had 
experienced damage due t o  scour .  The br idge  was c losed  t o  t r a f f i c  f o r  13 days 
whi le  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  were conducted t o  eva lua t e  t h e  e x t e n t  of scour  ad l acen t  
t o  t h e  b r idge  p i e r  foundat ions.  Although t h e r e  was no known s t r u c t u r a l  damage 
t o  t h e  br idge ,  scour  ho le s  extending a t  l e a s t  t o  t h e  tops  of  t h e  p i e r  f o o t i n g s  
were measured a t  s e v e r a l  l o c a t i o n s ,  and t h e  south  bank of t h e  low-flow channel  
was s e v e r e l y  eroded. Af t e r  t h e  flow r a t e  had decreased,  b u t  while  t h e  water 
w a s  still  flowing, ADOT placed heavy r i p r a p  on t h e  south  s i d e  of  t h e  low-flow 
channel and around t h r e e  sets of  p i e r s  t o  prevent  f u r t h e r  e ros ion  of t h e  south  
bank and t o  provide  some scour  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  p i e r s  i n  t h e  event  t h a t  t h e  
r a t e  of flow i n  t h e  r i v e r  aga in  increased.  
On March 10, 1980, ADOT reques ted  t h a t  Dames & Moore complete t he  f i n a l  
des ign  phases on an a c c e l e r a t e d  b a s i s  t o  enable  cons t ruc t ion  of permanent 
scour  p r o t e c t i o n  measures f o r  t h e  br idge  by November 1, 1980. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SALT RIVER 
The S a l t  River dra inage  a r e a  upstream of  t h e  1-10 br idge  c o n s i s t s  of 
approximately 13,000 square m i l e s  o f  d e s e r t  and mountainous t e r r a i n .  
E leva t ions  range from 1,100 f t  a t  t h e  br idge  t o  over  11,000 f t  i n  t h e  White 
Mountains. Vegeta t ion  is s p a r s e  d e s e r t  shrubbery i n  t h e  lower reaches and 
p i n e  f o r e s t  i n  t h e  mountains. A series of s i x  water s t o r a g e  r e s e r v o i r s  has  
been cons t ruc t ed  on t h e  S a l t  River and i ts  major t r i b u t a r y ,  t h e  Verde River ,  
s i n c e  1905. 
Most p r e c i p i t a t i o n  occurs  a s  snowfa l l  o r  gene ra l  s torms i n  t h e  months of  
December through February. Summer thunderstorms may produce l o c a l l y  high 
runoff ,  bu t  they  do n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  e n t i r e  dra inage  a rea .  I n  t h e  win te r s  of 
1977-78 and 1979-80 a s e r i e s  of gene ra l  storms inundated southern  C a l i f o r n i a ,  
Baja C a l i f o r n i a ,  and sou the rn  Arizona. These s torms i n  Ari'zona f i l l e d  t h e  
r e s e r v o i r s  on t h e  S a l t  and Verde r i v e r s  and s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  t h e  f looding  
t h a t  destroyed most o f  t h e  road c r o s s i n g s  i n  Phoenix. 
The S a l t  River i n  t h e  d e s e r t  reach below t h e  mountains fol lows a wide, 
b ra ided  a l l u v i a l  streambed. I t  is t y p i c a l l y  d ry ,  a s  runoff  from t h e  
mountainous headwaters is captured  by t h e  r e s e r v o i r s .  The r i v e r  is r e l a t i v e l y  
s t e e p ,  with an average g r a d i e n t  through t h e  Phoenix a r e a  of  approximately 10 
f t /mi le .  The r i v e r  bed is composed of sand, g rave l ,  and cobbles.  Braided 
s t reams g e n e r a l l y  convey l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of bed m a t e r i a l  on s t e e p  g r a d i e n t s  
and a r e  h igh ly  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  r ap id  change. 
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Man's activities on the Salt River have encroached on the nakurally wide 
alluvial floodplain 'and on the floodway itself. Encroachments include road 
fills, transmission tower footings, sanitary landfills, building pads, 
sanitary sewer crossings, storm sewer outlets, and an airport runway fill. In 
addition, sand and gravel mining has removed millions of tons of material over 
the years. The material is typically excavated to the water table; oversize 
matekial is rejected and piled in the river or used to form islands around the 
transmission tower footings. 
The water conservation dams on the Salt and Verde rivers have provided 
incidental flood control storage as they fill, and high flows have seldom been 
experienced by users of the Phoenix-area riverbed. Because of the natural 
armoring effect of the cobbles and small boulders, the riverbed has been 
relatively stable during these low flows. The large volumes of runoff 
experienced by the watershed in the winters of 1977-78 and subsequent years 
have filled the reservoirs. The dams have principal spillways designed only 
for small (less than 4,000-cu ftJs) water supply releases; after a reservoir 
is filled, floods must pass over the emergency spillway. 
FLOOD CONTROL WORKS 
The objectives of the final design of the flood control facilities, as 
defined by ADOT, were to complete designs and to develop construction plans 
and technical specifications for bridge improvements that would: 
1. Provide immediate and permanent protection against riverbed 
degradation at the bridge crossing. 
2. Provide immediate and permanent protection against local scour for the 
bridge pier footings. 
3. Provide a design for the scour protection measures that would allow 
construction to be completed by November 1, 1980. 
4. Satisfy applicable floodplain regulations. 
5. Be compatible with drainage and river control facilities that exist or 
are proposed in the vicinity of the bridge. 
The proposed scour protection facilities that were designed to meet these 
objectives are shown schematically in Figure 2. They consist of three major 
elements : 
1. A series of grade control structures downstream from the bridge to 
control riverbed degradation at the bridge crossing. 
2. Riverbed channelization that will extend upstream from the grade 
control structure and the bridge. The purpose of the channelization is to 
control the direction of flow of the water under the bridge and over the grade 
control structures. 
3.  Riprap protection over the bottom and side slopes of the portion of 
the channel passing under the bridge, as well as riprap protection around some 
of the pier footings situated in the channel. The principal purpose of this 
riprap protection is to prevent local scour from undermining support of the 
pier footings. 
One of the most critical aspects of the project was the timing of the 
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FIGURE 2 Schematic diagram of the Salt River channelization at Inter- 
state 10. 
construction of" the proposed improvements. Reservoir carryover storage was 
estimated to be high after the winter of 1979-80, and any significant 1980-81 
storm event could cause high runoff and necessitate bridge closure. This 
situation would be unacceptable to the people and the state of Arizona; flood 
control improvements had to be in place by November 1, 1980. 
HYDRAULIC-SEDIMENT ROUTING ANALYSIS 
A hydraulic-sediment routing and scour analysis was conducted to aid in 
final design of the proposed flood control protection measures. The analysis 
was conducted by computer using the sediment routing model that was developed 
during earlier phases of the study. The model consists of a computer program 
developed by Simons, Li & Associates for routing sediment by size fraction. 
It is used in conjunction with the HEC-2 Water Surface Profile program 
de3eloped by the Corps of Engineers. The model routes sediment by size 
fractions for discrete time steps of the hydrograph. The channel bed's 
response to flow conditions is available at all times during the passage of 
the hydrograph. 
The reach of river modeled for final design extended from approximately 
15,000 ft downstream to 28,500 ft upstream from the 1-10 bridge. The most 
recent topographic mapping and river cross section data were provided by ADOT 
and were used to provide input data for the model. The river cross sections 
used in the computer analysis include sections 1 through 22, which are shown 
in Figure 3. Each reach is composed of similar cross sections, slopes, and 
sediment characteristics. 
Both surface and subsurface samples of the bed material were collected and 
analyzed by Dames & Moore in 1979. The composite size distributions for both 
surface and subsurface samples are given in Figures 4 and 5. They did not 
change significantly during the 1980 flood. The surface sample shows a 
significant armor layer. Field observations verify that it is difficult to 
collect representative samples of bed material in the Salt River. For 
simplicity, the following characteristics of the bed material are adopted for 
the scour analysis. The surface layer has a DsO (median diameter) of 237 mm 
and a a (gradation coefficient) of 1.6. The subsurface layer has a DS0 of 
123 mm and a a of 7.0. 
The response of the river during the design flood was evaluated for two 
basic conditions: existing conditions, and future conditions assuming that 
the first two grade control structures are built and the river is channelized 
at th; bridge as proposed. The existing conditions were evaluated to provide 
a base for comparing the response of the river to the proposed scour 
protection facilities. The future conditions were evaluated to aid in the 
layout and sizing of the proposed scour protection measures and to investigate 
their stability during the design flood. The water surface elevation 
predicted for the design flow for future conditions was compared with that 
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FIGURE 3 Index map f o r  the  S a l t  River i n  the  v i c i n i t y  o f  the  I-PO 
bridge ("as- i s"  c r o s s  s e c t i o n ) .  


E x i s t i n g  Condi t ions  
Resu l t s  of  t h e  a n a l y s i s  f o r  e x i s t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  ind ica t ed  t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
degrada t ion  o f  t h e  r iverbed  a t  t h e  br idge  c r o s s i n g  would have been expected 
due t o  t h e  des ign - f lood .  The time-lapse change i n  t h e  gene ra l  scour depth a t  
t h e  1-10 br idge  dur ing  t h e  design f lood  is shown g r a p h i c a l l y  i n  F igure  6. The 
t o t a l  p red ic t ed  depth of gene ra l  scour was s l i g h t l y  more than 11 f t .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  gene ra l  scour ,  some l o c a l  scour  would have been expected a t  
t h e  b r idge  due t o  d i s tu rbances  i n  t h e  water flow genera ted  by t h e  p i e r s .  
Assuming t h a t  t h e  flow of  t h e  r i v e r  was p r a c t i c a l l y  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  stems of 
t h e  p i e r s ,  t h e  depth  of  l o c a l  scour  was es t imated  t o  be i n  t h e  range of 5 to 7 
f t .  I f  a 15-degree angle  of  a t t a c k  was assumed f o r  t h e  flow approaching t h e  
p i e r s ,  t h e  l o c a l  scour  would have been expected t o  i n c r e a s e  t o  13  t o  18 f t .  
General ly ,  l o c a l  scour  is added t o  gene ra l  scour  t o  e s t ima te  t he  t o t a l  
depth of  p o t e n t i a l  scour .  Therefore t h e  t o t a l  p o t e n t i a l  scour  depth a t  t h e  
br idge  c r o s s i n g  was est imated t o  be between 16 and 29 f t ,  depending on t h e  
angle  of  a t t a c k  of t h e  water on t h e  p i e r s .  
The water s u r f a c e  e l e v a t i o n  versus  flow r a t e  a t  t h e  br idge  f o r  e x i s t i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  is presented  i n  F igure  7. The looping e f f e c t  shown i n  t h e  f i g u r e  
is due t o  movement of sediment. The c a l c u l a t e d  water s u r f a c e  e l eva t ion  f o r  
t h e  des ign  flow of 176,000 cu f t / s  is approximately 1,103 a t  t h e  br idge 
c ross ing .  For comparison, f i e l d  measurements taken a t  t h e  br idge  during t h e  
February 1980 f lood  ind ica t ed  an  approximate maximum scour  depth of 16  f t .  
The water s u r f a c e  was measured a t  an e l e v a t i o n  of  approximately 1,103.7 with 
an es t imated  flow r a t e  of  170,000 cu f t / s .  Th i s  appears  t o  confirm t h a t  t he  
r e s u l t s  of  t h e  eomputer model a n a l y s i s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  p rec i se .  
Channelized Condi t ions  
The computer model was a l s o  used t o  eva lua t e  t h e  response of t h e  r i v e r  
assuming t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  two grade c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s  were i n s t a l l e d  and t h e  
r ive rbed  channel ized  f o r  a d i s t a n c e  of  875 f t  upstream from t h e  br idge.  The 
a n a l y s i s  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  depth of gene ra l  scour  a t  t h e  br idge c r o s s i n g  due 
t o  passage of t h e  des ign  f lood  would be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  I n  f a c t  a s l i g h t  
amount of aggradat ion would probably occur.  The depth  of  l o c a l  scour &round 
t h e  p i e r  was es t imated  t o  be i n  t h e  range of  4 t o  6 f t .  Th i s  assumes t h a t  t h e  
proposed channe l i za t ion  would c o n t r o l  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  f low of  t h e  r i v e r  and 
t h a t  t h e  angle  of t h e  f low's  a t t a c k  on t h e  p i e r s  would be neg l ig ib l e .  To 
provide  a d d i t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  undermining of  t h e  p i e r  foo t ings  by 
l o c a l  scour ,  a r i p r a p  b lanket  over t h e  channel  bottom was recommended. The 
leading  edge of  t h e  guide banks of  t h e  br idge  channe l i za t ion  would be expected 
t o  experience approximately 7 f t  of l o c a l  scour .  Therefore  s lope  p r o t e c t i o n  
was r equ i r ed  f o r  t h e  channel  s i d e  s lopes  t o  guard a g a i n s t  t h e  l o c a l  scour .  
The water s u r f a c e  e l e v a t i o n  versus  flow r a t e  a t  t h e  b r idge  c ros s ing  f o r  
f u t u r e  cond i t i ons  is shown i n  F igure  8. Because of  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  bed 
conf igu ra t ion ,  no looping e f f e c t  due t o  movement o f  sediment is shown i n  
F igure  8. The water s u r f a c e  a t  t h e  peak flow r a t e  of  176,000 cu f t / s  should 
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FIGURE 6 ~egradation-aggradation at bridge during the design flood. 
be at an elevation of approximately 1,101, and the average channel velocity 
should be about 11.5 ft/s. 
The water surface elevation at peak flow for future conditions is 
approximately 2 ft less than that calculated for existing conditions. 
Consequently, the proposed protection measures should comply with floodplain 
regulations. 
ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCT ION MATERIALS 
Drop Structures 
Several alternative construction materials and methods of construction 
were considered for the drop structures. These included: 
1. Soil cement base 
2. Riprap base 
3. Gabion base 
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FIGURE 7 Stage-discharge relationship at bridge (as-is condition). 
4. steel bin retaining wall base 
5. Reinforced concrete retaining wall 
6. Grouted river rock base 
Designs of sufficient detail to allow comparison of the alternative types 
of construction were prepared, and the cost for each alternative was estimated. 
Based on this cost comparison, a reinforced concrete retaining wall and 
gabion base drop structure were considered the most economically attractive. 
In our opinion the abrasion and corrosion resistance offered by the wire 
gabion baskets would not be as suitable as concrete for the conditions and 
environment of the Salt River. Therefore the reinforced concrete retaining 
wall and grouted riprap apron were selected for the grade control structures. 
Channel Side Slope Protection 
The calculated velocity of flow in the proposed channel in the vicinity of 
the bridge is 11.5 ft/s for the design flow rate of 176,000 cu ft/s. This 
velocity is an average value for the channel; it does not consider higher 
velocities caused by local concentrations of flows. 
A velocity of 15 ft/s was assumed for design of the side slope 
protection. Armoring of the side slopes of the channel was required to 
provide protection against erosion. The armoring was also extended to protect 
D~schorge (Ten Thousand c f  s ) 
FIGURE 8 Stage-discharge r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t  b r idge  f o r  f u t u r e  condi t ions .  
t h e  t o e s  and tops  of t h e  s l o p e s  t o  prevent  undercut t ing  and topcu t t i ng ,  
r e spec t ive ly .  A l t e r n a t i v e  cons t ruc t ion  m a t e r i a l s  were a l s o  eva lua ted  f o r  
channel  s i d e  s l o p e  p ro t ec t ion .  These were: 
1. Gabion baske t s  
2. Riprap 
3. Fabriform mats ( g r o u t - f i l l e d  nylon forms) 
4. Grouted r i p r a p  
5. S o i l  cement 
A comparison of t h e  es t imated  u n i t  c o s t  o f  each ind ica t ed  t h a t  s o i l  cement, 
f ab r i fo rm mats, and r i p r a p  were t h e  most economically a t t r a c t i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
There was some doubt  regard ing  t h e  d u r a b i l i t y  of  t h e  fabr i form mat s l o p e  
p r o t e c t i o n  under t h e  heavy ab ras ive  a c t i o n  encountered during flows of  t h e  
r a t e  and v e l o c i t y  t h a t  may be encountered i n  t h e  S a l t  River. F a i l u r e  o f  on ly  
one m a t  under c o n d i t i o n s  of  high flow could l e a d  t o  r ap id  and complete s lope  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  channel  bank. Because of t h i s  concern t h e  fabr i form mat 
a l t e r n a t i v e  was dropped from f u r t h e r  cons idera t ion .  
Of t h e  remaining two a l t e r n a t i v e s  r i p r a p  was p r e f e r a b l e  t o  s o i l  cement, i n  
ou r  opin ion ,  because of  its e x c e l l e n t  d u r a b i l i t y .  Riprap a l s o  has  t h e  a b i l i t y  
to sett le and r e d i s t r i b u t e  its weight without  de t r imen ta l  e f f e c t s  on its 
performance as slope 'protection. However, it is not available locally in the 
Phoenix area and thus is expensive. 
Discussions with the Portland Cement Association revealed that soil cement 
has been used successfully for side slope protection for similar purposes and 
its performance has been satisfactory. Therefore a properly designed and 
constructed soil cement slope lining should adequately protect against erosion 
by occasional floodflows in the river. The cost of the soil cement slope 
lining can be reliably estimated, in contrast to the case with riprap, since 
the materials for its construction are readily available. 
Based on the above considerations, the riprap and soil cement alternatives 
both had important advantages. Both were considered suitable from the 
technical standpoint, but the riprap was preferable. To allow for the 
pdssibility that a contractor could provide riprap at a price competitive with 
soil cement, alternative bids were solicited. The low bidder chose riprap 
from a nearby open pit mine. 
ADDITIONAL STAGES OF DROP STRUCTURF, CONSTRUCTION 
The first two drop structures constructed are designed to protect in the 
immediate and near future against gener a1 r iver bed degradation. As discussed 
earlier, future sand and gravel mining activities may require additional 
structures to be constructed downstream. The following sections discuss ways 
to determine when additional drop structures should be constructed. 
Failure Mechanism 
The governing processes of erosion and deposition due to a large 
downstream pit in an alluvial river are illustrated in Figure 9. Headcutting 
of future sand and gravel pits downstream is the most likely element of the 
erosion-deposition process that could damage the initial two drop structures. 
Additional drop structures may be required in the future to guard against this. 
As shown in Figure 9, headcutting will develop in three phases. The first 
phase consists of the actual excavation of the pit in the riverbed, which sets 
the stage for headcutting when water begins to flow in the river. When the 
water flows at a high velocity over the edge of the pit, it rapidly erodes the 
edge and begins headcutting upstream. The eroded material is deposited in the 
pit. This phase may occur at the start of high flows, or it may occur during 
continuous low flows. 
During the second phase the material eroded from the edge of the pit and 
upstream has built up a delta in the pit. The partially filled pit also 
creates a reservoir, which causes the sediment load normally carried by the 
stream also to be deposited in the delta. The head of the delta will reach 
the crest of the headcut; thus the maximum depth of headcut at the pit 
boundary will be attained. Erosion and deposition may continue due to the 
locally steep energy grade line. 






r'+khg&%k?K PHASE I 
Low flows or  in i t i a l  portions of larger flows 
rapidly erode the edge o f  the p i t  and deposit 
the material a t  the toe of the slope. 
MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 
CUT AT PIT BOUNDRY 
- ----- 
PHASE 11 
MAXIMUM HEADCUT AT EDGE OF PIT 
Continued low flows o r  larger flows have deposited material 
i n  the p i t  up to the depth of the cut a t  the edge o f  the p i t .  
The r iver  slope immediately upstream of the p i t  i s  steep and 
erosion and deposition will continue. 
- 
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PHASE IU 
MAXIMUM HEADCUT DISTANCE (NO SCALE) 
The r iver  and gravel p i t  have reached an equilibrium condition 
for  the par t icular  sequence of flows being considered. Continued 
flows of water and sediment will cause the bed to remain s table  
o r  aggrade. 
FIGURE 9 Schematic diagram of erosion and deposition at gravel pit. 
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headcut  e r o s i o n  ups,tream and cont inued depos i t i on  i n  t h e  p i t .  A t  some maximum 
headcut d i s t a n c e  t h e  bed s l o p e  is reduced o r  backwater e f f e c t s  from the  
r e s e r v o i r  cause  t h e  water-sediment system t o  reach  an equ i l i b r ium condi t ion .  
The r ive rbed  w i l l  remain r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  dur ing  cont inued flow a t  t h e  same 
r a t e  o r  w i l l  aggrade during l e s s e r  flows. 
"Danger" C r i t e r i a  
I f  t h e  propagat ion of  headcut t ing  upstream from t h e  p i t s  reaches t h e  
downstream drop  s t r u c t u r e ,  and i f  t h e  depth of  headcut t ing  a t  t h e  downstream 
drop  s t r u c t u r e  reaches  i ts  foundat ion l e v e l ,  t h e  foundat ion support  f o r  t h e  
drop  s t r u c t u r e  could  be undermined. The r i p r a p  apron t h a t  is planned to 
extend downstream from t h e  drop s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  p a r t i a l l y  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  
undermining of  t h e  foundat ion of  t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e  by headcut t ing.  However, 
t h e  r i p r a p  apron is no t  intended t o  provide permanent p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  drop  
s t r u c t u r e .  I n s t e a d ,  a d d i t i o n a l  drop s t r u c t u r e s  must be cons t ruc t ed  downstream 
a s  t h e  l o c a t i o n  and geometries of  p i t  excavat ion  downstream d i c t a t e .  
To a i d  ADOT i n  determining when a d d i t i o n a l  drop  s t r u c t u r e s  w i l l  have t o  be 
cons t ruc t ed ,  s e v e r a l  hypo the t i ca l  p i t  l o c a t i o n s  and geometr ies  were eva lua ted  
dur ing  t h e  hydrau l i c  and sediment modeling ana lys i s .  I t  was assumed i n  the  
a n a l y s i s  t h a t  6  f t  is t h e  maximum headcut t ing  depth  a l lowable  a t  t he  drop  
s t r u c t u r e s .  Th i s  depth is measured from t h e  t o p  of  t h e  upstream drop 
s t r u c t u r e  t o  t h e  r ive rbed  l e v e l  immediately downstream from t h e  second drop  
s t r u c t u r e ,  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igure  10. The h y p o t h e t i c a l  p i t  l o c a t i o n s  and 
depths  requi red  to cause  headcut t ing of 6  f t  a t  t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e s  under 
des ign  f loodflow c o n d i t i o n s  were then p red ic t ed  based on t h e  modeling 
a n a l y s i s .  The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  a r e  summarized i n  Table 1 and Figure  
10. 
Table 1 g i v e s  t h e  maximum headcut d i s t a n c e ,  t h e  bedslope a t  maximum 
headcut d i s t a n c e ,  and the  d i s t a n c e  a t  which t h e  headcut depth is 6 f t  f o r  
s e v e r a l  p i t  geometr ies .  The d i s t a n c e s  and s l o p e s  a r e  shown g r a p h i c a l l y  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  F igure  10. Bed s l o p e s  a t  which equi l ibr ium 
cond i t i ons  a r e  reached a r e  s t eepe r  than t h e  n a t u r a l  r i v e r  s lope  due to t h e  
e f f e c t  of  backwater from the  p i t .  A p i t  s i z e  o f  60 a c r e s  was assumed f o r  each 
of t h e  hypo the t i ca l  p i t s .  D i f f e r e n t  p i t  s i z e s  and f lood  hydrographs would 
r e s u l t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p red ic t ed  headcut depths  a t  t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e s .  
Presented  i n  F igu re  11 is a g raph ica l  summary of  t hose  p i t  depths  and 
d i s t a n c e s  from t h e  upstream edge of  t h e  p i t s  t o  t h e  downstream drop  s t r u c t u r e  
t h a t  a r e  p red ic t ed  t o  cause  d i f f e r e n t  depths  of headcu t t i ng  a t  t h e  drop 
s t r u c t u r e  dur ing  t h e  design flood. ADOT can use t h i s  graph t o  a s s e s s  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  impact t h a t  downstream mining a c t i v i t i e s  may have on t h e  s a f e t y  o f  
t h e  drop  s t r u c t u r e s  and t o  determine when c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  a d d i t i o n a l  grade 
c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s  may be needed. 
I t  should be emphasized t h a t  Figure 11 is based on assumed p i t  depths  and 
d i s t a n c e s  and t h e  e x i s t i n g  topography of t h e  r iverbed .  Add i t iona l ly ,  t h e  
headcut  d i s t a n c e s  shown on t h e  p l a t e  assume passage of t h e  des ign  f lood  of 
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AFTER PASSAGE OF THE DESIGN FLOW 
FIGURE 10 Alternative pit geometries for a 6-ft headcut. 
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TABLE 1 Maximum AlJowable P i t  Depthsa and Dis tances  from Drop S t r u c t u r e s  
Bedslope a t  
Maximum Maximum Distance a t  
P i t  P i t  Headcut Headcut Which Headcut 
Depth Volume D i s  tanceb ~ i s t a n c e ~  Depth Is 6 F t  
( f t) (ac re - f t )  ( f t)  (ft/ft) (ft)  
a ~ a s e d  on computer model r e s u l t s .  
b ~ i s t a n c e  inc ludes  1.5 f a c t o r  of  s a f e t y .  
C ~ n c l u d e s  n a t u r a l  r i v e r  s lope.  
176,000 cu f t / s  and 11 days dura t ion .  A s e r i e s  of  smal le r  flows and 
downstream p i t  excavat ion p r i o r  t o  passage of t h e  des ign  f lood  may erode 
m a t e r i a l  between t h e  lower drop s t r u c t u r e  and p i t s ,  thereby  reducing t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  m a t e r i a l  needed t o  c r e a t e  t h e  d e l t a  f o r  a h igher  flow condi t ion .  I f  
t h i s  occurs ,  a d d i t i o n a l  modeling a n a l y s i s  should be performed t o  r eeva lua t e  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  s a f e t y  of  t h e  proposed d r o p  s t r u c t u r e s  and f u t u r e  
mining ope ra t ions .  
I t  was recommended t h a t  ADOT make a t  l e a s t  a y e a r l y  topographic survey o f  
cond i t i ons  between t h e  1-10 br idge  and C e n t r a l  Avenue. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a 
survey should be conducted a f t e r  flows of any s i g n i f i c a n t  magnitude have 
passed. Based on r e s u l t s  of t he  topographic survey,  t h e  fol lowing ana lyses  
should then  be conducted. 
1. Determine t h e  thalweg p r o f i l e  and compare it wi th  t h e  previous  p r o f i l e .  
2. Determine t h e  p i t  volumes and t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e  depths  and d i s t a n c e s  
from t h e  downstream grade  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e .  
3 . .  P l o t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  depth of  each p i t  and i ts  d i s t a n c e  from t h e  
downstream grade c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e  on t h e  graph presented  i n  F igure  11. 
I f  t h e  thalweg p r o f i l e  shows a s i g n i f i c a n t  loss of  m a t e r i a l  downstream 
from t h e  drop s t r u c t u r e s ,  o r  i f  t h e  depths  and d i s t a n c e s  o f  g r a v e l  p i t s  p l o t  
i n  o r  above t h e  crosshatched a r e a  shown i n  F igu re  11, it is recommended t h a t  a 
hydraulic-sediment rou t ing  model a n a l y s i s  be conducted t o  r eeva lua t e  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  impact t h a t  t h e  sand and g rave l  p i t s  may have on t h e  s a f e t y  of t h e  
proposed drop s t r u c t u r e s .  Based on t h i s  r eeva lua t ion ,  a d e c i s i o n  can be made 
on whether o r  n o t  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a d d i t i o n a l  drop  s t r u c t u r e s .  When and i f  
a d d i t i o n a l  drop  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  requi red ,  it is recommended t h a t  a phys i ca l  
3 0 0 d (3 E " 0 
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modeL study be car2ried out to aid in their design. A series of low-drop 
structures, such as have been designed for the initial stage of construction, 
are not amenable to rigorous hydraulic analysis. A physical model is the best 
means of confidently predicting their behavior under various flow conditions. 

COASTAL WINTER STORM DAMAGE, 
MALIBU, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, WINTER 1977-78 
by George A. Armstrong 
. In  the winteE of 1977-78 a combination of high waves, local storm 
surges, and high t ides  caused $18 million i n  damages along the California 
coastline. The southerly and southwesterly facing beaches i n  the Malibu 
area were especially hard h i t  by waves passing through the open wave 
windows between offshore islands. These waves broke against beaches, 
seawalZs, and other structures, causing damages of beween $2.8 and $4.75 
mill ion t o  private property alone. 
The amount of erosion resulting from a storm depends on the overall 
climatic conditions and varies widely from storm to  storm. Protection from 
t h i s  erosion depends largely on the funds available t o  construct various 
protective structures that can withstand high-energy waves. To prepare 
adequately for severe storms, property owners should combine their  e f for t s  
t o  upgrade seawalls and other protective devices. Such cooperation i s  not 
yet common. 
The dissemination of a publication describing coastal processes and 
protection techniques could inform the public of the hazards of l iving i n  
coastal areas and help them select methods of shore protection. 
During the winter storms of December 1977-April 1978 California suffered 
significant coastal damage. During this period a series of severe storms 
battered the California coast. The destructiveness of these storms came from 
a combination of high astronomical tides, strong onshore winds, high storm 
waves, and excessive precipitation. This combination of environmental factors 
caused extreme erosional conditions along the entire California coast. This 
type of storm damage is not new to the southern California coast, and 
historical meteorological data suggest that wave damage will continue to occur 
along the coast at infrequent periods in the future. The resulting $18 
million of damages from high sea swells and high tides exceeded previous 
George A. Armstrong is with the Beach Erosion Branch of the Department of 
sdating and Waterways for the Resources Agency in Sacramento, California. 
l o s s e s  dur ing  t h e  l a s t  few decades. The damages s t a t ewide  a r e  t abu la t ed  i n  
Tables  1 and 2. Th i s  paper desc r ibes  t he  causes  and consequences of t h e  
dynamic cond i t i ons  t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  storm damage along t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  
c o a s t l i n e ,  with a  s p e c i a l  assessment of  cond i t i ons ,  a s  r epo r t ed  by t h e  U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers  and t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Coas t a l  Commission, f o r  t h e  p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  Los Angeles County s h o r e l i n e  near Malibu. 
CONDITIONS OF THE 1977-78 WINTER 
The n a t u r a l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  damaged c o a s t a l  s t r u c t u r e s  along t h e  Los 
Angeles County s h o r e l i n e  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of Malibu c o n s i s t e d  o f  a  combination 
of high waves, l o c a l  s torm surges ,  and high t i d e s .  During t h e  1977-78 winter  
s torm per iod  a  l a r g e  high-pressure system over Alaska and western Canada 
caused storm c e n t e r s  t o  be moved 1,000 t o  1,500 mi l e s  due west of c e n t r a l  
C a l i f o r n i a ,  f u r t h e r  south  than t h e i r  normal l oca t ions .  Under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  
t h e  more sou the r ly  high d i r e c t e d  a  s e r i e s  of  s torms t o  h i t  Ca l i fo rn i a .  Strong 
wes t e r ly  and southwes ter ly  winds generated l a r g e  swel l s .  The swe l l s  passed 
through t h e  open wave windows between t h e  o f f sho re  i s l a n d s  (Figure l ) ,  
reaching t h e  Malibu a r e a  with an unusual ly l a r g e  amount of  energy. Table 3 
g i v e s  t h e  wind and wave d a t a  f o r  some of  t h e  storms. Due t o  t h e  l o c a t i o n  of 
t h e  storm c e n t e r s ,  t h e  southwester ly f ac ing  beaches from P o i n t  Dume to Santa 
Monica experienced extremely high waves. Table 4 g i v e s  t h e  h e i g h t s  of 
breakers  along t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  coas t .  
The s t rong  winds a s s o c i a t e d  with these  f r equen t  s torms caused 
supe re l eva t ions  of s e a  l e v e l  (s torm surges)  t h a t  approached 2 f t  a t  some 
l o c a t i o n s .  The combination of storm surges  and extremely high t i d e s  allowed 
high waves t o  pas s  over o f f s h o r e  ba r s  without  breaking. The h ighes t  p red ic t ed  
t i d e s  (Table 5)  were on January 7-10 i n  t h e  Los Angeles a r ea .  Thus t h e  storm 
surges ,  combined wi th  high t i d e s  and high s e a  swe l l s ,  c r e a t e d  a  cond i t i on  t h a t  
allowed l a r g e  waves t o  break on t h e  beach, a g a i n s t  seawal l s ,  and on o t h e r  
s t r u c t u r e s  dur ing  t h i s  per iod.  
The most important  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  t h e  1977-78 winter  s torms was t h e i r  
pe r s i s t ence .  V i r t u a l l y  every s torm generated i n  t h e  North P a c i f i c  h i t  t h e  
C a l i f o r n i a  coas t .  Beaches along t h e  Malibu c o a s t  a r e  u sua l ly  50 t o  150 f t  
wide and provide a  good p r o t e c t i v e  beach f o r  one o r  two storm events  dur ing  a  
normal win ter  season. The usua l  h o r i z o n t a l  l o s s  of beach f a c e  during a  s i n g l e  
s torm is about 50 f t .  Between December 1977 and March 1978 t h e  repea ted  wave 
attacks overtopped e x i s t i n g  beach berms and subsequent ly eroded and lowered 
t h e  beaches by 10 t o  15  f t  i n  e l eva t ion .  Th i s  extreme l o s s  of p r o t e c t i v e .  
beach made a l l  c o a s t a l  s t r u c t u r e s  vulnerable  t o  t h e  high-energy waves breaking 
a t  t h e  base of  o r  d i r e c t l y  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e s .  These r e p e t i t i v e  high-energy 
waves caused t h e  o l d e r  seawal l s  along Malibu Beach t o  f a i l .  
MALIBU AREA DAMAGE 
P r i v a t e  Sector  
During t h e  win ter  of  1977-78 high t i d e s  and l a r g e  s torm waves i n  t h e  
Malibu a r e a  caused damage of  between $2.8 and $4.75 m i l l i o n  t o  p r i v a t e  
TABLE 1 Summary of,Wave Damage Costs by Region, Winter 1977-78 ( d o l l a r s )  
Region 
P r i v a t e  
Damage 
Publ ic  
Assistance t o  Publ ic  
a P r i v a t e  P a r t i e s  Damage 
b 
FDAA Aid 
f o r  Publ ic  
Property Damage 
North Coast 85,000 
North Centra l  Coast 604,000 66,000 510,000 
Central  Coast 
South Central  Coast 500,000 8,000 1,742,800 8, OOoe 
South Coast 2,150,000 f 96,430 
San Diego Coast 700, OOog 4,500 
Tota l  4,852,200 174,930 8,280,800 3,982,000 
Note: Costs a r e  es t imates  of  l o s s e s ,  r e p a i r s ,  and/or emergency work. 
a Does not  include Small Business Administration loans. 
b ~ h e  Federal Disas ter  Assistance Administration (FDAA) approved g ran t s  through J u l y  25, 1978. 
C Includes $3,225,000 i n  Federal  Highway Administration a id .  
$ublic  a s s i s t ance  was given, b u t  the  c o s t  is  not  y e t  known. 
e FDAA gran t  given t o  the  City of Santa Barbara t o  remove destroyed homes. 
f ~ n c l u d e s  $800,000 t h a t  may have been a combination of wave and o t h e r  damage. 
 an Diego County p r i v a t e  property damage no t  w e l l  documented. 
lboea not  include an app l i ca t ion  from t h e  City of  Oceanside f o r  $3.5 mi l l ion  from t h e  FDAA. 
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco D i s t r i c t .  
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FIGURE 1 Wave exposure chart for the Malibu coastal  area. 
TABLE 3 Wind and Storm Wave D a t a ,  January and February 1978 
> ,.lr( <>Z<
*l l
Wind S i g n i f i c a n t  Wave 
Speed Height Pe r iod  
Date (knots )  D i rec t ion  (ft) ( s e c  Di rec t ion  
Jan. 9 35 
Jan. 13  3 5 
Jan. 16 50 
Feb. 9 4 5 
Feb. 10 4 0 







Note: Wind data measured a t  F a r a l l o n  I s l a n d s  (N0A.A). Wave d a t a  obta ined  
60 mi les  west  of Golden G a t e .  
/ 
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ,  San Franc isco  D i s t r i c t .  
TABLE 4 Maximuln Breaker Heights ,  
December 12,  1977-March 12, 1978 
Maximum Observed 
Height  (equal  t o  
o r  g r e a t e r  than)  Duration 
(f t)  (days) 
Source: U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers ,  San Franc isco  D i s t r i c t .  
TABLE 5 P red ic t ed  T i d e  Heights  a t  Los Angeles (Outer Harbor) ,  
Winter 1979-78 
T i m e  Height 













Note: Heights 6 f t  o r  h igher  are shown. Storm surge  w a s  
estimated a t  2.0 ft. The maximum observed t i d e  a t  Golden Gate 
w a s  8.26 f t  (mean lower l e v e l  water  datum); t h e  p red ic t ed  t i d e  
was 6.8 f t .  
Source: U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers,  San Franc isco  District. 
proper ty .  The Nat iona l  Guard and t h e  Los Angeles County F i r e  Department, 
S h e r i f f ,  Engineer,  and o the r  departments provided $159,000 i n  emergency 
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  homeowners and businesses .  Small Business  Administrat ion (SBA) 
loans  approved f o r  t h e  r e p a i r  o f  wave-related damage a t  Malibu t o t a l e d  about 
$2.8 mi l l i on .  The fol lowing d e s c r i p t i o n  of damage a t  Malibu is based on 
personal  observa t ions ,  correspondence with government agencies  and p r i v a t e  
c o n s u l t a n t s  a s s o c i a t e d  with t h e  Malibu a rea ,  and d a t a  supp l i ed  by t h e s e  
sources  to t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Coas t a l  Commission. 
The Malibu Film Colony, one of  t h e  ha rdes t  h i t  c o a s t a l  a r e a s  i n  t he  s t a t e ,  
rece ived  t h e  most p u b l i c i t y .  Th i s  was due to t h e  number of  movie s t a r s  and 
o the r  c e l e b r i t i e s  owning homes i n  t h e  a r ea .  The c o a s t l i n e  f a c e s  south  t o  
southwest and was d i r e c t l y  exposed t o  t h e  l a r g e  s torm waves. Many of  t h e  
beach homes a r e  b u i l t  r i g h t  on t h e  beach and a r e  30 t o  40 Xears old.  
P r o t e c t i v e  works, such a s  bulkheads, proved i n e f f e c t i v e  or had d e t e r i o r a t e d  t o  
t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  any storm waves could cause  seve re  damage. Losses inc lude  
severely damaged or destroyed bulkhead~~~~~seawalls, beach access stairs, 
teahouses, decks, patios, piers, and @lings, numerous broken windows, and 
.- 
considerable interior flooding. 
I 
Similar damage occurred at Seacliff and Pothelly beaches (in Santa Cruz 
County), Favia Beach (in Ventura County), and along Oceanside and Del Mar 
beaches (in San Diego County). More than 140 residences along the Malibu 
coastline were damaged by high waves, tides, and storm surges. 
The photographs of Figures 3-9, indexed to the mileage of the map shown in 
Figure 2, illustrate some of the damage at Malibu. 
SBA records indicate that 138 property owners on the seaward side of 
Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu Road, and Malibu Colony Drive filed applications 
for $4.3 million in disaster loans. Other beach areas at Malibu had 
applications for $450,000 in damage. Public expenditures used to protect 
private property included those incurred by the National Guard and the Los 
Angeles County Fire, Sheriff, Road and Building, and Safety departments. 
These agencies provided personnel and equipment to advise property owners and 
construct temporary protection devices. Student volunteers from nearby 
Pepperdine University also helped Malibu residents install sandbags and make 
emergency repairs. 
The National Guard provided about 1,871 man-days from March 4 through 
March 7 in protecting homes and assisting residents. The National Guard 
operations cost approximately $70,000 and came from the state emergency fund. 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department from January through March 
also aided Malibu residents during each winter storm. The Fire Department 
does not record man-hours and costs of normal emergency activities except when 
it plans to apply for reimbursements from other agencies, but cost estimates 
supplied to the Santa Monica Mountains Comprehensive Planning Commission 
indicate that the Fire Department's total cost of involvement exceeded $70,000 
at Malibu. 
The Los Angeles County Road Department purchased about 20,000 to 30,000 
sandbags at a cost to the county of approximately $3,400. The sandbags were 
used by county agencies, the National Guard, residents, and volunteers to 
protect homes along the beach. 
Public Sector 
A storm drain ocean outfall was severely damaged on February 9, 1-978. The 
structure is maintained by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. 
Large storm-driven waves contributed to the failure of the outlet headwall and 
30 ft of 60-in.-diameter reinforced concrete pipe. The district's cost for 
labor, equipment, materials, and associated emergency work completed 
immediately after the failure was $4,200. The cost of repair and replacement 
will exceed $100,000. 
FIGURE 2 Map of coast showing potential winter storm damage. 
FIGURE 3 View up coast toward Corral Beach from beach level at 25442 
Malibu Road, March 8, 1978. The beach is stripped of sand and only 
cobbles remain. Mile 14.8. 
FIGURE 4 View seaward toward collapse of storm drain and slippage of 
driveway at 23950 Malibu Road, March 8, 1978. Mile 16.85. 
FIGURE: 5 View down c o a s t  nea r  lo t  60 o f  Malibu Colony. Note d e p t h  of 
beach e r o s i o n  below t h e  t o p  o f  t h e  bulkhead and t h e  emergency placement 
o f  rock r u b b l e  a t  t h e  t o e  o f  t h e  seawall. 
FIGURE 6 View u p  c o a s t  o f  damaged p a t i o  and d e s t r o y e d  bulkhead a t  l o t  
42 of  Malibu Colony, March 7 ,  1978. Mi le  17.06.  
FIGURE 7 View toward l and  of beach a r e a  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of  l o t  45  of  
Malibu Colony, March 3 ,  1978. Mile 17.1. 
FIGURE 8 View o f  destroyed t e a  house a t  l o t  45 of Malibu Colony, wi th  
a combination of pumpcrete and rock rubble  f o r  emergency p r o t e c t i o n ,  
March 7, 1978. Mile 17.1. 
FIGURE 9 View down c o a s t  of  beach from l o t  116 of Malibu Colony, 
March 7 ,  1978. Note l o s s  of beach beyond t h e  boundary fence of the  
colony. Mile 17.55. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The c o s t  o f  emergency work, r e p a i r ,  and l o s s  of p rope r ty  r e s u l t i n g  from 
t h e  1977-78 winter  s torms along t h e  L o s  Angeles County s h o r e l i n e  i n  the  
v i c i n i t y  of  Malibu was about $4.0 mi l l i on  to p r i v a t e  p rope r ty  alone. Coas t a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  were damaged o r  destroyed and beaches were denuded of  sand. Today 
a l l  damage is r e p a i r e d  and t h e  event  is dim i n  t h e  memories of most r e s i d e n t s .  
S ta te -of - the-ar t  p r e d i c t i v e  techniques i n  meteorology and oceanography 
cannot  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  extreme storm even t s  t h a t  cause  s i g n i f i c a n t  coastal 
e ros ion  and accompanying damage t o  s t r u c t u r e s .  The degree  and/or r a t e  o f  
e r o s i o n  during a s torm is a func t ion  of o v e r a l l  c l i m a t i c  cond i t i ons  and v a r i e s  
widely from storm t o  storm. The cumulative e f f e c t s  of t i d e s ,  winds, and waves 
(or  s e a  s w e l l s )  p l a y  a major role i n  determining t h e  e r o s i o n  r a t e  f o r  a g iven  
storm. 
The degree of  sho re  p r o t e c t i o n  depends l a r g e l y  upon t h e  funds a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of var ious  devices .  I n  t h e  Malibu a rea ,  which is 
e x c l u s i v e l y  p r i v a t e  proper ty ,  i nd iv idua l  landowners g e n e r a l l y  do not  have t h e  
funds t o  des ign  and b u i l d  t h e  needed p r o t e c t i v e  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  can withstand 
repea ted  a t t a c k  by l a r g e  high-energy waves. Therefore,  dur ing  most emergency 
cond i t i ons ,  jury-rigged p r o t e c t i o n  methods a r e  used and do  not  provide 
permanent p ro t ec t ion .  A s  a gene ra l  r u l e  most homeowners dev i se  t h e i r  own 
emergency storm p r o t e c t i o n  s t r u c t u r e s ,  which can e i t h e r  f a i l  o r  cause 
a c c e l e r a t e d  e r o s i o n  up o r  down t h e  coas t ,  t h u s  a f f e c t i n g  ad jacen t  p rope r t i e s .  
The Malibu a r e a  is l o c a t e d  i n  a wave hazard a r e a  and can expect  t o  be h i t  
repea ted ly  by damaging waves i n  t h e  fu tu re .  The l o c a l  r e s i d e n t s  need a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  coope ra t ive  e f f o r t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  property.  Los Angeles County 
o f f i c i a l s  met i n  t h e  p a s t  wi th  Malibu landowners and d iscussed  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of forming a shore  p r o t e c t i o n  dis t r ic t ,  b u t  no a c t i o n  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  
d iscuss ion .  Now t h a t  t h e  major damage has been r e p a i r e d  o r  rep laced ,  most 
landowners aga in  f e e l  s ecu re ,  and thoughts  of conso l ida t ing  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  
upgrade t h e i r  s eawa l l s  a r e  l o s t  aga in  u n t i l  t h e  next  major storm. 
The 1977-78 s torm season,  which caused t h e  worst  shore  e ros ion  i n  t h e  p a s t  
40 years ,  was excep t iona l  b u t  n o t  unusual. A review of  t h e  storm cond i t i ons ,  
t he  e x t e n t  of wave damage, and the  response of p rope r ty  owners and l o c a l ,  
s t a t e ,  and f e d e r a l  agencies  t o  t hese  cond i t i ons  has  l e d  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  C o a s t a l  
Commission t o  draw t h e  fol lowing conclusions.  
1. Damaging s torm waves can  be expected t o  h i t  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  c o a s t  
repea ted ly  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
2. Damaged p r i v a t e  development can be p a r t i a l l y  subs id ized  by l o c a l ,  
s t a t e ,  and f e d e r a l  sources  t o  r e p a i r  o r  p r o t e c t  wave-damaged p rope r t i e s .  
Subs id ies  l e s s e n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  of developing i n  hazardous a r e a s  and may 
i n d i r e c t l y  encourage f u r t h e r  development i n  a r e a s  s u b j e c t  t o  wave a t t a c k .  
3 .  Waivers of p u b l i c  l i a b i l i t y  a r e  n o t  an e f f e c t i v e  means of reducing t h e  
publ ic  subsidy involved i n  p r i v a t e  proper ty  development. 
4.  Local governments and owners of  e x i s t i n g  c o a s t a l  development a r e  n o t  
prepared t o  handle damaging wave condi t ions .  
5. There is s u b s t a n t i a l  l o c a l ,  s t a t e ,  and f e d e r a l  expense involved i n  
p r o t e c t i n g  and r e p a i r i n g  p u b l i c  f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  vulnerable  t o  wave a t t a c k .  
6. The Nat iona l  Flood Insurance Program cannot  adequate ly  r e g u l a t e  
development i n  wave hazard a reas .  
The U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers  suggested a j o i n t  e f f o r t  by l o c a l ,  s t a t e ,  
and f e d e r a l  agencies  t o  develop and pub l i sh  a brochure desc r ib ing  bas i c  
c o a s t a l  p rocesses  and sho re  p r o t e c t i o n  techniques f o r  t h e  va r ious  C a l i f o r n i a  
c o a s t a l  a reas .  T h i s  type  of p u b l i c a t i o n  would make t h e  p u b l i c  more aware of 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  hazards  a s s o c i a t e d  with l i v i n g  i n  t h e  c o a s t a l  zone and would 
provide some guidance i n  s e l e c t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  methods of  shore  p ro t ec t ion .  
The brochure would a l s o  d e l i n e a t e  emergency measures t h a t  could be i n i t i a t e d  
when a shore  p r o t e c t i o n  device  f a i l s  and endangers an e n t i r e  beach o r  
shore l ine .  The damage a t  Malibu and o t h e r  s i m i l a r  a r e a s  along t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  
c o a s t  du r ing  t h e  1977-78 s torms i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  b a s i c  shore  p r o t e c t i o n  needs 
f o r  c o a s t a l  r e s i d e n t i a l  a reas :  (1) A wide p r o t e c t i v e  beach is t h e  b e s t  + 
p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  e ros ion  and wave damage. (2)  The best ' secondary defense  
a g a i n s t  damage is a s t r u c t u r a l l y  sound seawal l  o r  bulkhead t o  r e s i s t  
high-breaking and overtopping waves. ( 3 )  Seawalls  i n  a r e a s  with narrow 
p r o t e c t i v e  beaches should be rock reve t t ed  along t h e  t o e  of  t h e  wa l l  t o  prevent  
undercut t ing.  ( 4 )  The seawa l l s  must be maintained and rep laced  when necessary  
t o  withstand high-energy loads  from l a r g e  waves. 
The Beach Eros ion  Branch of t h e  Department of Boating and Waterways w i l l  
cont inue  t o  g i v e  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  l o c a l  agencies  and p r i v a t e  landowners 
t o  upgrade t h e i r  shore  p r o t e c t i o n  devices  t o  reduce damage dur ing  f u t u r e  
storms with t h e  same magnitude a s  t h e  1977-78 events .  
COASTAL RESPONSE OF LEADBETTER BEACH, SANTA BARBARA, TO 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA STORMS OF FEBRUARY 16-21, 1980 
by Martha J. Shaw 
. The response'of protective beaches to  severe as weZZ as mild wave 
conditions great Zy determines the stabi Zity of coastaZ property and 
harbor channels along the southern California coastline. In  February 
1980 Pacific westerlies displaced southward generated a series of storms 
that caused unusuaZZy high waves a t  Santa Barbara, CaZifornia. A t  t h i s  
time, as part of the Nearshore Sediment Transport Study experiment, 
waves and the beach profile were being monitored a t  Leadbetter Beach 
i n  Santa Barbara. Within a period of severaZ days the foreshore of 
Leadbetter Beach was drasticaZZy eroded and adjacent property uas 
inundated and damaged. Beach surveys show that along a 709-rn Zength 
of the beach approximateZy 79,000 cu m of sand was removed from the 
beach face t o  a depth of 2 m below mean sea level.  Much of t h i s  sand 
was transported by waves t o  offshore bars and in to  the Santa Barbara 
Harbor. 
INTRODUCTION 
A series of storms originating several thousand kilometers west of 
southern California in mid-February 1980 generated large waves at sea. As the 
storms moved onshore they brought high winds and heavy precipitation to the 
southwestern region of the United States. The combination of high-energy 
waves, strong onshore winds, and a perigean spring tide caused severe erosion 
of beaches and extensive damage to adjacent property from direct wave impact 
Martha J. Shaw is with the Shore Processes Laboratory of the Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, California. 
Note: Most of the data used in this report were collected in conjunction 
with the   ear shore Sediment Transport Study, which is sponsored by the 
National Sea Grant and the Office of Naval Research. Special thanks are 
extended to D. Inman, S. Jenkins, B. Waldorf, T. White, S. Pawka, M. Clark, M. 
Freilich, and G. Kuhn of the Shore Processes Laboratory, to R. Seymour of the 
Institute of Marine Resources, and to R. Dean of the University of Delaware 
for their contributions to the acquisition and processing of data appearing in 
this report. 
and c o a s t a l  f looding  a l l  along t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  c o a s t .  A l a rge-sca le  
f i e l d  experiment was under way a t  t h i s  t i m e  a t  Leadbet ter  Beach i n  Santa 
Barbara, C a l i f o r n i a  ( s e e  F igure  l), t o  monitor va r ious  phys i ca l  parameters  of 
t h e  s u r f  zone a s  p a r t  of t h e  Nearshore Sediment Transpor t  Study. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Beach p r o f i l e s  were surveyed a t  Leadbet ter  Beach along a minimum of  t h r e e  
r ange l ines  a t  l e a s t  every t w o  months i n  1979 and monthly i n  1980, with 
increased  frequency dur ing  February, by t h e  Shore Processes  Laboratory. The 
beach p r o f i l e s  presented  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  were surveyed along r ange l ines  SIO 1, 
S I O  2,  and SIO 3 using s tandard  rod and t r a n s i t  techniques t o  a depth of  1.5 
t o  2.0 m below mean s e a  l e v e l  (MSL). The beach p r o f i l e  d a t a  were s t o r e d  on 
magnetic t apes  and processed on an I n t e r d a t a  Model 70 minicomputer to g i v e  
p r o f i l e  p l o t s  and volume c a l c u l a t i o n s .  Fathometer d a t a  seaward of t h e  t h r e e  
r ange l ines  were obta ined  from t h e  Department of C i v i l  Engineering of  t h e  
Univer i ty  of Delaware. 
Wave d a t a  were recorded by t h e  west wave a r r a y  of  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  C o a s t a l  
Engineering Data Network, which is sponsored by t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Div is ion  of 
Boating and Waterways. Th i s  a r r a y  c o n s i s t s  of  four  p re s su re  s enso r s  l oca t ed  
approximately 362 m o f f s h o r e  of t h e  SIO 2 benchmark a t  a depth of -9 m (MSL) 
( s ee  Figure 2 ) .  T i d a l  d a t a  were obta ined  from t i d e  gage measurements made by 
t h e  Nat iona l  Ocean Survey a t  S t ea rns  Wharf i n  Santa  Barbara Harbor. Synoptic  
weather c h a r t s  were obta ined  from t h e  Nat iona l  C l ima t i c  Center.  
WEATHER AND WAVE CONDITIONS 
Typica l ly ,  most o f  t h e  win ter  s w e l l s  reaching t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  
c o a s t  a r e  genera ted  by s torms t h a t  o r i g i n a t e  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of low-pressure 
c e n t e r s  i n  t h e  Gulf of Alaska and thus  approach from t h e  northwest.  These 
s torm c e n t e r s  u sua l ly  move o u t  of t he  Gulf of Alaska and eastward we l l  no r th  
o f  Po in t  Conception, s o  t h a t  southern C a l i f o r n i a  has  r e l a t i v e l y  mild weather. 
The r e f r a c t i o n  of  northwest swells around Po in t  Conception g r e a t l y  reduces t h e  
wave energy reaching Santa  Barbara. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  l i m i t e d  exposure t o  
northwest  s w e l l s ,  Santa  Barbara is p a r t i a l l y  p ro t ec t ed  from sou the r ly  swells, 
genera ted  by t r o p i c a l  storms, by t h e  s h e l t e r i n g  e f f e c t  of  t h e  Channel i s lands .  
I n  mid-February 1980 low-pressure c e n t e r s  from t h e  high l a t i t u d e s  migrated 
sou th  over t he  c e n t r a l  P a c i f i c  Ocean between 30% and 40% l a t i t u d e .  Due 
t o  a northward displacement  o f  t h e  s u b t r o p i c a l  j e t  s t ream a t  t h i s  time, warm 
moist  a i r  was en t r a ined  i n t o  t h e s e  low-pressure cyc lon ic  sy'stems, causing 
i n t e n s e  d i s tu rbances  t h a t  moved eastward ( Jenkins ,  Shore Processes  Laboratory, 
personal  communication). 
Waves of cons ide rab le  f e t c h  genera ted  by t h e s e  d i s tu rbances  t r ave l ed  
eastward d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  Santa Barbara Channel. P r i o r  t o  t h e  a r r i v a l  of 
t h e s e  long-fetch waves from t h e  west,  high-energy waves of  s h o r t e r  frequency 
from t h e  south,  generated by winds p a r a l l e l  t o  warm f r o n t s ,  a l s o  h i t  Santa  
Barbara ( s ee  F igures  3a  and 3b ) .  Leadbet ter  Beach was t h ~ s ~ s u b j e c t e d  t o  
FIGURE 1 Leadbet te r  Beach, Santa  Barbara,  showing wide s u r f  zone 
dur ing  t h e  storm and inundat ion of t h e  beach and ad jacen t  property.  
(Shore Processes  Laboratory photograph.) 
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FIGURE 3a Surface  synopt ic  weather map f o r  February 16, 1980. 
high-energy waves f i r s t  from t h e  south on December 16 and then d i r e c t l y  from 
t h e  w e s t  between December 17 and 21 (F igure  4 ) .  I n  F igure  5a wave energy is 
p l o t t e d  f o r  t h e  month of  February. 
When waves approach ob l ique ly  t h e r e  is a longshore d i r e c t i o n a l  component 
of wave energy (Scr ipps  I n s t i t u t i o n  of Oceanography, 1947; Komar and Inman, 
1970).  The longshore (y d i r e c t i o n )  component of  t h e  onshore (x d i r e c t i o n )  
wave energy f l u x ,  Syx, can be expressed by t h e  formula Syx = 
ECn[sin a) (cos  a), where E is t h e  wave energy d e n s i t y ,  Cn is t h e  group 
v e l o c i t y ,  and a is t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  ang le  of t h e  wave f r o n t  with t h e  bottom 
contour .  Syx, sampled four  t imes a day a t  t h e  w e s t  wave a r r a y ,  was normalized 
by d iv id ing  t h e  t o t a l  Syx of t h e  wave spectrum a t  each sample t i m e  by t h e  
abso lu t e  maximum Syx f o r  t h e  month of February. This  is p l o t t e d  versus  t i m e  
FIGURE 3b Sur face  synopt ic  weather map f o r  February 17,  1980. 
i n  F igure  5b. The o r i e n t a t i o n  of t h e  x and y axes  a r e  i nd ica t ed  i n  F igure  2: 
t h e  p o s i t i v e  x d i r e c t i o n  is eastward toward Santa Barbara Harbor, and t h e  
nega t ive  d i r e c t i o n  is westward toward Santa Barbara Poin t .  A s  is apparent  
from Figures  5a and 5b, t h e  dominant wave energy on February 16 was from t h e  
sou th ,  whi le  on February 17-21 waves from t h e  west dominated t h e  t o t a l  wave 
energy. 
During t h e  s torm per iod ,  waves reached a he ight  of a t  l e a s t  3 m. F igure  6 
shows t h e  magnitude of  a breaker on February 19. The s t rong  winds and heavy 
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s torms reached t h e  c o a s t  almost s imultaneously wi th  these  
high-energy waves. Enhancing t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  power of  t h e  waves a t  t h e  s tudy 
s i te  was en t r a ined  seaweed, which entangled and destroyed many of  t h e  senso r s  
i n s t a l l e d  i n  t h e  s u r f  zone f o r  t h e  experiment. 
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FIGURE 4 Location map of Santa Barbara, California, showing the wave shadowing effect of the 
islands. The arrows indicate the windows through which the storm waves of February 16-21 
entered the Santa Barbara Channel. 
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FIGURe 5 Wave energy, directional moment, tidal conditions, and the beach 
response at Leadbetter Beach in February 1980. (a) Total wave energy recorded 
four times a day at the west wave array. (b) Directional moment of the total 
wave energy normalized by the maximum for the month. The positive direction 
is east toward the harbor, the negative direction is west. (c) Actual tidal 
level measured at the National Ocean Survey tide gage in Santa Barbara 
Harbor. (d) Change in sand volume along rangeline SIO 2 to -2.0 m depth (MSL). 
FIGURE 6 View of a breaking wave on February 19, 1980, at Leadbetter 
Beach. (Shore Processes Laboratory photograph.) 
TIDES 
Coincident with this storm was the occurrence on February 16 of a 
"perigean spring tide," an enhanced tidal amplitude resulting from the 
astronomical condition of perigee-syzygy (Wood, 1976) (see Figure 5c). 
Perigee is the position at which the moon is in its closest proximity to the 
earth in its monthly elliptical orbit; syzygy is the position at which the 
moon is in the same longitudinal plane as the earth and the sun (producing a 
full or new moon). The phenomenon of perigee occurring within 24 hours of 
syzygy occurs approximately three times a year. 
The occurrence of perigee-syzygy with strong onshore winds and high waves 
has caused extensive coastal flooding throughout history. In this case 
syzygy, producing a new moon, occurred at 0100 PST on February 17, 1980. The 
enhanced tidal range, when combined with the waning beach profile and intense 
wave conditions, caused extensive inundation of lowland areas at high tides 
during the storm period. These unexpected conditions also forced evacuation 
of housing units and of many of the instruments being used by the Nearshore 
Sediment Transport Study (see Figure 7). 
FIGURE 7 I n u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  backshore  o f  L e a d b e t t e r  Beach a t  h i g h  t i d e  
on February 19 ,  1980. (Shore  P r o c e s s e s  ~ a b o r a t o r y  photograph.)  
BEACH CHANGES 
F i g u r e  5d p l o t s  t h e  change i n  sand volume v e r s u s  t i m e  a l o n g  r a n g e l i n e  SIO 
2 d u r i n g  February  for comparison w i t h  wave and t i d e  c o n d i t i o n s .  The waves 
from t h e  February  s t o r m  r a p i d l y  removed sand  from L e a d b e t t e r  Beach. A s  t h e  
beach was undermined, a d j a c e n t  s i d e w a l k s  and o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e s  c o l l a p s e d .  + 
P r o f i l e s  a l o n g  r a n g e l i n e  SIO 2 d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1979 and t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  of 1980 ( F i g u r e s  8 a ,  8b ,  and 8 c )  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
beach ' s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  th roughout  1979 and J a n u a r y  1980, as w e l l  a s  t h e  s e v e r e  
e r o s i o n  of t h e  p r o f i l e  i n  February  ( s e e  ~ i g u r e  9.) Between t h e  s u r v e y s  o f  
February  8 and February  1 8  t h e  mean sea l e v e l  con tour  a t  r a n g e l i n e  SIO 2 
r e t r e a t e d  landward 12 m and approx imate ly  5 1  c u  m o f  sand p e r  meter o f  beach 
were removed from t h e  r a n g e l i n e .  The wave energy  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  
e r o s i o n  began t o  o c c u r  on  February  16. Between February  1 8  and 23 mean s e a  
l e v e l  r e t r e a t e d  a n o t h e r  26 m and a n o t h e r  46 c u b i c  meters o f  sand were removed, 
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FIGURE 9 Change in sand volume along rangeline SIO 2 during 1979-80. 
bringing the total retreat of mean sea level at this rangeline to 38 m and the 
removal of sand to 97 cu m.* Similarly, along rangelines SIO 1 and SIO 3 mean 
sea level retreated 32 and 46 m, respectively, with associated volume losses 
of 129 cu m of sand and 121 cu m of sand from the profiles. Extrapolation of 
the change in sand volume along the 709-m length of beach between SIO 1, SIO 
2, and SIO 3 yields a total volume loss of 79,000 cu m of sand from the 
foreshore during the storm period. Poststorm surveys, presented in Figure 8, 
show the gradual restoration of the upper part of the beach .profile throughout 
the spring. Also apparent in the poststorm surveys is the continued 
denudation at the seaward end of the rangelines, indicating an onshore 
movement of sand. 
*This measurement refers to the change in volume within a 1-rn-width of 
beachfront at the rangeline surveyed out to a depth of approximately -2.0 m 
(MSL) . 
High-energy s torm waves t y p i c a l l y  remove l a r g e  volumes of  sand from t h e  
fo re shore  of  beache& and t r a n s p o r t  it t o  o f f s h o r e  b a r s  (Shepard, 1950; Inman 
and F i l l o u x ,  1960; Aubrey e t  a l . ,  1980).  Prestorm and posts torm beach 
p r o f i l e s  a long r ange l ines  SIO 1, SIO 2, and SIO 3 a r e  p l o t t e d  i n  Figure 10. 
A t  t h e  seaward l i m i t  o f  t h e  beach p r o f i l e s ,  p res torm and posts torm fathometer  
surveys  taken by t h e  Univers i ty  of Delaware on January  22 and February 25 a r e  
supefimposed a s  c l o s e l y  a s  poss ib l e ,  a l though t h e  r a n g e l i n e s  a r e  not  
i d e n t i c a l .  I t  is apparent ,  however, t h a t  much o f  t h e  sand removed from t h e  
beach above an approximate depth of -2 m (MSL) was t r anspor t ed  o f f s h o r e  t o  
depths  between -2 and -7 m (MSL). Below -7 m t h e  s e a f l o o r  appears  unaf fec ted  
by t h e  storm. 
The Santa Barbara Harbor, b u i l t  i n  1931, t y p i c a l l y  t r a p s  sediment moving 
along t h e  c o a s t  i o  t h e  l i t t o r a l  zone (Inman and Frautschy,  1966). This  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  an average dredging o f  200,000 cu m of  sediment per  year  to 
maintain naviga t ion  channels  (Shaw, 1980).  Shoal ing,  which causes  waves t o  
break i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  en t rance ,  is extremely hazardous t o  navigat ion.  
Rapid shoa l ing  occurred  i n  t h e  harbor en t rance  between December 16 and 21, as 
shown by a e r i a l  photographs. Analyses of prestorm and posts torm fathometer 
surveys of  t h e  harbor  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  50,000 cu m of  sediment accumulated i n  t h e  
v i c i n i t y  of  t h e  harbor en t rance  (R. Dean, Un ive r s i t y  of  Delaware, personal  
communication). Th i s  s u b s t a n t i a l  volume of  sediment t rapped  by t h e  harbor is 
evidence of  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  longshore component o f  sediment t r a n s p o r t  by t h e  
storm waves. 
SUMMARY 
Between February 16 and 21, 1980, a near alignment of  t h e  e a r t h ,  moon, and 
sun co inc iden t  wi th  unique g loba l  and l o c a l  atmospheric cond i t i ons  r e s u l t e d  i n  
enhanced t i d a l  ampli tudes and i n t e n s e  waves along t h e  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  
coas t .  The exposure of Santa  Barbara, C a l i f o r n i a ,  t o  long-fetch storm s w e l l s  
is l i m i t e d  due t o  t h e  s h e l t e r i n g  e f f e c t  of P o i n t  Conception and t h e  Channel 
i s l ands .  Powerful waves i n  mid-February, however, en t e red  the  Santa Barbara 
Channel d i r e c t l y  through narrow south and w e s t  windows and removed l a r g e  
volumes o f  sand from t h e  beaches. The r ap id  e ros ion  of p r o t e c t i v e  beaches 
l e f t  c o a s t a l  p roper ty  exposed t o  d i r e c t  wave impact and t i d a l  inundat ion 
(F igure  11). 
Comparison of beach p r o f i l e s  taken a t  Leadbet ter  Beach i n  Santa Barbara 
throughout 1979 and t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  of 1980 show t h e  d r a s t i c  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  
s i n g l e  c l i m a t i c  event  on a r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  s h o r e l i n e .  Approximately 79,000 
cu m of sand w a s  eroded from a 709-m l eng th  of t h e  beach t o  a depth of -2 m 
(MSL). Much of  t h e  sand removed from t h e  beach was depos i ted  o f f s h o r e  a t  
depths  of -2 t o  -7 meters  (MSL). Sand was a l s o  t r anspor t ed  longshore and i n t o  
t h e  Santa Barbara Harbor entrance.  The longev i ty  o f  t h i s  s torm's  e f f e c t  on 
t h e  s h o r e l i n e  is ev iden t  i n  posts torm surveys. By l a t e  May 1980 t h e  beach had 
no t  y e t  been r e s t o r e d  t o  its prestorm conf igu ra t ion .  
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FIGURE 10 Prestorm and poststorm 
beach profiles at rangelines SIO 
1, SIO 2, and SIO 3 with superim- 
posed prestorm and poststorm 
fathometer surveys showing the 
development of offshore sand bars 
following erosion of the beach. 
a 
FIGURE 11 View o f  damage to L e a d b e t t e r  Beach, February  23, 1980. 
(Shore  P r o c e s s e s  Labora to ry  photograph.)  
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PRESIDENTIALLY DECLARED MAJOR DISASTER FOR SEVEN SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA *COUNTIES: THE JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH 1980 STORMS 
by Jacob Angel 
This paper p ~ e s e n t s  the experience of the writer as a member of a dis- 
as'tgr survey team that  assessed damages caused by the 1980 floods i n  southern 
California t o  f a c i l i t i e s  owned by local private nonprofit and public agencies. 
I t  explains how Zocal agencies can improve the docwnentation of dmages to  
receive financial assistance under Public Lazj 93-288 and how they must mitigate 
for future f Zood damages. 
The paper describes the makeup of a disaster survey team (which includes 
a representative from the federal government, the s ta te  government (which the 
writer represented), and the local agency); the overall extent o f  damages; the 
type of damage incurred; the Damage Survey Reports (DSRs) submitted by disaster 
survey teams as required by the Federal ESnergency Management Agency for each 
category of damage incurred; the information needed t o  complete the DSRs; the  
measures e l ig ib le  public and private agencies can take t o  improve docwnentation 
of future flood disaster claims; the percentage of funds local agenciss are 
reimbursed depending on the type of repair work t o  be done; the wri ter 's  
opinion as t o  the cause of damage; and the mitigation of flood hazards required 
of each agency by relocating, flood proofing, flood insurance, or construction 
and operation of flood control f ac i l i t i e s .  
The January and February 1980 storms wrought widespread damage and 
d e s t r u c t i o n  i n  southern  Ca l i fo rn i a .  Af te r  t h e  s torms were over and the  
f loodwaters  had receded, r eques t s  f o r  governmental f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  were 
made t o  r e p a i r  t h e  damages. 
Based on p re l imina ry  d a t a  provided t o  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Of f i ce  of  Emergency 
Se rv ices  (OES), t h e  s torms i n  southern  C a l i f o r n i a  r e s u l t e d  i n  18 dea ths ,  145 
i n j u r i e s ,  1,344 homes damaged, 111 homes des t royed ,  and 282 bus inesses  
damaged. Water c o n t r o l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  pub l i c  bu i ld ings  and u t i l i t i e s ,  road 
systems, and a g r i c u l t u r a l  l ands  a l s o  were damaged. The i n i t i a l  f lood-re la ted  
damage d o l l a r  e s t i m a t e s  were $267 mi l l i on  ($155 m i l l i o n  t o  pub l i c  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
$69 m i l l i o n  t o  p r i v a t e  property,  and $43 m i l l i o n  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ) .  A s  a r e s u l t  
o f  t h e s e  damage e s t ima te s ,  Governor Brown dec l a red  a s t a t e  of  emergency i n  
Jacob Angel is Senior  Engineer with t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Department o f  Water 
Resources i n  Sacramento, Ca l i fo rn i a .  
seven southern California counties and later in three northern counties. In 
response to a request by the Governor the President declared eight counties 
in California a major disaster area, which allows state and local government 
agencies to file applications seeking federal funds under Public Law 93-288 to 
be used in alleviating the effects of the storms. 
Public Law 93-288 provides for local agencies to be reimbursed up to 100 
percent of the direct cost of disaster-related work. It allows for the 
permanent restoration of facilities to their predisaster condition in 
accordance with the codes, specifications, and standards in effect at the time 
of the disaster. In this past disaster the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) also indicated that it would allow up to 10 percent for disaster 
proofing to alleviate or prevent the recurrence of damage to facilities 
located in flood hazard areas, if those facilities could not reasonably be 
relocated from the floodplain. Many projects, however, will require niajor 
changes to implement hazard mitigation measures. These are costs that may 
have to be borne mainly by the local jurisdiction. 
After the declaration by the President, 73 damage survey teams were 
dispatched to 430 local agencies in seven southern California counties and one 
northern county to prepare Damage Survey Reports (DSRs) for each 
disaster-related project. These reports, submitted to FEMA and coordinated 
with OES, serve as the basis for federal funding to restore facilities and 
repair damages caused by the 1980 floods. 
I was a member of one of the damage survey teams. Each damage survey team 
consisted of an engineer from a state agency and a federal agency accompanied 
by a representative of the local agency who identified the specific damage 
project. 
As of June 12, 1980, 8,000 DSRs had been submitted for emergency and 
permanent work at public and private nonprofit facilities under the nine 
categories of work shown in Table 1. You should note that the DSRs are for 
public and certain private nonprofit facilities, which are the only ones 
eligible under Public Law 93-288. These DSRs for $113 million were less than 
the $155 million preliminary estimates submitted to OES, partly because the 
original estimates were too high, and partly because some projects were not 
available for review and cost factors were based on local rates rather than 
FEMA's rates. I want to stress to representatives of public agencies the 
importance of good documentation of unit costs and quantity for each facility 
repaired. Not having this information available for the damage survey team at 
the time of inspection delays the preparation of DSRs and the approval of 
reimbursements to eligible local agencies. 
From my own observations as a member of a damage survey team, I came to ' 
believe that the major flood emergency and restoration work involved debris 
deposition, erosion of roads, and distruction of utility lines in the bottoms 
of channels. I was pleased to see, based on the tabulation of DSRs to FEMA, 
that my field experience covered the major types of projects. 
The required contents of DSRs do not, in my opinion, place an unreasonable 
burden on applicants. The DSR forms ask for the following information. 
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TABLE 1 Categories of Public and Private Nonprofit Facilities Eligible for 
Governmental ~ssist$nce (arranged in order of dollar damage) 
Category of Work Damage (millions of dollars) 
Debris Clearance 
Road Systems 




(not included. in other categories) 
~acilities Under Construction 
Public Buildings and Equipment 
Private Nonprofit Facilities 
Total 
o The name of the applicant 
o The location, identification, and description of the damaged 
facilities--with vicinity and location maps and plan views of the damaged area 
o A description of the damage 
o Pictures showing the damaged areas 
o The scope of proposed repair or restoration work 
o Classification of work in the previously shown categories 
o Whether the work is to be by contract or force account 
o The percentage of work completed at the time of inspection 
o Estimated quantities verified by field inspection 
o Unit prices of labor, materials, and equipment, and estimated 
production rates 
Despite the simplicity of the requested information, a substantial number 
of applicants did not have the required information ready when the damage 
survey team arrived at the damage site. This slowed down the whole process. 
Fortunately, a majority of the applicants (both large and small agencies) had 
the required information available at the time of the site inspection. It was 
obvious that those agencies had planned ahead and established procedures that 
readily segregated the costs of labor, materials, and equipment used during 
the flood fight from the costs of subsequent repairs and restoration at each 
facility. For some of the agencies a lack of adequate documentation reduced 
the amount found eligible by the damage survey teams or the review process. 
When the DSRs were completed by the damage survey teams, they were sent to 
FEMA to be reviewed for completeness, accuracy, and engineering comments. 
After FEMA's review, copies of the DSRs were transmitted to OES for 
preparation of a formal project application and for a state analysis, which is 
in turn submitted to FEMA for review and approval. Applicants may, upon this 
submittal of their applications, request an advance of up to 75 percent of the 
recommended funding. 
Under the President's executive order and federal disaster statute, DSRs 
have been reviewed to determine whether or not certain facilities could 
reasonably be moved out of the floodplain to avoid repeated damage. Those 
facilities that may not reasonably be moved are identified for possible 
disaster proofing to minimize future damages. It should be emphasized that 
FEMA has become stricter in requiring flood mitigation or flood proofing to 
minimize repeated damages before approving submitted claims. This is required 
by statute. In general, the damage survey teams submitted requests for 
repairs only if there was sufficient mitigation or flood p~oofing to prevent 
or reduce a repetition of flood damages in the future. 
Originally, I had planned to provide representative examples of flood 
damages and the actions that might be taken to eliminate or reduce future 
damages. Instead, I suggest that you read the Department of Water Resources' 
pamphlet Reducing Flood Damage (see the appendix of the following paper, "New 
Approaches to Flood Hazard Mitigation," by Ronald B. Robie). The pamphlet 
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provides much more detail than I could provide. Even more detail can be found 
in Department of Water Resources (1980). 
As an employee of the Department of Water Resources I must, in closing, 
convey several strong, clear messages to the governmental structure in 
southern California. First, while some of the damage in 1980 was due to an 
"unusual event," most of the damage could be attributed to a lack of foresight 
in permit, design, or construction processes. Second, these mistakes of the 
past will be largely eliminated when local agencies initiate and carry out 
strong programs of floodplain management and zoning and hazard mitigation. 
Third, these programs must not only permit flood control agencies to become 
involved in the planning, zoning, and building permit process but must require 
their active participation in that process. Fourth, the flood control 
agencies must broaden their horizons beyond structural measures and consider 
all the actions that might be taken to reduce future flood damages. 
Finally, the floods of 1978 and 1980 have clearly demonstrated the need to 
implement floodplain management techniques (and do preventative planning) 
before opportunities for low-cost solutions are lost. The representatives of 
flood control districts must today assume a strong leadership role to reduce 
the flood hazards of tomorrow. Many flood control districts in California 
have, in recent years, moved aggressively forward with flood damage prevention 
programs that proved their worth in 1980. We encourage such efforts and hope 
that all flood control districts eventually will have active damage prevention 
programs. 
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NEW APPROACHES TO FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION 
by Ronald B. Robie 
The winter fzooding i n  California during 1980 resulted i n  the nation's 
taxpayers spending needless dollars on disaster assistance and i n  many o f  
California's c i t i zens  suffering personal hardships. To a large extent, damage 
occurred because of the reluctance of local government t o  keep people and their  
property from creating disaster potentials. Flood damage i n  the nine-county 
disaster area was largely the resul t  of human carelessness or ignorance i n  the 
form of inappropriate ac t i v i t i e s  encroaching onto floodplains. 
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, as amended, i s  the most recent program 
that  provides incentives to  s tate  and ZocaZ governments t o  ident i fy  natuxaZ 
hazards, evaluate existing protective measures, and develop and implement 
hazard mitigation plans. The ideal f Zood hazard mitigation plan would seek t o  
keep new development out of the floodplain and relocate existing damageable 
improvements. Practica Z economic and po l i  t i c a  Z considerations tend to  prec Zude 
to ta l  achievement of t h i s  ideal; however, recent s ta t e  and federal financia2 
sanctions and incentives discussed i n  t h i s  paper hold promise for inducing 
local governments t o  r e s t r i c t  the use of the ir  flood-prone areas. 
The financial sanctions and incentives discussed emphasize that  it i s  
appropriate and prudent t o  require aid recipients t o  take reasonabZe precautions 
against foreseeable future damage. 
INTRODUCTION 
After several years of work the Department of Water Resources has recently 
released California Flood Management: An Evaluation of Flood Damage 
Prevention Programs (Bulletin 199). This bulletin discusses historical 
patterns of flood control and new directions recommended by the department. 
Of particular importance to water planners are maps of the entire state, basin 
by basin, showing existing flood control projects and flood hazard areas. 
Structural flood protection projects and nonstructural flood management plans 
in each hydrologic area are also described. Exemplary projects are described 
and depicted. 
Ronald B. Robie is Director of the California Department of Water 
Resources in Sacramento, California. 
Along with the bulletin the department has prepared a brochure describing 
many ways of reducing flood damage, using specific problems in Los Angeles 
County as examples. This brochure is included as an appendix at the end of 
this paper. 
TRENDS IN FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
Once, flood-prone areas were developed with the recognition that 
occasional floods were inevitable. However, because federal disaster 
assistance funds were available, some flood-damaged structures have been 
rebuilt in the same places, only to be flooded again. 
California has seen much unwise development in floodplains. Mission 
Valley in San Diego is a prime example, as the area's continuing problems 
during winter rains demonstrate. 
Over the last 60 years, flood protection projects have been built on many 
of the state's major rivers. A few locations, as part of an overall flood 
management program, still need major structural projects. 
In considering flood management options, it must be realized that no 
project can provide absolute flood protection. Projects are designed to 
mitigate damage from floods of a specific magnitude, such as the 50-year or 
100-year flood. 
In addition, the original level of protection can be lowered by unforeseen 
watershed changes, such as intensive urban development, or by changed 
hydrologic assumptions, such as the recognition that storms greater than 
previously recorded could occur. The Santa Ana River is a classic example. 
Changed hydrologic assumptions and increasing upstream development have 
rendered the existing Prado Dam inadequate to protect the substantial 
downstream development, yet the floodplain continues to be developed at a 
rapid rate. Construction of physical works, along with many of the actions 
discussed later, is the only alternative, and will substantially mitigate 
flood hazards. 
This project, now being considered by the Congress--and supported by the 
state--demonstrates a couple of realities of the 1980s. Such projects are 
extraordinarily expensive. The latest estimate for the Santa Ana project is 
$865 million. Also, the local costs of lands, easements, and rights of way, 
traditionally paid mostly by the state, are also high and cannot all be 
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assumed by the state. The local area to be protected, with improvements 
valued at $34.3 billion, is capable of paying a larger share of this burden, 
considering the enormous benefits it will receive. 
In such cases, where assumptions or situations have changed, people in the 
floodplain may have a false sense of security and fail to realize that a large 
flood can do severe, unexpected damage. 
Local communities with serious flood problems that exceed the local 
capacity of funding traditionally turn to the federal government, and 
particularly to -the ,U.'S. Army Corps of Engineers, for help. Approval of a 
federal project usually leads to federal funds being appropriated to build the 
project and to considerable state financial aid for the project; this relieves 
local residents of much of the project's costs. 
In the past most federal projects have been structural solutions. 
However, the Corps has now developed procedures to comply with the Water 
Resources Development Act of 1974, which requires that nonstructural 
alternatives be considered. We encourage local agencies to recommend these 
nonstructural solutions. We believe that the Water Code should be amended so 
that state financial aid for nonfederal costs will include costs for 
nonstructural measures required by the federal law. 
Because federal funds for flood investigations and project construction 
are' limited, local agencies compete for the money. Success is not necessarily 
related to the merits of a particular project. The California Water 
Commission has worked long and hard to evaluate projects proposed in the state 
and see that the money is wisely spent in the areas of greatest need and 
concern. To give priority to the more critical flood problems, the Department 
of Water Resources has begun an objective evaluation of the investigations and 
projects, based on their relative contributions to reducing flood damage in 
the state. we are then recommending to the Congress priorities for studies 
and projects that the Congress is considering for federal authorization or 
funding. The days of supporting all projects, regardless of merit, are over. 
Changing public attitudes about flood control and governmental spending 
are bringing about new approaches to flood management. Although some in local 
government (and even in the flood control field) still mainly emphasize 
structural methods to prevent flood damage, it is generally recognized that 
the structural solution is only one of the options to be considered in 
planning flood management. 
In some cases, additional physical works should be built, complemented by 
programs to deal with the remaining flood risk. In others, extensive programs 
of floodplain management should mix structural and nonstructural measures as 
needed. Nonstructural measures include floodproofing, flood warning, 
watershed treatment, and removal or relocation of existing developments from 
the floodplain. Together with an emphasis on nonstructural solutions, state 
and federal laws have been enacted to restrict the use of flood-prone areas 
and to mitigate existing hazards. 
REGULATORY CHANGES 
In 1968 Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Program. This is an 
extremely important law. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 modified 
the original act and made it a major element in floodplain management. When a 
community participates in the program, flood insurance becomes available to 
its members, and participating communities must adopt plans for floodplain 
regulation. Prodded by the Department of Water Resources, most flood-prone 
California communities have entered the program to carry out the floodplain 
regulations it requires. 
This law emphasizes keeping people*@om floods rather than the more 
expensive and traditional keeping flq@ from people. Many attack and try to 
thwart this law because it takes a regulatory approach and does not represent 
"business as usual." Yet prior to the National Flood Insurance Program, 
nonstructural flood management had not been widely practiced in California or 
elsewhere. This was due to opposition by landowners and development 
interests, local pressure for growth and increased tax bases, and the 
reluctance of local governments to resist these pressures. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in response to statute, 
has imposed regulations requiring that natural hazards be evaluated and 
mitigated by all levels of government and that mitigation of natural hazards 
be enforced as a condition for obtaining federal disaster assistance. This 
should complement the National Flood Insurance Program. Unfortunately, this 
concept of hazard mitigation sounds better in the regulations than it does in 
real life. The main sanction--withholding funds--only comes after a disaster, 
when a community is digging out of the rubble of a flood. FEMA is unlikely to 
deny relief in the absence of a mitigation plan. Doing so would be criticized 
as the height of bureaucratic nit-picking, and the political pressure to 
rescue people, no matter how improvidently they have acted, is great. Yet 
once the damage is repaired, what is the incentive to develop a mitigation 
plan? It depends on the circumstances, but, clearly, hazard mitigation can 
only be meaningful when carried out before disasters. 
Our department is committed to ensuring that natural hazard mitigation 
measures are effectively carried out as a condition of federal and state 
disaster assistance. For example, with regard to the 1980 floods in the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta we are pushing for hazard mitigation--in this 
case, improvements of the terribly maintained levees that failed. It is an 
uphill struggle because certain governmental mechanisms, such as reclamation 
and levee districts, serve to insulate the owners of flood-prone land from 
both legal and social liability and responsibility. The public subsidies that 
result are significant. For example, Webb Tract (which was flooded and is now 
being reclaimed) has been valued at $5.4 million. Levee repairs and other 
restoration after this year's floods are costing the nation's taxpayers 
approximately $17 million. The district has spent about $100,000 for this 
work, and its annual expenditures for levee maintenance averaged only $82,000 
since 1973. The island has 15 landowners, yet they have no personal 
liability. A virtually insolvent reclamation district owns the levees and is 
the only one held accountable. The burden has been shifted from the shoulders 
of the landowners. The hazard mitigation plan proposed by the Department of 
water Resources would require levee improvements in the next three years 
costing $2.4 million. The district would pay this sum but could be reimbursed 
by almost $1 million from the Office of Emergency Services. 
The state and FEMA should also develop more meaningful sanctions against 
local governments that allow unsuitable developments in floodplains. As a 
start, a cooperative effort is being proposed between the Department of Water 
Resources and FEMA to monitor compliance by California communities with 
regulations of the National Flood Insurance Program. Department officials 
will meet with community officials over a two-year period to discuss wise use 
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of floodplains, to $valuate how each city and county is complying with the 
flood insurance program's building permit and va~iance procedures, and to see 
if governments are guiding development out of the floodway and, where 
possible, away from the floodplain. The project will also document any 
innovations by a particular community that might be useful to others. 
An ongoing program of great significance is the Designated Floodway 
Program of the State ~eclamati0t-I Board. Thus far, 1,100 miles have been 
protected under this program in the Central Valley. The program is described 
in Bulletin 199. 
Also, the department is now evaluating flood hazards in its review of 
environmental impact reports to determine if a proposed development is subject 
to flooding. This evaluation will allow mitigation of flood problems early in 
the planning process, and will possibly set aside floodplains for use as open 
space. 
MITIGATING FLOOD HAZARDS 
The department recommends that all future state appropriations for flood 
disaster relief include requirements to mitigate hazards. The first step was 
taken with the passage of Senate Bill 366 in 1979, which affects Los Angeles 
and Riverside counties and the City of Los Angeles. This law requires that 
adequate land use controls be applied to make sure that new construction or 
rebuilding in areas of flood or debris hazard is allowed only where adequate 
protection is provided. 
To comply with this law, we are asking the governments of both counties to 
pass ordinances requiring that actions relating to flood hazard 
identification, prevention, or mitigation be taken after consultation with 
county flood control districts; reimbursement of up to $3.3 million would act 
as an incentive to this consultation. The ordinances also seek to have the 
districts review, in flood-susceptible areas, subdivision maps, building and 
grading permits, flood zoning, the acceptance of storm drains dedicated by 
developers, the setting of water surface elevations, and the delineation of 
areas where building is not permitted. The appropriate decision-making or 
executive agency would prepare written findings regarding flood hazards after 
reviewing the districts' reports. The ordinances would also require that 
complete and accessible data files be maintained. Riverside County has 
already passed such an ordinance and has further delegated some approval 
authority in these areas to the county flood control district and the 
Coachella Valley Water District. 
We have asked the City of Los Angeles to consult with the Los Angeles 
County Flood Control ~istrict on major projects that could overload district 
flood and drainage facilities as a condition of receiving reimbursement of up 
to $900,000. We believe that the agency responsible for effective operation 
and maintenance of drainage facilities should be involved as a consultant in 
the process of approving development. We are encouraging the City of Los 
Angeles and Los Angeles County to adopt ordinances similar to those adopted by 
Riverside County. 
Another reason for inadequate flood-hazard mitigation has been the lack of 
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an adequate base of technical informabson. FEMA needs to speed up technical 
studies of flood risks to provide a &is for floodplain regulation and flood 
insurance. The state could contribute more to these studies, which when 
complete will leave no excuse for planning, zoning, and public works agencies 
to continue to ignore nonstructural flood management in undeveloped or partly 
developed areas. This, of course, must be done before further development 
makes such management impractical. 
It should be obvious that a flood hazard mitigation project is effective 
only if access and funding for proper maintenance are provided. With federal 
projects the price the local government pays for accepting federal funding 
includes paying for perpetual maintenance to preserve the capacity of the 
project. Yet the type of maintenance that has been provided for the channels 
and levees in some areas leaves much to be desired. In addition, maintaining 
agencies often in recent years have paid little heed to environmental 
considerations. There is public support for greater environmental efforts, 
however. Maintenance practices must be modified considerably to reflect 
environmental and esthetic values better. Bulletin 199 documents successful 
efforts and should be helpful in this area. 
Greater recognition is being given today to the value of wetlands and 
riparian vegetation--not only for ecological, recreational, and esthetic 
reasons but also for reasons of flood mitigation and water quality. Some 
counties have passed ordinances to protect riparian vegetation, and state 
agencies are encouraging the concept. 
It is state and federal policy not only to preserve but also to enhance 
the wetlands of the state and nation. The State Department of Fish and Game 
requires a permit before a streambed can be altered. The State Water 
Resources Control Board, in its Decision 1460, ruled that diverting nonflood 
flows of a stream segment that furnishes vegetative habitat is a waste of 
water and unreasonable. This permit requirement and ruling are intended to 
keep development from eliminating stream segments or from channelizing them 
without mitigation. 
All agencies involved in planning, zoning, and public works need to 
emphasize protection of wetlands and riparian vegetation as a technique to 
manage floods nanstructurally to enhance water quality. For example, 
Sacramento County is developing a Natural Streams Combining Zone for all 
property within the 100-year floodplain of county streams. By requiring . 
permits or approvals for all uses in the floodplains, more natural stream 
courses and habitat will be preserved than were preserved under former 
planning processes. Government agencies should continue to enact rules to 
protect wetlands and riparian vegetation, particularly in the aftermath of 
Proposition 13, which greatly reduced available operation and maintenance 
funds . 
Emergency measures to repair flood damage, by their nature, are rarely 
subject to an evaluation of their environmental impact, their consistency with 
state policy (such as protection of wetland and riparian habitat), or their 
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cost effectiveness before they are under taken. Nevertheless, analyses of 
these impacts and ekfects should guide both future emergency action and the 
long-term policies needed to prevent or reduce future damage. SB 366 provided 
funds for the Department of Water Resources to analyze the cost effectiveness 
of the emergency funds allocated to LOS Angeles and Riverside counties and the 
City of Los ~n~eles. These analyses will provide us with guidelines in 
declaring future emergencies under the Water Code. 
Government agencies in rural California are often reluctant to order or 
carry out prudent practices of nonstructural flood management. Yet rural 
areas are the very locations where floodplain regulation has the greatest 
potential to prevent flood damage and preserve environmental values. 
The federal government should accelerate its studies in rural areas and 
start a program to inform residents of the rare opportunity they have to 
prevent the disasters and unnecessary cost suffered by some more developed 
areas. Rural administrators and the public could benefit from graphic 
illustrations of the flood damage that has struck more populous parts of 
California that failed to adopt nonstructural flood management practices. 
Agencies that aggressively encourage public involvement in forming and 
planning flood programs and projects tend to experience fewer delays and 
objections from the public and generally achieve greater public acceptance of 
their actions . 
All levels of government should realize that active and effective public 
participation early in flood management planning will make the public aware of 
the flood hazard, educate them about governmental concerns and constraints, 
and produce a willingness to help design a project acceptable to those 
directly affected. Public involvement is required in the processes of local 
approval, producing an environmental impact report, and right-of-way 
acquisition; it can also prevent delays, litigation, and rejection by 
decision-making bodies. Public involvement basically combines the needs and 
wishes of various publics (and there are many!) with the professionals' 
knowledge of a government agency to achieve a result that optimizes the 
efforts of both. 
CONCLUSION 
I have tried to show the need for improved cooperation among the federal, 
state, and local governments in flood management and to suggest where these 
improvements can be made. We need better rules and processes at all levels. 
Local governments must shoulder more of the burden of protecting the lives and 
property of their citizens; they can best do so by better planning before a 
crisis rather than by cleaning up after a disaster. Local flood control 
districts need to be involved in the process of planning and development 
approval. 
The key to managing floods is to manage ourselves; we must all talk to 
each other and heed what the other is saying, particularly when the public 
speaks. The public is, after all, who we work for, and we must do our utmost 
to better shape bureaucratic processes to the democratic process. 
APPENDIX: REDUCLNG F W D  DAMAGE* 
To exp lo re  ways of  reducing f lood  damage, Los Angeles County dra inage  a r e a  
was s e l e c t e d  a s  an example of an  urban a r e a  t h a t  s u f f e r e d  heav i ly  i n  t h e  
d i s a s t r o u s  s torms of January  and February 1980, even though it had an  
ex tens ive  f lood  c o n t r o l  program. Most o f  t h e  damages sus t a ined  by homes, 
roads,  and o t h e r  developments were caused by mudflows and eros ion ,  r e s u l t i n g  
from overflowing s treams,  storm d r a i n s ,  and d e b r i s  bas ins .  
Under n a t u r a l  cond i t i ons  t h e  heavy runoff  would have been c a r r i e d  away by 
t h e  s t ream channels ,  and, i f  t h e  water exceeded what they  could handle,  it 
would have overflowed and carved a d d i t i o n a l  channels  on t h e  f loodpla in .  
But, through t h e  yea r s ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of  t h e  n a t u r a l  watercourses  has  been 
reduced by s t ream channe l i za t ion ,  development encroaching upon t h e  
f loodp la ins ,  t h e  dumping of  m a t e r i a l s  i n t o  t h e  stream channels ,  t h e  e roding  of  
h i l l s i d e s  and r i v e r  banks, and t h e  paving over of  land  where water could  once 
pe rco la t e  i n t o  t h e  ground. 
Channels and storm d r a i n s  have been b u i l t  b u t  do n o t  r ep l ace  t h i s  l o s t  
capac i ty .  I n  normal times they may be s u f f i c i e n t  to handle t h e  runoff .  But 
i n  heavy runoff t h e  water o r  d e b r i s ,  when it overf lows,  cannot  c u t  a d d i t i o n a l  
channels  i n  t h e  f loodp la in  because they  have a l r eady  been b u i l t  upon. 
Therefore it is forced  t o  seek an o u t l e t  through streets, roads,  houses,  or 
whatever o the r  s t r u c t u r e s  s t and  i n  its path. Adding t o  t h e  woes i n  l o c a l i z e d  
a r e a s  a r e  plugged d r a i n s  and i n l e t s ,  pump f a i l u r e s ,  and inadequate d r a i n  
capac i ty  . 
Thus it is c l e a r  t h a t ,  t o  reduce damages, we w i l l  have to: 
o Develop and en fo rce  adequate  l and  use con t ro l s .  
o Give p r i o r i t y  t o  n o n s t r u c t u r a l  f l oodp la in  management over s t r u c t u r a l  
s o l u t i o n s .  
o Require t h a t  homes o r  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e s  damaged more than 50 pe rcen t  by 
f loods  meet new s t anda rds  o r  be removed o r  re loca ted .  
o Approve and accept  dra inage  f a c i l i t i e s  on ly  i f  t hey  meet f l ood  c o n t r o l  
district  s tandards.  
o Require t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  o f  h i l l s i d e  l o t s  ,be c e r t i f i e d  by eng inee r s  and 
g e o l o g i s t s  before  bui ld ing  permi ts  a r e  issued.  
o Implement watershed management o f  h i l l s i d e  a r e a s  ( e ros ion  and runoff  
c o n t r o l  by p l an t ing  s lopes ,  i n s t a l l i n g  r e t a r d i n g  bas ins ,  and o t h e r  methods). 
*This appendix is r e p r i n t e d  from t h e  brochure Reducing Flood Damage, which 
was r e l e a s e d  by t h e  Department of Water Resources i n  September 1980. 
FIGURE 1 Identified with numbers in black dots on the map are repre- 
sentative areas in which flood damages were suffered in the storms of 
January and February 1980. The damages sustained at each of the loca- 
tions identified on the map are listed in the table below. Beside 
each of these damages are one or more letters indicating the actions 
that need to be taken to prevent such damages in the future. These 
are keyed to a list of mitigation actions following the table. 
Number 
on Map January-February 1980 Damages 
Mitigation 
Act ions 
1 Malibu. Debris washed to sea, plus heavy seas, battered B, H, J, 
pilings and bulkheads of homes on Pacific Coast High- MI T 
way. Some invaded by mud and water from hillsides; 
sandbagging required. 
2 Pacific Coast Highway. Closed from Santa Monica Freeway C, G, M 
to Pt. Dume by mudslides and-flooding. 
3 Malibu Canyon. Mulholland Dr. closed from coast to F, G 
Malibu Lake because road flooded or washed out. In 
Monte Nido woman killed when buried by mud. 
4 Woodland H i l l s .  Home near V e n t ~ r a  Freeway and Ave. San G, I 
Lu i s  inundated when Dry ~an~am.&dod c o n t r o l  channel  
overflowed. 
5 Topanga Canyon Rd. Washed o u t  i n  p laces .  
6 Be1 A i r  Estates. Swif t  c u r r e n t  through i n t e r s e c t i o n  of G, I, P, Q 
Sunse t  Blvd. and Charr ing Rd.; people rescued from 
c a r s .  Water 1.2 m (4  f t )  deep a t  Sunset  and Chautauqua. 
Rivas Canyon. Yards of t h r e e  homes eroded when double- 
w i re  revetment washed out .  Owners sandbagged threa tened  
homes. 
Mandeville Canyon Rd. Flooding and mudflows f o r  4 km 
(2.5 miles). 
Mandeville Canyon. Mudflows through homes forced  200 
persons t o  evacuate;  one house l o s t ;  one person k i l l e d  
by wa l l  o f  flowing mud; 20 homes damaged by mud. 
Saugus. Magic Mtn. Parkway c losed  f o r  0.5 km (0.3 
m i l e )  because washed o u t  i n  p laces .  
Stone Canyon Rd. Mudslides c losed  a t  Val ley  V i s t a  Blvd. 
Hollywood H i l l s .  Mudslides blocked 13200 block of  
Mulholland D r .  
Coldwater Canyon. Flooded on San Fernando Val ley  s i d e .  
Trousdale  E s t a t e s .  Water and mud broke open doors  and 
damaged l i v i n g  rooms of homes. 
Laure l  Canyon. One home demolished by mudslide; another  
co l l apsed  when suppor t ing  ground became s a t u r a t e d  and 
s t a r t e d  creeping.  
Laure l  Canyon. Fo r ty  homes near M t .  Olympus evacuated, 
mainly because of  mudflows, wi th  e ros ion  i n  yards.  
Kagel Canyon. Four homes flooded when d e b r i s  clogged 
d r a i n ,  caus ing  overflow. 
1 8  Beverly H i l l s  and West Hollywood. Gravel and mud on G I  L 
s t r e e t s  i n  l o c a l i z e d  a reas ;  underground garage and 
foyer of apartment  house flooded. 
1 9  Hollywood. Residents  on Genesee Ave. a l e r t e d  f o r  poss- I 
i b l e  evacuat ion i f  Nicholas  Canyon d e b r i s  bas in  over- 
flowed. (Basin d i d  n o t  overflow.) 
. Flooding c losed  Lincoln Blvd. between G, 1, F“ 
lvd.  and W. 83rd St .  Q 
2 1 Baldwin H i l l s .  Mudslides c lo sed  La Cienega Blvd. M, Q 
between Stocker  S t .  and Rodeo D r .  
22 Beverly H i l l s .  Flooded a t  Olympic and La Cienega Blvds. G, I 
23 West Los Angeles. Laure l  Canyon Blvd. f looded near  GI  1, PI 
Lookout Mountain Rd. One woman swept down to Holly- S 
wood Blvd. 
2 4 Hollywood. Mudslides c lo sed  Cahuenga Blvd. between M, Q 
Pi lgr image Theat re  and Barham S t .  
West Los Anqeles. Rossmore Ave. f looded between G I  I 
Beverly Blvd. and W. 3rd S t .  
Los Anqeles. Underground garage on S. Kenmore S t .  G, L 
flooded . 
Angeles C r e s t  Highway. Mudslides and washouts c lo sed  MI N 
3 km ( 2  m i l e s )  nor th  of F o o t h i l l  Blvd. 
L o s  Angeles. Elevator  s h a f t  i n  Queen o f  Angels Hosp i t a l  G ,  L 
flooded; also basement and f i r s t  f l o o r  of S t .  Vincent 
Medical Center  and Midway Hospi ta l .  
Verdugo H i l l s  Cemetery. Cof f in s  exposed by erosion.  J, T 
Monterey Park. Four houses co l l apsed  and t w o  knocked B, C, D, 
o f f  foundat ion when mud slammed i n t o  them. Mudslides FIJI MI 
overtopped mud b a r r i e r  and des t royed  house. N, T 
Alhambra. Backyard of  home eroded when conc re t e  w a l l  Kt R 
of San Pasqual  Creek channel undermined and co l lapsed .  
C i t y  of  Commerce. Santa  Ana Freeway f looded between 
G a r f i e l d  andwashington Aves. A l s o ,  i n t e r s e c t i o n  of  
A t l a n t i c  Ave. and Telegraph Rd. 
3 3 Norwalk. Imper ia l  Highway f looded near  Bloomfield St . ;  G,  I ,  P, 
people rescued from tops  of  cars. Q 
3 4 E a s t  Pasadena. Mud from h i l l s i d e s  c l o s e d  s e v e r a l  streets C, G,  I ,  
i n  Pasadena Glen. Man caught by mud and water swept M, Q 
0.4 km (0.25 mile)  downstream. 
3 5 Altadena. Rubio Diversion Channel became clogged and Bt E, I 
overflowed, c a r r y i n g  mud i n t o  20 homes. 
Actions to  Prevent  Future  Damage 
(Letters correspond to those  under " ~ i g i ~ a t i o n  Action" i n  t ab l e .  ) 
A. Floodproof homes and bu i ld ings  with permanent walls o r  removable wood 
planks and a r c h i t e c t u r a l l y  p l eas ing  d e f l e c t o r  w a l l s  to guide flow to channel.  
B. Implement s t r ic t  l and  use c o n t r o l s  t o  prevent  s t r u c t u r e s  from being 
r e b u i l t  i n  a r e a s  of  heavy damage and t o  prevent  encroachment on streambeds. 
(For  homes damaged more than  50 pe rcen t  of  market value,  l o c a l  government 
enforce requirements of  Nat iona l  Flood Insurance Program f o r  adequate 
p r o t e c t i o n  from f u t u r e  damage; i f  p r o t e c t i o n  cannot  be provided, deny bu i ld ing  
permits .  ) 
C. C i ty ,  county, s t a t e ,  and f e d e r a l  l and  management agencies  develop 
watershed management p l a n  f o r  mountain and h i l l  a r e a s  t o  reduce amount of  mud 
and d e b r i s  c a r r i e d  down t o  developed a reas .  Should p r o h i b i t  new ba re  
cu t - and- f i l l  s l opes ,  r e q u i r e  runoff  t o  be discharged i n t o  channels  a t  l o w  
v e l o c i t i e s ,  p l a n t  uns t ab le  s lopes ,  and, i n  extreme cases ,  use  s t r u c t u r e s  t o  
s t a b i l i z e  s lopes  and t r a p  deb r i s .  
D. Strengthen and enforce  ord inances  r equ i r ing  g e o l o g i s t s  and eng inee r s  
to analyze s t a b i l i t y  o f  h i l l s i d e s  and f lood  c o n t r o l  d i s t r i c t s  t o  approve 
proposed dra inage  f a c i l i t i e s  before  i s s u i n g  bui ld ing  permits .  
i 
E. I n s t a l l  e s t h e t i c a l l y  p l eas ing  d e f l e c t i n g  and t r a i n i n g  wa l l s  a t  
c r i t i c a l  p o i n t s  a long s t reams and a t  j unc t ions  t o  keep f lows i n  channels  and 
s t r e e t s .  Sandbags can  be temporary measure. 
F. S t a b i l i z e  s l o p e s  next  t o  bu i ld ings  and c r i t i c a l  s e c t i o n s  of  s t r e e t s  
and channels.  Example: homeowners use grouted r i p r a p  t o  t ransform channel  
i n t o  p l eas ing  cascade. Ter race  h i l l s i d e  s l o p e s  and i n s t a l l  s l o p e  d ra ins .  
G. Check c a p a c i t y  of  c u l v e r t s ,  storm d r a i n s ,  and i n l e t s ,  t ak ing  i n t o  
account l e v e l  of development i n  watershed. 
H. Local government adopt  and implement r e g u l a t i o n s  r e s t r i c t i n g  homes and 
development along sho re  wi th in  100-year f lood  t ide hazard boundary. 
I. Develop and fo l low adequate maintenance program f o r  dra inage  systems. 
Have crews a v a i l a b l e  t o  c l e a r  d e b r i s  b a s i n s  between storms. Keep c u l v e r t  and 
storm d r a i n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n l e t s ,  clear. Keep and analyze records  t o  
determine probable f u t u r e  problem a reas .  
J. Require in-depth s tudy  before  i s su ing  bui ld ing  and grading permits .  
K.  Reconstruct  p r o t e c t i v e  wa l l s  with deeper foundat ions t o  prevent  
f a i l u r e  by erosion.  
L. Follow p r o t e c t i v e  maintenance f o r  p r i v a t e  d r a i n s  and sump pumps. 
Mi Use vege ta t . ve  cover on s l o p e s  where c o n t r o l  o f  mudslides n o t  
o therwise  cost e f f e c t i v e  o r  p r a c t i c a l .  Covering s l o p e s  with p l a s t i c  s h e e t i n g  
g i v e s  temporary p ro t ec t ion .  
N. Check adequacy o f  d r a i n s  p r o t e c t i n g  c u t s  and f i l l s .  
0. Design o u t l e t s  to prevent  e ros ion  wi th  r i p r a p  or energy d i s s i p a t e r s .  
P. Exerc ise  strict t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  dur ing  storms. 
Q. I n s t a l l  s i g n s  on roads s u b j e c t  t o  f looding  and mud and d e b r i s  flows. 
R. Cons t ruc t  grade  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s  t o  blend i n t o  environment and t o  
reduce flow v e l o o i t y  i n  channel. 
S. If increased  c a p a c i t y  of  d r a i n  o r  channel  is on ly  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n ,  
a s s i g n  p r i o r i t y  f o r  cons t ruc t ion  funds. 
T. Relocat ion.  

HAZARD MITIGATION: THE ENFORCEMENT TOOL 
by Dale R. Peterson 
. The federal 'government has i n  the past responded t o  natural disasters 
such as floods and mudflows with response and recovery e f f o r t s  that  addressed 
the immediate need t o  get a community back on i t s  f ee t  and provide services 
t o  i t s  c i t i zens  a f t e r  the disaster. Unfortunately, i n  our desire t o  be 
responsive, unwise decisions have been made by a l l  levels  of government 
t o  allow u m i s e  or unregulated development within known hazard areas. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) i s  now charged with the 
responsibil i ty of mitigating future hazards by providing alternatives t o  
the more traditional response and recovery e f for t s .  The premise of FEMA's 
hazard mitigation programs i s  t o  provide a way t o  achieve long-range 
solutions. These programs, complemented by more e f f ec t i ve  local codes 
and development regulations, address uhat FEMA considers the most c r i t i ca l  
disaster recovery effort--the reduction of future losses of l i f e  and property. 
Hazard mitigation measures were tested i n  f iscal  year 1980 for the f i r s t  
time. Although FEMA believes that the programs are sound, constant refine- 
ment t o  improve development standards so that  they are tailored t o  f i t  the 
communities' needs w i l l  be our challenge. A l l  levels  of government must 
support t h i s  e f f o r t  so that our past development mistakes i n  flood and 
mudflow hazard areas w i l l  not be repeated. 
At the outset I would like to clarify several misconceptions about the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. This newly created executive-branch 
agency is a single point of contact in the federal government for emergency 
matters and coordinates the multiple use of resources in preparing for and 
responding to nationally declared emergencies. 
Much has been said about problems with FEMA'S responsiveness to the flood 
disasters of 1980. It must be understood that it is not FEMA's role to build 
a community back to its condition prior to a disaster; FEMA seeks rather to 
help all public and private sectors get back on their feet and mitigate future 
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losses due to flooding, mudflows, or coastal inundation. FEMA has initiated 
several new programs to relocate to hazard-free sites structures repeatedly 
damaged by floods and mudflows. We have four such projects under way in 
California and Arizona, with expenditures totaling $3 million. These new 
programs, combined with established FEMA disaster programs that provide 
individual assistance to recoup personal property loss and that provide public 
assistance to restore overall public services such as bridges, roads, and 
sewage treatment facilities, expand on hazard mitigation programs and offer 
alternatives to local governments. 
I represent the agency's Division of Insurance and Mitigation in Region 
IX. Formerly we were known as the Federal Insurance Administration under the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and we still administer the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Our primary responsibility is to 
provide technical assistance through detailed flood insurance studies of 
hazardous areas. This is done so that communities can develop appropriate 
regulatory controls that will reduce future losses due to flooding or mudflows. 
This year we have initiated a redirection of the program to address more 
firmly the philosophy of hazard mitigation. Supporting this objective are: 
1. The President's Executive Order No. 11988, which requires all federal 
agencies to assess the impact of any proposed floodplain development and, if 
possible, identify flood-free locations or otherwise mitigate the potentials 
for loss due to flooding. 
2. Section 1362 of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, which 
enables FEMA to purchase flood-damaged properties insured by the National 
- - 
Flood Insurance Program. This allows property owners to relocate to areas not 
prone to flooding and requires that damaged areas be rezoned for use as open 
space. 
3. The declaration of constructive total loss, which enables FEMA to 
assist property owners financially who are insured by the NFIP to relocate to 
ares not prone to flooding. In order for the property to qualify, the 
community must prohibit the repair of the structure or allow the repair only 
at significantly increased cost. Both programs require that damaged property 
be deeded to the community and put to use as public open space. 
These hazard mitigation measures were tested for the first time during 
fiscal year 1980. The programs are sound and provide FEMA with a 
problem-solving tool to reduce future losses due to flooding'and mudflows. 
Existing enforcement tools, via regulatory controls, can only complement this 
new effort. 
I am heartened that hazard mitigation has become a theme tying together 
the majority of papers included in these proceedings. However, I am also 
angered that together we continue to make the same mistakes of allowing unwise 
development in known hazard areas. In the name of expediency we have been 
known to do anything to justify the end, or as we have referrved to it, the 
emergency or temporary need. My experience is that nothing is more permanent 
r 
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than a temporary strpcture or decision. Almost without fail these decisions 
come back to haunt us, when in the next year we must replace the struature or 
facility again because of flooding we knew could occur. 
San Diego County has experienced the "disappearing bridge" phenomenon this 
past year. Structures inadequately designed to traverse a watercourse were 
further compromised when culverts were used instead of span construction or 
other design techniques tailored to site-specific needs. Likewise, the City 
of Phoenix loses not only bridges across the Salt River yearly but a sizable 
portion of the Sky Harbor Runway as well. The movable natural channel and the 
city's inability to stabilize the river's banks through the metropolitan area 
will continue to produce flood damages in the community. The costs to both 
the public and private sector continue to grow. Hazard mitigation through 
structural solutions will continue to cost the taxpayer more and more each 
year. One must evaluate the cost-benefit ratio of solutions to immediate 
needs in terms of the application of those solutions to long-range hazard 
mitigation. 
The development of subdivisions in areas subject to mudflows and flooding 
from alluvial fans highlights the problem of adequate enforcement tools. The 
apparent inability of communities to learn from last year's mistakes is 
clearly evident in the Southland. Relaxed building codes and a willingness to 
issue variances to performance standards will continue to plague governments 
as long as the ostrich approach to regulating future development continues. 
The issuance of a variance because of "economic considerationsn offends me. 
Yes, it will cost more to develop while recognizing an identified hazard. 
However, this additional cost is the price necessary to minimize future 
flood-related expense. How far will governments go to encourage risk 
development? We must awaken to the folly of these actions. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency continues to add to its experience 
with each event. The unique hazards in the Southwest range from riverine 
flooding to coastal inundation to alluvial fans to movable streambeds to 
mudflows; each is currently being addressed by FEMA. Before the National 
~esearch Council is a proposed methodology to study, identify, and map areas 
subject to inundation by mudflows. In addition, FEMA is this year initiating 
a physical modeling study to evaluate the nature of floodflows on alluvial 
fans and the associated problem of sediment transport. It is hoped that these 
studies will yield a method whereby improved and innovative development 
standards can be initiated. Papers included in these proceedings tell of the 
need to go beyond our current ability. In this regard, hazard mitigation is a 
viable planning tool. First, however, communities must recognize that there 
is a problem and be willing to address alternatives to mitigate the hazard. 
Hazard mitigation activities involve coordination efforts at all governmental 
levels, local, state, and federal. These efforts must be complemented by the 
enforcement of regulations on new developments and/or the replacement of 
existing developments after a disaster occurs. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency will not solve the problems that 
exist, but it can be used as a resource to address the need to mitigate future 
losses by wise management in hazard-prone areas. Hazard mitigation can and 
will be a solution to future flood and mudflow problems similar to those that 
occurred in California during 1980. It is our goal to provide the communities 
in this region with guidance to achieve this end. 
THOUGHTS ON THE FLOODING DISASTER OF 1980 
by Donald C. Tillman 
. During the stbrms of 1980 the City of Los Angeles experienced the worst 
rainfall on record. If one considers the entire storm series, it experienced 
possibly the greatest potential for disaster in many years. If not for the 
good disaster plans and operations in effect, and if not for many years of 
outstanding public works projects and field control, Los Angeles would have 
washed out to sea. 
Whether it be for flooding or erosion, mudflows or landslides, fires or 
earthquakes, the City of Los Angeles is ready and is continuing to improve its 
interdepartmental operations through disaster exercises. Of particular 
concern in 1980 was the condition of debris basins within the city, which had 
been filling from the heavy storms of 1978 and the runoff from the barren 
areas of the 1979 fires. Reconnaissance and maintenance efforts were under 
way months before the rains of February. 
There were two significant features of the rains that fell on the southern 
slopes of the Santa Monica Mountains. In Laurel Canyon, and probably in 
Nichols Canyon, a freak runoff was experienced, similar to that of 1978. A 
study is now under way to establish a special Disaster Alert for those 
canyons. It appears that a deluge of rainfall, combined with a confluence of 
peaks and narrow canyon topography, can result in a tidal wave of runoff. 
This occurred on February 14 in the early morning hours. On Saturday, 
February 16, 1980, the rain continued at a heavy intensity for about nine 
hours, without letting up. Never before have the San Fernando Valley and its 
drainage facilities been so taxed to capacity. The Los Angeles River, from 
the Sepulveda Dam across to North Hollywood, was above its capacity at many 
locations. Another hour of rainfall could have caused a super disaster. 
The 1978 rains triggered many mudflows and landslides that purged the 
mountains and caused some of the buildup of geologic instability. However, 
the extent of the mud runoff in the valley on February 16, 1980, has never 
been equaled. Cleanup and repair activities have been costly. There is no 
accurate figure for damage to private property, but public facilities in the 
City of Los Angeles alone suffered $10 million of damage. No allowance was 
Donald C. Tillman is City Engineer with the City of Los Angeles. 
made for general pavement failures, such as the formation of potholes and the 
additional deterioration of paved surfaces, that could result. However, the 
city council provided $7.6 million, of which it is estimated that restoration 
costs are around $6 million. Federal reimbursement is now calculated at $2 
million, though the amount of federal funds received as reimbursement to date 
is zero. 
Future preparedness will depend largely on the funds available for 
maintenance between flooding disasters. The debris basins and channels must 
be kept clean to operate at full capacity. Storm drains and catch basins must 
be regularly maintained. In addition, there are still many missing links in 
an underground storm drain system that should be provided. We have recently 
estimated that the costs for all drains needed will total $600 million in the 
City of Los Angeles. 
A disaster within the disaster has been federal reimbursement. The 
paperwork and numerous meetings held in the field during the design and 
construction operations of the recovery are excessive and unnecessary. The 
auditing and the attempt of local government to collect funds due from federal 
sources can go on for years. We are still trying to collect from .the 1971 
earthquake recovery work. Another fault I find with federal controls is that 
there are no national guidelines to prepare for decisions during the disaster 
and recovery period that influence eligibility for federal reimbursement. It 
makes a difference in the solutions taken if you must depend solely on 
nonexistent local funds. Standards of eligibility and guidelines for 
enforcement must be adopted now by the federal government for various types of 
disasters and must be given to local agencies for application. Otherwise, a 
total amount of federal money should be given to any area affected by 
disaster, to use as they determine proper, to make the necessary corrections. 
Auditing for uses on private property or illegal expenditures can then be 
performed afterward. This would minimize the number of meetings and expedite 
the repairs that the public needs. Some revisions are also needed in the 
federal government's procedures for Small Business Administration loans. The 
few citizens who are severely hurt by disaster must wait several months for 
the first loan funds to arrive and be of any assistance. 
In summary, flooding in southern California is being controlled, but it is 
still sufficient enough to cause concern. Public officials, who face the loss 
of limited tax dollars, must protect the general welfare and safety of the 
public. The best approach for the future is to continue public works 
construction where critically needed, develop disaster manuals that will . 
provide guidelines for all types of disasters, disseminate federal eligibility 
rules and regulations for reimbursement, and shorten the time it takes to 
process matters of management and administration so that they do not overlap 
from disaster to disaster. 
FLOOD ASSISTANCE ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: 
PRIVATE RESPONSE TO A GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY? 
by Andrew Lipkis, Sherna Hough, and Lisa.N. Geller 
For the past three years the California Conservation Project, also known 
as TreePeople, has been called on to provide emergency assistance for a 
variety of flood-related problems on private property. TreePeople is a 
prlvate nonprofit organization based in Los Angeles and involved primarily in 
reforestation and environmental education. The organization has a small paid 
staff supported by a large corps of volunteers. At the request of government 
agencies unable to respond to emergencies that arose from flooding in the Los 
Angeles area, TreePeople mobilized and dispatched up to 3,000 volunteers to 
participate in sandbagging, bridge building, and other immediate solutions to 
problems caused by extensive rains. Private citizens seeking help from 
agencies such as fire departments, flood control districts, and the police 
were referred to TreePeople for assistance in protecting their homes and 
mitigating damage. This is because of limitations on those agencies in terms 
of resources as well as limitations imposed by law. Volunteers were recruited 
from preexisting files of TreePeople and through the media. Because much of 
the damage is the result of runoff from fire-devastated hillsides, TreePeople 
rehabilitated burned slopes and offered preventative advice. 
Citizens were often shocked and angered to learn that there is no 
government agency authorized to provide aid on private property. The question 
of whether the responsibility for emergency flood assistance to private 
individuals lies within government agencies or the private sector is as yet 
unresolved. In the interim a program is being developed by TreePeople to 
train volunteers who will be able to consult with homeowners on preventative 
measures and lead crews of volunteers during emergencies. Because the 
organization has been able to offer services without great expense or 
extensive new bureaucracies, this plan could provide an attractive model for 
governmental or private service organizations. 
TREEPEOPLE EMERGENCY CENTER* 
In February 1980 the TreePeople staff was on duty 24 hours a day for 10 
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*The rest of this report is reprinted from TreePeople, Special Report, 
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days in a row. During that time they organized about 3,000 volunteers and 
saved nearly 1,200 homes from damage by a severe storm that was hitting 
southern California. At the peak of the storm--Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, 
February 16-18--as many as 150 crews were out at any one time, with crews 
ranging in size from 3 to 50 people. 
These volunteer crews worked in cold wet conditions to help people they 
had never seen before, people they probably would never see again. They set 
aside all thoughts of "daily routinen to deal with the intensity of the 
storm. All problems were urgent, all working conditions uncomfortable. 
Sometimes they were so cold they couldn't believe they would ever get warm 
again. Sometimes they were so tired they didn't have the energy to drive home 
to go to bed. And yet, if another call came in and they were needed, they 
would go out again and again to help. Their reward was a free cup of coffee 
and a sandwich. 
The TreePeople office was the scene of barely controlled chaos. When the 
Los Angeles Office of Civil Defense made TreePeople Headquarters the volunteer 
center for the entire city, Pacific Telephone had installed three emergency 
telephone lines into the Coldwater facility. Those lines, plus the office's 
normal four business lines, rang 24 hours a day for 10 days straight. All 
other activities that TreePeople normally are involved in had to be set aside 
for a time. 
The activities of the TreePeople had to be stopped, but the philosophy of 
the TreePeople was in full swing. Andy Lipkis, Director of the TreePeople, 
had always believed that if people got together and worked together they could 
create miracles. He had normally applied that philosophy to environmental 
problems, such as smog and energy sources. But citizens' responses during the 
flood crisis proved the point in a way that no speeches could. 
TreePeople unwittingly got into the "emergency business" in 1978, when 
three staff members went to help a neighbor whose home was being threatened by 
a landslide. As they had organized and equipped volunteers to plant trees in 
the past, they organized and equipped about 50 neighbors to help save that 
house. By chance, that night a representative of Los Angeles City Councilman 
Joel Wach's office was there. A few days later, when a storm was expected to 
hit the Los Angeles area, she called the TreePeople to ask if they would be 
able to organize volunteers if things got really bad. 
The TreePeople had never done anything like that before, but they said . 
they would try, and when the storm hit they mobilized about 800 volunteers to 
save nearly 300 homes over a period of three days. Since then, every time 
there has been a storm or fire in the Los Angeles area, some people have 
called the TreePeople asking for help in their homes, while other people have 
called offering to help. In each instance the TreePeople staff has done its 
best to connect the two groups of people. 
The floods in February 1980 were not a surprise to flood control experts. 
The month before it had rained very hard for several days in,a row. The 
southern California soil was saturated with water and simply couldn't absorb 
any more. In fact the TreePeople had gotten calls for help in January. When 
The heroes of the operation 
were the private c i t i z e n s ,  
volunteers who worked i n  cold 
w e t  conditions t o  help people 
they had never seen before, 
people they probably would 
never see  again. (Photo- 
graphs by Je f f  Share.) 
t h e  new r a i n s  s t a r t e d  i n  February, t h e  excess weight o f  t h e  water on t h e  
s lopes  i n  mountain a r e a s  caused t o p s o i l  to  begin t o  s l i d e .  H o m e s ,  c a r s ,  o r  
swimming pools  i n  t h e  pa th  of t h e  s l i d e  were f i l l e d  wi th  mud and d e b r i s ,  or 
washed away. 
Because of  t h e  magnitude of t h e  storm, government w o r k e r s  w e r e  rendered 
h e l p l e s s  t o  p r o t e c t  p r i v a t e  property.  The p o l i c e  and f i r e  departments worked 
very hard--and well--to p r o t e c t  p u b l i c  p rope r ty ,  b u t  t h e r e  simply were n o t  
enough of them t o  go  around. Thei r  f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  had t o  be to h e l p  save  
l i v e s .  The p r o t e c t i o n  of  p r i v a t e  p rope r ty  had t o  be l e f t  f o r  p r i v a t e  c i t i z e n s  
to do. Th i s  is where t h e  TreePeople came in.  
I t  was Thursday, February 14 ,  when Mike Regan, t h e  c i t y ' s  Di rec tor  of 
2 i v i l  Defense, v i s i t e d  TreePeople Headquarters a t  Coldwater Canyon 
Environmental Education Center .  Knowing about  t h e i r  p a s t  experience wi th  
emergency work, he s a i d  t h a t  he  would l i k e  t h e  TreePeople t o  coord ina te  a l l  
volunteer  a c t i v i t y  i n  Los Angeles dur ing  s torms t h a t  were expected t o  h i t  
soon. He c a l l e d  t h e  phone company t o  g e t  e x t r a  phones p u t  i n ,  then  gave t h e  
s t a f f  t he  phone number o f  a warehouse t o  c a l l  to g e t  some cots and t h e  number 
of the Sa lva t ion  Army, which set up a d i s a s t e r  k i tchen  a t  Coldwater f o r  t h e  
dura t ion  o f  t h e  emergency. 
The TreePeople made a l l  o f  t h e s e  arrangements, then  c a l l e d  t h e  media t o  
send o u t  a r eques t  for volunteers .  Some people showed up t h a t  n igh t ,  February 
14, bu t  it wasn't  u n t i l  Fr iday ,  February 15, t h a t  t h e  storm r e a l l y  g o t  bad. 
By Saturday, February 16, t h e  storm was i n  f u l l  fo rce ,  and t h e  TreePeople 
opera t ion  was i n  f u l l  swing u n t i l  Sunday, February 24. 
TreePeople s t a f f  and vo lun tee r s  answered t h e  phones by saying,  "TreePeople 
Emergency Resources Center." The people on t h e  o t h e r  end o f  t h e  l i n e  were 
almost always f r a n t i c .  Typica l ly ,  they  had c a l l e d  t h e  p o l i c e  o r  f i r e  
departments f i r s t ,  to be t o l d  t h a t  t h e r e  was nothing t h e  c i t y  s e r v i c e s  could 
do f o r  them, and were given t h e  TreePeople number. The c a l l e r s  were shocked, 
f r igh tened ,  and i n  urgent  need o f  help.  For many days TreePeople Headquarters 
w a s  t h e  only p l ace  they  could t u r n  to. 
I t  was t h e  job of  t h e  person answering t h e  TreePeople h o t l i n e  t o  calm t h e  
c a l l e r  down and t o  confirm t h a t  nobody's l i f e  was i n  danger. I f  a person had 
to be rescued, t h e  c a l l  was immediately connected with t h e  f i r e  department,  
which d i d  have t h e  r e sou rces  to  save  human l i f e .  But i f  t he  problem was one 
of  proper ty  damage, t h e  TreePeople handled it. 
The m o s t  d i f f i c u l t  job t h e  TreePeople ope ra to r s  had was t o  determine how 
much h e l p  t h e  homeowner needed. Could 3 people do t h e  job, o r  would 30 be 
needed? would 5 sandbags t a k e  c a r e  of  t h e  problem, o r  would 500 s t i l l  n o t  be 
enough? Often t h i s  never r e a l l y  was c l a r i f i e d .  Simply hear ing  t h e  person on 
t h e  o t h e r  end of  t h e  l i n e  was a problem i n  t h e  d i n  of  t h e  o f f i c e .  But 
everyone d i d  t h e  b e s t  t hey  could. Then they  wrote down t h e  information,  p l u s  
t h e  c a l l e r ' s  name, address ,  and phone number, i n  s p e c i a l l y  p r i n t e d  d i spa t ch  
shee t s .  
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The dispatch certer was in one of the new environmental classrooms at 
Coldwater, in what used to be a garage for fire engines when Coldwater was a 
fire station. The large room had no heat, few lights, and very little 
furniture. Volunteers sat on piles of sandbags, piles of sand, or on a dry 
spot on the floor if they could find one. They waited for a four-wheel-drive 
vehicle to be available to take them to a home that needed saving. 
The four-wheel-drive vehicles were a key to the whole operation. At first 
almost all of the vehicles available belonged to members of a club called the 
Associated Blazers of California. For most of the club members their 
four-wheel-drive vehicles were recreational transportation, but they, as a 
group, had decided to use them for service activities as well as for fun. 
They had sponsored such events as ecology cleanup parties, and they had helped 
the TreePeople with tree plantings in the past. 
When the TreePeople had agreed to organize their first emergency services 
during the flooding in 1978, the Associated Blazers had helped to make it 
possible. Now here they were again. For 10 days and nights they risked their 
personal safety and damage to their vehicles to take volunteers to places 
where cars could not go during the flooding. Many other people came to 
volunteer their four-wheel-drive vehicles during the crisis, but all 
transportation was coordinated by members of the Associated Blazers. 
The other key to the operation was the WB6BJM Repeater Group, a club of 
ham operators. Like the four-wheel-drive vehicle people, the radio people 
owned their equipment primarily for fun, but they had agreed to train 
themselves to help in emergency situations. ~uring the floods they set up a 
command post in the environmental library at Coldwater and sent a ham radio 
operator with as many of the four-wheel-drive vehicle teams as possible. This 
ability to communicate with volunteer teams all over the Los Angeles area was 
vital to the whole operation. 
The combination of the four-wheel-drive vehicles and the communications 
system supplied by the WB6BJM Repeater Group was so effective that the Los 
Angeles Police Department asked these TreePeople volunteers to help them for 
several days. The four-wheel-drive vehicles could go up flooded streets that 
rendered the police cars helpless, and the ham radio equipment was far 
superior to the police radios for transmitting in the mountain passes. 
It is impossible to assess exactly how much difference Treepeople's 
involvement in the disaster work made. However, it is clear that without 
their help things would have been much worse. In addition to the 1,200 homes 
that were directly helped, TreePeople volunteers covered large areas of 
hillsides with plastic, donated by a subsidiary of ARCO, to prevent further 
mudslides. They also pulled countless cars out from under piles of mud and 
helped keep police informed about the conditions of the roads. 
How much is this worth? TreePeople spent about $18,000 in staff time, 
food, telephone bills, and materials. In return they received about $3,000 in 
donations to help pay for their costs. When the City of Los Angeles asked 
them to coordinate a l l  volunteer  efforts,&.n t h e  c i t y ,  they d i d  not  say  they 
would pay f o r  the  c o s t s  of doing this , .  
Despite t h e  f i n a n c i a l  burden, t h e  TreePeople would c e r t a i n l y  respond to an 
emergency again. I t  is p a r t  of t h e i r  philosophy: t o  take c a r e  of  our 
environment includes taking c a r e  o f  t h e  people i n  it. Furthermore, between 
storm-related c r i s e s  t h e  s t a f f  is eager to t a l k  with homeowner groups about 
how t o  p lan t  vegeta t ion  on h i l l s i d e s  t o  l e s sen  the  chance of  mudslides during 
t h e  next storm. 
When t h e  crisis is over it almost immediately becomes hard t o  be l ieve  t h a t  
it happened. A s  soon a s  people a r e  dry,  warm, and res t ed  it becomes hard t o  
remember what it f e l t  l i k e  t o  s t r a i n  physica l  l i m i t s  only a few hours before. 
A s  soon a s  the  streets a r e  d ry  and c lean  it becomes d i f f i c u l t  t o  imagine them 
a s  r i v e r s  of mud. Y e t  t h e  experience of  c i t i z e n s  c rea t ing  miracles w i l l  
en r i ch  those involved forever. And it becomes t i m e  f o r  TreePeople to g e t  back 
to doing what they normally do: p lant ing  trees to he lp  ease  the  smog problems 
i n  t h e  Los Angeles a rea ,  and educating people about t h e  environment so they 
can perform grea te r  mirac les  i n  t h e  fu tu re .  
" CLOSING COMMENTS ON DEBRIS AND SEDIMENT 
by John M. T e t t e m e r  
INTRODUCTION 
The words "debr i s"  and "sediment" have been used over  and over aga in  i n  
t h e  papers  included i n  t hese  proceedings. I t  is i n t e r e s t i n g ,  because t h e  war 
s t o r i e s  w e  t e l l  each o t h e r  a r e  almost e x c l u s i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  d e b r i s  problems, 
sediment problems, o r  t h e  upse t s  caused by them. Maybe t h e  primary conclusion 
is t h a t  d e b r i s  and sediment a r e  major enemies t o  f l o o d  c o n t r o l  systems and 
t h a t  more a t t e n t i o n  should be pa id  t o  understanding them. 
NEED FOR NEW POLICIES AND APPROACHES 
I would l i k e  to sugges t  some new p o l i c i e s  and approaches t o  t h e  major 
cha l l enges  ahead. I th ink  w e  can look back a t  t h e  l as t  10 t o  15 yea r s  and s a y  
t h a t  wi th  t h e  h e l p  of  environmental i n t e r e s t s ,  s h o r t  money supp l i e s ,  u p t i g h t  
communities, and changing p r i o r i t i e s ,  most o f  u s  have l ea rned  t h a t  a wide 
range of f lood  c o n t r o l  op t ions  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  bes ides  conc re t e  channels.  I 
th ink  most of us understand t h a t  n a t u r a l  va lues  should be preserved,  and many 
of  us  are s u c c e s s f u l l y  implementing f l o o d p l a i n  management. While we may have 
been goaded by l o c a l  communities, l o c a l  groups, t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  Department o f  
Water Resources, t h e  Nat iona l  Flood Insurance Program, and common sense,  we 
s t i l l  have come a long way and w e  can be proud o f  our  w o r k .  
One ques t ion ,  however, has  been l e f t  unanswered. I t  is t h e  one t h a t  d e a l s  
wi th  I1non-clear water" engineering.  We have few problems wi th  engineered 
channels  s o  long a s  t h e  water s t a y s  c l e a r .  But w e  have experienced enormous 
damage and f r i g h t e n i n g  f a i l u r e s  throughout southern  C a l i f o r n i a  dur ing  1977-80, 
a l l  of which were r e l a t e d  t o  e ros ion ,  sediment,  and debris. I n  h i s  paper 
8 w P r e s i d e n t i a l l y  Declared Major D i sas t e r  f o r  Seven Southern C a l i f o r n i a  
Counties--The January,  February, and March 1980 Storms," Jacob Angel lists t h e  
t o t a l  c o s t s  t o  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  nonprof i t  f a c i l i t i e s  caused by storm damages 
dur ing  1980. A t  t h e  t o p  of  h i s  list is removal of  sediment and deb r i s .  Th i s  
should be t e l l i n g  us  something. Furthermore, I be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  
sediment management w i l l  i nc rease  because of  a c t i o n s  being taken by l o c a l  
governments (meaning you and me). 
John M. Tettemer is Acting Chief Deputy Engineer wi th  t h e  Los Angeles 
County Flood Con t ro l  D i s t r i c t  i n  Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a .  
A s  sediment moves from t h e  mountains to t h e  ocean through r i v e r s ,  
f l oodp la ins ,  and f lood  c o n t r o l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  it is viewed i n  many ways. Some of  
us want it t o  r e p l e n i s h  t h e  beaches, some do n o t  want it i n  t h e  harbors ,  some 
want it t o  s t a y  i n  t h e  mountains s o  it does n o t  bother  t h e  f loodp la ins ,  and 
everyone wants it someplace e l s e .  The on ly  t h i n g  f o r  s u r e  is t h a t  it has  to 
be d e a l t  with a s  long a s  people l i v e  between t h e  mountains and t h e  ocean. We 
need innovat ive  new management s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  a r e  based on a sound 
understanding of  sediment engineer ing  and t h a t  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  a range of  
economic environments. 
EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMS 
Let  me sha re  a few problems of  Los Angeles County t o  s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  a 
proposal.  
The Santa C l a r a  River d r a i n s  about 800 square mi les  o f  L o s  Angeles County 
t o  our neighbors i n  t h e  west. I t  suppor ts  a wide v a r i e t y  o f  land  and 
a c t i v i t i e s :  dense urbaniza t ion ,  r u r a l  and p a s t o r a l  s e t t i n g s ,  d e s e r t s ,  
manufacturing, and t h e  Magic ~ o u n t a i n  amusement park. I n  t h i s  a l lo tment  of 
use t h e r e  a r e  competing needs and problems. For example, i f  w e  managed 
sediment i n  t h e  Santa  C l a r a  River system t h e  way we have been managing it i n  
t h e  L o s  Angeles bas in ,  we would end up wi th  a sediment s t a r v a t i o n  problem. We 
have seen t h a t  our neighbors  i n  Orange County f a c e  very s e r i o u s  sediment 
s t a r v a t i o n  problems. When we t r a p  t h e  sediment,  l evee  l i n i n g s  w i l l  be 
undercut,  a s  were those  i n  Ventura County and Santa Barbara County. On t h e  
o ther  hand, i f  we a l low t h e  sediment to come i n t o  t h e  system, w e  end up with 
a c c r e t i o n  o f  r iverbeds .  I n  r e a l i t y ,  we do no t  know what t h e  sediment 
t r a n s p o r t  balance is i n  t h e  Santa C l a r a  system. W e  do n o t  know what t h e  
50-year c y c l e s  a r e .  W e  need t o  know and we want t o  know; i f  we do not  
understand the  system we w i l l  have t o  spend m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  t o  s t o p  
e ros ion  by r e t r o f i t t i n g  channels  with s t a b i l i z e r s ,  a s  they  a r e  doing i n  Santa  
Barbara County, o r  by d r i v i n g  t h e  t o e  rock down another  20 f t .  We a r e  n o t  
w i l l i n g  t o  spend t h a t  kind o f  money based on t h e  p re sen t  engineering s t a t e  o f  
t h e  a r t .  We would p r e f e r  t o  avoid expensive adjustment by pursuing s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  a r e  based on understanding t h e  mechanics of t h e  r i v e r .  
There a r e  some o t h e r  problems. Funny th ings  a r e  occurr ing  i n  small  d e b r i s  
basins .  I cannot t e l l  you e x a c t l y  what. A l l  I know is t h a t  dur ing  major 
storms, d e b r i s  sometimes goes over t h e  sp i l lway  when t h e  bas in  is n o t  r e a l l y  
f u l l .  We do no t  understand t h e  dynamics, bu t  it seems t h a t  t hese  smal l  bas ins  
a c t  more l i k e  f l i p  buckets  than  lakes .  The model of  t h e  p l a c i d  l a k e  quie t ly .  
f i l l i n g  with mud does no t  seem t o  f i t .  I do not  have t h e  answer, nor do I 
th ink  any o f  u s  have it. We need t o  know, however, because t h i s  problem 
a f f e c t s  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  s a f e t y  below these  f a c i l i t i e s .  
Another problem is l i t e r a l l y  i n  our  own backyard: t h e  smal l  backyard 
canyon we s o  o f t e n  overlook. I t  is very easy t o  recognize sediment and d e b r i s  
problems i n  a b ig  canyon. However, w e  a r e  a l l  g e t t i n g  b l i t z e d  a f t e r  f i r e s  by 
small canyons. Here is where w e  need t o  review proposed developments lot  by 
lot  t o  eva lua t e  t h e  d e b r i s  hazard from a f i r e  and f lood  sequence. W e  can then 
des ign  l o t s ,  s t r e e t  p a t t e r n s ,  and bui ld ing  s i t e s  with f u l l  recogni t ion  and 
accommodation of t h e  hazard. 
'An~ the r  sedimeqt-'related problem is t h e  ab ra s ion  and d e s t r u c t i o n  of 
conc re t e  channel  bottoms by sediment-laden flow. W e  and t h e  U.S. Army Corps 
o f  Engineers  expected our  channels  t o  l a s t  maybe 100 years .  We have seen  
c a s e s  where t h e  r e i n f o r c i n g  s t e e l  was exposed i n  one storm. Almost no 
research  has  been* done on t h i s  s u b j e c t .  We a r e  i n s t a l l i n g  scour gages i n  t h e  
channels  t o  monitor wear and ga ther  da t a .  
I n  summary, I am t r y i n g  t o  emphasize t h a t  we r e a l l y  do  no t  have a l l  t he  
answers t h a t  we th ink  w e  have concerning sediment,  whether it is i n  a r i v e r ,  a 
concre te  channel ,  o r  a smal l  d e b r i s  bas in  o r  is gene ra t ing  t h e  enormous sand 
waves w e  have heard about. By t h e  way, I saw some sand waves t h a t  were 8 f t  
high s tanding  i n  t h e  middle of  nowhere i n  L i t t l e  Tujunga Creek. I do  n o t  
understand how they  g o t  t h e r e ,  nor do I understand how they  could be p red ic t ed  
i n  a manner t h a t  would inf luence  our  design.  I t  is another  ques t ion  we need 
t o  answer. 
A REGIONAL CHALLENGE 
These problems throughout southern  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Nevada, Arizona, and New 
Mexico a r e  i n  a r e a s  of  "hard t o  develop" land. I t  may be hard t o  develop 
because it is p a r t  o f  an a l l u v i a l  cone t h a t  we do n o t  f u l l y  understand or have 
no t  completely planned out .  I t  may be a c o a s t a l  p l a i n  a t  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  
between t h e  ocean and a sediment-carrying stream. It may be a s t e e p  canyon 
high above t h e  l i g h t s  i n  t h e  v a l l e y  below. Even though w e  a r e  d i l i g e n t  a s  
p lanners  and r e g u l a t o r s  with clear water ,  w e  may n o t  be d i l i g e n t  wi th  sediment 
and deb r i s .  We do no t  know enough. W e  a r e  g e t t i n g  involved i n  enormously 
increased  governmental expense and c o s t l y  r e t r o f i t t i n g .  Both of  those  can be 
avoided through good planning. The problems have genera ted  concern among our  
p o l i t i c a l  bosses  and a t  t h e  s t a t e  and f e d e r a l  l e v e l s .  W e  a l s o  f i n d  
communities s t a r t i n g  t o  wonder why t h e i r  high-priced f a c i l i t i e s  f a i l  during 
s torms when they  a r e  needed. I do no t  blame them, do you? 
PERSPECTIVES 
During t h e  l a s t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  I have had an oppor tun i ty  t o  work very  
c l o s e l y  with t h e  e n t i r e  h i e ra rchy  of f l ood  watchers. From t h e  p o l i c y  maker's 
s t andpo in t  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  i n t e r e s t i n g  pe r spec t ives .  H e  o r  she  must 
cons ider  t he  f e e l i n g  of t h e  homeowner who says ,  "Why was t h i s  house b u i l t  
here? Why was it allowed t o  happen? Why d i d n ' t  t h a t  backyard drainage 
f a c i l i t y  work? Why were we flooded?" These a r e  good ques t ions .  Can w e  
answer them? I cannot.  The houses should no t  have been the re .  I n  most ca ses  
they  a r e  s a f e  from c l e a r  water flows bu t  they  a r e  no t  s a f e  from sediment o r  
d e b r i s .  
The home bu i lde r  has  another  perspec t ive .  He s t r i v e s  f o r  minimum cost and 
o p e r a t e s  on both t h e  engineering and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l s .  I f  w e  keep h i s  
c o s t s  down, every th ing  is cool .  H i s  o b j e c t i v e  is t o  s e l l  t h e  product  and move 
along. 
The t h i r d  pe r spec t ive  is  t h a t  of  l o c a l  government, which i n h e r i t s  t h e  
problems. We a r e  paying d e a r l y  throughout t h e  Southwest f o r  those  problems. 
Our a t t i t u d e  i n  l o c a l  government is mixed. Some o f  u s  have t h e  courage t o  
d e a l  wi th  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ;  o t h e r s  do  not.  There is apathy. There a r e  mixed 
s igna l s .  Some of  us  a r e  say ing  t h a t  w e  have t h e  r i g h t  i dea  bu t  t h a t  we cannot  
s e l l  it to our p o l i t i c a l  bosses ,  o r  cannot  s e l l  it t o  planning,  o r  cannot  sel l  
it t o  t h e  community. These a r e  d i f f i c u l t  problems t h a t  need t o  be tackled .  
To convince o t h e r s  about  sediment and d e b r i s  hazards,  w e  need t o  know more. 
A s  an indus t ry  of eng inee r s  and s c i e n t i s t s ,  w e  need t o  gang up and have 
overwhelming information on sediment. Then w e  can g e t  a b e t t e r  toehold i n t o  
t h e  p o l i t i c s .  
The f i n a l  pe r spec t ive  is t h a t  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  government, an  i n t e r e s t i n g  
animal. I t  loves  t o  b a i l  people o u t ,  and we have become e x p e r t s  i n  r i ng ing  
t h e  chimes t h a t  b r ing  i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  d i s a s t e r  funds. A l l  t h e  while  w e  go 
happi ly  along r ep lac ing  l a s t  y e a r ' s  problems without  mi t iga t ion .  We owe a 
deb t  o f  g r a t i t u d e  t o  t h e  Fede ra l  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The 
National  Flood Insurance  Program is a g i a n t  s t e p  i n  t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n .  We 
should s t o p  bu i ld ing  t h i n g s  where they  do no t  belong and l eave  some room f o r  
nature.  FEMA had t h e  courage through t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  mechanizations t o  t r y  t o  
p u l l  a na t ion  toge the r  on obvious storm damage problems. They have done a good 
thing. I have been involved i n  implementing the  f lood  insurance program i n  
many cases .  I f  you a r e  c a r e f u l  and smart  and i f  you s t a y  ahead o f  your 
p o l i t i c a l  bosses ,  you can  show t h e  b e n e f i t s  to them and t o  t h e  community of  
handling f e d e r a l  f l ood  insurance i n  t h e  r i g h t  way. We have managed, l u c k i l y  
maybe, t o  convince some die-hard antigovernmental people t h a t  t h e  program is 
r i g h t  and they  should suppor t  it. Now some of  them w i l l  go o u t  and t ake  on 
l a r g e  groups i n  community meetings, suppor t ing  t h e  National  Flood Insurance 
Program. I am no t  say ing  it can  be done everywhere, bu t  it is t h e  b e s t  t h ing  
t h a t  h a s  happened t o  s t a t e  and l o c a l  government i n  t he  i n t e r e s t  of s a f e  
development. What they  have done is t o  t e l l  us to apply some common sense  and 
knock o f f  t h e  bus iness  of c r e a t i n g  problems f o r  t h e  p l easu re  of so lv ing  them. 
UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATION--A COMMITMENT FOR THE 1980s 
I would sugges t  t h a t  we look forward t o  t h e  1980s and t o  a new cha l lenge  
t h a t  I would l eave  with a l l  o f  us. The 1980s must be a per iod  o f  recommitment 
to b a s i c  engineer ing  and t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h a t  engineering t o  our  
p r o j e c t s  and r e g u l a t o r y  func t ions .  I f  sediment and d e b r i s  problems r ep resen t  
t h e  major cause of  f a i l u r e  o r  upse t  i n  our systems, we should commit ou r se lves  
t o  g r e a t e r  understanding and wiser a p p l i c a t i o n  of  what w e  know. Floodplain 
management and o t h e r  s o f t  or n o n s t r u c t u r a l  s o l u t i o n s  w i l l  be r e l i e d  upon by 
t h e  pub l i c  j u s t  a s  much a s  t h e  conc re t e  channels.  They must be every b i t  a s  
r e l i a b l e .  We have seen  t h a t  they  a r e  not  y e t  f u l l y  r e l i a b l e .  
ACTION PLAN 
Many of  us f e e l  t h a t  we understand t h e  engineering p r i n c i p l e s  involved bu t  
t h a t  community and budgetary problems a r e  consuming a l l  o f  our energy. Maybe 
so. The s torms of  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  yea r s  t e l l  me t h a t  we can accept  n e i t h e r  our  
p r e s e n t  l e v e l  of understanding or t h e  obs t ac l e s .  I would recommend t h a t  w e  
recommit ou r se lves  through a four -s tep  program. 
1. Go back to our  o rgan iza t ions  and examine them. What is t h e i r  
understanding o f  t h e  engineering? What do they r e a l l y  know? What needs t o  be 
learned? Who are those most capable of pursuing the necessary knowledge? 
What field data exist? 
2. Collectively as a group, or in professional associations, pool data, 
knowledge, and resources to develop standards for some of the things we are 
talking about. Get together at meetings and exchange ideas and come up with a 
basis on which the Southwest can build and regulate itself. 
3 .  Join with the Los Angeles County Flood Control District in urging the 
federal flood insurance people to proceed with the mapping program for 
so-called mudslide hazards. They have contracted with the National Research 
Council to review and assess methodology for mudslide mapping. I would 
encourage all of you to prod all of them, at both the political and 
engineering levels, to get on with it. I would not say that they are 
malingering, but after all these years of flood mapping we still do not have 
maps that show the true sediment hazard. You need them, I need them, we all 
need them. We should let the public know what is going on in these 
communities. I think it will change your own staff's view of what is safe and 
what is not safe. We need the maps and we need to push for an appropriation 
to get them started. 
4. As we are working on the first three steps, I suggest that we work 
together to develop a new understanding of "sediment engineering practice in 
local government.' This can be used when the opportunities arise to influence 
planners, zoners, and building people. It will help them understand the 
problem and the solutions. In my view the potential for sediment damage is 
getting worse. Not enough energy is being put into it. It is the sediment 
and debris aspects of drainage that create the upsets, and we, who are 
presumably the leaders in this field, bear a grave responsibility to solve the 
problem before it gets completely out of hand. 
